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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

OF THE

US Com. on the Judiciary
**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE**

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 7

JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1952

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 9:45 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran (chairman), Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also Present: Senators Hayden, Knowland, and Welker; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, at the conclusion of the hearing yesterday we were up to the period of about December 1942.

MR. VINCENT. You mean in reading over my—yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. To the extent that we were taking things chronologically we had about reached that point.

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. You may remember that during the afternoon session yesterday afternoon there was some questioning about your approval of a talk which was made by Mr. Service before the IPR or before a group of IPR people.

MR. VINCENT. Yes; I remember that.

MR. SOURWINE. Am I correct that it was your testimony that you remembered nothing about having authorized such a talk?

MR. VINCENT. Yes; I had no recollection of that, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this is the State Department employee loyalty investigation hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, part 2, appendix. On page 2234 appears the text of a document which was apparently entitled "Personal Statement of John S. Service—Part 2." I read this paragraph, Mr. Vincent, and ask if it refreshes your memory in that regard.

Shortly after my arrival—

and he is referring then to his return to the Department in April of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with the research staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were 10 or 12 people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Laurence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk, and most of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion.

Did you know anything about that at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you Chief of the Division at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I was Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; yes, sir. What was the date of that?

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 1945, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean the month.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been in April.

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten the exact date, but I left for San Francisco about the middle of April.

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there an earlier occasion on which you personally had approved Mr. Service's appearance before an IPR group?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said, sir, that I just don't recall any instance of that kind.

(Senator McCarran took the chair.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the same hearings, Mr. Chairman, from the transcript of proceedings before the State Department Loyalty Board, page 2051 of the hearings. This is Mr. Service talking:

The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Question: In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?

"Answer. That is right.

"Question. And authorized by the Department?

"Answer. That is correct, and it was quite a customary thing. We had a great many officers who did exactly the same when they came back from the field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he also returned from China in June, 1945, and I am sure that there are many other instances of Foreign Service officers being authorized by the Department to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions."

What would be your comments on that Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Mr. Service apparently refreshed his memory. I don't recall these people going regularly over to the IPR. What Mr. Service says there is no doubt correct, that the people did talk to the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any doubt now, having heard this, that you did receive a request from the IPR with regard to Mr. Service and passed it on to him and told him it was all right to go?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no doubt that Service was testifying correctly.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer, please?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I originally said I had no recollection of this incident, but the question there is whether or not now, having heard this, I still have no recollection of that specific incident, but I am not doubting the fact that it occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that the question primarily was whether you had engaged in the discussion, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have no doubt that you did?

Mr. VINCENT. According to that testimony now, I have no doubt that that incident occurred because Service remembers it better than I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to get your testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. On December 15, 1942, sir, you were——

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me. Would you repeat that?

Mr. SOURWINE. On December 15, 1942, you were named counselor to the Department of State?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no such title.

Mr. SOURWINE. Counselor of Embassy, perhaps?

Mr. VINCENT. Counselor of Embassy in Chungking in 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what it was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; if that was the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you back in the United States in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you not know Jack Stachel?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that?

Mr. VINCENT. From reading the hearings of this committee. I don't know his precise work even now from memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. All you know about him is what you have read in the hearings of this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you ever ate lunch in the Tally-Ho Restaurant in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember eating there, but I could have eaten there. I don't remember any instance of eating there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having lunch there one day in April of 1943 with Mr. John Stewart Service and one or two other persons?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that instance. I have heard it referred to, but I still don't recall it. I may say there that I ate lunch every day with various and sundry people and I don't recall that luncheon that has been referred to here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did have lunch on at least one occasion in there with Mr. Service, did you say?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean I might have had lunch. I do not recall eating in the Tally-Ho with Mr. Service. I might have eaten elsewhere with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of any time when you did?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that particular one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether on the occasion referred to in April of 1943 or on any other occasion about that time you discussed with Mr. Service and one or two others ways and means of getting rid of Ambassador Hurley as Ambassador to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of discussing getting rid of Ambassador Hurley at that time. As a matter of fact, I think, sir, that you will have to correct the date there because you said 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Hurley was not made Ambassador until the fall of 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be a good reason for stating that you did not discuss it on this date, wouldn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now so state?

Mr. VINCENT. I now so state.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember on the occasion of such a luncheon or a luncheon about that time discussing Mr. Hurley in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you still using that date of April 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Still referring to April 1943.

Mr. VINCENT. April 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I have no recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you did or did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly did not. I didn't even know Ambassador Hurley and he wasn't Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we are talking simply about Mr. Hurley, whether he was discussed. Did you on the occasion of such a luncheon state that the up-and-coming political group in China was the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making any such statement and don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you ever could have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in June of 1943 or about that time while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China—were you counselor of the American Embassy in China in June of 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had already left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you leave Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I left Chungking the latter part of May 1943, or the middle of May. I don't recall the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in the spring of 1943, while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China, cable to the Department of State with respect to an interview which you had had with Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that cable quote Chou as having said:

Japan and Russia will not clash for the time being, but in the future will inevitably fight. Therefore, we welcome American forces to help our guerrillas in north China to prepare for joint opposition against Japan in the future. Now they, the guerrillas, have been dispatched to occupied territory for intense activity. It is hoped that the American leaders will adopt positive action and send an observer to North China.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify that that is the exact language of the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. A telegram was sent, and I would have to refresh my memory on the telegram, sir, to be able to say whether that was what was actually said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. That was certainly what Chou would have said, I think, that he would have wanted somebody to be dispatched to North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you remembered that you had sent such a telegram.

Mr. VINCENT. I remember such a telegram. I don't remember the substance of the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember even the substance of the telegram? Do you remember whether in that cable you stated "The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved."

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of saying that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you did say that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I did say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have been a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have to read that again. You mean the fellow who sent that should be pro-Nationalist in order——

Senator FERGUSON. No; to get the Nationalists to do it, to consent to it. Read it.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved.

Mr. VINCENT. Now your question is could that——

Senator FERGUSON. No. Was that a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a fact that certainly the Nationalist Government was very much anti-Communist and would have disliked any pro-Communist who was sent up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and if you had wanted to do it and have it approved you would have had to make it appear that he was pro-Nationalist.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think you would have had to do that kind of subterfuge. What you would have had done is send a man up there who was just a factual reporter on the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then that was not a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. This statement here would be a fact, if it existed, that you would not send a pro-Communist to North China.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever send anyone up?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't, but they were sent there in 1944, after I left China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that person pro-Nationalist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten who was sent up there. There was an Army group sent up there in 1944, and then various and sundry other people from the State Department were sent up there in 1944, I mean people with Stilwell's headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you now testify that you did not make such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall the substance of my telegram. I recall that a telegram was sent on the basis of Chou En-lai coming in and calling on me before I left Chungking in 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I was trying to find out if that was the fact and that could have been in the telegram. You see, this committee is handicapped that they can't get records, and they have to reply upon testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would have to refresh my memory by seeing the telegram before I could testify that that was in that telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. That telegram is one of the papers which the State Department has declined to give us and which the President has declined to permit the committee to have, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether the committee asked for it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it falls in that category of papers?

Mr. VINCENT. It would, I think, fall in that category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that you would be able to see it and refresh your memory from it and come back and testify to the committee with regard to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I could; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you can see it in the State Department, can you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I can ask to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you try to do that, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything else about that conference with Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't have any other recollection except he called before I left to talk with me and to see Acheson, to meet Acheson for the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you become Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. It was about that time; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were detailed to the office of the Foreign Economic Administration as special assistant to the Administrator October 25, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, according to this thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stayed there until February 25, 1944; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. About that time; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in the FEA office on detail, who was the Administrator?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you work in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he maintained an office up on Fourteenth Street, and I worked down in the temporary T or U Building on Constitution Avenue.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Currie with FEA at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie was Deputy Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did he maintain offices?

Mr. VINCENT. He maintained his office in temporary U or T, down on Constitution Avenue.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your work then closely associated with his?

Mr. VINCENT. What work I did; yes. It was not closely associated with his because I just did odd jobs down there for the time. I never took any active part in running FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your office close to Mr. Currie's office?

Mr. VINCENT. Across and down the hall.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same floor?

Mr. VINCENT. The same floor, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time, sir, was Mr. John Stewart Service in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this. He was assigned to China. Whether he had come home on leave I don't know. I think he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether Ludden was still in China or not. I would assume he was. If you will let me refer to this I will find out, but I would say he was still in Kunming or Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, John Paton Davies, Jr., was also in Chungking at that time; wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was either in Chungking or New Delhi. He spent a great deal of time in New Delhi, India.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. John K. Emmerson was second secretary at Chungking in 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this, but he arrived after I left Chungking and must have been there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific Operations, OWI?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall when Mr. Lattimore took on the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in Washington at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. If he was Deputy Director of OWI, he would have been in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were with the FEA, sir, can you tell the committee just what functions or duties you did perform? What did you do over there?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be very difficult to say because I never had any definite functions. I can tell you what one of the principal things was, because I went up for Mr. Crowley to the UNRRA conference, simply as an observer at the UNRRA conference. That took, I should say, the better part of a month of this time. Otherwise, it was a matter of the area directors and what not in FEA coming in from time to time and asking me specific questions as to factual conditions. I was used more or less as a person to be consulted with on conditions in China for the brief period I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you were there as an expert, or were you there as an adviser and consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was there to be consulted by the FEA people as they might wish to on conditions in China, from which I had just returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your immediate superior while you were with FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. My immediate superior would have been Currie in the position I held.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were your principal associates over at FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to think who was over there. You see, I was there such a short time. There was a man named Riley, I recall his name, who worked with Crowley. I saw him from time to time at conference meetings. There was Oscar Cox, who was I think legal counsel for the FEA; I just don't recall the others who were over there to any great extent. I was trying to think of the area director, but I can't place him now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already explained to the committee, have you not, how your detail to FEA was brought about by Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I said Mr. Currie asked me to come over and the State Department detailed me.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know it was initiated by Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already testified in executive session about your acquaintanceship with Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. You did know him, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. The only distinct recollection I have of meeting him, as I think I said, was at the IPR conference in 1945. He was there, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him well at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him socially?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have business dealings with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never recall having any business dealings with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in your office in connection with your official duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall a call from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of the one meeting you have mentioned did you ever attend any meetings with him?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been present at this meeting the nature of which I do not recall very clearly, of the American delegation to the conference which met some time in the late autumn of 1944 before the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it met here in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the whole delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the delegation; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any meetings of the IPR or functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, sir, that I did attend a meeting or that I don't have any recollection, but I probably did attend a meeting in 1938 if Mr. Rosinger was there—I have no recollection of his being there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then aside from the two meetings you have mentioned, one in 1945, the conference, and one in 1938, and the further

possibility that he might have been at a meeting of the delegates to the 1945 conference, is it your testimony that otherwise you never attended a meeting with Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of attending meetings with Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read his book, War Time Politics in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection distinctly of reading that book. I have seen the testimony that it was sent to me, and I apparently retained the manuscript and was asked by Mr. Bisson to send it back. That is in the testimony before this committee. I don't have any recollection of whether I read the book in manuscript or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have the book in manuscript form?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that I did. I would not have recalled it had I not noticed that—I mean I would not have known it or remembered it had I not noticed this letter from Bisson to me asking me to send it back. Therefore, I must have had it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no independent recollection of it now?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how that manuscript came to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Whether it was mailed to me, handed to me, I just don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it sent to you for criticism by the Institute of Pacific Relations or some official of that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that the fact that he sent it to me in manuscript was for me to look it over and see if it had factual mistakes in it or something else. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you well acquainted with New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been there a number of times?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have been there a number of times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Seville Hotel is located in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Twenty-ninth and Madison would be in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I mean I would know——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you have ever been to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I don't ever recall having been at the Seville Hotel. It makes no impression on my memory at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you have ever stayed overnight there?

Mr. VINCENT. At the Seville?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say almost positively I never have stayed overnight at the Seville.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Agnes Smedley there?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Louis Gibarti there?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't know who Louis Gibarti is, but I didn't meet him there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that name before?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I haven't heard the name of Louis Gibarti.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone every tell you to go to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever arrange to meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never arranged to meet anyone there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs January 15, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I was appointed to it. I see there is a conflict there. This would say that I left FEA in February. I became Chief of the Division about that time. It says I was with FEA until February, but it says I was appointed Chief of the China Division in February.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that impossible?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could have had the title and rank and still be on detail, could you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Raymond Dennett, the secretary of the American Council of the IPR, the question of American policy in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection now of discussing it with him, but I would say it would be logical that Dennett as secretary would come down and discuss matters in China with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why would you discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say, sir, that I discussed American policy. I might have discussed matters concerning China, factually or otherwise, with Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you did discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any distinct recollection of discussing policy with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have discussed policy with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have discussed policy which was policy that should not be discussed with someone on the outside, but policy which was adopted I would have and it would have been carried out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the so-called least common denominator of American policy in the Far East, that is, what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing the least—or in those terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be the kind of policy that had been made and could properly be discussed with an outsider?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, you would have to be more precise, I think, as to what would be called a least common denominator of American foreign policy with regard to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have an opinion about that phrase; wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Just at this moment the meaning of the least common denominator doesn't even arouse in me any recollection of such an idea as a least common denominator.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question of what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand in its Far East policy—would that be a matter that could properly be discussed outside the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be discussed speculatively with Mr. Dennett. To demand of whom? I am just trying to clarify that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to keep the questions reasonably short. Demand in general, or of particular nations, or in regard to particular situations. Does that clarification change your answer in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett specifically the alternative policies which branched out from the so-called common denominator, which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it, but as I say Mr. Dennett was a man whom I knew, not too well, but a man whom I knew and thought was a very intelligent man, and I may easily have discussed them with him in the matter of trying to get his views and benefit by them if he had any views on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would not be a matter of fixed policy or matters of policy that had been established; would it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because I think from what you are saying here, this was looking into the future.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were matters which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Foreign policy with regard to the future in China was being considered seriously by the State Department, I should say, at all times.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it would have been entirely proper for you to have discussed with Mr. Dennett alternative policies which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were not matters of secrecy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever tell Mr. Dennett or imply to him that American policy in the Far East might grow out of Navy demands rather than being founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands would be integrated and by which Navy demands would be limited?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say whether I discussed that thing with him or not. That seems to be a very involved matter. I imagine that you are referring to a memorandum or something that Mr. Dennett himself may have prepared as a result of a conversation with me. People came in and out quite frequently. I suppose they went out and said they had had a conversation with me; but I have no recollection of discussing a particular problem of that kind with Mr. Dennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of such a problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even recall having in mind such a problem of the Navy and discussing the matter of policy with relation to the Navy in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard that there was a problem of Navy there?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a problem of the Navy in the postwar period, of what the position of the Navy was, but it was not one with which I was familiar.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you, as the head of this Division, pass on these questions if you weren't familiar with all the ramifications?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. How could you help to make policy if you didn't know?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a general idea of what was the policy and what we wanted out of the war, but as far as——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you were making policy on just general ideas?

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't making policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you helping to make policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I was helping to make policy.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you do it on general ideas? Didn't you lead this committee to believe that you didn't have all the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the whole accumulated experience in the Far East on which I was depending, but I am not setting myself up here as an expert on naval relations in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the Navy relations had something to do with the question you would have to consider that in order to advise on the policy?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give this committee any idea as to what the facts were about this Navy entering into this decision?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot from the reading of this question that we have here, and can't recall from recollection discussing with Mr. Dennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Or with anyone? I am not talking about Dennett now. I am talking about the facts.

Mr. VINCENT. He would have to read that question again.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I ask a different question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, early in 1944 were the views and needs and pressures of the Navy an important factor with regard to United States policy in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly would have been; yes, sir. You are speaking now of the postwar period? You are speaking of the needs of the Navy in China at that particular time or with relation to the Far East?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will leave that to your definition. I believe my question is clear.

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would have been of entirely different character while we were prosecuting the war, that is, for the next year, if this was in 1944; but in the postwar period certainly the position of the Navy in the Far East had to be given consideration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that help at all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, you are again asking me to remember what I said to an individual that long ago, and I just do not recall the conversation with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have so stated or intimated?

Mr. VINCENT. That China could not be considered a stabilizing power?

Mr. SOURWINE. That you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think that I said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold that view at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I held the view at that time, now that I recall it, which may have been misinterpreted here, which was that I did not think too much confidence could be placed or too much weight could be placed on China becoming the stabilizing influence in the Far East, that we would have to look to other means of having stabilization there because China was coming out of the war rather weakened.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you held the view substantially which you say you think you did not give to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. That it would be a mistake to count too much on China being a stabilizing influence in the Far East at the end of the war?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether I expressed it to Mr. Dennett or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want us to understand that you think you did not express it to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I could easily have expressed it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer, please?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I could have expressed that opinion to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the difference between that opinion and the statement that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. Because the statement taken like that out of context would mean that I had no confidence in China. This was, in the broad picture of China, that it would be a mistake in our policy to place too much confidence in China being the stabilizing influence, and I am accenting "the" because I just remember having held the view that China was coming out weakened from the war and that we could not count too much on China. Let's go back to history a little bit. There was entirely, it seemed to me, too much weight being placed on China for China's own good, that China was being ushered in as one of the great powers and that China was going to come out of the war in a weakened condition and we would have to do a great deal ourselves toward building up China.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question at that point. That didn't happen to be the view of Mr. Roosevelt, did it? He felt that China was to be one of the great powers and seemed to emphasize China's importance and her ability to carry on.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to build China up as a great power.

Senator WATKINS. As I recall something has been said recently by Mr. Churchill or someone to the effect that they felt Mr. Roosevelt had placed too much faith in the ability of China.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't read Mr. Churchill's statement, but probably to come out of the war as the stabilizing influence in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. If China wasn't to be, what was to be the stabilizing influence in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. We would have to be the stabilizing influence in the Far East in combination with China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you think we carried that policy out?

Mr. VINCENT. Of trying to be the stabilizing force?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think we did.

Senator FERGUSON. With what we did with Nationalist China?

Mr. VINCENT. We tried to support the Nationalist Government of China.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the Marshall mission?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that was support of the Nationalist Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. The whole intent of that mission certainly was to support the Nationalist Government of China by bringing about a cessation of civil war and bringing into the Government all of the dissident elements, including the Communists, but under the Nationalist Government of China and under Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you do about communism, do you think you could stabilize any government by taking the Commies into it?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified before it was a matter of alternatives, and I thought and the President thought and the Secretary of State thought that the best alternative was to try to bring about a cessation of civil war through the matter of some kind of political settlement under a constitutional government arranged by the Chinese which would have representation in it of the various non-Kuomintang policies.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is your contention now, you, knowing what communism is, that you can stabilize a government by putting the Commies in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it wasn't stabilizing a government. It was stabilizing a situation, sir. Let me answer, please, sir. It was stabilizing a situation where your alternatives were civil war or trying to bring about some kind of political agreement. The Chinese themselves, the National Government, was trying to do just that.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you cite a case in history where Communists have been taken into a government and that that has stabilized conditions and that they didn't take it over or they had to kick them out; one of the two?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified here, sir, that it was in the back part—

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. My question is, you state a situation in past history where they were.

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that in the French Government—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about what you have already testified.

Mr. VINCENT. I say now, then, that an analogous situation is that the Communists came into the Government of France at the end of

the war, that the Communists came into Government of Italy, and were eventually kicked out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You had in mind, then, that either you would have to kick them out or you can't stabilize the situation or they would take it over.

Mr. VINCENT. That would have depended entirely on how the Communists conducted themselves in the government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of a case where they did conduct themselves such that you could stabilize the situation and not kick them out or they not take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you think that it could be done in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it was an alternative to civil war in China and—

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't my question. Why did you think it could be done in China, that you could stabilize it, and not kick them out or they not take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. Because you could stabilize the situation by the avoidance of civil war, by taking them in on a minority basis with the Kuomintang and the major parties maintaining control of the government. That would have been stabilization of a situation insofar as the avoidance of civil war was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Chinese Communists would ever have given up their position in the civil war on any philosophy such as you now say: that you would take them in and they would be in such a weakened condition that you could kick them out?

Mr. VINCENT. I not only thought that, sir—

Senator FERGUSON. And lose their position in their civil war.

Mr. VINCENT. I not only thought that, sir, but General Marshall thought it. It has turned out not to have been the case.

Senator FERGUSON. It turned out not to be true.

Mr. VINCENT. It turned out the Chinese Communists were not prepared to come into the government on a minority basis.

Senator FERGUSON. And on a basis that you could take over their position in the civil war and then kick them out.

Mr. VINCENT. But I will say this: that the Chinese Communists themselves had joined in these conferences with just that idea in mind, because, as I have repeated before, the conferences were going on among the various parties, including the Communists, before General Marshall ever reached China.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, don't you know that when the Chinese were negotiating, as you now say they were, they were negotiating to better their position in the civil war and to kick the Nationalists out, and not for the purpose that you and General Marshall were trying to have it done?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact information as to what were the ideas at that time of the Communists. I would say, from what I know now, that the Communists never intended to come in and let themselves be subordinated, because their very actions show they would not be subordinated to the Kuomintang.

The CHAIRMAN. Past history had proven at that time that that would be the very result that would follow.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator JENNER. Taking that position and that attitude and that policy toward China, when General Marshall returned and made his report and that program had failed, then what was the next policy or position of the Far Eastern Division and our Government toward China or Marshall's report back that his mission had failed?

Mr. VINCENT. The next position of the Government toward China was to help the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator JENNER. All right, then, I want to ask you if it is not a fact that, although Congress had appropriated the money for military aid to Chiang Kai-shek, for the next 15 months after Marshall made his report, although the money was appropriated, this Government didn't do a single thing for Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, you are speaking of a period when I was not in America. I have no first-hand knowledge of that appropriation. I left in 1947. But I do know that arms were turned over to China, airplanes.

Senator JENNER. Following the Marshall mission?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1947, a considerable amount of arms.

Senator JENNER. When did Marshall return from China?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall returned from China in January 1947.

Senator JENNER. And for the next 15 months we went ahead arming Chiang Kai-shek and giving him aid and support? You state that as a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. I can state as a fact that specific instances occur to me during the time I was still here, during half of 1947.

Senator JENNER. All right. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you testified—didn't you, Mr. Vincent, in the executive sessions—that the War Department, for General Marshall, made up the directive under which he went to China?

Mr. VINCENT. That directive was prepared over in the War Department.

Senator JENNER. In the War Department? General Marshall brought it to you made up?

Mr. VINCENT. I have described it. Do you want me to describe the various steps in that again?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you already in the open hearing described it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; we haven't discussed it in the open hearings.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have quite a series of questions on that a little later, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. I would like to return, Mr. Chairman, to one question. I would like to know what was done following Marshall's return from China and reporting that his mission had been a failure; that Chiang Kai-shek refused to take the Communists into his government. What did we then do to aid Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. I am working on memory here. One, there was a large amount of ammunition at Tsingtao in China.

Senator JENNER. What kind of ammunition?

Mr. VINCENT. Rifle ammunition, which was there and was surveyed and turned over to the Nationalist Government troops in the Province of Shantung.

Senator JENNER. Did they have rifles to shoot that ammunition with?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I think I testified yesterday, Senator, that people with much better knowledge of the situation in China have testified or stated that Chiang Kai-shek did not lack the military equipment in the year 1947 to carry on his campaign; that, as a matter of fact, during that year he was more successful than he had been at any time before or after in consolidating his position.

Senator JENNER. Who in the State Department could give us better information about what we did to aid China?

Mr. VINCENT. In the period 19—

Senator JENNER. Following the Marshall report back that it was a failure and that we would wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and that it was impossible.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the Secretary of State could do that.

Senator JENNER. The Secretary of State. You know we had the same situation paralleled in Korea. We said we gave them aid, and I believe it came out in the evidence in some of the hearings that we did give them aid. We sent them some baling wire. I just wonder if that was the same policy followed in China. It is the fact that following that 15 months' lull there, during that period, the Chinese Communists organized in Manchuria and marched down and took over the Government. Isn't that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator JENNER. That is the result?

Mr. VINCENT. During 1948.

Senator JENNER. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask a question with respect to this ammunition. Were you referring to what I think one of the witnesses testified to, an incident in which the ammunition was placed out in a dump somewhere and indirectly or by some other means Chiang and his group were told it was there and they went and helped themselves to it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is one of the instances which I was speaking of.

Senator WATKINS. We had a witness as I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That was Admiral Cooke's testimony, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Admiral Cooke said that is what happened. I think he also testified or someone testified on that point before this committee that they were short of ammunition in this period of time; that they didn't have more than about 2 rounds to fight with.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that testimony, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Have you gone over the testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Some of it. I haven't gone over all of it.

Senator WATKINS. I may be mistaken on that, but that is my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States, with the tacit approval of Great Britain, and with the active support of Australia and New Zealand, would be the stabilizing power upon the Eastern Asian Continent?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to testify again that I cannot recall a conversation with Mr. Dennett on that specific subject, but I would

say that that would seem to me to have been a logical position to take; that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia could stabilize conditions in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed to be prepared for what its prospective course of action in or with respect to Eastern Asia would cost?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall stating that to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed work on the development of a formula for the problems of the independent areas in Southeast Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall stating that to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might you have stated that to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have stated that to him. We were very much preoccupied at that time with the postwar status of such areas as French Indochina, Indonesia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think the IPR might be an organization which would be a good one to assist in the formulation of that formula?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not thinking in terms of the IPR. If I was speaking to Mr. Dennett, I was speaking to a man who I considered to be intelligent and was discussing the matters with him. The idea of the IPR, with which my relations were not close except that one year, did not enter my mind as an instrument for bringing about that policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you remember talking with Mr. Dennett at a time when he was about to take a job with the American Council of the IPR and he said he needed to know what the outlook was, what the future of American policy was going to be, to decide what he was going to do?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee whether you ever stated or intimated to Mr. Dennett that you did not think Russia was a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have been likely to have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It would sound most unlikely that I would say that Russia was not going to be a large factor. It would have to be considered in connection with the situation that might be described. I never in my life thought that Russia was not going to be a factor in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in January of 1944 hold the view that Russia was not a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall holding such a view or stating it to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that in your opinion Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and would probably not interfere to upset the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall making such a statement to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you could have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't believe I could.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not hold that view yourself?

(No response.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Mandel, who has been sworn for the purpose of all of these hearings, if he can identify that as a photostat of a document taken from the IPR files.

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document from the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify it by the heading?

Mr. MANDEL. The heading is "Confidential," marked "R. Dennett, January 18, 1944, memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this memorandum of a conversation, as Mr. Vincent surmised, is the basis for the line of questions that have just been completed. I don't think it is necessary to take the time of the committee to read all of it. I would like to read from the last page five short paragraphs which are marked "Conclusions" and then ask that the entire document be placed in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Conclusions:

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands will be integrated or limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin, and questions its stabilizing influences upon the eastern Asiatic Continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

The CHAIRMAN. You want this instrument inserted in the record in toto?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the chairman please.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 380" is as follows:)

Confidential

R. Dennett. January 18, 1944.

EXHIBIT No. 380

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH JOHN CARTER VINCENT

I explained to Mr. Vincent that I was considering a job with the American Council of the IPR, and that I thought it highly desirable to get some inkling of American policy in the Far East with a view to determining (1) the least common denominator of that policy—what, that is, everyone was agreed to as the minimum that the United States would demand, and (2) the alternative policies which branched out from the common denominator which were being seriously considered. My purpose, I explained, was to see what the minimum was which the American people would be called upon to support, so that I could

get a line on what educational work the American Council should be concerned with in the next few years, and to see, on possible future policy, what alternative proposals were being seriously considered so that IPR research could be geared as close to reality as possible. Mr. Vincent indicated the following:

(1) Consideration of American policy in the Far East is definitely "second drawer" and is the concern at the present time of relatively few people in the American Government. He personally, and he thought others in the Government, would welcome the publication of material which pointed out just what the situation was. Ed Snow has an article on southeast Asia which he cannot get published now because of the fear that it will give aid and comfort to the enemy. What Snow says in effect is that Japanese propaganda on increased nationalism is catching on in Burma and other areas. Vincent thinks that, through a slight feeling of guilt, Americans have been building up China in the past few years and are still a little ashamed of the small amount of aid going to that country. There is a vast difference, he feels, between having a feeling of this sort and allowing this feeling to keep (handwritten insert maybe us, not clear) from telling the American people what they ought to know.

(2) There seems to be a general agreement, undertaken at the instigation of the British, that dependent areas in southeast Asia will remain undisturbed after liberation, and that their future will be worked out at a later date. Vincent thinks that unless the United States gets on the ball and makes some definite suggestions for the record pretty soon, it may be too late as no one will have notice of what American policy might be.

(3) Vincent thinks that the first determinative on American policy will be the demands of the American Navy for what it considers it needs on the Pacific area in the way of bases for defensive purposes. He believes that they will want considerably more than they had before and that, in view of what happened in 1941, they will get a receptive hearing on the Hill. The result of their demands will be to bring out several consequential questions:

(a) Granted that the Navy gets what it wants, the first problem facing the United States will be to utilize those bases for other than purely negative influence of defense of the United States. Vincent believes that the demands of the Navy, when met will actually make the United States the "stabilizing power" in the Far East. We will be there, and we will have the power.

(b) So far as China is concerned, the problem of the United States far from being that of building up China to become the stabilizing power, will be to keep China from disintegrating. China cannot become industrialized in the modern sense unless the United States will literally give her the heavy capital machinery; it would, he believes, be possible to increase Chinese purchasing power through agrarian reform and improved communications to a point where China could support a light industrial economy which would assist in keeping her from disintegration. Whether the things that need to be done will be done by the conservative Kuomintang is doubtful. In essence, therefore, this means the development in China of a "welfare economy" rather than an "industrial economy."

(4) Vincent believed that the British would have no serious objection to the implication behind the probable United States Navy demands, that the primary interest of Britain would continue to be Western Europe, and that she was not prepared to equip and to maintain an adequate force in the Pacific to be the "stabilizing power," and that they would certainly prefer the United States in that position than China. This would, of course, mean that Australia and New Zealand would gravitate toward the United States in political interest.

(5) I raised the question as to where British and American interests might, in the outline he had presented, come to disagreement. I pointed out that the line between a stabilizing power and a dominating power was thin, and that if the United States failed to make some provision for dependent areas, or attempted by the possession of adequate power plus assistance from Australia and New Zealand to put the stopper on the development of nationalistic feeling in any of the far-eastern areas, the position of the United States as a stabilizing power changed to that of a dominating power. This, I suggested, Britain might not be opposed to. On the other hand, if the United States did take a lead in developing a formula providing expression for nationalistic feelings in southeast Asia, I wondered whether the United States and Great Britain might not fall out over India, which would, in this situation, certainly attempt to line up as a far-eastern nation in order to come under whatever formula the United States developed for other parts of southeast Asia.

Vincent stated that this was precisely the point at which he thought intelligent work was needed. It is very apparent that Britain is as unwilling to talk about

India as Russia is to talk about Poland—in fact the reason William Phillips is still in this country because the British convinced him of the validity of their position. Vincent felt that the Indian question might very well be the point of major disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.

(6) I raised the question whether, at this point in the line of reasoning so far pursued, it did not become apparent that some mechanism was needed in the form of a regional council at the very least, through which the pressures developed by nationalistic feelings could be siphoned off into discussion and open examination, and what the prevailing attitude, if any, was toward the British regional ideas.

At this point Vincent became vague. He indicated that few people other than Hornbeck and Blakeslee had done much thinking on the subject, and that Blakeslee was all in favor of some sort of international political machinery. The implication was that Hornbeck and he had their doubts. He did say that Hull was very sympathetic about the problem of dependent areas and thought that something should be done, but left the impression that very little had in fact been done. He thought that the British were, in all probability, through in Hong Kong, and that, although they had little enthusiasm for Hong Kong as a base, they might definitely want it developed to a free port. He thought that the question of face could be handled by letting British troops retake Hong Kong, although he admitted quite a situation would arise if, by any chance, the Chinese recaptured the area.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands will be integrated and limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific Basin, and questions its stabilizing influence upon the eastern Atlantic continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever meeting Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall reading any of his writings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read in manuscript form anything that Mr. Stewart wrote?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of reading in manuscript form.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that a manuscript written by Mr. Stewart was not transmitted to you by Miriam S. Farley, of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the incident.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to this exhibit, Mr. Sourwine, should it not be further identified as to its date? It is dated January 18, 1944, headed "Memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman is correct.

You recall this incident was referred to yesterday by Mr. Morris.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; at which time I said I couldn't recall the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want your testimony to imply that you find the incident incredible, or that you are willing to accept the possibility that this manuscript may have been transmitted to you, that you may

have read it and that you may have expressed an opinion with regard to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like my testimony to be that I have no recollection of the incident as it occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now of what? You used the term "manuscript."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is in the record of the hearings as exhibit No. 176 (page 629, part 2,) a memorandum to W. L. H. from M. S. F., presumably to Mr. Holland from Miriam Farley, which reads:

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on point of detail.

Then there is more to it, all of which is in our record. It was mentioned at yesterday's hearing. Mr. Morris asked some questions about it, and I was endeavoring to find out, thinking it over overnight, if there had been any recollection come to Mr. Vincent about it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand the witness to testify that he does not recall at all having the manuscript or going over it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; that is my testimony, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Would you go so far as to deny that you had such a manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. I just said I do not consider it incredible that I might have.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a habit on the part of IPR people to send manuscripts to you for criticism and approval?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it a habit. I do not recall other manuscripts.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, you would not call it a habit?

Mr. VINCENT. One would have to define habit.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it customary?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have to say I do not recall other manuscripts being sent to me. Apparently the Rosinger manuscript was sent to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that this thing has been read, I don't recall the incident, but as I say, there was a letter written to me asking me to return it, and I have no reason to deny it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in a position to make policy as far as the Far East was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have said many times I was in a position to suggest courses of action or policy to my superiors.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that the IPR was interested in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. It was interested in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. What their people were writing for consumption here in America would be of interest to you as a foreign officer.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be. I never followed the IPR too closely.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was of interest because you became a trustee in the organization; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The fact that there is evidence in the files that they sent you these before they were published would indicate to you that they had been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would indicate that they had been sent to me. I so testified.

Senator FERGUSON. And you believe that they were valuable, their works, in forming public opinion; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't use the word "valuable," no; but I think they were of use in forming the public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that was of greater value in forming public opinion than these documents and books and papers being written by the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. What I would say offhand is that the IPR did not have too wide a circulation. Therefore, I would say that what was reported in the national press would probably have had a greater influence on public opinion with regard to the Far East than the IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that some of these publications, and the speeches made from them, were getting into the public press?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say whether they were getting in the public press or not. It would certainly be logical to say they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Were not you watching the public press also for public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but Senator, I could not now say whether I can recall whether the IPR was covered in the public press to any great extent. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not sound reasonable that if a publication came to your desk that could have some effect upon public opinion in manuscript form for your criticism that you would have read it or had somebody read it to report to you so that you could judge whether or not it was accurate and you felt that that should be used as a mold of public opinion? Does that not sound reasonable?

Mr. VINCENT. That sounds reasonable to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you explain where the other facts and testimony show that you were submitted these papers that you did not so act? Is it one of neglect? Is that what you are telling us?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't understand your question, Senator. One of neglect if I had not read them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and did not have somebody read them to report to you. Would it not show now neglect on your part?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to have read them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, or have somebody read them.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it neglect. It would depend on whether you had time to read them or not. I have already testified that I possibly read these publications. It is not incredible. But I have no recollection of reading them.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not swear now that you did not read them?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not swear now that you did not read them?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not swear now that I did not read them.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever have any connection with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter, former president of the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I have no recollection of meeting Mrs. Carter, but that I probably did meet her at the IPR conference if she was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Mrs. E. C. Carter, who was at one time president of the China Aid Council, the same Mrs. E. C. Carter who was the wife of E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask Mrs. E. C. Carter to send your regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. You have made that question before and I have said I have no recollection of asking her to send it to her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I show you a publication headed "China Aid Council Newsletter," June 1944, and I ask you to look at the marked paragraph in the second column.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you see there a reference to yourself?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you read that paragraph, sir?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

John Carter Vincent, in charge of Chinese affairs for our State Department, asked Mrs. Carter to send his regards to Mme. Sun since he knew her well in Chungking, and both liked and respected her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not refresh my recollection, but I don't find it incredible that I would have sent my regards to Mme. Sun.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the last part of your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. That I might have sent such a letter of Mme. Sun.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you have communicated to Mrs. Carter your request that she give your regards to Mme. Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I have no recollection of how I might have communicated that to her. I have already testified that the incident on my own memory, relying on it, I had no recollection of the incident. Therefore, I have no recollection of how I might have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understood you, sir, in your answer to that question the first time to indicate that the only occasion on which you could have met Mrs. Carter was this IPR conference you attended.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that was the only occasion I had a recollection of meeting Mrs. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did have a recollection of meeting her there?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the only one I had any recollection of meeting her, at the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recollect that you did meet her at the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it is not the only occasion you remember meeting her, because you don't remember meeting her at all, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. I wouldn't know Mrs. Carter if I saw her today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you send your greetings to Mme. Sun Yatsen through someone you never met or saw before?

Mr. VINCENT. I say this is an incident I have completely forgotten about. When I say that I have no reason to doubt that at some time I may have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun, that does not alter my testimony that I don't know Mrs. Carter, or would not know her if I saw her today.

Mr. SOURWINE. The fact you have no recollection of her or would not know her if you saw her is not, in my mind, any reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement that you did ask her to give your regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said it is possible. I don't recall the incident at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was not whether it is possible. Is not the mere fact that you do not remember and would not know her if you saw her enough in your own mind to make you doubt somewhat the accuracy of this paragraph? Why do you say you have no doubt about this paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. I just don't recall the incident at all. As I say, it is not incredible—put it on a matter of doubt—that I sometimes talked with Mrs. Carter, that at some time I met her, which I don't recall, and she may have said she was going to see Madame Sun, and I may have said, "Go ahead, and give her my regards." I say I have no recollection. I am simply speaking with regard to the possible rather than something I myself recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not even entertained the thought that this might be something made out of the whole cloth relating to a completely nonexistent message?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not considered it from that angle.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that this was in good faith?

Mr. VINCENT. I say again this is possible.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, do you have the same difficulty in your work in the State Department, advising with other officers, of remembering things that have happened as you have here on the witness stand?

Mr. VINCENT. If it is a matter of going back——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you as uncertain in your work there about what has happened as you are here?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, this all happened 7 or 8 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer that question?

The CHAIRMAN. You better answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is necessary for a foreign officer and a diplomat, such as you are, to remember things for 7 years, is it not? You have to keep them all in mind?

Mr. VINCENT. These incidents here, as I say, I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. But are you in as much doubt in conferring with State officials on things that have happened as you are before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it is a matter of recalling what I would think now as details.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking, Are you usually in as much doubt?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a simple question and easily understood. Why do you not answer it?

Senator FERGUSON. Are you in as much doubt in advising on facts with the State officials as you are here in this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were matters which I considered of as little importance as some of these things brought forward here, I would be in the same degree of doubt. In other words, whether or not I remembered would be a case whether I can remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. As to whether or not documents passed through your hands for criticism in manuscript form is not a minor matter, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a matter—I do not know whether you call it minor at all. It is a matter which made no impression on me at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only answer you can give to my question as to whether or not you are as uncertain and lack as much knowledge in your advice to State officials as you do at this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, following up what Senator Ferguson has said, if we could return for just a moment to the Maxwell Stewart pamphlet, do I correctly understand your testimony with regard to that, that while you do not remember anything about the incident, you think it is possible that the manuscript was submitted to you, that you did read it and you did comment on it as indicated by the Miriam Farley memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I used your words. I think it was not incredible that I might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know whether this has been called to your attention before. I think perhaps it may have been. I am reading, Mr. Chairman, from Wartime China by Maxwell Stewart, the pamphlet referred to in the memorandum which we are discussing. These paragraphs appear:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots, populace movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. In the past the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and ruthlessly with landlords and others who they considered oppressors of the people and expropriated landlord estates in order to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today in the interests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They no longer expropriate the property of landlords except that of traitors. In fact, they welcome the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help fight Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes, and exorbitant interest rates, and encouraged education, cooperatives, and other measures of popular improvement. In addition they have developed a rough and ready system of local democracy in the villages under their control. Elected councils have been set up in village, town, and district, and the local executive officials are also chosen

by popular vote. Tax assessment committees made up of local farmers have been set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures reflecting the most deep-seated desires of the Communist peasant have given him the feeling of having a stake in the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the peasants for support of the war effort.

Having heard that read, I ask you, sir, does it appeal to you as a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It seems to me to be a statement by Mr. Stewart of his opinion of what was the condition in Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. That is scarcely an answer. That does not answer at all. The question is, Does it appeal to you as a factual statement.

Mr. VINCENT. It is certainly a statement of the conditions in that area insofar as Mr. Stewart knew them; and I didn't know, and I could not judge.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why you want to evade the question. Why do you not answer it? The question is, is that a factual statement.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not be in a position to testify because I had never been in the area. I didn't know what the conditions were there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, sir, consider it credible that you would have read that as part of the pamphlet and then reported that it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. As this man's statement of his opinion of what was happening in that area, that it could be published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, Mr. Vincent, have read that and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall saying whether it was good and should be published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you find it credible that you could have read that as part of this pamphlet, and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was good and it should be published in bringing information about Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did your counsel say to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't hear him.

Mr. SURREY. I don't believe that is the statement as to what he remembers, since he testified he did not remember the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. Hearing this statement, you want to say now that as a foreign officer in the State Department, and a former trustee of the IPR, that you would allow to go to the public a statement like that when you did not know whether it was a fact or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it was not a case of my allowing it to go to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were to criticize it in manuscript form before it was printed, were they not asking you in effect, "Do you approve this to be printed and circulated to the public?" Is that not what your criticism was asked for?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not my criticism. They might have completely rejected any criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Surely, but you would have been on record as saying you did not agree with it because you either did not know what the facts were, or did not believe what he was saying. You

do not think they were submitting it to you just for the English, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. They were submitting it to me as they say there as to whether it would be good for this to be published. So they say in this memo.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is exactly it, whether or not it should be handed out to the American public to help crystallize public opinion, and here you were, a State official, and now you say that you would pass it because it was his word, and anything he would say you would pass, is that correct? Is that what you want to leave with this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not a case of my passing the thing. It was not my document. It was submitted to me to go over. It could be published whether I approved it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you did not say anything to the contrary, the IPR would take for granted that you were approving it, is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not think so?

Mr. VINCENT. That I was approving it. My approval was not necessary to publish IPR documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not mail it back and say to IPR, "I am not going to criticize your document. Print anything you want to, but I am not going to criticize it. I am not going to say whether it is good, bad, or indifferent"? Why did you not tell them that?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have just said, the whole matter is one I have no recollection of what attitude I took on it. I said it is not incredible that the incident occurred.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated that you are willing to accept the fact that it occurred?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The memo indicates that you have expressed your opinion in confidence. You were advising the IPR but you did not want the fact that you were expressing an opinion to go out. That is the implication of the memo. Does that change your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. This memo was not written by me. I cannot myself vouch for what my exact attitude was at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. But you still find nothing incredible in the memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Except the matter of saying, "I have expressed in confidence" or the language of the thing, the existence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you deny that you expressed an opinion in confidence?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not deny that I told them that.

Senator FERGUSON. With your present knowledge, Mr. Vincent, having heard this read, do you say now that it accurately sets forth the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. I say now, sir, that I did not know the facts as they existed.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether now this was an accurate statement of what was happening?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, with your knowledge now is that or is that not an accurate statement of the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. Knowing what I do know about Communist China, I would not say that was a completely accurate statement of the conditions in Communist China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say now with your present knowledge that that was a pro-Communist writing?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was a writing which had a slant in favor of giving the Communists. I do not think it was pro-Communist. I don't even know that Stewart expected it to be. Stewart was writing what he considered to be an account of conditions in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you defending Stewart in this answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even know Stewart.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing it is an inaccurate statement, which you have said, why do you doubt that Stewart was trying to put propaganda out in favor of the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call—I have no idea of what Stewart's motives were at that time. If he wrote a memorandum, I must assume that he was trying to write what he thought was a factual memo of conditions in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose he was a Communist, would you still give that answer?

Mr. VINCENT. If he were a Communist, I would say certainly he was trying to slant it toward a better understanding of what was going on or a sympathetic understanding of what was going on in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. From that statement, have you any doubt that he was pro-Communist in the statement?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time? At the time he made the statement?

Senator FERGUSON. No, from what you know now.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say now on the basis of that statement that he probably was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that it is a fair statement to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know whether it was a fair statement because I have to go back again and say I was not familiar with conditions—

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now. Your knowledge of the facts now.

Mr. VINCENT. From my knowledge of the facts now, I would say that was a statement which was slanted or sympathetic toward Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked the question, do you regard that as a fair statement to go to the American people.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Is it now, or was it then?

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you do now, was it a fair statement to go to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say as a statement of Maxwell Stewart, a man who was supposed to learn something about it, that it was not a case of it being a fair statement to go to the American public or not. It was a case of Maxwell Stewart putting out in IPR a statement. And its fairness does not seem to enter into it.

Senator FERGUSON. My question is, you as a State official, and a United States Government official, knowing what the facts are now, knowing what he said, was it or was it not a fair statement to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a statement to the American people which could have misled them as to what conditions were in Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, not a fair statement to go to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I find trouble in saying what is fair when one man wants to report.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is misleading, it is not fair?

Mr. VINCENT. The American public, it would seem to me, would have a right to receive anybody's opinion through these kinds of things.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated in answer to Senator Ferguson that it was not a fair statement to go to the American people. Then it was misleading the American people, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have so testified that the statement itself, slanted as it was, would have misled the American people at the time as to conditions in Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. By your previous answer—

Mr. VINCENT. From what I know now.

Mr. SOURWINE. By your previous answer, one question ago, do you mean to say that you feel the American people have the inalienable right to be misled as far as the Communist writers want to mislead them?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly did not. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, was this statement Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. In my opinion at that time, I did not so consider it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now.

Mr. VINCENT. Now I would say, as I look back on it and know about communism, it would have misled people as to conditions in Communist China. It was painting too rosy a picture of conditions there.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, would you say it was Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was Communist propaganda, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that the thing was slanted towards the Communists and giving an unduly rosy view of what was happening in Communist China as I look back on it now.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that regard, it was pro-Communist, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I find it difficult to define what you mean by pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. That phrase is used in the State Department commonly. How does the State Department use it?

Mr. VINCENT. Then it was in that sense. If it gave a rosy view it would be considered to be slanted toward the Communists and pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it propaganda in the sense that Mr. Stewart, as far as I know, was trying to report on the situation as he saw it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have defined propaganda once.

Mr. VINCENT. Information.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, which is put out, which is propagated, with a view to creating an impact on the people to whom it is sent. In that sense this certainly was propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. In that sense it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it was pro-Communist propaganda, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was pro-Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, do you find as much trouble among State officials as you are having here this morning on the question of pro-Communist propaganda? Do they all have as much trouble as you have here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. In looking back upon other situations at times, and trying to described what was or was not a pro-Communist situation in 1943 or 1944, I couldn't answer that question, sir, whether they would or would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have trouble at that time in determining what was or was not pro-Communist or anti-Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall an instance of having trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not feel there was any trouble in determining that back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. People may have had difficulties in determining what was Communist and what was pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I don't know that during the war, when they were fighting, that a great deal of emphasis was placed on that particular phase of the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when you say you had no trouble in distinguishing pro-Communist and non-pro-Communist matter, is that because you had no trouble making the distinction, that is, you were always readily able to make the distinction, or is it because you were not bothered very often trying to make the distinction?

Mr. VINCENT. I think trying to get it down to a fine point of what was or was not pro-Communist was not something that occupied one's thoughts too much at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It did not occupy very much of your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that means that if it did not occupy your attention, it did not really occupy anyone's attention in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, that is not so.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to pay attention as to whether or not the people were being misled by Communist propaganda, if it was not yours?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say that I was not occupied. I said we were not too much occupied.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by that?

Mr. VINCENT. That you didn't examine every document that passed over your desk to see whether it was pro-Communist or anti-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would have been a very easy thing for Communists either in or out of the State Department to act with immunity and mislead the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't agree with that, sir, because people were certainly conscious of the threat of communism. I was myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you not think that the head of a desk in the State Department, the director of a division, should be thoroughly conversant with the Communist objectives in the area under his jurisdiction, so that he would recognize almost instantly Communist propaganda, or their line, if it cropped up in anything that came to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think he should be alert to such a situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you were, while you were the Director of the Far Eastern Division, informed and so alerted with regard to Communist propaganda and the Communist line in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I endeavored to keep myself so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, as an alert man, that this statement that has been read by Mr. Sourwine would go through your hands with approval?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that it went through—it did not go through my hands with approval insofar as I recall, but I am perfectly willing to say that the thing went through.

Senator FERGUSON. With your approval.

Mr. VINCENT. Again, I don't use the word "approval."

Mr. MORRIS. The memorandum states that you said it was good and worth publishing.

Mr. VINCENT. I am not testifying that the report of what I said there is a factual statement of what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do not contest it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not find it incredible?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might turn to another line of questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Try to turn to something that the witness knows something about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, was Owen Lattimore an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek at the time he accompanied Mr. Wallace to China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had ceased to be adviser to Chiang Kai-shek some time before that, had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he ceased to be adviser to Chiang in the fall of 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in China during the period when he was adviser to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. During that period when Mr. Lattimore was adviser to Chiang, did he make reports directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say with any assurance which way he made his reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consider the possibility that he was making reports directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I assumed that he was, since he was sent out by the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss this possibility with Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it with Ambassador Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, is it not true that possibility was a source of irritation to Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall that the Ambassador did not like the idea of having two people reporting out of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know he didn't like the idea if you never discussed it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say I didn't discuss it with Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you said you had no memory of discussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the White House.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember ever discussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any particular incident, but I do have a recollection that was his attitude at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was irritated at that possibility?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it irritate you?

Mr. VINCENT. It did me, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did it irritate you?

Mr. VINCENT. Because as Foreign Service officer in the field, it was somewhat difficult for us to have a separate reporting office out of China on conditions there, and not know what was going on in that reporting field.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore had not reported directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore, under directions he had to report to the White House, showed us what he was reporting so we could know as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not show you any reports that he filed with the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I ever recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, Mr. Vincent, do anything to condition Mr. Wallace for his mission to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified that we met not frequently but on several occasions before we started out. I have no distinct recollection of memory that I may have prepared him for the mission, but I may have; of factual conditions in China as I saw them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not indicate, in executive session, that you did supply him with material in advance of the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. That is just what I was testifying again now. I testified further that I had no distinct recollection of the exact character of the material.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also testify in executive session that you had consulted with Owen Lattimore to make preliminary arrangements for the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall my exact testimony in executive session, but I think it is quite logical that I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, did you not say that you had discussed the trip with him before the appointment was announced?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I told you, sir, it was quite logical I did, but I can't recall any particular discussions with him. But as I say, it certainly would have been logical for Lattimore and myself, who were going out with him, to have had discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you influenced Mr. Wallace at all on his trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I should hardly see how it would have been impossible for me not to influence Mr. Wallace on the trip, since I had been in China for 20 years, with factual information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can "hardly see how it would have been impossible" for you "not to influence"? Straighten that out.

Mr. VINCENT. I say it certainly would have been logical for me to have had some influence on Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you know you did influence him?

Mr. VINCENT. What I am trying to say is that I don't recall specific influences I had on him. I am trying to give the question or the answer a general character, rather than saying in what particular way I may or may not have influenced him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am perfectly willing to be general, but perhaps you can be a little more specific. Do you really mean that you cannot recall any instances in which you influenced him or might have influenced him? You do not mean that, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Furnishing him material in advance of the trip is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be giving information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influencing him, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Talking with him one evening after having a conversation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next day is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to consider specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a specific instance, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been to some degree influenced by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know he was, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because you suggested it, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer him in particular directions was influencing the mission was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there is not any question in your mind that you did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mission, is there?

Mr. VINCENT. There certainly is no question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at all of the talks between Mr. Wallace and General Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I was present at all except the first and the last.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anywhere at any time, in any written memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace, any reference to a request by General Chiang for the assignment of General Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no memorandum. It was all oral discussion as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever tell you orally that General Chiang had made a request for the assignment of General Wedemeyer or had indicated that he would like to have General Wedemeyer assigned as the President's representative to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his ever telling me that the Generalissimo wanted General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where the first idea of having General Wedemeyer recommended originated?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that it originated with Mr. Alsop. I didn't know Wedemeyer, and I think Mr. Wallace stated that he had never known General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You and I have been over this, and I realize I am cutting corners on it. I simply wanted to traverse that here for the public record in case Senators who were not present at the executive session might want to ask questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also testify that it was Mr. Alsop who had stopped the proposed recommendation of General Chennault for that job?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of my testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that he had done so by saying that General Chennault did not want the job?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Alsop's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read it carefully; no, sir. I glanced through it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed that matter at all in recent years with Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not, then, know whether what you have just testified was in any way at odds with what Mr. Alsop said?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify in executive session that Mr. Lauchlin Currie played a part in your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that it was possible that Lauchlin Currie was the first one to mention to me that Mr. Wallace was going to China. If I could have the testimony I could——

Mr. SOURWINE. I just asked.

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified to a fact there. You testified to the same fact here. There cannot be any conflict in your testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, who initiated the request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, Mr. Wallace initiated it.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that Mr. Wallace initiated it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I testified that we had a conversation one time about conditions in China. He called me and we had this conversation regarding going to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that before Mr. Currie had mentioned to you the possibility of your going with Mr. Wallace on this mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the sequence as to whether Mr. Currie mentioned it first or Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention it to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That Mr. Wallace was going to China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention to you that you would go along with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the testimony in executive session, but as I have said, it is possible that Mr. Currie was the first to mention the matter of going.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to distinguish between a knowledge that there was going to be a Wallace mission——

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, yes?

Mr. VINCENT. And who first initiated the request that I go along. In any formal way Mr. Wallace initiated it insofar as the Secretary of State was concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mr. Wallace talked to you about it, he came to your office, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He came over to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That meeting was arranged?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not come without an appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time the appointment was arranged you knew what he was going to talk about?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who arranged that appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that I have testified that Mr. Wallace called, and I said I would come over to his office, but he came over to the State Department. But Mr. Currie may have arranged the interview.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know at the time that Mr. Wallace called you on the phone that the thing he wanted to discuss with you was going on the mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I was sure of his going on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; your going.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that I was, but as I say, it is logical. I am just trying to be factual in the testimony here. Whether Mr.

Wallace told me he was coming over to talk to me about going on the mission with him or whether he was coming to talk about going on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. As of now, as of this morning, are you able to remember who first discussed with you the matter of you going on that mission with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. From my memory this morning I would have to repeat again that Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss with me the mission, but I do not recall whether Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss that I would go on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did Mr. Hull send you with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace as far as I know because I had had 20 years' experience in China, I had just come back from China, with 2 years' experience there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he want to send anybody with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Putting it this way, that Mr. Wallace was the one wanting someone to be sent with him. I don't know that Mr. Hull wanted somebody to be sent with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember your testimony on this point in executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember my testimony, but you put the question differently here. Why did Mr. Hull want somebody to go. I am saying after Mr. Wallace had asked for somebody to go, and I had been designated by Mr. Hull to go, I referred to a brief conversation which Mr. Hull had with me. I am using the word "want," why did Mr.——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not that conversation indicate to you why Mr. Hull wanted you to go?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you are using what Mr. Hull wanted me to be alert to, it already having been decided I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Tell us about the conversation if you will.

Mr. VINCENT. It was a very brief conversation in which Mr. Hull told me to be careful not to let Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, make promises to the Chinese that we would be unable to fulfill.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that not mean to you that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified in executive session that there was a feeling, which I had no knowledge of, that Mr. Wallace in his trip to South America the year before had given the impression there that we were going to be of greater help to the South American countries than was possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. The answer to my question is what, then, yes or no?

Mr. VINCENT. What is your question, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). Did Mr. Wallace make any promises?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you on any occasion have to warn him not to make promises?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had to warn him that I can recall not to make elaborate promises.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you call an elaborate promise?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say promises beyond our own possibility of performance; the matter of support to China——

Senator FERGUSON. What did he promise them that you thought was within our capabilities of carrying out?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace made no specific promises insofar as I can recall to General Chiang other than a continuation, and if possible, an augmentation of support for the Chiang Kai-shek government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Hull said elaborate promises?

Mr. VINCENT. No. You used that word. He just said don't make promises to the Chinese that we were unable to fulfill.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you know what we would or would not be able to fulfill? Did Mr. Hull tell you what we could or could not fulfill.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull was not specific in telling me that.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you be of any aid on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would recognize with my knowledge of China that if Mr. Wallace were to go out there and make promises of support which could not be carried over the hump in the air, or further support of a military nature which was impossible——

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the military situation so that you could advise as to what we could or could not carry over the hump?

Mr. VINCENT. I was familiar enough to know what I would consider to be an unreasonable request and if I did, I would also be in touch with the military people in China who could give me any advice that they might wish to.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never had to use this so-called warning?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall did I ever have to stop Mr. Wallace from doing something which I thought was going beyond our ability to fulfill.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he make any promises at all?

Mr. VINCENT. The only promises I recall he made was that we were going to try to go back and get support for General Chiang's government continued over the hump insofar as it was practical to send lend-lease.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only promise that he made?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only promise as I recall he made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he promise to get him a representative—Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he did not promise him so far as I know unless it took place in a conversation at which I was not present. It was only the fact that the Generalissimo had given Mr. Wallace the distinct impression that he could not get along with Stilwell. What promises he may have made in trying to alter that situation to Chiang Kai-shek, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not quite fill your mission for Mr. Hull, did you, when you allowed Mr. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the last occasion without you being present?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States then, and Chiang Kai-shek was President of China, and they got in a car and rode to the airport, and I rode in another car. I could hardly have insisted on riding with the Vice President when he did not invite me.

Senator FERGUSON. But Mr. Hull had told you that you were going for a specific purpose, and that was to watch Mr. Wallace so that he would not make promises to Chiang Kai-shek, is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Not watch him so he would not.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you do?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not stay by Mr. Wallace's side all the time because as I say, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States. I do not think Mr. Hull ever intended that I stick to his side in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you did not hear the last conversation.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not hear the last conversation, but Mr. Wallace to my recollection reported it to me going down in the plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report to Mr. Hull that you had not been at the last conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. In my memorandum on the thing it shows very clearly I was not at the first or last conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You reported that to Mr. Hull?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to resort to the book, but I am quite sure it shows clearly in my memorandum that in the last conversation General Chiang and Mme. Chiang and Mr. Wallace occupied a car going to the airport, and I was not in the car.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not expect that if any promises were made, they may have been made on the last conversation just before he would leave?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not say whether they would be made then or at some other time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever make, other than your original notes and the memoranda which are printed in the white paper, any other memoranda or narrative of the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, sir. I think I have testified that they were the first notes, which were then transcribed either in writing first and then on the typewriter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You kept a copy of what you filed with the Department in that regard, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I kept a copy?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall keeping a copy. I turned it over to the State Department when I got back here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had access to it subsequently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not subsequently from those notes prepare in more narrative style a summary somewhat shorter of what took place on the Wallace mission, just a summary record?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I told you in executive session that a summary in shortened form was prepared in the State Department. I did not prepare it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did prepare it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall. It was probably Mr. Stanton who prepared it. I could refresh my memory by going up there to see whose initials were on it. Mine was a 20-page running thing. As usual, it was narrowed down to much shorter pages.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did prepare it if it was not Mr. Stanton?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I could name half a dozen people there. It was the kind of a thing that Mr. Stanton might have done, it is the kind of thing—who else was in the Division, this was in 1944—there was a Miss Ruth Bacon there who did that kind of thing quite frequently, of going through things, she had legal training, she would reduce things. I would have to see who the personnel was to guess who put the initials on. I do know it was reduced and summarized for the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared from your notes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether a copy of that summary was ever given to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether the summary was given to Mr. Wallace or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it would be given to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it would be logical that it would be given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen that summary?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember seeing the summary. I did not prepare it myself. It was prepared in the normal procedures of summarizing things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you recognize that summary if you saw it again?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to ask you, if this, that I show you is in any way to you reminiscent of that summary.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what I have just shown you, does it appear to be a summary of the Vice President's trip?

Mr. VINCENT. No; this is not a summary of the trip insofar as I can see which has anything to do with the memo I wrote, which is a summary of the conversations.

Mr. SOURWINE. This that I have showed you refers to the Vice President in the third person, just as your notes did; does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I always referred to him as Mr. Wallace or the Vice President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. This is Henry Wallace's letter of July 10 to the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I have seen it—I have it right here myself—since it was published. I have never seen it before.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know how you know it was Henry Wallace's letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I know only by the fact it was published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it published as Henry Wallace's letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I have to see what it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you have is a letter. What I have shown you is headed "Summary report of Vice President Wallace's visit in China," is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is dated the 10th of July 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was transmitted apparently to the President with a note by Mr. Wallace: "Dear Mr. President: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East. Sincerely yours, H. A. Wallace."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it does not say it is Henry Wallace's own report, does it? He says "a report."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he does.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it is in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. This?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. The report refers to Mr. Wallace in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you said you referred to him in the notes?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I did not even know of its existence until this thing was published here, until the last 3 or 4 months. If there is any confusion in your mind about the relationship of that and the summarization of the memoranda of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Vice President, this has no relation to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. How can you be sure?

Mr. VINCENT. I can be sure because I have seen the summary of the memorandum that I wrote on the conversations and I have just testified it was prepared by some officer in the Far Eastern Office, and was a two or three page summarization of 20 pages, and it followed much the same lines as my own, that on such and such a day they talked and this was taken up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you account for the fact, if it was a fact, that Mr. Wallace in reporting to the President on his trip, would refer to himself in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do that in the Kunning cables, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here was the Vice President of the United States reporting to the President of the United States; do you think it is quite the logical thing to do that in a report which he himself had written he would refer to himself in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify on the basis of what the logic of Mr. Wallace was in using the third person.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the other hand, if a report had been prepared by someone else as a summary of your notes, such a report would have had to refer to Mr. Wallace in the third person, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you from those facts draw any conclusion as to whether the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President was written by himself or prepared by some other person?

Mr. VINCENT. I think the report prepared by Mr. Wallace was written by him. As I say, I cannot testify—

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, a report prepared by him was written by him. What I want to know is whether you have any conclusion, on the basis of the meager facts now at our joint disposal, as to whether this report, a copy of which you have just seen, a copy of which you have before you, was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. My belief is that it was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what do you base that belief?

Mr. VINCENT. Because Mr. Wallace transmitted it to the President on July 10, so he himself said.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not say it was "my report."

Mr. VINCENT. He said, "Here is a report."

Mr. SOURWINE. "Here is a report."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge that Mr. Wallace himself prepared the report. My assumption is that Mr. Wallace did prepare the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. The heading on that report does not say, "Report by Henry Wallace," does it?

Mr. VINCENT. Counsel is just showing me a paragraph out of Mr. Wallace's letter to the President in which Mr. Wallace himself says here—

Mr. SOURWINE. What letter to the President? Is this what I have been referring to as the report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; this is the letter to President Truman of September 19, 1951, which Mr. Wallace says, "I wrote the July report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President."

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis you are testifying this was Mr. Wallace's report?

Mr. VINCENT. I can reach no other assumption. I have no reason why Mr. Wallace should wish to deny or lead to any subterfuge on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it does not seem queer to you that the report was not headed "Report by Henry Wallace," but "Report of the Trip of Henry A. Wallace," and it did not refer to the Vice President in the first person, but in the third person.

Mr. VINCENT. It is not a matter of my thinking it is queer or not. Mr. Wallace has testified he wrote it. Why he may have used the third person with respect to himself instead of the first person, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot account for that?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't account for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not think it is queer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it is queer or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not write a report like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I might under certain circumstances write a report like that and not use the first person.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. I would like to talk for just a little while about the conversations with General Chiang, using your notes as the basis.

Mr. VINCENT. Can I go back just to clear up this matter of the possible relationship of this to the summary?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. I hope it is clear to you that the summary of those conversations has no relation to this.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have so stated, sir, very clearly.

Mr. VINCENT. I just wanted you to be sure of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I presume you made that statement from your own personal knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. From my own personal knowledge, and I have tried to narrow down who it was in the Department that summarized my memoranda of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you remember that summary well enough that you can say definitely it is not the basis for this report?

Mr. VINCENT. It has no relation to this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your memory in that regard is clear?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Now I am reading the white paper, and if you would like to have it before you——

Mr. VINCENT. I have it, sir.

Mr. SURREY. Do you have another copy, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman has it now.

You will note on page 550, at the top of the page, you wrote:

Mr. Wallace expressed the opinion that there should not be left pending any question which might result in conflict between China and the U. S. S. R. President Chiang suggested that President Roosevelt act as an arbiter or middleman between China and the U. S. S. R.

NOTE.—President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that President Roosevelt was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time.

By that you mean, unquestionably, that Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time of President Chiang's suggestion; but your own note suggests that Wallace previously made the statement that President Roosevelt was prepared to act as arbiter between the Communists and Kuomintang?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask if the record makes it clear that the white paper shows on page 549 that what you are reading was prepared by John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, on note 11 at the bottom of the page.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are his notes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. These are the notes I made.

Senator FERGUSON. So they are not Stanton's notes; they are your notes.

Mr. VINCENT. No. This is the full text of the memorandum rather than the abbreviated form.

Senator FERGUSON. But these were made by you and not Stanton?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir—yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were made by——

Mr. VINCENT. They were made by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the notes continue:

However, after discussing the matter with Mr. Vincent that evening, Mr. Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R.

That was one occasion when you pulled the Vice President back from what might have been a commitment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, because the Vice President himself had informed me of his conversation with the President in which he jotted down notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Which was that he could tell Chiang Kai-shek that he would be glad to be helpful in anyway to bring about a settlement of the difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists. That was his statement to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wanted Mr. Wallace to make it perfectly clear to Chiang that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. I wanted him to make it clear because he himself told me that was just exactly what the President wanted him to do, was to be an arbiter if it was needed or asked for between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and not between Russia and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say that the President had told Mr. Wallace and that you knew about it that he, President Roosevelt, was willing—ready, willing and able, shall we say—to act as an arbiter between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what Mr. Wallace told me that the President told him. Whether he used the word “arbiter” or not——

Mr. SOURWINE. Intermediary?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, or help settle their difficulties.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you told Mr. Wallace about this situation and persuaded him to make it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., did you also make it clear to him that the President was willing to act as arbiter between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I reminded Mr. Wallace that that was what he had told me and Chiang apparently misunderstood it to mean arbiter between Russia and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. But when Mr. Wallace made his position clear to President Chiang, the generalissimo, the next day before breakfast, did he express that distinction to him, or did he simply make it clear that Roosevelt was not available as an arbiter between China and Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not present at that conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You reported in your notes——

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace reported the conversation to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether Mr. Wallace made this clear to him. From his own statement to me of this conversation before breakfast——

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. He told me that he had made it clear to Chiang that the President had not intended to suggest that he be a mediator between China and Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate anything beyond the unavailability of President Roosevelt as a mediator between Russia and China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate any availability as a mediator between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. The notes here state "President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that the President was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. So Mr. Wallace must have made an earlier statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. To the Generalissimo.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. Which, as far as I can figure here, was misinterpreted by the generalissimo because it says here, "Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time."

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am trying to get at is whether when he went to Chiang the next morning before breakfast to correct this false impression, against which you had warned him the night before, whether he did it in such terms as to negative his original statement with regard to President Roosevelt's availability as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang, or whether he made it clear that he was simply fearful that Chiang had broadened his statement to carry a meaning that he had not intended.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot add anything to what is said here, but it would appear here that all he did was to straighten out the misconception that the President was willing to be a—what do you call it—a mediator between U. S. S. R. and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Bearing on the question of your influence on Mr. Wallace, which we discussed before, this is another incident where you did have a considerable influence, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It is a case where Mr. Wallace had himself been misunderstood and I pointed out to him that the generalissimo had misunderstood him.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is evidence of the fact that Mr. Wallace was receiving and listening to your advice.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, we find this statement farther down on the same page, referring to a conversation which Mr. Wallace had had in Tashkent with Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. Wallace suggested that Dr. Soong discuss the matter with Mr. Vincent who had probably a better idea of the contents of the memorandum since he had had a number of conversations with Ambassador Harriman.

(NOTE.—That evening Dr. Soong asked Mr. Vincent about the matter, requesting to see any notes that Mr. Vincent might have made. Mr. Vincent said that he had only his memory to rely upon.)

Was that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no notes?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not made notes of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

And informed Dr. Soong of those portions of the memorandum which he thought it appropriate and judicious to give him.

What portions of the memorandum did you withhold from Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the portions I withheld from him. I only recall what I had told him. There may have been things in Mr. Harriman's memorandum which were highly injudicious to show him. I had no memorandum. We are speaking now of Mr. Harriman's memo which he showed me in Tashkent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write this in your notes because you knew there had been portions of the memorandum which you thought it inappropriate or injudicious to give to Chiang and which you had therefore withheld, or did you merely use this language to protect yourself against any eventuality?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say from reading this that I had knowledge of some comments that were in Mr. Harriman's memo which would not have been wise to give him.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any rate, that is the impression intended to be conveyed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it at the time you were talking with Dr. Soong, the Harriman memo was clear in your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. Fairly clear, yes. I noted this——

Mr. SOURWINE. How long before had it been that you had seen that memo?

Mr. VINCENT. Possibly a week or 10 days.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was quite recent at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Sourwine, I do not see any other member of the committee here, and I want to be on the floor, so I will have to recess at this time. Senator McCarran and I have a meeting with other Senators at 2. I would have to put this at 2:30, so we will recess until 2:30.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask Mr. Vincent one question?

Mr. Vincent, you testified that you did not know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that picture, and see if you ever met that woman?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of meeting Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MORRIS. There is another picture here. According to the back she is identified as the first one on the lower left. That is the same woman?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the record show that these photographs and pictures which have been shown to Mr. Vincent are pictures of Agnes Smedley, if that is the fact?

Senator FERGUSON. I think there is testimony on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The pictures have not been identified.

Mr. MORRIS. The picture has the caption "Agnes Smedley" and there is a designation "Agnes."

Mr. SOURWINE. How can that be identified for our record? Will you read what is on the back of it?

Mr. VINCENT. "Front row, left to right, Agnes Smedley" and somebody else. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be marked an exhibit, and so will the pamphlet.

(The pictures referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 381 and 381A" and were filed for the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Just for the sake of the record, I want to ask Mr. Vincent if he will put his initials somewhere on the back of the picture as the picture shown here. That is for his protection.

Senator FERGUSON. And the same under her name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just on the back of that photograph, to identify that as the one that is shown you, and which you have not recognized.

Mr. SURREY. Put "Shown to me this date."

Mr. SOURWINE. Whatever you wish. Otherwise, we could put in any picture.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon at 11:55 a. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, at the noon recess, we were discussing the notes you made of the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had read an excerpt from page 550 of the white paper with regard to a conversation you had with Mr. Soong, Dr. Soong, about the discussions of Mr. Wallace with Mr. Harriman, at Tashkent?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading further from your notes: "Specifically," meaning Mr. Vincent—

he told Dr. Soong that Mr. Stalin had agreed to President Roosevelt's point that support of President Chiang was advisable during the prosecution of the war, that Mr. Stalin had expressed a keen interest in there being reached a settlement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, basing his interest on the practical matter of more effective fighting against Japan rather than upon any ideological considerations; that Mr. Stalin had criticized the suspicious attitude of the Chinese regarding the Sakhalin agreement with Japan, and that Mr. Stalin felt the United States should assume a position of leadership in the Far East.

Is that your own best summary of what you told Dr. Soong at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my best summary of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a present recollection of the Harriman conference with Stalin as it was recounted to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not present at that, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. And I haven't seen the memorandum of that conversation with Stalin since that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee, sir, whether, in saying in your notes that Stalin based his interest in a settlement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists on the practical matter of more effective fighting rather than upon any ideological considerations, you are stating something which Mr. Stalin himself had told Ambassador Harriman, or stating merely Ambassador Harri-

man's understanding of Stalin's attitude, or stating merely your own interpretation of it?

MR. VINCENT. So far as I was capable of remembering the memorandum, I was reporting what Mr. Harriman had told me had taken place in his conversation with Stalin.

MR. SOURWINE. In other words, it is your impression, your understanding, that Stalin himself had made the distinction, had said, "I am interested in this from the standpoint of fighting the Japanese" rather than from the standpoint of any ideological consideration?

MR. VINCENT. That is my recollection of what Mr. Harriman told me.

MR. SOURWINE. Going over to page 553 of the white paper, the paragraph that begins near the bottom of the page, we find this sentence: "Mr. Vincent inquired as to the progress of conversations between the Communist representative in Chungking"—how do you pronounce that name?

MR. VINCENT. Lin Tso-han.

MR. SOURWINE. "And the Kuomintang representatives of which Dr. Chiang Tse-che was chief."

You were, in other words, saying in effect, "Let's talk about the question of how the negotiations are getting along between the Nationalists and the Communists"?

MR. VINCENT. We had an interest in how they were getting along. Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador, had indicated that they were talking.

Senator FERGUSON. They were what?

MR. VINCENT. That they were discussing this matter among themselves. I hadn't been back for a year, but this Lin Tso-han—I don't know who he was, but apparently I was told that he was a Communist delegate at that time.

MR. SOURWINE. Just before that, a different matter had been under discussion; is that correct?

MR. VINCENT. I will have to read this to see, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. Yes; that is a change of subject.

MR. SOURWINE. It was then one of the occasions where you brought about a change of subject in the conversations; is that correct?

MR. VINCENT. Well, I wouldn't say it was a very abrupt change in subject.

MR. SOURWINE. No; I did not characterize it as abrupt. You were opening up a new subject; you were changing the focus at that point.

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that because you did not want Mr. Wallace to discuss the other point?

MR. VINCENT. No. I mean, I have no recollection of that being in my mind, to change the subject. The conversation may have lapsed.

MR. SOURWINE. It was probably because this was a matter of particular interest to you and you wanted it brought up; right?

MR. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any instructions as to what to discuss in China when Mr. Wallace was there?

MR. VINCENT. You mean, did we receive any instructions from—
Senator FERGUSON. From the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; the State Department gave me no specific instructions as to what line of instructions, line of conversations; no.

Senator FERGUSON. They had given you warning, Mr. Hull had, not to permit Mr. Wallace to make promises; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had no instructions as to what to take up?

Mr. VINCENT. Myself; no.

Senator FERGUSON. With the respective parties?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Gauss himself was the Ambassador there, and any instructions about what was to be taken up would have come from him.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not give you any instructions?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Gauss did not give me any instructions. I talked with him, when I got there.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you figure the Wallace mission was? What were you trying to accomplish?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I was told at the time, it was the return of the visit that Madame Chiang had made to the United States the year before. I never did know exactly what.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only purpose; just a return courtesy call?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, then it was, too, just that occasion for Mr. Wallace to have conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. But what was he to accomplish? He was not to promise anything. What was he to accomplish?

Mr. VINCENT. You ask me something there, Mr. Chairman, that I don't know, what he was supposed to accomplish. He had himself a little note that he referred to from time to time, as to his conversations with Roosevelt before he left.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, whatever instructions he had came from the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And whatever instructions you had were that of a warning from the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Secretary of State had any mission for Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection that Mr. Wallace ever saw the Secretary of State before he went out. He may have; but I say I don't know what he did.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know that, if Mr. Wallace, was making a promise, he did not have a direct authority from the President to make it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because from time to time Mr. Wallace would refer to these rough notes he had taken in his conversations with the President, and the main idea of this was to go out and talk to Chiang Kai-shek about the situation in China and bring it back and report to him, insofar as I knew.

Senator FERGUSON. What were some of the things that Mr. Wallace had on these notes that he was to accomplish in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There is only one of them that I recall right now, and that was to try to bring about some kind of cessation or better relations between the Chinese groups for more effective fighting in China.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, were you at that time to get a combination of the Nationalists and Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. For more effective military operations.

Senator FERGUSON. For more effective military operations?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the emphasis at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will the Senator pardon me?

Do you mean that Mr. Wallace had been given instructions, to your knowledge, by the President, which were, in effect, a forerunner of instructions given General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. My meaning there is that Mr. Wallace, himself, told me that the President had indicated to Chiang that he was prepared to act as adviser or mediator to get them together, which showed that the President even at that time had an interest in trying to settle the internal dispute in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, still on that same page, and going back just a little bit above the passage that I read in my last question, you were recounting the remarks of Chiang, were you not—"it was his statement * * *" to quote your words as a matter of fact—"the Communists follow the orders of the Third International." It that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't see that here. Yes, I do.

This is Chiang speaking?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you. It is not you speaking is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will have to read this to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it would not be Mr. Wallace, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is General Chiang speaking there.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing) :

The Chinese Government cannot openly criticize the Communists for their connection with the Third International because it is afraid of offending the U. S. R. * * *.

That was Chiang himself, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a report as well as I understood Chiang's statement.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading) :

Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States—

That is Wallace speaking, your report of what he said?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing) :

and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that this difference in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communists might be explained by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communists seizing power; whereas, the Chinese Communists definitely desired to do so in China.

Now, going back to your reference to Mr. Wallace, can you give us any further details about Mr. Wallace's reference to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No more than there is right there, sir. I was trying to be just an accurate reporter of the conversations that were taking place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just how did Mr. Wallace refer to it? Did he say, "In our country the Communists are patriotic," or do you remember just what kind of words he used?

Mr. VINCENT. Other than what I have here, at this time, I do not recall. This was put down at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a generalization of what he said?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he probably had more words to say, but I put down here all I could recall at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. All you could recall at that time, and all you can recall now, is that he referred to the American Communists as patriotic?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what he meant by that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what he meant by that. That is his statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. He then said—and you are referring to Wallace—that "* * * the United States was far removed from the U. S. S. R." Is that Wallace or Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. That is Chiang, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is Chiang—"but that the U. S. S. R. would not feel safe if the Communists were not in power in China. He then laughingly remarked * * *." That is still Chiang, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

* * * He then laughingly remarked that the Chinese Communists were more communistic than the Russian Communists.

Do you know why Generalissimo Chiang should laugh about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did laugh?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your understanding that he was referring to the Chinese Communists being more communistic than the Russian Communists in the sense that they lived a more communal life, or that they were more indoctrinated with the principles of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist communism?

Just how did he refer to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't tell you. I don't know what was in the Generalissimo's mind at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you understand it?

Mr. VINCENT. I understood him to mean that they were more dangerous.

Mr. SOURWINE. More dangerous?

Mr. VINCENT. More communistic. It wasn't a case to my mind, but I was trying to remember here, that he wasn't referring to the fact that their doctrines were more of a Russian doctrine, but from his point of view they were a greater menace.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was saying that the Chinese Communists were more dangerous, more dangerous to him than the Russian Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was laughing about it?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, turning over to page 554, in the second paragraph, we find this sentence—and may I ask, sir, throughout these if, on any case in reading these, you feel that they are being taken out of context, will you please so say and indicate the whole context which should be read? These are necessarily notes which jumped around among a lot of subjects.

I am trying to read all of a note that had to do with a particular subject that was pertinent to the question.

If, in your opinion, I fail, please call attention to it.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think I have taken anything improperly out of context, so far?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that you did. I would have to read the whole thing, but it doesn't seem so to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. This sentence is on page 554:

President Roosevelt should bear in mind that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

That is a statement by Chiang, as you report it; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Wallace reported that to the President at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Vice President——

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, reported that to the President at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do so in his Kunming cable, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do so in this report which was transmitted under the January 10 date, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to reread that to see. Do you want me to read that?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Do you know whether he did?

I will rephrase the question. The report will speak for itself.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Do you think that was a fair statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was a statement of Chiang, and I think it was a fair statement from his point of view that that is what he thought actually at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without regard to what he thought, was it a fact at the time that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that the Communists were using U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they were making any effort in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. They probably were, which I don't recall. They probably were. At least, Chiang Kai-shek felt they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I am asking you what you thought.

Did you know of any efforts that the Communists were making in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize at that time that the Communists would like to have the force of the United States public opinion back of accession by the Kuomintang to Chinese Communist demands?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think there were people reporting that. The press were reporting it.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I say, did you realize that that is what the Chinese Communists wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am trying to think whether I had any obvious reason for realizing it at that time, that this is a flat statement of Chiang Kai-shek, and I am trying to think of what other evidence there might be, I mean, that would have come to my attention.

And as I say, I can't think of any specific thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American opinion in their favor.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know, and you do not now recall, anything that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I'm afraid I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you keep close track of what the Communists were doing in America?

Mr. VINCENT. Of what the American Communists were doing in America?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To sway public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. In this country?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You anticipated, from what was said here, that they apparently were doing something?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communists were doing something, that the Chinese Communists were doing something?

Senator FERGUSON. No, that the Communists in this country were doing something to sway opinion here that would sway opinion over in China.

Mr. VINCENT. In this statement?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not find anything in there to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I thought we were talking about Chinese Communists in here, and I think that is what Chiang Kai-shek was talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Chinese Communists. Were there any?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any Chinese Communists in this country?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not at that time, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, going down to the bottom of page 554 of the White Paper, we find this paragraph—

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment.

Do you think the IPR might have been acting to sway public opinion, as a pro-Communist organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You found no evidence in any of these writings that have been shown to you or that you have read?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time? No.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time or up to that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Up to that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing in any of these documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall anything up to that time of evidence that the IPR was trying to sway.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known of any pro-Communist activities in America up until that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1944? No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, up to the time this trip was made. You did not know that the Communists had been active along any line?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not following Communist propaganda or lines at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you had no knowledge about any of their activities in America?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge of their activities in this country at that time, in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that generally true in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say it was generally true in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it true in your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that it was generally true in my Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was assigned in your Department to keep track of what was going on among the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say no one was particularly assigned in the Far Eastern Office to keep track.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, as far as you know, there was not any one looking into that question at all?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Far Eastern Office, no, no one that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. No one that you knew. And do you not think you would know if there was someone?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I would know if there was someone in the Far Eastern Office specifically assigned to that task. There were people in the State Department who did have such jobs to do, I believe. They were security.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they report to your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. They didn't report to me. I don't know whether they reported to the higher-ups.

Senator FERGUSON. At least, in your Department, they did not report?

Mr. VINCENT. To me.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that there were people to look out for the security because of Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You know, then, they were a menace. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communist ideal was a menace; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But no one was assigned to look into the problem as to what they may be doing to change opinion here in America as far as China was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody in the Far Eastern Office that I knew of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No one in the Far Eastern Office. And that covered China?

Mr. VINCENT. That covered China.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph at the bottom of page 554, is:

Mr. Wallace was asked whether it was not possible to reach an understanding on a lower level with a view to maximum use of forces in the north. Mr. Vincent asked what President Chiang thought would be the adverse effects of sending the United States Army Intelligence group to Communist areas now without awaiting settlement.

Now, that was another occasion, was it not, on which you shifted the focus of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the next page, which is your account of the discussions of the morning of June 23:

Mr. Wallace reported conversations with General Marshall and with Secretary Stimson before leaving America in regard to China's situation in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. He and Mr. Vincent had decided upon this line of approach the night before in order to avoid further lengthy discussion of the Communists, per se.

That is, is it not, another instance in which you had guided the course of the conversation through a conference with Mr. Wallace alone, and not with Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, where I had given Mr. Wallace the best of my advice which I thought would save time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, and he had taken it?

Mr. VINCENT. But let me say here that these conversations are not fully reported because I didn't take a note on everything, and the conversation would go on for 3 hours. This is my quick note on what was said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. But you have, I am sure, endeavored to bring out all of the salient, all of the important points of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I had endeavored to; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were a trained observer in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So it is reasonable to assume that you have covered all of the important points, all of the salient points of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't promise that I have covered every salient point, because, as I say, this whole thing can be read and these conversations covered 3 hours. I was trying to clarify, because there would be very lengthy discussions, which then had to be translated, on the Communists, per se.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not deliberately leave anything out?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't deliberately leave anything out.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a case where, the night before; that is, June 22, there had been a rather involved conversation about the Communists, per se; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you wanted to avoid the continuance of that discussion the next day, so you discussed with Mr. Wallace what kind of an opening approach could be made to avoid it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Wallace took that line in opening the conversation the next day?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what he was trying to do, according to your statement here, is to persuade President Chiang that we, that is, the United States; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That we, the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. That we are not interested in Chinese Communists, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. You mean only in the prosecution of the war; right?

Mr. VINCENT. Interested in the Communists from the standpoint of the prosecution of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only from that standpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. Only from that standpoint.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record can be completely clear, by saying that Mr. Wallace reported his conversations with General Marshall and Secretary Stimson in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, and so forth, you do not mean any implication that he was just trying to persuade Chiang of something, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he reported it as a fact, and it was simply to get the conversations down to what he thought was some kind of progression along, to disabuse his mind of the fact that we were interested in communism and Communists in China, as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, you were not interested, Mr. Wallace was not interested, and the Government of this country was not interested in the Chinese Communists, per se, but only in the progress of the war against Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. That was what he had come out there to discuss, getting on with the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, from what was said on page 554, of what President Chiang had said about the Communists, particularly what they were doing in this country, did that not indicate to you that we should have an interest in it if we wanted a real prosecution of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because at that time, Mr. Chairman, what we were trying our best to do was to get some kind of joint military activity.

The Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese, and the Kuomintang were fighting the Japanese, and it was the hope of Mr. Wallace, of me, of the Army authorities, and the President to get those groups fighting in some kind of joint effort.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he not indicate the fact that the Communists were acting as they were acting, that that was interfering with the prosecution of the war, and that they were trying to use America, or American Chinese, to influence the opinion in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Influence opinion in the Far East, that is what his testimony, his statement, was here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; after you heard that, and returned to this country, did you pay any attention to Communist activities in this country as far as they related to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. To whatever came to my attention, I did; but I don't recall any specific instance of the Communist activity in this country, Chinese Communist activity.

Senator FERGUSON. You had great difficulty in determining whether or not propaganda or literature or statements were pro-Communist; have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I haven't; I don't think.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not? You would say this testimony did not indicate that you had difficulty in determining when a thing was pro-Communist?

When I read a Communist statement yesterday, you did not recognize it as pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified that I could not readily have a definition of what I would call procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if the statement that I read to you yesterday did not indicate to you that it was pro-Communist? Would you tell me what procommunism was back at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I haven't got a ready definition of what one would call procommunism in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you know what the State Department means when it uses the phrase "pro-Communist"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you not heard that phrase used in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department uses it in many contexts, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not always mean the same thing when used as a phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what it would mean at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not mean that?

Mr. VINCENT. There is one time when procommunism might mean sympathy, or, at another time, people working for communism or Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, have you not had any warning in the State Department about what is or is not pro-Communist, so that you may guard against Communist activity in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, any warning that one had about what is procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think you have had any warning?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew it was a menace, because you had a Security Department; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you know of no instructions or warning as to what communism really was or its menace?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no warnings that were given an officer in the State Department to alert him to what was a warning against communism or procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Communists might have been working right in the very Department.

Mr. VINCENT. But that was a matter of the Security Division, to try to find out whether Communists were working in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I see; so it was not up to the Department itself, it was up to some distant security officer—

Mr. VINCENT. No; that was an integral part of the Department, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many security officers worked in your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any?

Mr. VINCENT. In my Division?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that any worked in my Division, because it was a separate Division.

Senator FERGUSON. How would they be able to tell whether or not you had pro-Communists or even Communists in your Department, if none of them worked in there?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that they made investigations of the people as they were employed.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think that you can tell by an investigation when you employ a person as to whether or not he is a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well. I don't know whether you can or not. That was the intent of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think that by asking a man if he was a Communist you would ascertain the fact as to whether or not he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think you would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think you would?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think you would; but there were security investigations even back in those days, I imagine.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you only imagining that there were security investigations back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. I am saying that because I have not any direct familiarity with how the Security Division operated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, just to clear up one little point before we go back to your notes, is it your desire to leave the impression with the committee that the State Department considers that procommunism or the phrase "procommunism" is a relative phrase, that it covers a rather broad field of conduct, some of which is relatively harmless and some of which is serious?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I would want to leave that impression, but I just simply can't make what would be a definition of pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. When the State Department uses the appellation "pro-Communist," the State Department is always referring to a serious problem; is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department does not use the phrase "pro-Communist" to mean merely some one who has a slight ideological aberration from the normal; does it?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were using the phrase carelessly, I don't know. I mean that the common use——

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Department of State use the phrase "pro-Communist" carelessly?

Mr. VINCENT. What I was about to say, I don't recall frequent use of the phrase "pro-Communist" by the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question of frequency has not been asked, sir. The question is when the Department of State uses that phrase, if it does use that phrase, how is it meant?

Mr. VINCENT. It is meant to describe a person who is sympathetic with communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I would say would be a simple definition of "pro-Communist."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a definition. Now, can we talk about pro-communism in the frame of that definition from now on?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think we could; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, fine.

Now, reading from page 555 of the white paper:

Mr. Vincent again stressed the point that whereas he appreciated that President Chiang was faced with a very real problem in handling negotiations for a settlement with the Communists, the American Army was also faced with a very real problem with regard to obtaining intelligence from North China.

That was, was it not, another occasion when you brought up in these conversations the matter of sending a mission to North China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I was doing it after conversations with the American military there in Chungking, with the full knowledge and agreement of Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we find this sentence:

He—

referring to you—

pointed out that the American Army had no interest whatever in the Communists, but that it had for very urgent reasons an interest in carrying on the war against Japan from China.

Now, when you stated that the American Army had no interest whatever in Communists, did you mean to imply that the American Army had no interest either for or against the successes of the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. What that meant, by that, is that the American Army, to disabuse Chiang's mind of anything, they had no interest in the support of the Chinese Communists, per se. They wanted to get intelligence out of North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize at the time, did you feel at the time, that the American Army had any interest adverse to the success of the Chinese Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. The American Army's, at that time, interest was primarily, sir, the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, and I cannot vouch for what the Army's attitude was toward the Chinese Communists other than as the Chinese Communists were useful to the Army in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then your answer must be, must it not, that you did not know at the time of any adverse interest which the Army had to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That the American Army at that time was not in the position to take an adverse attitude because the Chinese Communists themselves were fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then what you were saying, is it not correct, is that the American Army had no interest either for or against the Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In taking a position against the Chinese Communists, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, going down into the next paragraph, sir, you were recounting what President Chiang had said, were you not, when you said this:

Much pressure has been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but the United States Government has exerted no pressure upon the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a statement, as I can see—is that Chiang saying that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking if it was not. I believe it was.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The sentence itself does not attribute it, but in context it seems clear you were reciting what Chiang had said.

He said that the American Government should issue a statement that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Government. He said that the United States Army attitude supported the Communists and requested Mr. Wallace, upon his return to America, to make it clear that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Government. That is all what Chiang said to Mr. Wallace and you, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, was Chiang stating matters factually as they then existed, when he said that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that Chiang was overstating the matter when he says that the American Army here—where is that statement?—that the United States Army attitude supported the Communists. I have no knowledge that that was a factual statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a factual statement that much pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that is also an overstatement.

Mr. Gauss had frequently spoken to Chiang, and so had some of the military commanders, about the vital necessity of their getting together in a military way for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do not think that constituted much pressure?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think it would constitute much pressure. I mean, it wasn't pressure in the sense of intervening. It was just from time to time the Chinese themselves were trying to get together.

The pressure was brought to bear as much by Chinese leaders to bring about some settlement and that therefore we were not introducing any subject that the Chinese were not familiar, or not themselves anxious to accomplish.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question, sir, is not who else brought pressure, but whether the United States brought much pressure.

Mr. VINCENT. The United States had certainly expressed its interest in many cases. I think "pressure" would be an overstatement—had expressed its interest in some kind of a settlement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you not tell us just a few minutes ago that Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to do that very thing?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to tell Chiang Kai-shek that the President was prepared, himself, if there was any opportunity for it—he would be glad to assist in getting them together; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not figure that that was some pressure, to send the Vice President out to see the President of China, to tell him to get together with the Communists, and if he could not do it alone, the President of the United States would mediate or help to get them together?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say that was expressing an interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not more than an interest? Was it not indicating that that is what the President wanted done?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think that it is what you would call exerting pressure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did not the President of the United States at that time, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, hold a position in world affairs and in world esteem such that if he conveyed a message directly to the sovereign of another nation through the second executive officer of this Nation, it could not fail to have a profound effect?

Mr. VINCENT. It could not fail to have a profound effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then was that not exerting substantial pressure, when he so conveyed his wishes and expressed his desires?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it true, sir, that the United States Government had exerted no pressure upon the Communists to reach a settlement with the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. The United States Government had no contact with the Communists, and I know of no pressure that was brought to bear on them.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a true statement, then, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Do you change your testimony? You say that the United States Government had no contact, when they sent the Vice President out there?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is with the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. With the Communists in China.

Senator FERGUSON. But with the President of China.

Mr. VINCENT. With the Communists. The question here—would you restate your question?

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you want to let it stand that we did not exert, as a nation, any pressure on the Chinese Government—that is, the Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have just testified that we did exert pressure on them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we in any way see the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We did not see the Communists at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Wallace see any Communists up there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that Mr. Wallace saw any Communists on his visit to Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you think over and see whether or not he did while he was in China on this mission?

Mr. MORRIS. Did he see Madame Sun Yat-sen while he was there?

Mr. VINCENT. He saw Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. MORRIS. She is a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. She was not a Communist that he knew of at that time. I didn't know of her at that time as a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn she was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. When she first went to Peking, and when I heard that she was a Communist, I had no direct knowledge that she was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Wallace go to any place where the Communists were in domination?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, he did not go?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as you know, he saw only Nationalist officials?

Mr. VINCENT. He saw only Nationalist and provincial officials, and American officials.

May I read from your own hearings here? This is Mr. Wallace's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. But I was saying, in fact:

He—

meaning the President—

asked me not to see the Communists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored the Communist cause.

That is Mr. Wallace's testimony here.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any such instructions?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no such instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, Mr. Vincent, up until the time you left the Far Eastern desk, or had any connection with it, that there were Communist fronts in this country?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would have known there were Communist fronts in this country. I don't know now what specifically they might have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any of them?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall them now. This would be in 1946-47.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the Far Eastern desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I left in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. The middle of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to that time, do you know of any?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't name any now.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you mentioned it, I have heard of it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether or not that was a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I have heard since it was; I don't know whether I knew then it was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't specify now that I did know at that time it was a Communist front.

Senator FERGUSON. You know now that the former Attorney General had found it to be a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I don't know at what time he found it to be a Communist front.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you name any?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether the Chinese Aid Council was a Communist front at that time or not.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are unable to name any Communist fronts?

Mr. VINCENT. From the memory of that time, I probably knew of them, but from my memory now, I can't recall what you would call a Communist-front organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what a Communist-front organization is?

Mr. VINCENT. It is an organization which does not take on real Communist character, but it is a front for the Communists, just what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. You have read some articles and books and pamphlets by the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that they were or were not a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say they were Communist front, from what knowledge I had of them at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that. I said, from what has been read here.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not say they were a Communist-front organization.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have established, then, have we not, Mr. Vincent, that in that one particular, that double-barreled statement, Chiang was correct when he said that pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but that the United States Government had not exerted pressure upon the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, at the bottom of that paragraph, you will note the sentence:

Mr. Vincent again pointed out that solution of President Chiang's important problems of relations with the Communists and the U. S. S. R. need not precede the dispatch of military observers to North China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was another occasion, was it not, on which you turned the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. And I will tell you why, because I myself had been in contact with the Army, and it was a matter which appealed to me because of their advice as one of the utmost importance. I had just been in Chungju, where we had B-29's flying out. There I was told of the urgent need for getting people into North China, to get Intelligence there for them, and it seemed to me to be the most urgent problem there was at the time, to try to get some kind of military group into this North China area.

It was a vacuum in all of our Intelligence work.

Mr. SOURWINE. And at that time, that is, at the conclusion or very near the conclusion of the morning session of June 23, you finally won your point and President Chiang said that the military observers would be permitted to go. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, over on to page 556, in the third paragraph from the bottom, we find this statement:

Mr. Vincent suggested that the best defense against communism in China was agrarian reform.

That is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Where is that statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is just this far down the page, here.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is, I believe, the third sentence in the paragraph, but I began with it because it appears to be a new thought at that time, and I am trying to find out if that is right.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a statement that, as I say, I would have made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; it is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I think in that case Mr. Wallace said that unity should express itself in the welfare of the people if communism was to be avoided.

Now, this was when we were having a conversation and the welfare of the people was mentioned. It was largely an agrarian population, and I simply added to that that the best defense against communism would be agrarian reform, meaning the welfare of the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the first mention of agrarian reform at that point in the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Agrarian reform is not a change in the subject. It is discussing the same subject but introducing a new idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is, shall we say, a particularization of the general subject of the welfare of the people?

Mr. VINCENT. Just exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to that extent, can we agree that what you did was, if not to change the conversation, to narrow it down to the agrarian reform at that point?

Mr. VINCENT. To narrow it down or to add to it that, for the welfare of the people, being 80 percent agriculture, agrarian reform would certainly contribute to the welfare of the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. The welfare of the people is a broader term, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So when you spoke of agrarian reform, you were narrowing the subject, if the previous subject had been the welfare of the people; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I was interpreting it down, sir. I was interpreting what the welfare of the people was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean that welfare of the people was wholly agrarian reform?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there must have been some area of welfare of the people outside of agrarian reform?

Mr. VINCENT. There would be, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the term "agrarian reform" is narrower than the term "welfare of the people"; is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. In this context, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you were narrowing it down, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. If you wish it that way, it was narrowing it down, but not much, when you have 80 percent of your population that are agricultural.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know why we quibble about this, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Because, in my own mind, that was not. It was just simply an explanatory statement of whether it would be welfare rather than narrowing it down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if we will look at the very last sentence, beginning on page 556:

Mr. Vincent made a brief recapitulation of the morning's conversation, and asked President Chiang whether his understanding was correct that the observer group might proceed to North China as soon as it was organized.

That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North China. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session was nailed down, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. This was a summary of the morning conversation, and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood.

Mr. SOURWINE. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 558, in the third paragraph from the top of the page, we find this:

A conference with regard to Pacific affairs was desirable, and the United States would be the logical place for such a conference.

Now, that was Chiang speaking; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't found that place yet, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 558, the third paragraph from the top.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, that is Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you say:

Madame Chiang interpolated to suggest that it be called the "North Pacific Conference." Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two re-

lated but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said—

that is, you said, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE [reading]:

He said that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, that was another occasion in which you directed the trend of the conversation; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. And I directed it at that time in keeping with what was my earlier understanding we have spoken of here, that the President's indication was to keep out of—not keep out of, but to not be a mediator between the Chinese and the Russians, which I would have interpreted a North Pacific conference to have been at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, in effect, what you were telling Chiang, was it not, was this: that he would have to settle his differences with the Chinese Communists before he could expect any American help with regard to a North Pacific conference such as Madame Chiang and he were urging?

Mr. VINCENT. I was expressing the opinion that a conversation between the Chinese and Soviet—I am speaking of the U. S. S. R. now, not the Chinese Communists—that a Sino-Soviet negotiation would be preferable in advance of any North Pacific conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I realize that that is what it says here, sir. But I had understood you, in your last answer, to say that you were following what you understood to be the President's desire to separate the question of conversations between the Chinese and Russia from the question of conversations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Did I misunderstand you?

Mr. VINCENT. That was true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I misunderstand?

Mr. VINCENT. No. But here we are speaking of Chiang introducing the subject of conferences with the U. S. S. R., and here we are speaking of possible conferences between the U. S. S. R. and China.

Senator FERGUSON. Taking your last view, did you not know that the Communists of China were under the control and domination of the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I did not know that they were under the control and domination of the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first come to that conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified already it was about 1945 that I began to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists were being directed from Moscow. As a matter of fact, in those days, Ambassador Hurley and the others had generally accepted the idea that the Russians were not interfering on the side of the Chinese Communists in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not believe Chiang when he told you and Mr. Wallace, when he told you that the Chinese Communists took their orders from the Third International?

Mr. VINCENT. We had no evidence that that was the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not consider Chiang's statement as evidence?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What had you to the contrary, that you did not believe Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Because there had been visitors to Moscow, and Moscow had itself said several times that they were not interfering in China, and we saw no evidence of it at that time. They weren't getting material aid.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had Chiang's statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That they were supported?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Whose statement did you have that it was not a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. We had the statements of people who were observers that did not see any evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean observers in China, that we saw no evidence that the Russians were in any way giving any aid to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. John Stewart Service had so reported, had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether he reported it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Ludden, did he so report?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any report from Ludden.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Emmerson so report?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall those reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a view held by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a view of Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the view of Edgar Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a view held by Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't read Epstein's book, so I don't know.

I know 6 months later it was a view held by Ambassador Hurley when he came back from Moscow, when he reported they were not supporting the Communists. And we saw no visual evidence of it there. When you mention these people, did they report it, I do not recall it.

But it was a generally accepted view of Gauss and all others, and all of us there. Therefore, it could have been of the names that you have mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you felt Chiang was wrong?

Mr. VINCENT. That any direct aid was given to the Chinese Communists? We saw no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. We were not talking about aid, we were talking about under the influence. Are you talking about aid?

Mr. VINCENT. I was talking about aid or influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us talk about influence?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what influence the Russians were exerting in Yen'an at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If any?

Mr. VINCENT. If any. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Chiang said they were, is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read his statement here to see whether he said they were influencing him or not. Do you recall what page that was on?

My recollection was that Chiang said that the Communists were not being aided by Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Not openly.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I can't find that quotation I was just trying to remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Here it is, on page 554:

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

So Chiang did claim they were connected, did he not? He said they were linked.

Mr. VINCENT. The quotation I had in mind, or the reference I had in mind, Mr. Chairman, was:

President Roosevelt—

this is Chiang speaking—

should bear in mind that the Communists do not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use U. S. A.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, openly. But down at the next part, where Mr. Wallace pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

That indicated clearly that they were so linked, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean, Mr. Wallace is certainly giving an "if" clause.

Senator FERGUSON. If they were as Chiang contended: Chiang was contending that they were linked.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any evidence that they were not?

Mr. VINCENT. That they were not linked?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You had at least Chiang's word that they were. Did you have any that they were not?

Mr. VINCENT. We were taking it purely from the standpoint of what was brought to them, and I don't recall any evidence that we had that they were getting support from—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about support. I am talking about being linked with them.

Mr. VINCENT. No; we had no evidence that I know of, other than Chiang's statement, that they were linked with them at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you did not take that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That statement, that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just want to be sure that the record speaks truly with regard to this matter of a North Pacific conference.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. What page is that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 558. Your note says:

Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two related but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in

regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said—

that is, you said—

that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, in view of that whole conversation right at that point, what Chiang had said, what Mrs. Chiang had said, what you said, I ask you were you not, in effect, telling Generalissimo Chiang that his nation could not expect any United States aid in bringing about a North Pacific conference until it had first settled its matters with Soviet Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I was indicating that it was preferable, from my mind, that they settle their own differences before they would call together a general North Pacific conference; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How does that differ from the way I phrased it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, you will have to rephrase.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not getting across to him the idea that he had better settle his affairs with Soviet Russia before he could expect any aid from this country in setting up a North Pacific conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not want to say it that way. I much prefer to say it my own way. It is that I was expressing an opinion that it would be advisable for them to settle their own differences before you got into any general North Pacific conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you making it clear to him that that was only your own, individual opinion and you were not intending to reflect the opinion of the American Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that General Chiang himself would have taken it in this conversation as an expression of my opinion in any discussion carried on there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And not reflecting the opinion of your Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as reflecting it as the opinion of my Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean in such conversation, on a very high diplomatic level, you would ever be presumed to have expressed an opinion not in complete accordance with that of your Government?

Mr. VINCENT. He would expect it to be in accord, but he didn't at that time, I don't believe, because he simply introduced the subject that very morning and I couldn't have had any consultation with the Government and, therefore, be expected to express a Government opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not expressing a Government opinion in a strict diplomatic sense. But he did know, as you have said, that he had a right to expect what you said to be in accord with your Government's opinion, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have a right to expect, although he had no reason to expect, I had consulted the Government, and was therefore speaking a Government opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace was there. If there had been a Government opinion to be transmitted, protocol would have required transmission through Wallace, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you were the Chief of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did General Chiang know that?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. He would expect that you would be familiar with your Nation's policies, would he not, particularly in that field?

Mr. VINCENT. He would.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that when you expressed an opinion, he, having a right to expect that you would not have expressed an opinion which was at odds with your Nation's policies, and knowing that you knew what your Nation's policies were, would be expected to think that you were expressing an opinion which was, in essence, the policy of your country, would he not?

Mr. VINCENT. There, again, you have to go back to the nature of these conversations. He suddenly introduces a subject here, and there was no attempt on my part to give him the feeling I was speaking Government policy.

They had introduced, as a speculative idea, "Why not have a North Pacific conference?" I expressed an opinion, and he certainly knew that I had no chance to express Government opinion at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us ask this question: Were you telling him that in your opinion he had better settle his differences with Soviet Russia before he looked for any help from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I was giving it as my opinion that it would be preferable for them to settle their own differences before we emerged in international conferences as suggested by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were an expert on China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To be an expert on China, do you think you should have known what was going on by the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I tried my best to keep myself informed on what was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was a volume in existence, Workers of All Countries, Unite, volume 7, Congress of the Communist International?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the volume. When was it published?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was such a book in 1939?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of the 23d to the 32d sittings, Continuation of Discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's Report? That is the manuscript cited to you yesterday and you couldn't recognize his pro-Communist leanings. Now I show you on page 293 of that, what the Communists in Russia themselves said about the Chinese Communists and ask you to read it into the record.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean right here?

The ideological, political, and organizational growth of the Communist Party in China is explained by the fact that it is being led by the Leninist Communist International, by the fact that it can utilize the experience of all sections of the Communist International and, primarily, the valuable experience

of the leading section of the Communist International—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. With that in mind you say you were correct in not giving any weight to Chiang's statement to Wallace and to you, as I read to you?

Mr. WALLACE also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement—

and that you as an expert on China should have known that you should take Chiang's word?

Mr. VINCENT. If I read this—

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it the duty of someone in the State Department to know that, and to advise you as Chief of the section? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. VINCENT. I know that and I had no knowledge of this at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out what the Communists of China were?

Mr. VINCENT. When I was in China, certainly I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find out? That book was in existence then.

Mr. VINCENT. We were viewing the problem of the Communists in China at that time, not this time, at that time, from the standpoint of fact that both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were fighting the Japanese, and that was the context in which we viewed it.

Senator FERGUSON. We have gotten off the subject. Let us go back. They were talking about the Communists of China being agrarian reformers, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. Who is "they"?

Senator FERGUSON. The people. Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard it; yes. I don't know whether you are speaking of Government people.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you have the writings of the Communist International telling you who the Chinese Communists are, Chiang telling you who they were, and you and Mr. Wallace came to the conclusion there was nothing in what Chiang told you, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That at that time that the Chinese Communists were not being directed from Moscow?

Senator FERGUSON. That was in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time there was a statement in the book by the Communist themselves, is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember, Mr. Vincent, testifying with regard to the question of any proposal that the Communists in China receive arms from America?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean testifying in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, or here.

Mr. VINCENT. In executive session. I don't recall down here. In executive session I remember testifying that toward the end of 1944

or early in 1945 the idea became generally bruited that we were going to try to make landings in north China, and my testimony upstairs in executive session was to that effect. I had a talk with General Wedemeyer in March of 1945 suggesting to him the possibility of getting arms to the Chinese Communists. That was the nature of the conversation. Mr. Grew himself had earlier in that year suggested that any troops that could be used to fight the Japanese should be used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that the proposal for arming the Communist Chinese was made formally and officially to Chiang within 2 weeks of the Wallace conversations with him.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it was made formally and officially to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say that it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. Within 2 weeks of the Marshall mission?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean of the Wallace mission. I do not recall that it was formally made that there should be arms within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the date of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable?

Mr. SOURWINE. The date of his Kunming cable was about June 26, I should say, is that right, or 28?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was drafted on the 26th and dispatched about the 28th, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that within less than 10 days after that message that the President of the United States sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek proposing the arming of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that there had been one sent?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the fact of a message telling them to arm the Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you ever write any memorandum that might have been used by the President, as to communism in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked or did you have supervision of any document or memorandum of advice to anyone on communism in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Reports were made from the field——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; I am talking about you.

Mr. VINCENT. I know I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see a report on it?

Mr. VINCENT. On communism as such in China?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall a report on communism in China. Reports were made by officers who were out in the field from time to time. To what extent they got to the President——

Senator FERGUSON. But you never saw them?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw them, the dispatches coming in from the field reporting on conditions in China including conditions——

Senator FERGUSON. As to what communism was?

Mr. VINCENT. As to what their idea of communism was, yes. Are you—I am talking about conditions in Communist China as far—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about conditions. I am talking about the party activity and whether or not it was under—

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall anything like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you then help to make the policy of the United States toward the Communists in China if you didn't have any support?

Mr. VINCENT. You made up your mind that the Communists were in China because of the reports you got of conditions in the Chinese Communist area.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you look at what the Communists themselves said?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not studying that at that time. You mean the earlier documents?

Senator FERGUSON. How could you advise without studying it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because we were faced with the situation there. Again I say, the Communists of China were fighting the Japanese. We were not studying what their ideological content was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't Chiang tell you there was a difference between the Communists in China, which wanted to take over the Government, and those in America? Now we find very little difference when we uncover what was going on in America, that they had the same intent there in China as they had here, to actually take over, but they had a much better chance in China. Isn't that what Chiang told you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You discounted that entirely?

Mr. VINCENT. No one discounted it; no, sir. What we were trying to get there was an agreement to fight against the Japanese. It wasn't a case of discounting or not discounting it.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you get that when the Chinese Communists wanted to become the government and were therefore fighting against Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but the Chinese Communists at that time were protesting that they did not want to take over the Government, not that that made it necessarily true, but the all-important fact was to utilize these Communist armies to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Today would you believe a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. I believed that the Chinese Communists were really fighting the Japanese and that is what we wanted them to do.

Senator FERGUSON. So you believed the Chinese Communists at that time—

Mr. VINCENT. Wanted to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. Did you believe Chinese Communists back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. When the Chinese Communists told me they were fighting the Japanese and we had visual evidence of it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But the fact that they didn't want to take over the National Government of China or the Government of China—did you believe them?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that any of them protested they were not going to take over the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you included that in one of your answers.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall including it. That the Chinese Communists had told me they did not want to take over the Government?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so the record may be clear, sir, did you have any visual evidence that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I? No; I never visited the areas. But people who did visit the areas reported they were fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had evidence of that kind in reports of witnesses? You used the phrase "visual," and I just wanted to clear that up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, who were some of these people who reported that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember one American coming down from the National City Bank, passing through, and he had seen conditions there. I don't recall what he others.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he? Will you tell us who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his name. I don't recall his name.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you give us the name of anybody who visually saw the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this was a man from the National City Bank. Excuse me. I haven't finished my answer.

Mr. MORRIS. If you know of anybody who visually experienced the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese, will you give us the names of those people?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the names of those people, but there were people coming in and out, so far as I recall, who did make reports, and there were newspaper reports to that effect, also of battles here, there, and yonder.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you have any connection whatever or any cooperation between the military intelligence of the War Department and the State Department? Was there close cooperation during the war?

Mr. VINCENT. Between military intelligence in the War Department and the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I should say there would be. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I want to show you a page from the Chinese Communist Movement, dated July 5, 1945. That is before the war ended. "Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C." This is "d." I ask you to read what the military intelligence said about the Communists in China. I will ask you then what you know about it.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

The Chinese Communist movement is part of an international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies

follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have supported loyally and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you explain why you as an expert and the head of this Division didn't know what the military intelligence thought about the Communists of China?

Mr. VINCENT. What is the date of this?

Senator FERGUSON. July 5, 1945, but it says from the beginning it was that. Here is the front page.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether this was available to me or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen it before?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing it before.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for at least that much cooperation between the State Department, which was making policy in relation to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Communist government in China, that you wouldn't get that?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I don't recall seeing it. I am not saying I did never see this; but—

Senator FERGUSON. Was it, Mr. Vincent, that the State Department at that time was not even slightly interested in communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly it is not the case. The State Department was interested in communism.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, then, why did you not know about what the Communists themselves had written, what our own G-2 in the War Department had written?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that you have to change your idea of what we were trying to do if we can pin this down to the specific situation we are talking about in China at that time, of trying to bring about some kind of military activity of a greater nature against the Japanese. That is what I am speaking of, a consciousness of what the international position of the Communists was—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. You told me you discounted what Chiang said, that you and Mr. Wallace didn't believe what he said. Now I am showing you these two documents and ask you as an expert on China why you didn't have that evidence along with Chiang's statement and now why you would discount his statement. You would not do it today; would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not do it today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, now that his intelligence report has been brought up and since it has been declassified, may I respectfully suggest that it be ordered printed as an appendix to the hearings of this subcommittee.

Senator FERGUSON. It is too large—

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not elsewhere available, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the circumstances, if it is not available in any other form, I will receive it and have it in the appendix of this report, because I think this is the kind of thing that may convince the American people of what was going on.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is an important historical document.

Mr. MORRIS. There will be other references to it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it in evidence now.

(The document referred to is printed as appendix II of this part.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you remember in discussing the matter of Mr. Wallace's Kunning cable, great stress was laid upon the recommendation that General Stilwell be replaced?

Mr. VINCENT. The necessity of replacing General Stilwell. Yes; that was in our minds something that was necessary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything as to what effect that may have had upon the President or upon American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. The effect of the recommendation?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I should think it was taken seriously by the President and the interested departments of government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What evidenced that?

Mr. VINCENT. The evidence of it was, so far as I can figure, that Stilwell was eventually relieved.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by eventually?

Mr. VINCENT. Within a matter of 2 or 3 months.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the President had very shortly after receiving the Kunning cable taken a step directly contrary to that recommendation, would that indicate to you that he was not very much impressed by the Wallace cable and the Wallace recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. It would. It would have to.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had taken such a step, that is, directly opposite to the Wallace recommendation, and then had a matter of 2 months or so after that changed his mind, would it indicate to you that it was something other than Mr. Wallace's recommendation that caused General Wedemeyer to be sent out?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was taking Mr. Wallace's recommendation plus whatever other thing happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the President did in fact very soon after receiving the Kunning cable take a step contrary to the recommendation therein made with regard to Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. I do. I recall—and I think it was a War Department-White House matter—that Stilwell was authorized to go over to Chiang and see him and recommend a unified command of all troops in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that mean?

Mr. VINCENT. That meant, so far as I can recollect, that Stilwell was to assume command of all forces in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't that necessary imply the arming of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. If Stilwell was going to take over all command?

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. VINCENT. It would imply the arming of them under his command and utilizing them as a unified army.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was, then, a proposal for arming the Chinese Communists, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. If it had been carried out in the way that I understood Stilwell wanted to carry it out, it would.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a proposal for arming the Chinese Communists, whether it was carried out or not, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a proposal that Stilwell would take command of all the troops, and I assume it would have followed from that that the Chinese Communists would have been utilized.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was necessarily implicit, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that proposal was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall when it was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because of the question of how long after the Kunming cable it was made, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to refer to page 1970 of State Department employee loyalty investigation hearings, previously referred to here, part 2, appendix, where, from the personal statement of John Stewart Service, appears this paragraph [reading]:

On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of messages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in China, Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge of the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in Burma, and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was considered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that there should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal procedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore ordered to accompany the chief of staff and to translate the telegram, phrase by phrase, to the Generalissimo himself. This was in effect a proposal that the Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if General Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies, this would include the Communists and that they would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American equipment. This was, so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On July 15—

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of this statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. The date of that was July 7, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Mr. SOURWINE. 1944. Which is 9 days after the Kunming cable was transmitted.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that while you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It was while I was on my way back. I think I arrived back on the 10th of July.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing reading):

On July 15 there was a second telegram from the President which I again was required to interpret for the Chief of Staff. I have been sure since then that my presence on these unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity toward me and to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very unwelcome demand.

It is understandable how General Chiang should have considered that an unwelcome demand, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. We had evidence later that it was an unwelcome demand.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Chief of Staff they were mentioning in there?

Mr. VINCENT. General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; it is the Chief of Staff of General Stilwell.

Mr. VINCENT. The Chinese Chief of Staff to Stilwell?

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the American Chief of Staff.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall who the American Chief of Staff to Stilwell was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Who do you think they were talking about in that cablegram there?

Mr. VINCENT. When they say Chief of Staff?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If the Chief of Staff at that time was still Ho Ying Chin, it was Ho Ying Chin; but there was another man named Chen Cheng who was Chief of Staff at one time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not named in Mr. Service's statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, to revert to a subject that we previously discussed, you remember the question of whether you asked for or received any security information on Max Granich.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Then let me ask you this question: Did you at the time of the question of the treatment of Mr. Granich and his publication—do you recall that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at that time ask for or receive any security report on Mr. Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for any. I seem to recall somewhere that a security report was included in that large file. That was my testimony, I think, last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did testify that you neither asked for nor received a separate security report, was that testimony in error?

Mr. VINCENT. That if I asked for it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or received a separate security report.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that so far as I can recall there was probably in that batch of papers, that I went over hurriedly, a security report on him. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring to such a security report as you would have had to sign for. You know what the procedure is in regard to that.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any security report that I had to sign for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you ever sent for a security report that you had to sign for when you received it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never have?

Mr. VINCENT. Back in those days; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on or about June 20, 1944, attend a conference at which John Stewart Service was present?

Mr. VINCENT. What time?

Mr. SOURWINE. About June 20, 1944. That would have been while you were in China with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. John Service would have been present at a conference that I would have had with General Ferris about this very mission into the north China area. But there was also the fact that Service himself attended one of the meetings in Chiang Kai-shek's house with General Ferris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than those two occasions, did you on or about June 20, and while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, attend a conference at which John Stewart Service was present?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the only two that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stewart Service and General Stilwell were both present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I do not recall, and I don't think he was in China during the period of our visit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stewart Service and Owen Lattimore were both present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, unless Owen Lattimore was present at this conference with General Ferris about sending a mission into north China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there was not a conference which you attended at which John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore, and General Stilwell were all present?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that the best I can recall I had a conference with General Ferris, but my recollection as to General Stilwell is that he never came north during this visit of ours, so that would eliminate him, and, insofar as whether Lattimore was present, I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If John Stewart Service or anyone else has reported such a conference, would you accept the report as true?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that his memory was in error because my distinct recollection is that General Stilwell never set foot in China while the Wallace Mission was in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yunnan while he was in China in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a visit by the Vice President to Yunnan discussed at all while he was over there?

Mr. VINCENT. A visit to Yen-an?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yunnan is what I am talking about.

Mr. VINCENT. Which is the same as Kunming. I want to get the Chinese straight. One of them is Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n, which is another name frequently used for Kunming. Yen-an, Y-e-n-a-n, was the capital of the Province of Shensi, of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You had better repeat your question and spell the word.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yen-an, Y-e-n-a-n, while he was in China in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no Communist headquarters at Yunnan that I know of, and if there were I am quite sure Mr. Wallace didn't visit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the question of a visit to Yen-an discussed with Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been, but I don't know that it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he opposed to such a visit?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say Mr. Gauss would have been opposed to a visit to Yen-an. By the Vice President, you are speaking of?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. We have already had the Vice President's testimony himself that he had been told by the President not to visit the Communist territory, and he did not visit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who coded the Kunming cable for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. It was sent out in Army code, so I assume that it was coded by some Army personnel.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that it was sent in Army code?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it was handed over to the Army and sent down to New Delhi for transmission from there.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom was it handed for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hand it over to somebody for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that Mr. Alsop handed it over to whoever would transmit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what became of the original copy?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Owen Lattimore accompany you and Mr. Wallace to Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he stay with you while you were there?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace and I stayed at Chennault's headquarters and that Mr. Lattimore stayed somewhere else, I don't know where.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to Chiang so far as you know?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have been acceptable to General Chiang, as I have already testified. I don't know whether he would have been acceptable—Did you say to the President?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Would he have been either desirable or acceptable from the standpoint of the War Department, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear a view expressed with regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't Mr. Alsop express the view that General Chennault would not have been acceptable?

Mr. VINCENT. To the War Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If he did I don't recall it. It was the general understanding that General Chennault would stay where he was and do the flying there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, you stated that you did visit Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Atcheson, the counsellor of the Embassy, go with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether Atcheson went with us or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Sun Fo at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Sun Fo was, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified to that. And I thought Sun Fo was present, and there was possibly another Chinese, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Madame Sun request Mr. Wallace and America to help the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory on that, but Madame Sun I know was in favor of bringing about some kind of united front to fight the Japanese. Whether that would be construed as aiding the Communists I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese Communists as the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall such phraseology, but Madame Sun Yat-sen had such ideas with regard to oppressed peoples. She was a very humanitarian woman and would have felt keenly about people she felt were oppressed, but whether she specifically mentioned the Communists as being oppressed I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she express any views with regard to broadening the political power of the Communists in China and permitting them to participate in the government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think she did. I am testifying here from memory and also from my knowledge of Madame Sun Yat-sen, that she would have made such a suggestion.

Mr. SOURWINE. What views did she express in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the exact views, but she was in favor of broadening the base of the government, like many people elsewhere, and I would have assumed that that would include bringing in the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the question of replacing Stilwell discussed at all at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall; but I say I am trusting to my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe Madame Sun Yat-sen would have raised the issue of replacing—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you raise it or Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think that the question would have been raised, of replacing Stilwell, at this meeting with Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that Stilwell was not discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say from my memory that Stilwell was not discussed, but I think it would seem to me illogical that we would have discussed with Madame Sun Yat-sen the replacement of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would it have been illogical?

Mr. VINCENT. Because Madame Sun at that time was a private citizen so far as we were concerned, and the whole problem of replacing General Stilwell would have been to my mind a very delicate one.

Senator FERGUSON. You were discussing the question of war and the relation of the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. This involved the future of an American military officer there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you go to see Madame Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before that the President—and the Vice President himself was so anxious to meet her and wanted to make a courtesy call.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because she was the wife of the President of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was a very important person, was she not?

Mr. VINCENT. She was an important person, but not politically at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not politically important?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe she would have been considered politically important at that time in China. She was an influence among

liberal groups, but politically insofar as the Government was concerned, she didn't have any position and I would not have considered that she was of great influence in the councils of the Government in China then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't she an outstanding spokesman, if not the outstanding spokesman, for the Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have considered her such; that she was an outstanding spokesman for the improvement of conditions in China, but to say that she was an outstanding spokesman for the Communists as such I do not recall that she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't it generally recognized in the diplomatic service at that time, particularly among those in China, in the Foreign Service, that Madame Sun was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think we recognized her as a Communist then. She had been associated with the Communists as early as 1926.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had never ceased that association, had she?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether she was a member of the Communist Party, I have testified before that we generally looked upon her as a person who was sympathetic toward the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had been since 1926; that is the date you mentioned?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, that is the date, but when the northern march came, in 1925 or '26.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had never ceased to be associated with them and sympathetic to them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was well known?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was an outstanding figure in China?

Mr. VINCENT. She was a very—I don't know whether you call it outstanding. Yes; an outstanding figure. The wife of the former President was an outstanding figure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any woman in China who was more outstanding at that time than Madame Sun Yat-sen, with the exception of Madame Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. And the possible exception of Madame H. H. Kung, her other sister. I would say that Madame Sun Yat-sen, depending on what group you are speaking of, would be looked upon as an outstanding woman, either before or after Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was certainly the outstanding pro-Communist woman in China, was she not?

Mr. VINCENT. She would have been so considered if you called her pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did call her pro-Communist?

Senator FERGUSON. You called her that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she say anything at the meeting of you and Mr. Wallace to indicate she was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. She did not, as I recall it, but as I say I am trying to recall the conversation from memory.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, February 1, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Senator Knowland, Senator Kem; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The Committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you in the summer of 1944 know that you had been recommended by Mr. Lauchlin Currie as one of the Government delegates to the IPR conference to be held the following winter?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that Mr. Lauchlin Currie recommended me as a delegate to the IPR conference in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be the 1945 conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever talk to you about it at all, going as a Government delegate to that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall talking to him about going to the conference; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett, the secretary of the IPR, was worried about whether Mr. Grew would let you attend that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I recall speaking to Mr. Grew about attending the conference, but I didn't know that Mr. Dennett was worried that I couldn't attend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Grew had expressed the view to Mr. Dennett that, since the conference would be discussing postwar plans, he, Grew, didn't see how anyone in the Department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself, upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know that Mr. Grew told that. Is that what Mr. Dennett told?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you knew of that.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know of that incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the problem raised by Mr. Grew's attitude in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think so. I sat in on a panel at the discussions there, at the IPR, and what turn those panel discussions took I could not possibly recall today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett had written to Mr. William C. Johnstone of the IPR, stating that "either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come?"

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Come where?

Mr. VINCENT. To the IPR conferences, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether anything was done about changing Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Grew, when he spoke to you about the matter, express any objection to your attending the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that he did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did he say when he spoke to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall, Mr. Sourwine, what Mr. Grew would have said. He made no objection to my going, because it was mentioned to him. It was cleared with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You volunteered that you did remember talking to Mr. Grew about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you remember about that conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. The only thing I remember is that I mentioned it to Mr. Grew, and Mr. Grew took no exception to my going.

Mr. SOURWINE. We mentioned yesterday the question of the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President after he returned to this country from his mission to China.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for any suggestions with regard to that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never discussed that written report of his after he got back here with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed with him at any time the question of whether he was going to make a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Only that I testified in executive session that he told me he was going over to see the President when he got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never saw a rough draft of that report or notes for that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor ever suggested any language for possible inclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore see the report or suggest language for inclusion or submit language?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, wasn't it unusual for a man to go out on a foreign-policy matter like Mr. Wallace's trip and then make a report to the President, and no copy of that go to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have called that unusual; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be unusual.

Mr. VINCENT. It would seem to me to be unusual, and I was surprised that he had ever done it when the question arose as to whether he had made one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other occasions where people would be sent out, particularly not on a secret mission, because you went along, a State Department official who made reports to the President, and no copies or any reports went to the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it have been that the President heard about the fact or something had happened about Mr. Grew's warning to you to not allow Mr. Wallace to make promises, that the report was not made back to Mr. Grew to ascertain whether promises were made?

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about Mr. Hull. I don't think that that would be a connection, but I would just have to give that as an opinion, because I don't think anybody knew. I never told Mr. Wallace, for instance, that Mr. Hull had told me to see to that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not tell Mr. Wallace that?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I didn't tell Mr. Wallace that Mr. Hull had made this one remark to me about his not——

Senator FERGUSON. Was this an unusual proceeding, to send a man out like that from the President? He had sent Mr. Lattimore at one time on the same kind of mission; had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No. It was a different kind of mission. Chiang Kai-shek himself had asked for somebody, and Lattimore went out. The Vice President went out at the President's suggestion for a brief trip to consult with Chiang Kai-shek and to return, as I understood it, the courtesy call of Madame Chiang the year before.

Mr. MORRIS. Who recommended Mr. Lattimore for that trip, the 1941 trip, to the Generalissimo?

Mr. VINCENT. The President recommended him so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the one who arranged for the appointment; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who arranged for his appointment to go out to be with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your testimony, Mr. Vincent, that you did not know who made the arrangements for Mr. Lattimore to go out?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know who made the arrangements for him to go out other than that the President sent him out at Chiang's request.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Mr. Currie made the recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Currie had been sent out by the President at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie was sent out by the President at one time while I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. While you were there. Did a report go back to the State Department from Mr. Currie on that trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know, Mr. Chairman, whether one did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever heard of one?

Mr. VINCENT. I myself never saw a report that Currie made of his trip to China in 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. How were you able to coordinate these matters in the field, in the State Department, and in the White House, if you did not know what these reports were showing or what these people found, or at least a report on that report telling you what they had found.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me something that I don't really feel competent to say, what the relationship was with the White House. The Vice President had gone out under instructions of the President. I have testified that it seems to me to be curious that we did not see his report. But why it was not sent over, I don't know. I don't know about Mr. Currie's report. I never saw a report of Mr. Currie's when he went out in 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. You were head of the China desk?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very important position?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, looking back, that the whole China situation was handled properly by the State Department, given the attention it should have, and the care?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was given as much attention as we were capable of giving it, sir; yes. I certainly gave it my full time and attention. I had nothing else to do but that.

Senator FERGUSON. But your information on communism as shown by yesterday's testimony was limited?

Mr. VINCENT. Was limited to the reports we got in from the field, I said yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the field, did you ever make a report on communism, when you were in the field in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have those reports?

Mr. VINCENT. There is one in the State Department that I recall now, made sometime in the year 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us a little better description so that we may ask for it?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give you the date, sir; but I know it was written in 1942, and I can tell you more or less what was said in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a rather long report, but I can remember some of the thoughts that were in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what was in it if you can.

Mr. VINCENT. That was a report which I wrote in which I distinctly recall saying that the Chinese Communist leaders were definitely Communists and not agrarian democrats. The general argumentation of the dispatch was to the effect that the Kuomintang or the National Government could cut the ground out from under the Communists if they would take some reform measures in the matter of land and in general handling of the popular difficulties of the Chinese people. I would have to reread it—

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general argumentation it was pointing out, as I said before and testified upstairs.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. We referred yesterday to your conversation with Madame Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the question was asked, then as to whether General Stilwell had been discussed; and, as I recall it, you said you did not remember whether that had been discussed.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I said I did not remember that it was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of view from any Chinese Communist source on Stilwell's removal?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not get any from any Communist source. I would doubt very seriously if Mr. Wallace got any expression of view on the removal of Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other report from a Communist source that was received by an American representative on the question?

Mr. VINCENT. Expressing a view on the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. SOURWINE. On Stilwell's removal.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you send in separate reports to the State Department or to the President while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, that is, any reports other than the notes that you transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I remember Sergei Goglidze as the man who made the toast during the trip in Siberia at some time or other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now remember that toast?

Mr. VINCENT. I can look here and find it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that it was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember that the toast was made now. I would not have remembered it, as I testified in executive session, had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it in his book. There were hundreds of toasts made during that time, and it did not impress me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many toasts were there at this particular dinner?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say there were probably as many toasts as there were guests, but I could not say with any exactitude.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a dozen, fifteen?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't even recall the occasion of the toast or the luncheon or the dinner, whichever it was. Usually in this group there were six or seven of us and probably an equal number of Russians, which would make as you say 12 people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did they drink the toast in?

Mr. VINCENT. They drank the toast usually in vodka.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this particular toast to you and Mr. Lattimore the first toast that was drunk?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine, whether it was the first, the middle one—

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the fifth or the tenth?

Mr. VINCENT. I see your point, but I cannot say whether it was the last one or the first one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see where it is leading?

Mr. VINCENT. I see where it is leading.

Senator FERGUSON. We understood you then, the larger the dinner party, the more toasts, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I make the statement here that Mr. Wallace did not drink vodka.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is the fellow who reported the Goglidze toast in detail in his book.

Senator FERGUSON. He seems to be the only one who remembered it.

Mr. VINCENT. It made no impression on me, but I won't say it was because it was the tenth toast.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the way back from China, sir, did you and Mr. Wallace fly?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore with you in the plane?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do on the way back? Did you work? Did you have work to do?

Mr. VINCENT. We worked as much as we could. We were doing fairly high flying and we were fairly sick one day flying back. We had to fly at 22,000 feet with no particular apparatus for it. But most of the time was taken up in assisting Mr. Wallace in writing a speech which he was to give in Seattle the first week of July. I have forgotten the date. We got back here by the 10th so he must have given the speech on the 8th or the 9th in Seattle.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, as soon as he got back he was to give this speech and you worked on that on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. We worked on that on the way back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Alsop with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the Wallace book, Mr. Vincent, where the toast was quoted?

Mr. VINCENT. I never read through it, sir. He sent me a copy and I regret to say I never did take the time to read that book.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not think that would be valuable in your position in the State Department? Here he had gone out and made this trip and came back.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I glanced through it but I never read it with any care. It was not concerned with my area. It was concerned with Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the record may be clear about the toast we are talking about, we are all referring to the toast where Goglidze said "To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future." Is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is the toast.

Mr. VINCENT. That is the toast as Mr. Wallace has reported it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you approve the book?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not approve the book. You mean did I approve of its contents or did I approve of it in advance of its publication?

Senator FERGUSON. No; its contents.

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify, because I have just said that I only glanced through it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know enough about it to approve or disapprove?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know enough about what Mr. Wallace had in the book.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think this toast meant when you heard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply thought it was the kind of a toast that a man would make as you usually make toasts, overstating the case but recognizing at least a fact which was that I at least—I don't know whether Lattimore did—had a certain amount of responsibility with regard to the future of China, since I was at that time Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon, sir, but I think your answer may give an impression that you don't intend. The chairman's question was, What did you think when you heard the toast? and you have testified here, as I understood it, that you don't remember hearing it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is quite correct. What I mean is what do I think of the toast now. At the time the toast was given, as I say, I have no recollection of the toast being given.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, those toasts were given at that dinner party, and I have no memory of it and would not have remembered it had not Mr. Wallace made a report of it in his book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at that time believe that you did share a great responsibility for the future of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't put it a great responsibility, but as Chief of the China Division I had some responsibility for the future of China insofar as American relations with China would have any effect on the future of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Were these people Communists who were giving this dinner?

Mr. VINCENT. Goglidze was a Communist. And I also assumed that any other Russian present, and there were usually a half dozen, were Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I felt that he was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and therefore would be pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. We have found one man now who is really pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he was a Communist, and I would naturally assume that he was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore assisted at all with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's Seattle speech, the one that was prepared in the airplane on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of his helping, but I would say it was quite logical that Lattimore would have helped with it because a portion of the speech was given over to conditions as Mr. Wallace found them in Siberia. Mr. Wallace himself had made, as I have noted, as we went along, copious notes on his Siberian trip, and to what extent he relied upon Lattimore I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of the conversations with Chiang mentioned in the Seattle speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall. I would have to have the speech here, but I am quite sure they weren't. May I say that the speech, if you haven't seen it, I don't know whether I have it here or not, was taken up largely with an estimate of the postwar commercial relations between the west coast of the United States and the Pacific area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether the preparation of that speech took up your available work time while you were on the plane on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. Pretty much so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't have time to do any other work on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall doing any other work.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got back from Chungking, sir, were you consulted about the question of establishing a Washington information center on the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Currie talk to you about that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no present knowledge of his ever talking to me about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Council of American Soviet Friendship had requested the establishment of such an information center?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to see Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the occurrence, but I would probably have seen Mr. Currie soon after I got back. I know one time was at one of the early meetings attended, was one of the meetings that he held in his office at the time he was still holding his meetings of far-eastern people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. In those meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. General far eastern things. I don't think records were made of them or anything. I attended only one meeting, and it seemed to be, as I have testified in executive session, meetings of experts from various departments in regard to far eastern problems.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you state definitely that you did or did not meet with Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot state definitely. If you would like for me to say, I would have considered it logical that I did see him soon after I got back. He was the White House assistant who was at that time under presidential direction, I suppose, to inquire into far eastern matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. He naturally would have been interested in the results of your trip, would he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He certainly would have been. You mean after we got back from the Wallace trip?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he would have been interested.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had talked with you about it before you went?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was logical that he would talk with you about it after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mortimer Graves? I believe you have testified on that point.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading in the hearings of this committee, exhibit No. 177, page 631, part 2, introduced on August 25, 1951, being a note from Mr. Graves to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, reading:

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for a discussion of a Washington information center on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself, but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian war relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent just back from Chungking.

Mr. VINCENT. Is that in 1943 or 1944?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am unable, sir, to place the date of this, and that is why I was asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you had said whether it was after I came back from the Wallace mission or whether it was when I came back from China for the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was simply asking you about the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. There is no date on it. What is your question, sir, or is that a question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether you had an appointment with Mr. Currie or an arrangement to see him after you did get back.

Mr. VINCENT. As I have just testified, I have no recollection of seeing him. You have read this. It would be logical for me to see him. I was trying to correct that in this sense, that in 1944, although Currie had still retained his White House position, at that time he was already operating as Deputy Director of the FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been logical for Mr. Currie to have consulted you about the question of a Washington information center for U. S. S. R., if that matter had been brought to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not consider it logical, and I have no recollection of being consulted on that matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it probably was coincidental that in Mr. Graves' note that matter was mentioned in the same note with the sentence about Mr. Currie waiting to see you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the way I had interpreted this letter. I saw it in my hurried reading of the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how well Mr. Currie knew Mr. Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I couldn't testify on that. I don't know to what extent the relationship was, or the closeness of the relationship between those two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever, Mr. Vincent, take part in the drafting or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. That is the message that we referred to in executive session, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you referring to the message which appears on page 560 of the white paper, the message under date of July 14, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to the message which we discussed in the executive session, which I think is that message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Would you see if that is the message you refer to?

Mr. VINCENT (after examining white paper). Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us, sir, what part you took in the drafting or preparation or submission of that message?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the drafting officer of that message. I would not want the inference drawn from that that I had the sole responsibility for its contents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it substantially changed after it left your hands?

Mr. VINCENT. No, it was not substantially changed as far as I can recall, but I am speaking now of in the matter of what kind of information was wanted in the message. I have no recollection of consultation with anybody, but I imagine that Mr. Wallace himself had in some way indicated to me what kind of message he wanted to go out, but I can't testify on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That message refers to two other documents, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection of those two other documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. As I have testified before, sir, I see they are mentioned here but I have no recollection of the contents of those two documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the general tenor of those two other documents?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have looked that up. You asked me that once before in the executive session. As I testified then, I have no recollection of that. I have looked it up now and have found that it was a message drafted in the special assistant's office in the State Department, Mr. McDermott, and that it passed through the China Division and was initialed by Mr. Chase, who was working for me, and by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing that I recall to do with its preparation. It was prepared in the office of the special assistant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it was going to be prepared before it was presented to you for initialing?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of having any knowledge of it before it was sent up to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was that message to be transmitted when you approved it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be transmitted to Mr. Gauss, the American Ambassador in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only direction of it that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any sense order the distribution of that document?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or direct where it should go?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not direct it or have anything to do with drafting it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a copy of the document in question, sir?

Mr. VINCENT (witness examining document). I have a copy here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would much rather talk about your copy, if you have a copy here.

Mr. VINCENT. I have it here, if you would like to have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see it, please?

Mr. VINCENT. That, I may explain, Mr. Sourwine, is a photostat of a press conference held by Mr. McDermott, the press man in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you have here, then, is not a copy. What you have here is a photostat of an actual transcript of a press conference at which Mr. McDermott read it, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Working from that may I ask the witness, is that paper of mine a copy of the document?

Mr. VINCENT. There are differences. The one I have here is longer than the report that you have here in this document.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have the copy that you have there. And will you tell us, Is that a photostat of the original State Department records?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a photostat of a press conference held by Mr. McDermott.

Mr. SOURWINE. A photostat of a transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That transcript is in the official records of the State Department; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Let me say this: This telegram as it is quoted here is quoted from the original telegram insofar as I am able to testify, but I haven't got the other telegram in front of me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was not present.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have that?

Mr. VINCENT. This was in 1950. I was in Switzerland when that happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is Mr. McDermott's press release of Friday, June 2, 1950?

Mr. SURREY. It begins on page 4 in connection with this item.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is addressed, Embassy, Chungking, from Hull, July 25, 1944.

July issue of Amerasia possibility of using Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping Japanese people to establish Government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department "will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called 'liberal elements' in Japan's present ruling class."

Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout eastern China should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla forces that are now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in north, but

also in central and southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow the policy adopted toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

Magazine denounces "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Government. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving that northern guerrilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in that resistance, despite constant "mopping up" campaigns by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese Government. Article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic support of local population. Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won the support of local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon Railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over 2 years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for success of our future offensive against Japanese.

Signed by Hull, HMB, SA/M.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same, as I checked it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

You said it was longer. What did you have in mind that was in this that was not in the other?

There is a word or two variation, but not in length.

Would the only difference be that a few articles such as "the" and "a" have been left out in the cable text that was read?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This does not purport to be a cable text, does it?

Mr. VINCENT. It doesn't seem to me to be, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the preparation of messages for sending by cable in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not familiar with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever prepare messages for sending by cable?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepare messages for sending by cable, but so far as distribution: no. I just prepare the message on a cable form, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you prepare a message for sending by cable, do you abbreviate it? Do you use "cablese" or do you write the message out and leave it to someone else on the cable desk to abbreviate it?

Mr. VINCENT. I write it out in ordinary English except for the possibility of the elimination of some articles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't that the message as it was written out in ordinary English and perhaps what Mr. McDermott read at the press conference was the "cablese"?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't testify on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us what those distribution symbols at the bottom of that message mean, or what any of them mean?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I could simply hazard the guess that these are distribution symbols which the office of Mr. McDermott used to put on them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what they meant? Or what any of them mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I think that last, "State FC/L," is foreign liaison, but I couldn't be sure whether that is the designation or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this message may be put in the record at this point immediately following the text of Mr. McDermott's press conference which was read into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received, and it will show the variation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 387," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 387

Secret

(JULY 28, 1944.)

(Message sent:) Chungking, China, July 25 (1005), Hull (Secretary)

FAR EAST

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the Japanese people to establish a Government who will discard the aggressive aims of the present ruling oligarchy.—The magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the U. S. State Department "will support the program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called 'liberal elements' in Japan's present ruling class."

The same issue proposed that the opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China should be strengthened by the Allies' establishing close working relations with the guerrilla forces now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in the North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. The article insists there is no reason the U. S. and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to the current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates the Allies follow the policy adopted toward the guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

The magazine denounces the "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo Tse-Kai that the Eighth Route Army has never fought the Japanese and condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put the blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that, for a long time, have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by the Central Government. It is asserted the vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at the time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only a short distance away in barracks that form an iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving the northern guerrilla forces have carried on their resistance to the Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating the people to participate in that resistance, despite the constant "mopping up" campaigns by the Japanese and the hostility on the part of the Chinese Government. The article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted the enthusiastic support of the local population. The Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won the support of the local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both the Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and the repeated efforts on the part of the Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride the Canton-Kowloon railway, the article reports, that although the Japanese have controlled

both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

Amerasia contends the time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition of the potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for the success of the U. S. future offensive against the Japanese.

GOMINCH F-0

GOMINCH F-20

Op-13

Op-16

Op-16-1

Op-16-F

Op-20-G

Op-16-A-3-1

State FC/L

EXHIBIT No. 377-A

JANUARY 2, 1952.

MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Due to unforeseen circumstances, your appearance before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

We had previously notified you that you would be asked to bring certain documents to enable the Committee to have full access to the facts. We are enclosing herewith a list of the documents which you are requested to bring with you.

We are notifying the State Department of our request in the interest of assuring full cooperation in the fulfillment of this request.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

(The 32 categories requested are the same as those appearing on pages 1915 and 1916.)

EXHIBIT No. 377-B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 14, 1952.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I have received your letter of January 2, 1952, postponing the date of my meeting with your Subcommittee on Internal Security from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

On September 7, 1951, I wrote you from my post at Tangier, Morocco, denying the allegation made by Budenz before your Subcommittee that I was a member of the Communist Party. I also requested an opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee in the event that you had any doubts as to my loyalty. I received no reply to my letter.

On November 9, 1951, after my return to Washington on home leave, I wrote you again. I then advised you that I had had an opportunity to read not only Budenz' testimony of August 23, 1951, before your Subcommittee, but also his subsequent reiteration of the same allegations on October 5, 1951, and that I desired an opportunity to meet with your Subcommittee before Christmas, because of my scheduled return to Tangier at the beginning of the year, for the purpose of denying publicly under oath the false testimony of Budenz.

On December 3, 1951, in reply to your letter of November 30, I stated that I could postpone my departure for my post in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January 11.

In response to my request, the Department of State has again authorized a delay in my departure in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January 24 or 25. I hope there will be no further postponements. I consider it highly important in the public interest as well as my own that I meet with your Subcommittee, but it is also in the public interest that I resume my duties in Morocco as soon as practicable.

With regard to your request that I bring with me State Department documents designated under 32 separate categories, I have to inform you that this is a matter for consideration by the Department of State. My own desire is, as it has been from the beginning, to assure you and other members of the Subcommittee that I am and always have been a loyal American official and citizen and to make available to you any further information that I may have to assist your Subcommittee in its inquiries regarding the internal security of the United States.

Sincerely,

[s] John Carter Vincent.
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask that instructions be given to the staff to ask the State Department to send down here someone who is familiar with their distribution symbols and can testify to what is meant by the distribution symbols at the bottom of this. May we ask that that person be down here at the beginning, if not before the conclusion this morning, at the beginning of the afternoon session?

Senator FERGUSON. If they can come down right away. See whether they can come immediately because it may help the witness on the matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we then pass over this until we have that testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I would like to ask some questions, but I will reserve them until that goes in.

I notice it is marked "secret." How do you have a secret press release?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, the first time I ever saw this thing it would have been marked "secret." I have no explanation of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The press release was in 1950, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. The press conference was in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. So Mr. McDermott, having read it to the press in 1950, removed the secrecy injunction and it need not be regarded?

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you understood it was a secret document?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am quite surprised to see that document marked "secret." It may have been marked "restricted" when it went out. Usually telegrams from State going to Chungking at that time used naval radio, and they had to be sent out in some kind of code. I was surprised to see that thing marked "secret."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on or about August 18, 1944, write a letter dated that date, August 18, 1944, to Mr. Raymond Dennett accepting an invitation to become a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the date, but I would say I must have written a letter accepting this invitation at some time. Therefore, I have no reason to question that the date is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you stated or implied here that your naming as a trustee was without your consent, that you had nothing to do with it, that they just named you and you learned about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. You mean that I had no idea that they were going to name me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have already testified that I had spoken to Mr. Grew about the matter of becoming a trustee. If I did not, in

executive session, it was my intention to. As I say, I testified that I had no recollection of a letter, but a letter may have been written and I don't deny that Mr. Dennett may have informed me that I was being elected or may have asked me whether I could be elected.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether instructions or orders were ever sent to Ambassador Hurley to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have no recollection of a telegram telling him to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists.

Mr. SOURWINE. "Instructions and orders" is a little more broad than "a telegram."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection at all of Mr. Hurley being instructed or ordered.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send or assist in sending such orders or instructions to Mr. Hurley?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as far as I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it, in 1944 and 1945, a Communist objective or aim to achieve removal of the Japanese Emperor so as to give the Communist type of "democratic elements" an opportunity to move into the government of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Was it the Chinese Communist aim?

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944, yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as having any knowledge on that subject, sir. I have no knowledge now and don't recall ever having any that that was an objective of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it, at about that time, a policy objective or aim of the Communists to secure removal from participation in Japanese affairs of the existing business and political leaders, and the breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial control so as to bring about social and economic disorders and permit the communistic democratic elements to take over?

Mr. VINCENT. You asked me to testify and I have no personal knowledge of that aim.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what the Communist aims and objectives were?

Mr. VINCENT. With regard to Japan at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you favor, or seek to further, either of the two objectives about which I have just inquired, that is, either the removal of the Emperor or the removal from participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial control?

Mr. VINCENT. In my position after I came into the State Department as chairman of SWNCC, both matters were discussed. We will take the first one first, which is the removal of the Japanese Emperor. There was a great deal of discussion as to his standing—

Senator FERGUSON. Will you speak a little louder.

Mr. VINCENT. As to his standing trial as a war criminal. My recollection, without notes in front of me, is that my position was stated fairly clearly in a radio forum address in early October 1945, in which I said that the Japanese Emperor or the institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese decided to retain the Emperor must be radically modified. That is my attitude on the Emperor question.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by radically modified?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant that the institution of the Emperor which theretofore or up to that time had been what we call an absolute mon-

archy would have to be modified into a constitutional monarchy if the Japanese retained the Emperor with responsibility to the elected representatives of the Japanese people.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to the matter of securing removal from participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large organizations, did you favor, or seek to further, that?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time I took over my chairmanship of SWNCC that was already adopted policy. I had no argument with the policy. I thought the breaking up of the large combines would further the economic development of Japan along democratic lines, along lines that would encourage the healthier economic development and away from what I would call the feudalistic capitalistic system of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it clear, then, sir, to you, that although you do not remember having any knowledge as to whether either of these things were Communist aims or objectives, since you did favor them you must have felt at the time that they were not Communist objectives? Would that be correct?

To put it another way, sir, you would not have favored these two things knowing that they were Communist objectives, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have favored them because they were Communist objectives. I cannot be responsible for any coincidence of papers worked out in the State Department in which I had a part and what the Communists at that time wished to accomplish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anything about the withdrawal of the Marines from China?

Mr. VINCENT. The withdrawal of the Marines from China was a matter under discussion almost continuously during early 1946; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department have anything to do with that?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department from time to time under pressure from public opinion here was interested in withdrawal of the Marines as soon as it could be accomplished without endangering our position in North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with that?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably took a position as subordinate officer in the State Department on the withdrawal I knew that I favored it, but the actual withdrawal, which was not completely accomplished until after I left for Switzerland, I would not recall a specific instance of my favoring the withdrawal except under the circumstances in which as I say when they were no longer needed. That was reiterated and reiterated in press conferences I remember held by the Secretary and the Under Secretary in response to press questions, when are the Marines going to be withdrawn. The answer always was, when they can be spared. Chiang Kai-shek himself had welcomed their being in there, but he himself had also stated in public, as I recall, that they would be withdrawn as soon as they had accomplished whatever mission they were there for, one of which was to assist in the Japanese surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever visited 155 East Forty-seventh Street in New York City, apartment 7-D, or any apartment in that building?

Mr. VINCENT. What would be the building? I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. 155 East Forty-seventh Street.

Mr. VINCENT. My knowledge of New York is not very clear, but I was just saying that I have visited people in New York—155 East—

Mr. SOURWINE. Forty-seventh Street.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of visiting anyone there. If you would try to refresh my memory—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a meal at Anthony's Steak House at 627 Lexington Avenue?

Mr. VINCENT. At Anthony's Steak House? I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944 and 1945 who in the State Department had authority with regard to the issuance of visas, do you recall?

Mr. VINCENT. I could look it up here, sir. I don't recall who the head of the Visa Department was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was only a preliminary question. The second question is, did you ever have anything to do with instructing embassies to issue visas?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever indirectly or directly instruct, that is, yourself or through your subordinates, the issuance of visas to any alien Communist writers?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I do not recall ever giving any instructions or causing to be issued visas to anybody, including Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not a member of that board during any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless the trusteeship ran over to some period into 1946. I don't know when they changed their trustees.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not contribute to the American Council during 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I have any recollection of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. During any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I have any recollection of.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking leading questions because we are covering territory that has been covered in executive session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you given to understand that even though you were a member of the board of trustees, you were not expected to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any definite statement being made to me that I would not be expected to contribute. I know I did not contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of IPR in that year who was listed as a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know why it was that you were a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you think they wanted you on the board?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified in executive session, sir, that it was the kind of organization that would like to have in it somebody from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did they want somebody from the State Department on the board?

Mr. VINCENT. Because they had had people from the State Department before. Dr. Hornbeck had been in it. They wanted somebody from the State Department. I don't know whether there was anybody else in that particular year from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that to lead the public, which was reading their books, pamphlets, and so forth, to believe that it had the backing of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, whether that was their intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you think they had in mind? Were you told?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never told what they had in mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you went on didn't you inquire anything about it? "Here, I am a trustee, and what am I to do?"

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not inquire what I was supposed to do. My understanding was that many people were trustees who never took any active part in the IPR trusteeship meetings. I don't even know whether they have trusteeship meetings. I presume they do have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you get that understanding?

Mr. VINCENT. From looking at the number of people who were on it, who couldn't possibly, it seems to me, be called together for trustee meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever attended a trustee meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever talked to anybody about a trustee meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever asked anybody who attended trustee meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever asked anybody whether you would be expected to attend trustee meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many people did you know, approximately, having their names on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall how many people there were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there as many as 50?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there as many as 500?

Mr. VINCENT. No; there wouldn't be 500.

Mr. SOURWINE. What difficulty would there have been about calling together any lesser number than 500?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say because the names they had, like for instance in 1949 General Marshall, I would assume that General Marshall didn't go to trusteeship meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never inquired?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know to this day whether he did or not; do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony is then, you want it to stand, that simply from the number of names on the board of trustees you assumed that it would not be an obligation of a trustee to attend meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. From the character of the names on there I would have assumed that not all the trustees went to the meetings, but I don't know. I would have to change the testimony, then, that I don't know who attended the meetings other than the fact that I didn't attend meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean there were names on that list of board of trustees who were obviously stooges or phoneyes to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, they were prominent people who I would have thought didn't come all the way, or to a trusteeship meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see anything unusual about prominent people being members of the board of trustees of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it occur to you that prominent persons probably wouldn't attend the meetings of that board?

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply trying to explain now that there was no occurring to me at that time whether people did or did not attend. You were asking me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just stated that from a perusal of the list of the board of trustees you arrived at the conclusion that the trustees were not expected to attend meetings.

Mr. VINCENT. I only perused, so far as I can recall, the list of the board of trustees only after I came back to the United States this time, seeing a list of the board of trustees in the hearings exhibited here.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was not at the time that you had accepted trusteeship?

Mr. VINCENT. That I perused it and came to the conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time you had no knowledge whatsoever as to what the duties of a trustee were?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never inquired of anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wrote a letter accepting trusteeship, membership on the board of trustees, with no knowledge as to what the duties were and without inquiring of anybody what the duties would be?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think, Mr. Vincent, this name of yours, being in the State Department, at the China desk, conveyed to the public as a trustee of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. You have asked me that, sir, and I don't know what the public would derive from that.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think it would convey to the public when you accepted?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I did not think, in accepting, of any effect my name as a trustee would have on the public.

Senator FERGUSON. You never thought of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not think of that. I did not take myself in a vein that the public would be impressed by my being on the board of trustees.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought of yourself in terms of a State Department official when you thought of yourself as going on the board of trustees of IPR, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was a State Department official.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought of yourself in that connotation and not just as John Carter Vincent, private citizen; didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. That I wouldn't want to testify, whether I thought at all that that was the reason I was being put on there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you stated that you knew they wanted State Department people on?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew they had State Department people on there before. Dr. Hornbeck had been on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you state they wanted you because you were a State Department person?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I was in the China Division; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Because I knew China.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew China and they wanted to convey, apparently, the idea that they had a trustee on this board who knew China and who was an expert and was directly connected with the United States Government. That is apparent; isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would certainly be logical, but you asked me whether I thought in those terms in accepting it. I am not trying to quibble.

Senator FERGUSON. No; and I am not trying to quibble with you, but the only way I can get an answer is as to what you did think. If you didn't think, I am not going to get an answer. Did you think at that time what this would mean to the public?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you, Mr. Chairman, I did not think of what it would mean to the public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the IPR have a democratic method of electing its trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what method the IPR had for electing its trustees, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see any of the literature of the IPR as to how your name was listed? Isn't it true they put under your name that you were with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen any of that literature, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, didn't you write to them to give instructions as to how your name was to be listed in the roll of those who attended the convention in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. How my name was to be listed?

Mr. SOURWINE. Exactly. Didn't you write to the IPR telling them that you were listed as (then giving your title) but that it was not necessary to use the whole title, including "Office of Far Eastern Affairs"?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall writing and telling them how to list me. I wouldn't have thought I had to write, but if I did it is certainly

something which has slipped my memory. They knew I was Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, of course they did, and they did list you that way, didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you through, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the ballot for the election on which you were elected a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that your name was one of six names on that ballot under the subheading "Washington," with the instruction at the top, "vote for six"?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. What duties, if any, did you perform as a member of the board of trustees of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall I performed no duties at all as a member of the board of trustees of IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have indicated that perhaps you were sought as a member of that board because of your expertness in your field. While you were a trustee did the IPR ever call upon you, as a trustee, for expert advice or opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have already testified, I saw members of the IPR from time to time. Mr. Dennett, as I have already testified, came to see me. Whether they came to see me in my capacity as a trustee of the IPR, whether they came to see me simply to discuss, as many people did, conditions in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, IPR people came to see you before and after you were a trustee, didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any increase in the number of them that came to see you while you were trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any increase or decrease of the numbers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any increase after you became or decrease after you ceased to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any charges of the IPR being controlled by a Communist or pro-Communist group?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read a report on the IPR prepared by a State Department investigator?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know such a report had been made?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the present date do you know that such a report was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge even to the current date that such a report was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know the State Department had been called upon for such a report and had refused to produce it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the hearings of this committee with regard to the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not all of them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time take any action for the purpose of bringing about a change or changes in the Department of State personnel assignments for the handling of far eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. The matter of changes in personnel in far-eastern matters was handled by the administrative section in personnel. I can't recall any instances of making their suggestions as to where people would go. I do recall that—I am thinking now of the ones that made an impression on me—remember recommending that Mr. Stanton be made Ambassador to Siam or Minister to Siam at the time, that was in 1945. But insofar as interfering or directing the assignment of people, I may have made recommendations from time to time as to assignments. I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were Director of the Far Eastern Division, were people hired in that Division without your knowledge, consent, or approval?

Mr. VINCENT. While I was Director?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I won't be consulted as Director of the Far Eastern Office in regard to people being hired unless it was a matter of hiring a new secretary or a higher officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone who was going to deal with policy would have to have your approval, wouldn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Practically, yes; theoretically he wouldn't have to have my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Secretary could always go over your head?

Mr. VINCENT. Go over my head and just send somebody in the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. But as a matter of form that wasn't done? You had the confidence of your superiors?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were therefore consulted about personnel changes in your department, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Of a major nature, of an important nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which involved policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever initiate any such changes?

Mr. VINCENT. We are speaking of the Far Eastern Office, are we, when I was Director, that period?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are certainly people dealing with the handling of far eastern matters.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I mean, I am speaking of a period now, because when I was Director of the Far Eastern Office I had much more to do with the organization of that office than I did when I was Chief of the China Division, and there was a Director and an Assistant Director. I am speaking when I was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is obvious. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall recommending the man who took the China Division at that time, who was Mr. Bill Turner. I am trying to think of the organization of the office. He was a Foreign Service officer whom I suggested to take that job.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you made many recommendations, didn't you, during the course of your tenure?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you wanted me to recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. I am just trying to establish the fact that you were the active head of that Office, that you were not a figurehead, that you did initiate recommendations, and pass on the recommendations of others.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any information to any person or persons outside the Department of State regarding changes sought or effected in the State Department's assignment of personnel for the handling of far eastern matters.

Mr. VINCENT. Will you read that again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you ever give any information to any person or persons outside the State Department regarding changes sought or effected in the State Department's personnel assignments dealing with far eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such conversations outside.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates do so with your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of their doing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall stating at a dinner in 1945 that "for 3 years I worked at nothing but to get the Communists and the Nationalist Government together in China."

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have said that?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I might have said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been a true statement at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been a true statement at that time; to get the Nationalists and the Communists to settle their differences.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever engage in a private correspondence with personnel of the Embassy staff in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. I am not much of a personal correspondent. At some time I exchanged a personal letter with somebody, George Atcheson or somebody else, but I have no recollection of personal correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever carry on such personal correspondence by way of the diplomatic pouch?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would there have been anything wrong with that if you had?

Mr. VINCENT. In getting things to Chungking it was about the only way we had of getting them there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything wrong in carrying personal stuff or sending personal stuff in a diplomatic pouch?

Mr. VINCENT. There is now, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there then?

Mr. VINCENT. To Chungking there was not because Chungking was an exception because it was so difficult to get in there. I don't know when the regulations were put in, but I know now you are expected not to use the pouch for purely personal matters, unless you put stamps on the letters; or, in some places, exception is made for it. I don't know what the regulations are.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had something when you were in China that you wanted to bring back with you, couldn't you have put it in a pouch and brought it back even though it was personal to you?

Mr. VINCENT. In Chungking during the war years you could.

Mr. SOURWINE. Couldn't you do that from another station?

Mr. VINCENT. Putting personal things in a Government pouch now is discouraged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose you had a friend and he said, "I want to get this back to the States, and I am afraid if I carry it I will have trouble with the authorities or will lose it, I will be questioned about it, you take it back for me," would you not be authorized to do that?

Mr. VINCENT. You are speaking of when? During the war years in China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. In the war years in China people who were trusted, people who were Government people, did use the pouch for that purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. But currently you are not supposed to put things in the pouch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean except in the China situation you couldn't do it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what prevailed in other areas. I am speaking only of the one that I had any knowledge of, that communications with Chungking were very difficult in those war years.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been at other stations, at other posts, was it permitted from other posts?

Mr. VINCENT. In Bern, where I most recently served, using the pouch for transmission of personal letters was discouraged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever use the pouch for bringing anything back to this country for a friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, but I may have from Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with bringing the manuscript of Berlin Diary back to this country?

Mr. VINCENT. I brought it through Spain; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you carry it?

Mr. VINCENT. I put it in my trunk.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who owned Berlin Diary at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. William Shirer was the author of the notes that I brought in my trunk through Spain in 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a matter of accommodation?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a matter of accommodation, because at that time Shirer was afraid that if it came out in private hands, that the Spaniards would see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it correct to say you favored political settlement of the dispute between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It is correct to say so, and I may add that Chiang Kai-shek on numerous occasions said he favored political settlement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by that phrase, "political settlement"?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant that they would settle their differences in political conferences, as they were trying to, in order to avoid, as I say, a disastrous civil war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Chiang Kai-shek mean the same thing when he used the same phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Kai-shek would mean the same thing, of bringing them into the Nationalist Government in some manner which would avoid conflict between them.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you attended that conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1945, did you do so as a member of the board of trustees or as a member of the American delegation to the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection, sir, is that I attended as just one member of the delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were invited to attend the conference sometime before you were elected a trustee, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. You have spoken to me of a letter here from Dennett in regard to my becoming a trustee and I don't recall whether I was asked to be a trustee before I was asked to go to the meeting. I would say that I was asked, my best recollection on attendance at the conference, being asked to be a trustee was somewhere near about the same time, but which came first or second, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not invited to a conference in the late summer of 1944 or earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have placed the time later but I have not clear memory as to what the time was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were given several months' notice, in any event?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recommended you for inclusion in that American delegation to the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated you made no speech at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I made no speech that I recall at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make a lengthy statement, 10 minutes or longer, at any discussion at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall making any lengthy discussion. I may have talked 5 minutes, and my recollection, as I testified in executive session, is that I took very little part in the panel discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got to Hot Springs, were you included in any preliminary meetings of any groups other than the conference groups in the official meetings and sessions of the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me to recall that?

I don't. I do not recall any political meeting. I should imagine the American group met. I don't know of any other meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. The American delegation group had met before you left to go to Hot Springs, had they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified in regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking of a meeting with not all but some members of the American group after you got to Hot Springs.

Mr. VINCENT. I think that the American delegation met, whether I attended all the meetings, every morning before the panel discussions took place, but whether every member of the American delegation was present at those morning meetings—I was not regularly present, but my memory as best as I can bring it to bear on this matter that I have

forgotten a great deal about, is that the American delegation did hold meetings preliminary to the day's discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Julian Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about him?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that in 1944 Julian Friedman was assigned to the Far Eastern Office, that he worked in the China Division for a matter of about a year, and that subsequently he went to China as a labor attaché.

My recollection is that before he came into the Far Eastern Office, that he had worked in some other office or division in the State Department concerned with labor matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his position in the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. He was simply one of the junior members of the staff. He had no specific duties except that he was trying to learn something about China preparatory to going out to China as a labor attaché. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not have a title of some kind? Was he just a clerk?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was one of those types of people—I am trying to think now what we called them in those days. He was not a Foreign Service officer and he was not Foreign Service reserve, because that title was created later.

Foreign Service auxiliary, I think, is what they called it at that time, but I don't know whether he was Foreign Service auxiliary or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I read you a description of Mr. Friedman, and ask you if it is correct:

Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately upon graduation from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he was hired by the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international economic affairs.

Mr. VINCENT. That was the job that he had before he came to the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what the job was when he came to the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether he had that title of junior divisional assistant, because it was a departmental title.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that title mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it meant just what it says, a junior divisional assistant, somebody who assisted as a junior in a division.

As I say, I don't know what division he was in, but I think he was in that division of labor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it about equivalent to third assistant supervisor of auxiliary functions?

Mr. VINCENT. It would depend on the man, but it was just about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He certainly took no demotion when he came into the Far Eastern Office, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether his title was changed or not, I don't know, but I don't think he would have taken a demotion in salary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with bringing him into the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve?

Mr. VINCENT. I neither approved nor disapproved. I don't think I was consulted. The first time I saw him, he was assigned to the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were Chief of the China Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Chief of the China Division. Assignments were made then to the Far Eastern Office, and people were assigned then to the Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean he was just foisted upon you without consultation with you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of being consulted on the employment of Julian Friedman.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean in the State Department the superiors will say to the head of a division, "Move your desk over in the corner, we are going to put another desk in the opposite corner, we have a man that is coming in here who is going to work with you"?

Mr. VINCENT. No. You mean his employment and transfer to the Far Eastern Office. I had nothing to do with that. After he came into the Office, he was no doubt assigned to the China Division. I was probably consulted by Mr. Ballantine or Mr. Grew as to whether that was an assignment for him. I have no recollection of interfering with the assignment one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at least consulted, then, when they moved him into your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I must have been consulted.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean physically, the room that you occupied.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would have been consulted. But you asked me whether I remember being consulted. I don't remember being consulted but it would be logical to be consulted.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did approve bringing him in?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony you did not initiate that in any way at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the suggestion for moving him into your office, for desk space roughly corresponding to your own, was not your suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. No. It came, I suppose, as a matter of discussion between Ballantine and myself or someone else as to whether I needed new personnel in the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. A person coming into that Office would have seen two desks, one on his right and one on his left, in the corners opposite the door?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether that was the Office—I know what you are speaking of now, when Friedman first joined the Division, but the Office when he occupied space with me was one of those large State rooms.

Mr. SOURWINE. A person coming in the door would have seen two desks, one on his right and one on his left?

Mr. VINCENT. People coming in the room would have seen a desk of a secretary immediately on the left. She did not have an outside room. They would have seen in the left-hand corner, as I recollect it, another desk. In the right-hand corner, on the far side, they would

have seen my desk and, as I recollect it, there was another desk against the wall immediately to the right.

MR. SOURWINE. Was that being occupied?

MR. VINCENT. That other desk was not occupied except as people came into the Division as visitors. General Hurley occupied it, incidentally, for a month.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Friedman share a secretary?

MR. VINCENT. I don't know whether he used the same secretary as I did or not, but if she wasn't busy, I would assume he did.

MR. MORRIS. Who occupied that desk?

MR. VINCENT. People would come in. I remember that General Hurley, when he visited the United States in March, General Hurley and I sat there in the room. I gave him my desk and I sat in the corner desk for about a month, but there would have been other people. We had very little room and there would have been other people to use that desk who were visiting from the field.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any security check that was ever made on Friedman?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't know of a security check on him.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman what material or information might be shown to Andrew Roth?

MR. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

MR. SOURWINE. Would you describe Mr. Friedman's full duties?

MR. VINCENT. I have tried to do that in executive session, sir. I wound up with the fact that he did just whatever job was assigned to him from time to time, to read dispatches when they were of particular interest on social or labor matters.

MR. SOURWINE. Did anybody ever assign work to him, other than you, when he was occupying office space with you?

MR. VINCENT. I couldn't testify exactly on that. I don't know whether the director or the deputy director would have assigned some. They could have assigned it to him.

MR. SOURWINE. Mainly; and, insofar as you know, any assignment he got came from you?

MR. VINCENT. Assignments he would have gotten were mainly from me.

MR. SOURWINE. What kind of assignments did you give him?

MR. VINCENT. As I say, he just did what other people gave him, just worked in the office and did jobs of reading dispatches when they were of one concern or another.

MR. SOURWINE. When he would read a dispatch, he would do it because you assigned him to do it?

MR. VINCENT. Either I or my deputy, the Assistant Chief.

MR. SOURWINE. Generally, you gave him most of the assignments?

MR. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify exactly on that.

MR. SOURWINE. You just did testify on that. Did you not say that generally you gave him most of his assignments?

MR. VINCENT. I said generally I would give him most of the assignments, or my deputy.

MR. SOURWINE. You did, on occasion, assign him to read dispatches; is that right?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. When you asked him to read a dispatch, why did you want him to read it?

Mr. VINCENT. In order for himself to become informed on it and, as the system was in those days, to put briefings on the dispatches so you would not have to read the whole dispatch.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was briefing dispatches for you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever prepare any memoranda for you on dispatches?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any memoranda, but he probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. The briefings did not constitute memoranda?

Mr. VINCENT. If you call a brief on the thing a memorandum. But sometimes, depending on the length, it would be a memorandum on one subject or another, but I don't remember any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever rough draft anything for you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether he did or not. He had the work there and he could have.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he there in July 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. In July 1946?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to look up his record here, if you have that book; but I think he had already gone to Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever dictate to your secretary for your signature?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had so dictated, would his initials ever appear anywhere on the letter or paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been normal procedure; if he had dictated a letter for my signature, it would have his initials in the lower left-hand corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not do that with some frequency?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether frequently or not, I assume he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had a man there who was in your Division whom you considered was competent to do the work. You gave him a lot of routine correspondence to handle for you?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say "probably"?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, he was there; I don't recall any specific instance. I don't recall any general instance, but he certainly was there earning whatever he was making and doing work. I would have assigned him to answer this letter or that letter. The answer is "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. You did do so?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not confine his assignments to reading dispatches and preparing briefings for you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You gave him other work?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that other work included the preparation of certain correspondence?

Mr. VINCENT. I can only say that it is logical to say that he would have prepared correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. What other kind of work did you give him?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't think of the specific types of work.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he kept busy?

Mr. VINCENT. He seemed to be busy to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have him run errands for you, personal errands?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever do any research for you?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been possible, that I had asked him to look into something, read something, to let me know what was in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was one of his functions, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that you never investigated his loyalty record.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never asked for his loyalty file?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. His security file?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I think in executive session you, yourself, said he was in San Francisco, so I know it from your report that he was in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Independently of anything I might have said, do you have any knowledge as to where he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; because I testified in executive session I didn't know where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, on the question of what I said, I told you that information had come to the committee that he was at the University of California. That does not necessarily place him at San Francisco, but he might be only a "bay" away.

Mr. VINCENT. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was he dropped or terminated at the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge as to why he was dropped or whether he himself resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed that matter with anyone?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing it. I was in Bern and I don't know the date when he was dropped or resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone ever tell you that Friedman was suspected of being the source of leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have seen that in the testimony here but at the time he was working with me nobody told me, as far as I know, that he was suspected of leaking.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one ever made those charges to you or told you about such charges or such suspicions?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody coming to me and accusing him of leaking.

Senator FERGUSON. You were never questioned about leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you not think you would recall an important matter like being questioned about leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Think a moment. Were you ever, while you were in the State Department, questioned about leaks from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Questioned about leaks from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge and belief, I don't recall being questioned about leaks from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked any questions about the loyalty of any employees in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I have been questioned about the loyalty of people after I got out to Bern because we would get letters from the Security Division there about people who had served or who had lived in Switzerland.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what we are trying to get at.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a system that was initiated. I am describing now a system which the State Department has which you call checks on people who apply for jobs.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that start?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say definitely when it started.

Senator FERGUSON. About when?

Mr. VINCENT. It had started when I went to the field, when I went out to Bern in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until 1947, had you ever been questioned about leaks in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been questioned about the loyalty of any person in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, prior to going into the field in the middle of 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall being questioned about leaks or loyalty of people in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Since you went to Bern, have you been questioned about leaks in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. Our office used to get letters, but I don't recall being questioned about leaks in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You had charge of the Far East desk at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not true that in the Amerasia case the papers were taken from the State Department or had been in the State Department and got to Amerasia and were published?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. And found in their office?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever questioned by anyone about those papers or how they may have gotten out of that office?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to think whether I was or not.

The reason I am hesitating here is because I am trying to figure—it is a perfectly logical question—as to what the logical answer would be.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest that you think about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say, Mr. Vincent, you were trying to think what a perfectly logical answer would be?

Mr. VINCENT. I said it is a logical question.

Senator FERGUSON. I have already given the question. Do not worry about the question being logical.

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to think whether at the existing time——

Senator FERGUSON. Can you not remember a thing like that, as important as it would be, about leaks or about papers being taken from the State Department, that you were questioned about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is just what I am trying to do, Senator, to see whether I can recall anybody asking me about the leaks in connection with the Service case, and I am trying to think of anybody I might have known in the Security Division that might have come up and questioned me about it. I think somebody did come up from the Security Division or somebody was sent up by the Security Division that did ask where papers were kept and asked about them at that time, what the files were.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you know about that investigation.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of the thing except that it was on the matter of where files were kept.

Senator FERGUSON. Where files were kept. Anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. Where files were kept in connection with the availability of papers to one person or another.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the explanation now as to the questioning?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the explanation, as far as I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. As to the investigation that was made?

Mr. VINCENT. As to the investigation, the only one I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did it take to complete the investigation, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know whether it was 10 minutes, 20 minutes, 30 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you no recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't recall back in 1945 how long a conversation I might have had.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw in the newspapers the question in the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that not refresh your memory? Was it not about that time you were questioned?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you meant the length of time. It was at the time of the Amerasia case, and I didn't even recall this in executive session, but I now think somebody came up.

Senator FERGUSON. You now only "think" there was some one. Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall somebody came up. I am trying to think who it was that came up, whether he came from the Security Division, whether he was sent up from the Security Division to ask how we kept papers, and that is all I recall of that particular instance. I thought you asked me of the length of the conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. All they did was to come in and ask how you kept the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of what the thing was about.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your best recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you can give this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean the whole investigation was in connection with the disappearance of papers from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about your share in it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of my share in it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you were questioned about?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I recall being questioned about.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that not an important matter to the State Department, papers being removed?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did some of them come out of your files?

Mr. VINCENT. I have since learned that some of them came out of my files; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only examination that was made is what you have told us about here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. That somebody was sent up by the Security Division. I imagine I can add to that; they asked me whether—

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would do more than imagine.

Mr. VINCENT. I say it was in connection with the Amerasia case and in connection with the disappearance of these papers that the man came up.

Senator FERGUSON. First, when I asked the question, you had absolutely forgotten about that.

Mr. VINCENT. I had forgotten whether anybody had come up or not.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Amerasia case was so unimportant that you had forgotten anybody had asked you about papers or leaks or anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. The Amerasia case took place in 1945. I was trying to do my best to remember if in any way I was questioned about the Amerasia case, and I have told you all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it is possible you may have been a member of the Communist Party in 1945 and now have forgotten it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you would remember that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure I would remember that.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you were concerned, did you make an investigation about the papers that were taken from your files? Whom did you question?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at that time who, or what papers had been taken from the files, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean they never told you what papers they were talking about when they investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. The FBI was keeping the papers, and I do not know what the exact papers were that were taken from the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to an FBI officer?

Mr. VINCENT. There may have been an FBI officer sent up by Security.

Senator FERGUSON. Just may have been? Do you not know if an FBI officer came in he would show you his picture and credentials?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because I don't recall being interviewed by an FBI officer except possibly on this one occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get it a little more definite than "possibly." Did you make an investigation about the papers or the leaks in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not make an independent investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to make an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall being asked to make an investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only thing that you can recall now is someone coming to you and asking where you kept the files; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. And who had access to the files.

Senator FERGUSON. And who had access to them. Is that all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave these papers to someone outside?

Mr. VINCENT. They might have, but I don't recall their asking me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think they might have?

Mr. VINCENT. I think they might have, and my answer would have been "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave the papers to Roth or Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me whether they did or didn't. I don't recall whether they did or didn't ask me whether I gave the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. They may have missed asking you that, the man in charge?

Mr. VINCENT. That may have been one of his questions, and my answer would have been "No."

Senator FERGUSON. It may have been. Did you know Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. I had seen Roth come in and out of the Department; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he ever been in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been in the office one time or another calling on Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you any questions about Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you any questions about Roth and Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether they did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you whether Roth had ever been in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall this conversation, whether they asked me specifically about Roth or not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the best you can do for this committee about this investigation of the leaks and the removal of papers from your files?

Mr. VINCENT. From my memory, that is the best I can do.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think this committee has been enlightened about this problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have liked to enlighten the committee more, but I do not recall exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask whether John Service came in and out of your office?

Mr. VINCENT. They probably did.

Senator FERGUSON. Just probably?

Mr. VINCENT. When I say that, I am not recalling the conversation, but it certainly would have been logical to ask for the disappearance

of the papers whether Service could come in or out of my office, and my answer would have been "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have as much trouble giving the Department heads and so forth, in your office, information as you do this committee of happenings in the past?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, that question was asked me yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. And I ask it again.

Mr. VINCENT. I answered it yesterday the same as I will answer today. If the Department asked me questions about something that happened 7 years ago, I would have equal difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. This was an important matter, the removal of papers from your office.

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was.

Senator FERGUSON. It cast a reflection on you personally: did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly could have.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all, just "could have"? Did you not take this matter seriously when this man came?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it?

Mr. VINCENT. I said he was somebody sent up by the Security Division of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you question Friedman about the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall interviewing Friedman about the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not strike you that, if Friedman was in the office and Roth came in to see Friedman and the papers were removed, you ought to ask Friedman about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That never struck you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. As I say, I wasn't, myself, conducting the investigation. As I say, I didn't interview or question Friedman about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though you were not conducting the examination, Mr. Vincent, I would have thought, and now think, that you would have been more interested in it than you have displayed to this committee. I must tell you frankly that I do not think you have been frank on this investigation that I have been asking you about.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have tried to be frank.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not believe you have been. I refer to the record, and the record will speak for itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when was the so-called Amerasia case? When were the papers discovered in the office of Amerasia? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the latter part of March or early April 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Toward the end of 1945, was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investigations growing out of the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investigations growing out of the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever consulted by anyone connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations about the possibility of surveillance or other activity which might drag the Institute of Pacific Relations into some kind of turmoil in connection with subversive charges?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge was I consulted about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically, did Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore or Mr. Lattimore ever see you about such a matter?

Mr. VINCENT. If they did, I am afraid I would have to make my usual statement, I don't recall their seeing me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to state if what I hand him is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a carbon copy of a letter, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And attached to it is an original of a letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom is the carbon copy letter addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Signed by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. Signed, Mrs. Marguerite Ann Stewart, Acting Administrative Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. How is the other letter addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. "Dear Peggy" and refers to Mrs. Marguerite Stewart, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. How is it signed?

Mr. MANDEL. Betty Ussachevsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I have those?

This letter, which is dated December 12, 1945, addressed to "Dear Eleanor," reads as follows:

I am going to read the whole letter, but we will get down to the meat in the coconut toward the end.

I have discussed the matter of your pinch hitter in Washington with ECC and he tells me that Phil Lilienthal is out of the picture. With Hilda gone, Pacco is too understaffed to spare him.

Do you know who Phil Lilienthal was?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified I have no recollection who Phil Lilienthal was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who the "Hilda" was that he referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Not by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. By that name or any other name?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless you give the last name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Hilda Austern?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I testified I didn't know Hilda Austern. I said I thought she was secretary to Carter. I may be wrong on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Pacco is, that is referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading the next paragraph of the letter:

As you surmised, he is not particularly interested in either Gretchen Green or Eleanor Perkins. I thought your suggestion about an old IPRite advisory

committee meeting at a regular weekly luncheon a masterful one, and think it should be started at once by you so that it will be in full swing for the newcomer. With regard to your accompanying suggestion of Ellen Atkinson, ECC asked how pink she is. I think this query was motivated by Betty's worries with regard to possible future trouble and, in that event, Carter does not favor Ellen's being associated with the IPR. He is, however, open to argument on this matter if you feel strongly that she has no pink reputation.

In the meantime, I have consulted the staff and Larry suggests Lillian Coville and Audrey Menefee, both of whom, I understand, have recently been let out of FCC.

Do you know Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I think, if the Audrey Menefee was connected as a script writer with NBC.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was Selden Menefee.

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Audrey Menefee is related to Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Miss Coville, in particular, sounds rather good and has already told Larry she would like a job in the IPR. Enclosed is a bit of dope about these two prepared by Shirley and Larry. Will you be good enough to try to get in touch with them and interview them?

I just received a note to Eugene Staley from Betty. Please tell her that he is the executive secretary of our San Francisco office and, in future, mail to him should be directed there. I shall forward this letter.

Now we come to what I characterize as the meat in the coconut:

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things.

Now, does that aid your recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Marguerite Ann Stewart, the acting administrative secretary of IPR, referred to you in a letter to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council of IPR as a trusted friend who might be in the know?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the "knows" was whether this party was pink or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what "these things" referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Do let me know what you think of Coville and Menefee as soon as you have had a chance to sound them out.

As ever,

(MRS.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Acting Administrative Secretary.

Did you know Marguerite Ann Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is any relation to Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. This second letter addressed to "Dear Peggy" and dated December 5, is on the stationery of the American Council of

IPR. I will read the first paragraph. It appears to be of little relevance:

DEAR PEGGY: I was very horrified to discover that I had not sent one of the school orders to you with the batch that I sent after we had moved here. I am enclosing it in this letter. It is dated October 25. I discovered it in a file box which I have just got around to sorting out. I hope that you can feel assured that we won't have any more delays like this and I am very sorry. I would fill this out myself except that Eleanor's pamphlet is listed and I think it better that you handle that request; also, so far we have established no machinery to take care of school discounts. The latter is something I'll take up with Tillie soon. Also, today it is quite difficult to get at our publications because of some workmen who are tearing apart a floor. I won't go on about this difficulty; it makes me absolutely profane.

This is the paragraph which is referred to in the previous letter when they said:

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things.

Now, I would like you to listen to this, if you will, and I am going to ask you when I am through whether you had any conversations or discussions about the subject matter of this letter with Mrs. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, or anyone else connected with IPR.

Something that has been on my mind these last few days and which I haven't yet mentioned to Eleanor since she has been in Ruxton, is a bit of news that you should have. I was told that there would again be all the business that preceded the arrest of the six. The warning was that this time-tailing, midnight raids, et cetera, tapping of wires might get started in an effort to establish a "Communist ring" and that the IPR would definitely be on the list, and that people who had been questioned during the case would be on the list as possible suspects in this ring. I must say that this warning has only made me angry and it hasn't in any way, or won't stop normal business here. The office of course, is quite accessible for searching, but I am at a loss as to what can be construed that is in our possession as being evidence of communism. At the same time, it is good to know that this process is going on because it shows that the "open" fight over on the Hill is employing under-cover methods that are malicious in intent. If this report is true, I am not sure whether or not the under-cover activities are being instigated by a small group of Republicans, by the Un-American Committee whom Hurley has stirred up, or by the FBI itself. However, it is dirty and it is quite possible to believe that every attempt to distort and twist facts will occur, and because of that we should be prepared to be on the offensive. That this whole mess of name-calling, the obscuring of issues, and all the red herrings that have cluttered up the perspective in the past is emerging again has made me feel sick; however, Peggy, I hope that people like you can insist that we take a belligerent stand if we are dragged in. Of course, I am not sure whether this information is true, but I can well believe it.

Cordially,

[S] Betty.
BETTY USSACHEVSKY.

Now, did you ever discuss the subject matter of that letter as such or as a subject with Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Mr. Owen Lattimore, or anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, discussing the subject matter of that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, can you not be more definite? Can you not be more definite after hearing that letter read?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I can be that definite, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not discuss the subject matter of that letter with anyone.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of the subject of that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the subject of that letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not heard that the IPR was going to be under investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard of any of the other things?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore any question having to do with surveillance of IPR members, searching of the IPR offices, or possible attempts to check the IPR for communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no current knowledge of having such a conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have had such a conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't deny that the Lattimores may have mentioned to me at some time they were afraid of the IPR. I have to testify I have no knowledge at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want that answer to my question read back. (The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say now?

Mr. VINCENT. What I said then was, in answer to Mr. Sourwine's question, I do not deny it is possible they did discuss it with me.

Senator FERGUSON. Discuss what with you?

Mr. VINCENT. The fact that the IPR might have been under investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. This letter is dated December 5, 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the first mention of red herring, Mr. Vincent?

Senator FERGUSON. In connection with communism.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify as to whether it was the first mention.

Senator FERGUSON. You know the words "red herring" in relation to investigations of communism became rather prominent later?

Mr. VINCENT. I heard that, yes, sir, when I was in Switzerland.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in Switzerland in 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here we have a girl who is worried about a possible investigation that might involve the IPR, using the phrase "red herring" in a letter to Mrs. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart forwards that letter to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and suggests that Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore get in touch with you about the matter.

Can you say definitely you never saw this letter of Betty Ussachevsky's?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say to the best of my knowledge and belief I never saw that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say definitely you never were told about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say definitely I have no recollection of ever being told about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a different thing.

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to say to the best of my knowledge and belief I did not see that letter nor was I told about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think you would remember that letter if you saw it before?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I would, yes, and therefore I am testifying to the best of my knowledge and belief I didn't see that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these two letters be inserted in the record at this point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, they will be received.

(The letters referred to are Exhibit No. 382-A and No. 382-B, and are read in full.)

Senator FERGUSON. You did have a conversation with one or both of the Lattimores?

Mr. VINCENT. From time to time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About the IPR and its connection with communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my testimony was that I said it would have been possible to have had a conversation but I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not help this committee at all, that it could be possible that you had such a conversation. I am asking you, did you ever have a conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not, but I am also testifying in response to your question that they might have mentioned it to me at some time. I am speaking now from my memory of 5 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Which do you think is the more probable, that they did or did not? You have given both ways in the record, as I recall it. Which is right?

Did they ever talk to you about the IPR and communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I am testifying that I have no recollection of their talking to me about communism in the IPR, but I am saying I am not denying that such a thing is possible for them to have discussed it with me, but based on my memory, on my memory, I do not recall such a conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not a lawyer, are you?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that you are under oath?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And have been under oath?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And are you giving now your best answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I am giving you the best answers.

Senator FERGUSON. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. VINCENT. I am telling you I have no recollection about the conversation in regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what the conversation was. I am asking you whether you ever had a conversation with both or either of the Lattimores about the IPR and communism.

Mr. VINCENT. I am telling you that I have no recollection of that conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not say that you did not have the conversation. It merely says now you have no recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. That is perfectly correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a mental reaction at the present time that you have no—

Mr. VINCENT. My memory does not inform me that I had a conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. So if we could prove you did, it would only be a matter that you did not remember it at this particular moment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to clean up one thing about Mr. Friedman. I have read you part of a description of Mr. Friedman. I would like to read the rest of it and ask you if it is accurate, so far as you know.

At the time of the Amerasia investigation, he—
that is Friedman—

held the rating of Division Assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the United States Department of State?

Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. What are you reading from, sir? I have already testified that he might have had the title of "Division Assistant." I did not recall his exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you were a pretty close friend of the Lattimores?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, after hearing these letters read to you, that they should have come to you and discussed this matter with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, we can go back to that again. I have said already that it is quite possible that the Lattimores had discussed it with me, but I cannot recall the occasion of any such discussion.

It could have happened later, but I went to Moscow with Mr. Byrnes 4 or 5 days after that letter was written, but the conversation could have taken place after I returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have Julian Friedman with you in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Julian Friedman was out in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference working on the Secretariat of the Conference.

I was assigned to the office that was set up under Mr. Ballantine to keep contact with the far eastern delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not have any contact with Mr. Friedman at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I saw Mr. Friedman at San Francisco. You asked me whether he was assigned to me at San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you whether you had him with you in San Francisco.

Mr. VINCENT. My answer is that he was in San Francisco at the same time I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the assignment to San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having anything to do with it. He, himself, independently tried to get the job.

There was a notice around to try to get people on the Secretariat, and he got that job for himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that assignment away from your office?

Mr. VINCENT. That assignment was away from my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not asked to approve that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have had to be asked to approve it.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you know you did approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. Either I approved it or the Deputy Chief of the Division approved it. I don't know who approved it. He asked for permission to go to San Francisco, and he would have had to ask permission from me. Who actually signed the order for him to go to San Francisco, I don't know. It wouldn't have been me, to sign his orders.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this morning it was ordered that a request be made of the State Department to send someone down here who was familiar with their distribution of documents and their distribution coding. I believe such a man is here. I would ask that he be sworn and that we hold Mr. Vincent on the stand while I ask a few questions of this gentleman from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT E. STUFFLEBEAM, CHIEF, DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your name, sir?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. Robert Stufflebeam.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your position with the Department of State?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. Chief of the Division of Communications and Records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Stufflebeam, I hand you a document which this morning was placed in the record of this committee. Will you read the heading?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. The underscored portion?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Just enough to identify what the document is.

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. This document is headed "Far East," and the first sentence reads:

The July issue of the *Amerasia* suggests possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the Japanese people to establish government—

Is that sufficient?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a two-page paper, is that correct?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. That is a two-page paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in the lower left-hand corner of the second page appear some symbols?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. There are a number of symbols there, which appear to be Navy organizational units.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say those are distribution symbols, those are symbols indicating the distribution of this paper?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. If the Navy uses a system similar to the system used by the State Department, those would probably be distribution symbols.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are not State Department distribution symbols?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. No. Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sufficiently familiar with the Navy Department distribution symbols to tell us what those symbols mean?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. I am not familiar enough to know what organizational units these would stand for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it appears that we have gone to the wrong place for our information. Perhaps we owe Mr. Stufflebeam an apology. I would suggest that he be excused and that we make a request of the Navy Department that they send us a man to try to identify these symbols.

The CHAIRMAN. There are none of those symbols that you can identify, is that right?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it instructed, Mr. Chairman, that the staff request the Navy Department to send someone up here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we hold this matter in abeyance until the Navy Department man gets here?

The CHAIRMAN. The matter will stand in abeyance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you remember testifying in executive session about the question of whether you ever gave or arranged a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you briefly summarize your testimony in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to the testimony? I think I testified then that I had no distinct recollection of it, that luncheons and dinners were given there, and that I did not know of any luncheon or dinner particularly that I had given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify that you might have arranged such luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that if you had, while you would have been host, the State Department would have paid for the luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. If I said I was host, I might have been host.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. I have since investigated to find out what this function is, which is the only one that I recall having any part in.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to find out, if you had checked up.

Mr. VINCENT. May I say that I found out that it occurred on January 23, 1945, after the termination of the IPR conference in Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. That is was a reception arranged primarily for the foreign delegates who had attended that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, delegates from foreign nations?

Mr. VINCENT. Delegates from foreign nations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who had attended the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Who had attended the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I said it was a reception. You mean it was a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No; a reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. The one I have in mind now. I don't recall a luncheon. It was a reception at which Mr. Grew—because at that time Mr. Grew was Under Secretary but was familiar with the area and familiar with some of the people, that Mr. Grew would act as host to this group of I would say distinguished foreigners. I have copied down here the names of some of them. If you would like me to—

Mr. SOURWINE. We would like those in a moment, sir, but I would like to ask you first what did you have to do with arranging this luncheon.

Mr. VINCENT. As far as the record shows—

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon. This reception.

Mr. VINCENT. This reception. Insofar as the record will show, I asked that invitations be sent down to Hot Springs, and I think it was there that I gave these people their invitations to attend this reception. I may have made a preliminary survey to see whether they would be in Washington at that date rather than just asking them without any anticipation that they would be there.

Mr. SOURWINE. So while Mr. Grew was the host, you were the, shall we say, major-domo of the affair?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the fellow who arranged for the foreigners. There were Americans present, too, which Mr. Ballentine, in the State Department who was Director of the Far Eastern Office, kindly arranged there to get the foreigners together.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many people were there altogether, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. About 60, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anywhere in existence a guest list for that reception?

Mr. VINCENT. There is, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether we have it here or not. It is in existence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you furnish it to the committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I can furnish it to the committee, yes sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have copied off certain names?

Mr. VINCENT. I have copied off quickly certain of the names. Not all 60 of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am going on and ask you to give us those names in a moment, but would you agree now that you will furnish the committee with the complete guest list?

Mr. VINCENT. I agree to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. May it be ordered, Mr. Chairman, that that list when furnished be inserted in the record at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Such will be the order.

(The document referred to is Exhibit No. 383 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 383

LIST OF GUESTS INVITED TO A RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. GREW, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, IN HONOR OF DELEGATES TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ON JANUARY 23, 1945, AT BLAIR-LEE HOUSE AT 6 O'CLOCK

IPR delegates and officials:

Bailey, K. H. (Australia)	The Secretary
Bolton, Hon. Frances P. (United States)	The Under Secretary
Belshaw, Horace (New Zealand)	Mr. Dunn
Bunche, Ralph (United States)	Mr. McLeish
Carter, Edward C. (United States)	Mr. Acheson
Chiang, Mon-lin (China)	Mr. Clayton
Dennett, Raymond (United States)	Mr. Hackworth
Eggleston, Sir Frederic (Australia)	Mr. Pasvolsky
Farmer, Victor (United Kingdom)	Mr. Edwin Wilson
Gyaw, the Honorable Sir Htoon Aung (United Kingdom)	Mr. Mathews
Hart, Admiral T. C. (United States)	Mr. Blakeslee
Johnstone, Wililam C. (United States)	Mr. Ballantine
Kunzru, H. N. (India)	Mr. Dooman
McDougall, Sir Raibeart (United Kingdom)	Mr. Stanton
Morizon, Colonel Victor (France)	Mr. Lockhart
Naggiar, Paul Emile (France)	Mr. Dickover
Pramoj, M. R. Seni (Thailand)	Mr. Vincent
Rao, B. Shiva (India)	Mr. Meyer
Reid, E. (Canada)	Mr. Steintorf
Shao, Yu-lin (China)	Mr. Williams
Turner, Bruce (New Zealand)	Mr. Moffat
Visman, Franx H. (Netherlands)	Mr. Dickey
Watt, Alan S. (Australia)	Mr. Taft
Yang, Yun-chu (China)	Mr. Julius Holmes
Yeh, George (China)	Mr. Haley
Zafra, Urbano A. (Philippines)	Mr. Peck
	Mr. Fearey
	Mr. Friedman
	Mr. Sol Bloom
	Mr. Eaton
	Senator Connally
	Senator Hiram Johnson

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the names you have copied off?

Mr. VINCENT. I have copied off some of the more prominent ones.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you see that list?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw that list a matter of 3 days ago, sometime this week after the question was raised.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got it from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I got it from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, there were about 60 guests. The foreigners included, I shall say, Chiang Mon-lin, who was the principal Chinese delegate—

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you spell these names for the reporter?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Mon-lin—C-h-i-a-n-g M-o-n-l-i-n.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the principal Chinese delegate, if I recollect. He was on the Chinese delegation.

Sir Andrew McFayden—M-c-F-a-y-d-e-n—I think that is the way it is spelled.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you talk about Mr. McFayden, was the Chinese gentleman you mentioned Nationalist Chinese or did he have some other connection?

Mr. VINCENT. He was Nationalist Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what position he occupies now. He was with the Nationalists and was an adviser. He is primarily an educationalist, who had been president of a university before the Japanese invasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. To save questions, as you mention each one of these names will you give a little thumbnail sketch about him and what his connection is so far as you know it?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir Andrew McFayden was the British or United Kingdom delegate. I had never met him before and don't know what his position was other than as a leading delegate for the British.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the IPR conference.

Mr. VINCENT. To the IPR. There was a Mr. Naggiar. He was French, and I don't know what his position was at that time, but he later became the French delegate to the Far Eastern Commission.

There was Sir Frederic Eggleston, who was at that time Australian Minister in Washington. He attended the conference.

There was a Mr. Zafra of the Philippine delegation. I know no more about him.

There was a Mr. George Yeh, of China. He came over from England and was at that time in the Chinese Embassy at Hongkong.

There was a Mr. Belshaw, of New Zealand, whom I cannot identify any further than that I recall the man.

There was a Mr. Bailey, of Australia. He was a member of the staff of the Australian legation, if I remember correctly.

There was a Mr. Reed, of Canada.

There was a Mr. Shao Yu-Lin, of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that?

Mr. VINCENT. Shao Yu-Lin; S-h-a-o Y-u-L-i-n. He was with the Chinese Government at that time and if he still occupies the same position he had when I was in China, he was with an information service with the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he still occupies the same position that he had when you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know what position he occupies now, sir. I haven't heard of him for years. He was a friend of mine in Chungking, and my testimony was if when he came over here in 1945, he still occupied the position when I had known him in Chungking, it would have been in connection with some kind of information service in the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is just another way of testifying that at the time you knew him in Chungking he was in some kind of information service, right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I thought you asked me whether he was now in it; in the Chinese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't mean to suggest that you think he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. There was a Mr. Turner, of New Zealand; a Mr. Farmer, of the United Kingdom. There was a Mister or Sir, Sir I have it, Sir Gyaw, of Burma. There was Colonel Morizon, of France.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do any of those people have Communist connections?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything more about Mr. Belshaw than you have told us?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Belshaw?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not know any more than I have told you about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know, then, whether he had any Communist connections?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the complete list as you copied it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the complete list. There were probably twice that many.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many names are there on that list?

Mr. VINCENT. There are 15, but there is a Mr. Pramog of Siam, who I see I skipped.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis did you select the 16 names that you have there?

Mr. VINCENT. I have selected the 16 names primarily on the basis that they would be available to come to a reception in Washington. Many of them were going back to their homes.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. You are answering that question in the connotation of why did you select them to be invited.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am glad to have that information. But what I meant was when you copied these 16 names down from the list of 60 on what basis did you copy these 16? Were they the only 16 foreigners or were they the only 16 people whose invitations you were responsible for or in what other category did they fall that you chose to copy down these names?

Mr. VINCENT. I copied these names down, my recollection, as being a representative of the people who were there.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a representative list of the people who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. These approximately 25 percent is a cross-section of those who were there, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any Americans there?

Mr. VINCENT. I was coming to that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. There was also present Mr. Carter, Edward Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. Of IPR, Edward C. Carter. Mr. Dennett of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond?

Mr. VINCENT. Raymond. There was present Admiral Hart, retired at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a member of the American delegation. That was the reason for his inclusion here.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that Tommy Hart, what is his first name?

Mr. VINCENT. The one who was in the Far East. I would not be able to know what his first name was.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Senator at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, he was a Senator at one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Tom Hart, then.

Mr. VINCENT. There was Mr. Johnstone, William Johnstone, George Washington University.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There was Mrs. Frances Bolton of the United States Congress.

Mr. SOURWINE. A Representative from Ohio?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, at that time, and a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference. There was Sol Bloom, Mr. Eaton, both of the United States Congress, House of Representatives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that Dr. Eaton?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. And there was Senator Connally.

I could not say with complete assurance that every one of these came because the check list I have did not show. I mention that simply because I do not have down Senator Johnson, Hiram Johnson, because there was a clear indication that he could not come.

From the Department we had besides Mr. Grew, who was host, and myself, there was Mr. Dunn and here I have given just a few of the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that James C. Dunn?

Mr. VINCENT. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary. There was Mr. Will Clayton, Under Secretary. There was Ballantine, of course. Mr. Dooman. Mr. Matthews, who at that time was Director of the European Office. Mr. Julius Holmes. There was Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Assistant Secretary at that time; yes. There was Charles Taft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Charles P. Taft?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And Mr. Hackworth.

That is all I have here. This is far from complete.

Mr. SOURWINE. George Hackworth?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; the American list, I mean the list from the State Department—I cannot be too sure how many of them came to it—was made up in the State Department and I don't know how many came. Looking back on it, I didn't even put the name down here. I think that the Secretary was included on the list but I would doubt that the Secretary got over to that reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a very strong top-level representation from the State Department, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and for that reason I question whether every one of them came. My recollection is that Mr. Will Clayton came. I am sure Mr. Grew came. They were all invited.

Mr. SOURWINE. An effort was made to get them there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the State Department paid for this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department. It was a State Department reception. I remember looking up, which I had not known before, how much it cost, and the reception for 59 or 60 people cost only \$53, which was a fairly good bargain.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't serve any food; did you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, we served food.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the decision as to who would be invited to this reception other than the suggestions that you have already said you made with regard to the foreign delegates?

Mr. VINCENT. To the ones who were down—No, I don't recall making any selection from the State Department people.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean did you designate or name or suggest any of those foreign delegates who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made out that list?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the one who would have handed them their invitations. My recollection is that the list was made up down in the IPR there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the list of people to be invited?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that include the IPR people, the Americans also?

Mr. VINCENT. It included those that I have mentioned here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The IPR people that I have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. And possibly some others.

Mr. VINCENT. Possibly some others.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there were any IPR people invited they were on the list that was made up down at the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the IPR didn't make up a list of the State Department people they wanted or did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I recall. The IPR did not make up the State Department list. In these papers I have seen the statement made that Mr. Ballentine said he would take care of the foreign list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at your request?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. It would have been the normal thing, I think, to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the request for the State Department people?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no record up there that I initiated it, but Mr. Ballantine would have understood the idea was to have these foreigners entertained by State Department people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whose idea was that originally?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't remember. It could have been mine, but as I say, whether I initiated or thought up the idea or whether it was

somebody in the IPR who thought it would be an excellent idea or whether it was even Ballantine who thought it would be a good idea, but I think——

MR. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving a letter, Mr. Vincent, in December of 1944 about the matter of this affair?

MR. VINCENT. I do not.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as a photostat of a letter from the IPR files?

MR. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a letter from the IPR files.

MR. SOURWINE. I show you this, Mr. Vincent, and ask you——

THE CHAIRMAN. Please identify it as to date.

MR. SOURWINE. I was going to ask Mr. Vincent to read it, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to identify it for the record.

MR. SOURWINE. This is a letter dated December 19, 1944, and signed Raymond Dennett, secretary, addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Would you read it, sir, and then tell us if that refreshes your recollection in any way?

MR. VINCENT. Read it just to myself?

MR. SOURWINE. If you wish, or aloud, sir.

MR. VINCENT. Yes. (Examining document.)

MR. SOURWINE. To what extent does that refresh your recollection?

MR. VINCENT. I would say that it refreshes my recollection to the extent that now that I see this letter it tells me how the matter was first initiated.

MR. SOURWINE. Tell us how the matter was first initiated.

MR. VINCENT. This matter was first initiated presumably by my speaking to or writing to Mr. Dennett about the matter.

MR. SOURWINE. Is that all that you can remember now?

MR. VINCENT. That is all I can remember now.

MR. SOURWINE. All right, Mr. Chairman, would you prefer that this letter be read into the record now or would you rather have it inserted?

THE CHAIRMAN. I think you might read it into the record now.

MR. SOURWINE. It is fairly short, sir.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: I was very pleased indeed with your suggestion that you might be able to arrange either for Mr. Grew or yourself to have seven or eight of the top members of the conference to a luncheon at Blair-Lee House in the week following the conclusion of our meeting. If it is acceptable to you, I would suggest that you try for a reservation at the Blair-Lee House January 23 or 24, as Mr. Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to have a luncheon on the Hill on Monday, January 22.

If you could confirm which date you would like to have the luncheon, we can keep it open, making up our list after we look the situation over in Hot Springs. The reason I ask that you confirm some date is that I suspect that Tom Connally may want to have a similar meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and I just don't want to get mixed up on our dates.

With cordial best wishes and sincerest thanks, I am,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary*.

He was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was he not?

MR. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Can you testify that your original suggestion was to have 7 or 8 of the top members of the conference to a luncheon?

MR. VINCENT. I can testify after reading that letter, but I would not have distinguished between that and the reception, and my testi-

mony would be that somewhere along the line we decided to have many more than just a luncheon and decide to have a reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is perfectly clear. You originally suggested 7 or 8 of the top delegates and between then and the time you held it, it grew into a luncheon for 60 people?

Mr. VINCENT. Reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reception, and a number of IPR people and a number of top State Department people?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the suggestions for the growth came from you or from the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether they came from one or the other. I would imagine that in this case they came from me, thinking it would be a better idea to get that many people together to try to meet some of the State Department people rather than to try to be selective and get only a few.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said the IPR made out a list, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, my testimony was that down at Hot Springs, whether I conferred with IPR people or not, was that I would have remembered that I made out the list of these people.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understood you to say that the IPR made out a list of the people who were to be invited to this reception, that they put on that list the names of the foreign delegates and that they put on that list the names of any IPR people who were there, but that the names of the State Department people were added separately at the Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I think if you will check back here it was a slip of the tongue.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember testifying to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that I testified that I chose the ones in Hot Springs and that Mr. Ballantine picked the foreign guests, I mean the American guests.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember testifying substantially as I just recited to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, and I think if you will check back I said that I picked out the ones down at the IPR conference, the members down there, and Mr. Ballantine chose the ones—

Mr. SOURWINE. The record, of course, will speak for itself, but I wanted to know what your memory at this time was.

Mr. VINCENT. My memory is that I, with probably some assistance from the IPR, went around and found out which ones of the delegates would be available for such a reception or luncheon, I don't know when the change from one to the other, to be given in Washington on or about the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who picked the IPR people to attend? Did you select those people?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my recollection, and that is what I thought I testified, that I picked them in consultation with, I suppose, these people themselves and with IPR people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the IPR give you a list of any kind?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them giving me a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you testify that they didn't give you a list?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify they did not give me a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you definitely do not remember that there was any list of people from the IPR in connection with this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall; as I say, I do not recall who picked the list. I thought I had picked the list of people by asking them and——

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not now recall having had any list from the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall having had it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not now recall having testified here concerning any list from the IPR; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That a list was received by me from the IPR? I do not recall testifying that I received a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you. Do you recall testifying here concerning any IPR list of people to be invited to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I do not recall receiving a list. The best of my recollection is that in consultation down there, presumably with other people, a list was made out more or less under my supervision.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall testifying here——

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, Were you a trustee of the IPR at this time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And listed on the letterhead of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this part of your duties as trustee, do you think?

Mr. VINCENT. No. The whole inception of this thing from my point of view was to get some of these distinguished foreigners together with some of our State Department people who were handling far-eastern problems or European problems and to have them meet. The main idea was to give them a reception, to give them some entertainment here in Washington after the conclusion of the conference there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you originally suggested that, sir, and at that time you were suggesting a luncheon——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you include in your suggestion among those to be invited Mr. Bloom and Mr. Connally and other Members of Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. No; my suggestions had only to do, as I recall it, with the foreigners, but again, if Mr. Dennett discussed it I would have said promptly it would have been a good idea to have members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had suggested it you would readily have acceded; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly would.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fact, did he suggest it or did you subsequently suggest that those men should be included?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as the papers in the State Department are concerned, I would have thought that Mr. Ballantine, who was in charge of getting invitations to the American guests, may have suggested it himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think that this letter that you have just read and which I subsequently read aloud, indicates that in acknowledging your suggestion Mr. Dennett was already bringing in names

of that nature? He mentioned Mr. Bloom and mentioned Mr. Connally?

Mr. VINCENT. That he was trying to get them, but you are asking me whether I might have suggested to him originally to get them and he tried to get them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated, did you not, that you did not originally suggest them.

Mr. VINCENT. I said I had no recollection of originally recommending Members of the House.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I asked you whether subsequently you first broached it or he did, and I understood you to start saying that you thought Mr. Ballantine first brought that subject up.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I thought Mr. Ballantine, in accordance with the memorandum I have seen in the State Department, was left with the matter of choosing and getting invitations to the foreigners—I mean to the Americans.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what?

Mr. VINCENT. To the American members.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now testifying that it was Mr. Ballantine's decision and Mr. Ballantine's initiative with regard to all of the Americans who were invited to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly the Americans that came from the State Department. I say, I don't see what the point here is, but if Mr. Dennett himself first suggested that we have Mr. Bloom and Senator Connally and the others, he would have had then to take it up with Mr. Ballantine because Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting out the invitations.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point here is very clear, sir. I will try to make it apparent.

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here was a reception which was held by the State Department, as a State Department function, which brought together high officials of the IPR, high officials of the State Department, and foreign delegates to the IPR convention and certain important and influential Members of Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This affair was brought about, you have testified, through your initiation originally.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question arises whether the concept of the whole affair as it finally was held was yours or whether your initial concept was seized upon and, through suggestion or otherwise, expanded by the IPR. In other words, to what extent the IPR influenced what was ultimately decided with regard to this reception. That is what I am trying to get at. If you will address yourself to that we will be very grateful.

Mr. VINCENT. I have to address myself to it in the same way that I have, that from a reading of Mr. Dennett's letter it would appear that he was going to contact the Congressmen. From a reading of the memo that I have up in the State Department, that Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting the Americans from the State Department, and that insofar as my recollection goes, the foreign guests at Hot Springs were chosen by me or in consultation with IPR people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That still leaves one category of guests at this reception, does it not, that you have not mentioned? To wit, the American IPR members.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who suggested their names? Who made up the list of American IPR people who were to be brought to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection. It might have been me. It might have been someone else. It might have been somebody down there. It would certainly have been very obvious to me to have Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have quickly jumped at the suggestion of Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have wanted to have Admiral Hart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would Mrs. Bolton have come under the IPR group or under the congressional group?

Mr. VINCENT. Mrs. Bolton would have come under the American delegation group. She was down there in Hot Springs. She would have been one in Hot Springs that I would have contacted to find out whether she could come, and the invitation would have been delivered to her in Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about American IPR people who were neither State Department nor congressional? Who decided which of those people were going to come?

Mr. VINCENT. Who were neither IPR—

Mr. SOURWINE. IPR people who were neither State Department nor congressional.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who made the final decision. As I say—

Mr. SOURWINE. If it wasn't you—

Mr. VINCENT. Mrs. Bolton. It would have been to me obvious to have Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Bolton doesn't fall within that category, does she? Mrs. Bolton was congressional, wasn't she?

Mr. VINCENT. She was congressional but was a member of the American delegation and was at Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stressed that fact several times. I am attempting to talk about IPR people who were neither congressional nor State Department. There were such, were there not?

Mr. VINCENT. There were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Who decided which people, in that category, were to come?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who decided. I would say it would have been quite easy for me to decide. The names here seem to me to be obvious people who would come.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list that included all the IPR people who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. All of the IPR people so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. There will be no names on this list you are going to furnish us—

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't promise I might not have missed a name. The list will be furnished you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you consult with the IPR about what IPR people were going to be invited?

Mr. VINCENT. I would naturally have consulted with them. I said I consulted with the people down there as to who were to be invited,

but I say here are the people that I have on here. I have on here also Senator Connally in that group. He was not a member of the——

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course. It was their suggestion, that is the IPR's suggestion, as to what IPR people should be invited, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Whose suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I can't recall. It would be perfectly logical for the IPR to have suggested people who would be coming to this reception. As far as I can see here there are four of them who were suggested.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. You will furnish the full list?

Mr. VINCENT. Five of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will furnish the full list?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I will furnish the full list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever discussed with Mr. Dennett plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall discussing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the matter of IPR activity in connection with the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, but again I will say I quite easily might have discussed with him that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest to Mr. Dennett that it might be very desirable for the IPR to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference, the San Francisco Conference, for the Far Eastern people at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express an opinion to Mr. Dennett with regard to the necessity or desirability of the IPR providing a staff of specialists to be available for consultation during the United Nations Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, if I had a conversation of that kind with Mr. Dennett I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have had a conversation like that with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I could have had a conversation with him like that. I knew Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. At a time when the State Department was marshaling all of its own specialists to go to San Francisco, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was, but not all of them. Many people went out to the San Francisco Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly the Department sent its best qualified people out, didn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. The best available qualified people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might at that time have expressed to Mr. Dennett the desirability or necessity of IPR providing a staff of specialists for consultation?

Mr. VINCENT. Consultation at the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I do not recall suggesting it to him. You mean for the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean to be on the staff of the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. To be available for consultation during the Conference, an unofficial expert staff, so to speak.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I have no recollection of an instance of that kind, but it would seem—

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been unusual?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not have been unusual to discuss with Mr. Dennett having people out there because there were many foreign delegates coming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it be possible that you ever talked with Mr. Dennett about that matter in the presence of Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. Alger Hiss was Secretary-General of the Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. You say could it be possible? I don't recall it, but it could be possible. He was in San Francisco if this conversation which I don't recall took place in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Hiss ever confer jointly here in Washington with Mr. Dennett about the matter of IPR activity at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, sir, any conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say by that that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I said I do not recall such a conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you conferred with Mr. Dennett about the United Nations Conference, did you at that time know that Mr. Dennett had also conferred in that connection with Mr. Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, so far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Hiss was, as you stated, in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference at San Francisco, wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hiss was Secretary General of the Conference, but I don't know whether he was in charge of arrangements in advance of the Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know to what extent Mr. Hiss' connection, if any, with the UN Conference at San Francisco was known early in March of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. I have testified here that Mr. Hiss was at that time in charge of some kind of activities which had been connected with Dumbarton Oaks. He had left Dr. Hornbeck's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it public knowledge at that time that Mr. Hiss was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco? That is, in March of 1945 was it known that Mr. Hiss was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was public knowledge or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it known to you?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say I don't recall myself whether he was actually in charge of arrangements or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Dennett probable length of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing the probable length of the conference with him. As I say, I could have.

Mr. SOURWINE. In early March of 1945 was it the policy of the State Department to encourage or to discourage the plans of private organizations to be present at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify to that from exact knowledge, but I would say again that it was probably to encourage private organizations to come out to San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was State Department policy at that time to encourage private organizations to be present in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge of it, but you are asking me whether I would have thought it would be and I say yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did talk with Mr. Dennett as the questions I have asked you would appear to indicate, and as you have not negatived, if you did so talk with Mr. Dennett, would you say that that was not contrary to any general rule or policy of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have. As I say, I don't recall the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you indicated to Mr. Dennett in March of 1945, early March, or about that time, that the State Department would welcome a move on the part of the Institution of Pacific Relations with regard to defining and making arrangements for the Institute's activity in San Francisco in connection with the UN Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall the conversation, but again I say that it is a perfectly reasonable conversation to have had if the IPR were coming out to San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist or were you ever asked to assist in the securing of air priorities for Mr. Dennett or any other official or representative of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have assisted them in getting air priorities to go to San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how I would have been able to get them air priorities, but if I did it would be the first time in my recollection I ever got air priorities for anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have been asked to assist them?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify this as having been taken from the files of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. This document dated March 5, 1945, addressed to Admiral John W. Greenslade, from Raymond Dennett, is a photostat of a document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this letter is two pages, but I think we should take the time to read it. May I have the permission of the Chair?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Saturday I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Department, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is pertinent to our plans.

I ask you again at that point, suspending the reading for a moment—the date of this letter is March 5—do you know whether on March 5, 1945, it was general knowledge that Alger Hiss was going to be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I still cannot say that I knew it was general knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I interrupt there. On March 5, 1945, did you know the contents of the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On March 5.

Mr. VINCENT. On March 5 I still did not know the contents. I have testified to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get the date.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they had been published at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The Yalta agreement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite certain it had not been published by March 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say now that the Yalta agreement or agreements were favorable to the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Senator, I testified in executive session that I did not think they were favorable. I described them as nearly as I could as setting the wheels back, that they were retrogressive, that they had the possibilities of setting up a preferential position in Manchuria for the Russians, and I spoke of them as agreements which would be inimical to our own foreign—

Senator FERGUSON. You were very critical of them?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in July.

Senator FERGUSON. When you learned about them you say now that you are very critical of their contents?

Mr. VINCENT. I told you that I was shocked.

Senator FERGUSON. You were shocked. Here is a letter indicating that they knew that Hiss had been at that meeting and they wanted in effect to make sure that they were going to San Francisco or that he would go there.

Mr. VINCENT. That who was making sure, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. The writer of this letter.

Mr. VINCENT. But the contents of the China portion of the Yalta agreement were not public knowledge then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was known by the writer of this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so. The writer of this letter is Mr. Dennett. I do not think so at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it indicate that it might be known by the writer of that letter that where Mr. Hiss had been there had been very favorable consideration to the Russians, to the Soviets? In fact, it was so favorable that you said it was even shocking to you.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You make take the witness, Mr. Sourwine.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that letter should be inserted in the record, and then you may read it. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 384," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 384

[Copy—For your information]

MARCH 5, 1945.

Admiral JOHN W. GREENSLADE,
1201 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Saturday, I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Department, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is pertinent to our plans:

1. The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (b) office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people they might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (d) the offer of any specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through the Bay Region Committee.

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget could permit it, to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference for the Far-Eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt that the IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the agenda.

3. Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to library and other material.

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference, he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the Conference.

5. The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in advance. There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.

6. Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite apparent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send me immediately the following:

1. A description of the library facilities—not over 200 words in length.

2. A statement of whether any office space would be available. I would assume that one room at least could be loaned to the Conference, and possibly two, and that a total of six people could be given desks. The description should mention the size of the room and number of accommodations available.

3. It might be desirable to consider whether we should not state in the letter that a committee to assist in housing had been set up which could probably make arrangements to take care of some specified number of people in private houses, say 25 to 40, or whatever number seems most appropriate. We could then state that the committee will not go into action until we receive word that their services are desired.

4. It might be helpful to explore the possibilities of reserving rooms at some of the private clubs at 10-day to 2-week intervals, starting a week after the Conference opened, for possible dinners for groups of 15 or 25 people. These reservations might be made in advance to protect us in case it does seem desirable to have dinners of the kind suggested.

If you will have the information forwarded to me at once, I will see that the formal letter goes to the State Department. There is no assurance, of course, that they will accept any of our offers, but they obviously would welcome the move on our part.

Admiral Horne was not in his office, so I shall have to wait until next week to find out about air priority. It seems to me that the best procedure would be for me to come out for a week or 10 days later this month and help work out preliminary plans. I could then return to New York, keep in touch here, and return later to San Francisco during the Conference, making arrangements, if it seems desirable, for members of the international staff to come periodically to assist as well.

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter from the American Association for the United Nations, which indicates their plans for Conference participation. No doubt Mr. Rowell will be able to keep you in touch with developing plans which they may have.

With very cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary*.

Enclosures.

(Enclosure sent with original only.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue to read, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 1:

The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (b) office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people they might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (d) the offer of any specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through the Bay Region Committee.

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget could permit it—

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest you listen to this, Mr. Vincent.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference for the far-eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt the IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the agenda.

Suspending the reading for a moment, does that paragraph in any way refresh your recollection, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent?

Mr. VINCENT. To the extent that I have testified before, that it was quite possible that I could have talked to Mr. Dennett and now I find that I did talk to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. You now have an independent recollection that you did talk with Mr. Dennett about this matter; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I still don't have any independent recollection of a meeting with Mr. Dennett in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Read the question. Repeat the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply trying to determine, Mr. Chairman, whether Mr. Vincent's memory has in fact been refreshed or whether he simply having read this letter is willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Greenslade as a fact.

Mr. VINCENT. The latter is the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote Admiral Greenslade as a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 3:

Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to library and other material.

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference—

He refers there to the conference of the IPR, does he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I suppose he does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Security in the Pacific was the title of the report of the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the conference.

Conference there means the San Francisco Conference, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So what that states is that Alger Hiss recommended that each delegation to the San Francisco Conference receive an appropriate number of copies of the report of the IPR Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 5:

The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in advance—

You don't know whom he meant by that, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing the reading):

There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.

Did you furnish to Mr. Dennett any of the information contained in that paragraph that I just read, the one that I designated as No. 5?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 6:

Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite apparent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.

Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall expressing that view to him, but I might easily have made that expression to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that fall within your statement that you are willing to accept as fact what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Greenslade?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it would fall within fact. I have no reason to deny it. I only say that I don't recall making it.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing) :

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send me immediately the following :

And thereafter, Mr. Chairman, follows some instructions with regard to material to be sent to Mr. Dennett. There is no further mention of this witness or of Mr. Hiss. The matter has been placed in the record and I suggest it need not be read.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, a question to the witness if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This makes it quite clear that you were consulted about IPR going to San Francisco.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conference with Mr. Hiss about these problems?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall having any conference with Mr. Hiss—jointly with him. Mr. Hiss was in the Department and I might have had a conference with Mr. Hiss on these problems.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not this letter as a whole indicate that you and Hiss had conferred about it and had advised together?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from my recollection of the letter, sir. I would have thought here that Mr. Dennett came to see me and came to see Mr. Hiss, because there is reference in different paragraphs to what Mr. Hiss stated to him and what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. But apparently no conflict.

Mr. VINCENT. No conflict so far as I can see. I would have to read it again if there is a conflict in advice, but I don't see any. I don't recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. How many delegates had the IPR at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't state with any exactitude.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no idea how many they sent out there.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there?

Mr. VINCENT. I was there. At the time this conversation took place I wasn't even expecting to go. It was probably the end of March or early April that I was designated to go out for the half time of the conference. I attended the first half of the conference and Mr. Stanton attended the second half as the assistant to Mr. Ballantine.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before I move to another subject I would like to revert to two matters. One, you remember I asked you about Mr. Belshaw.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the State Department Biographical Division would have had information on Mr. Belshaw in case you had wanted it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that the State Department had a Biographical Section at that time, but it might have, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know that the State Department maintained a Biographical Division?

MR. VINCENT. I know that it does now, but I am trying to place the time.

MR. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that the State Department maintained a Biographical Division?

MR. VINCENT. I say I don't know when it may have started one. I know now that it had one when I went to the field, but I can't recall from memory—

MR. SOURWINE. It has been since 1945 that you learned that the State Department had a Biographical Division, is that right?

MR. VINCENT. I can't testify exactly when the State Department maintained a Biographical Section.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you know when you were Director of the Far Eastern Division that the State Department had a Biographical Division?

MR. VINCENT. Not as a positive fact.

MR. SOURWINE. You called it a Biographical Section. Did you know there was a Biographical Section?

MR. VINCENT. You are asking me to say whether I knew there was a Biographical Section?

MR. SOURWINE. That is right.

MR. VINCENT. I say I can't recall that there was. At the time I may have known it, but at the present moment I can't recall whether at that time I knew there was in existence a Biographical Section.

MR. SOURWINE. You cannot say whether while you were Director of the Far Eastern Division you knew whether the State Department had a Biographical Division or a Biographical Section?

MR. VINCENT. I cannot at this moment say—

MR. SOURWINE. Did you know it?

MR. VINCENT. That at the time I was Chief of the Division I may have known it, but at the present moment I am trying tell you that I don't know from memory that the State Department had a Biographical Section.

MR. SOURWINE. How did it come into your knowledge that they do have a Biographical Section?

MR. VINCENT. You mean to my positive knowledge?

MR. SOURWINE. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. I am saying now that when I was in the Far Eastern Office I would have known if there was one and may have known it, but I don't recall now whether I did know it.

MR. SOURWINE. How do you know now?

MR. VINCENT. I know now because when I went to the field in 1947 we were asked to send in biographical data on people abroad.

MR. SOURWINE. Before that time you don't know whether you knew it or not?

MR. VINCENT. Before that time, as I say, I don't know now that I did know then, you see.

MR. SOURWINE. As Director of the Far Eastern Division, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs or as Chief of the China Division, didn't you use the Biographical Division or Biographical Section of the State Department?

MR. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I am trying to tell you that I don't recall now whether I did or did not use it or whether one existed, but I would be perfectly willing to say if one existed I would have used it and I am quite willing to say it would be perfectly logical for them

to have one but on the basis of my memory now I haven't a distinct recollection of a Biographical Section.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a fair inference that you did not seek information from the State Department's Biographical Section or Division with regard to any of these foreign delegates who were invited to the Blair-Lee House reception?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a fair assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the fact, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at any conference or conferences between Ambassador Patrick Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified in executive session that General Wedemeyer and Mr. Hurley, Ambassador Hurley, came home in 1945, in March. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer which I have already described which had to do with the equipping of Chinese guerrilla Communist troops in north China and on the coast in anticipation of a landing of American troops in that area. General Wedemeyer and I had quite a discussion on that subject. Earlier that year, as I recall it, Mr. Grew had indicated that wherever we could use Chinese troops that might save American lives, they should be used. It was on that basis that I talked to him about it and mentioned that to him. I made it clear, however, in talking with General Wedemeyer that it was purely a military decision to be made in the event it was made. General Wedemeyer himself indicated that he had no clear knowledge of the problem of using them but that he would look into it when he got out to China, when he returned. Insofar as a conference jointly with Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley occupied as I testified this morning, my desk in my office, and it is quite possible that there were meetings between General Wedemeyer, who was home, Mr. Hurley, who was in my office, and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. March or April of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. In March or April of 1945. Mr. Hurley went back to China through Russia in April, I think it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a "Yes" answer to my question or a "No" answer or an answer "It is possible, but I don't remember"?

Mr. VINCENT. It is possible. I would say more than that. I do not remember the meeting. I remember the meeting with Wedemeyer. I do not remember a conference, but I am saying it is more than possible, it is probable that General Wedemeyer came into the office where Mr. Hurley was. He was Ambassador, and General Wedemeyer was in command of the troops.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memo with respect to such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a memo with regard to the Wedemeyer conference. I do not recall preparing a memo with regard to a conference with Mr. Hurley and General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you prepared such a memorandum would it be in the State Department files?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have a copy? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of any such memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be able to furnish the committee with a copy of any such memorandum if it exists?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that comes under the provisions of the letter from the President to the Secretary of State which we read and put into the record here—what day? Wednesday, or yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the release of a—

Mr. VINCENT. State Department document.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think the release of such a document as your report on a conference between yourself and Hurley and Wedemeyer here in Washington would hamper the free flow of information from the Foreign Service field.

Mr. VINCENT. I would be glad to ask the State Department whether they would make an exception.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you what you think.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. You refer now to a memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Hurley and with General Wedemeyer and myself?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I was referring to a memorandum of a conversation between General Wedemeyer and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out if you have participated in and subsequently prepared a memorandum with regard to a conference or conferences between General Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I have no recollection of preparing such a memorandum. I was referring to the earlier memorandum of the conversation with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a memorandum with Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no knowledge of having discussed that memorandum with Andrew Roth?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish him with a copy of such memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any of the IPR authors access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of having ever given any of them and I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Andrew Roth access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mark Gayn access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with Mark Gayn?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. With Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Owen Lattimore access to any State Department information?

MR. VINCENT. None that I can ever recall.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with Owen Lattimore?

MR. VINCENT. When Owen Lattimore was Director of the OWI or Deputy Director we would have discussed State Department matters.

MR. SOURWINE. But at no other time?

MR. VINCENT. Presumably when I would meet him from time to time, yes, we would discuss matters of China.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't hear you.

MR. VINCENT. We would have discussed China whenever we met socially because he was very much interested in the area, but I would not have revealed to him confidential information in the State Department.

MR. SOURWINE. Your testimony is that you never did reveal to him any confidential information?

MR. VINCENT. No; not so far as I know.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with T. A. Bisson?

MR. VINCENT. No; not so far as I can recall.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him access to any State Department information?

MR. VINCENT. No.

MR. SOURWINE. How about Lawrence Rosinger?

MR. VINCENT. The same answer there, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I haven't given him any.

MR. SOURWINE. How about Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore?

MR. VINCENT. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have never given her State Department information.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to another subject now, the matter of the Japanese surrender policy. Mr. Vincent, did you or do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether I might inquire.

Did any of these people who have been mentioned here as to whether or not you gave them confidential information of the State Department, not using each name but you remembering the names, did any of them ever ask for any confidential information?

MR. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of these mentioned here have asked me for confidential information of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you had Mr. Lattimore under consideration for an adviser in the State Department?

MR. VINCENT. I would say that we had him under consideration only in the early spring of 19— or the late winter of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945.

MR. VINCENT. 1945. He had quit OWI some time before that and had gone back to his work at Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time it was in 1945?

MR. VINCENT. I can only testify as to my memory, that it was in early 1945, January or February or March.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, early 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is what I meant, early spring, or the late winter of 1944-45.

Senator FERGUSON. After you came home from the Far East with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he employed by the Government when he went out with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he was Deputy Director of the Office of War Information.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he leave that department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he employed in the spring of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was at the Johns Hopkins University. He had gone back to teaching.

Senator FERGUSON. So at the time you recommended his coming back, he was employed by the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not. He was back at his teaching job at Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. While he was at Johns Hopkins and before you recommended him, did you discuss any of the Chinese problems with him in order to ascertain if he was the kind of a man that you would want?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I just testified, Senator, that I would have discussed Chinese problems with him because he was an old friend, and a friend who understood China from my point of view.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, would it not have been necessary to discuss what was secret?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; it would not have been necessary to discuss what was secret if we were discussing the matter of his coming into the State Department on a consultant basis and in a technical capacity.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss communism in China with him before you recommended that he be on the advisory staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing that as a specific subject, but it could have been a subject of discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure about that. I have no recollection of discussing communism in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, of course, you dispute what is in these letters that were exhibited here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. The letter that was exhibited this morning—my testimony this morning was that I have no knowledge of those subjects discussed in that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the part here indicating Carter—which would be you, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think it would be Edward Carter, Edward C. Carter. People don't usually call me Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. They don't? You are named down below as John Carter Vincent.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. But as I say here—let me see the context.

Senator FERGUSON. You were considered at that time as a trusted friend about this question of communism in the Department, "trusted friends who might be in the know on these things," meaning communism in the IPR. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read the whole letter. The language that these people use here, I am not responsible for at all, sir. It isn't in this letter. It isn't in this letter here what we are talking about. [Witness referring to another letter].

Senator FERGUSON. The letter we are talking about is an answer to another letter that did have it in it.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not say that statement there implies by its use, as they say, of "trusted friends" that I had a knowledge of what was in this paragraph here.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think Margaret Ann Stewart was writing to Eleanor Lattimore about, that "John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things"?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you, Senator, I cannot be responsible for the language of these people.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the sake of the record, Mr. Senator, may the record show, if it is correct, that when Mr. Vincent said "this paragraph here," he is talking about the last paragraph of Betty Ussachevsky's letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Next to the last paragraph of the December 12 letter.

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about this letter, and I think Mr. Sourwine is talking about the long paragraph in this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he said, "this paragraph here," I think he referred to the long paragraph in the Betty Ussachevsky letter.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The record shows that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not also true that in the letter of December 12, in the next to the last paragraph, that that is what they were talking about, this long paragraph in the letter of December 5? Is it not clear that that is true? "We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter." That is what was outlined in Betty's letter, the long paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. About communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then she goes on and says, "I hope that you will have a discussion." That is to Eleanor Lattimore. She was a good, close friend of yours. "* * * have a discussion about this with Bill"—

Who is Bill? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. He would be the head of the American delegation, the American office here in Washington—Johnstone, as I called him.

Senator FERGUSON. Bill Johnstone. "And also with John Carter Vincent, and any other," indicating that you two were trusted friends, but "any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things."

Did you ever discuss with Eleanor Lattimore and/or Owen Lattimore, communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified this morning, Senator, and I testify again this evening, that I have no recollection of any such discussion. Soon after this letter was written, I left the country, and I do not recall any consultation or conversations I had with regard to the matter of communism in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least by reputation, this letter would indicate, and as far as knowledge of Eleanor Lattimore would be concerned, that you were a trusted friend, and she could discuss communism in the IPR with you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the apparent intent of this, that I might be in the know about—whether it was communism in the IPR she has in mind, this covers quite a large field of subjects, this letter in the second paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that paragraph covers quite a bit, but it is principally concerning communism in the IPR, and the FBI investigation of it, and the stealing of papers from your Department which you indicated this morning.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It refers to the papers that were taken out of your office, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read it to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it mean by the arrest of the six?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The arrest of the six were the Amerasia group.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; for taking papers; and part of them were taken out of your office; is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. Taken out of the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is a good friend of yours describing you in this language, that you are a trusted friend and that you might be consulted in regard to the taking of these papers and communism; is that not true? You do not think Eleanor Lattimore ever discussed it with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir; and I cannot, as I have said before, be responsible for what a Mrs. Margaret Ann Stewart would put in that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not expect a good friend of yours to at least tell you that, "Here, your papers have come out of your office"?

Mr. VINCENT. I would. You are reverting back to the Amerasia case?

Senator FERGUSON. The Amerasia case. That is what we are talking about in these letters.

Mr. VINCENT. I knew, as I testified this morning, that there was an investigation to see how those papers came out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, when was the investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Service and the other group?

Senator FERGUSON. No; you. They investigated you, that is, they asked you questions. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to fix the time of the Amerasia case. I think it was in April, and sometime during that period in April.

Senator FERGUSON. Of what year?

Mr. VINCENT. Of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. April 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said this morning, it might have been the latter part of March. It could not have been much later than that, because I left for San Francisco, oh, I should say the 10th or 12th, for the United Nations conference.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you or did you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I have testified on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you know that such a draft was submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified, I think, that I did not at that time have any first-hand knowledge of the handling of that paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know now that there was such a paper submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss such a paper or such a proposed policy with anyone at any time, outside the Department, between May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no, sir. I would doubt that I had any knowledge of the paper, because I was not connected with the group that was drafting such a paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. What ultimately happened to that paper, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. That paper was ultimately adopted on the—let me see. I have it here. It was adopted by the SWNCC committee on August 31, earlier on August 29, but it had to be reopened. May I read this thing? No, I don't need to read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a statement which you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a statement which I read to you in the executive hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is in the record, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I am just trying to place in here the date it was finally adopted. It was August 31, as I have just testified, it was adopted by the SWNCC committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was considerably changed between May of 1945 and the date of adoption, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, because I have just testified that I had nothing to do with its formulation until I became—and there were no considerably changes in it after I became—

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not changed after August—what is the date there—31, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. August 31, except for some minor changes which, if you wish me to, I can reread them, but it would take a long time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified with regard to that.

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified there were only minor changes of phraseology after August 31.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to August 31, you had nothing to do with the far-eastern subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the first meeting. I attended my first meeting of the subcommittee of SWNCC on September 1.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. You took over the next day from Mr. Dooman; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say what view General Marshall took with regard to this proposed policy as early as May or June of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. What attitude he took? No; I could not state that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took about it at any time prior to its adoption by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the matter with Mr. Lattimore prior to August 31, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief did I discuss it with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about that proposed policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever learning that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about that policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you say in executive session you had learned it from our hearings for the first time?

Mr. VINCENT. If I did, I will stand by that, but I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember ever having learned it or knowing it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss the matter of that proposed policy with anyone in the IPR or representing the IPR prior to the time it was adopted by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you thereafter?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I thereafter? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mrs. Betty Ussachevsky, the Betty who wrote this letter we talked about earlier, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact recollection of that, but I wouldn't know whether it would be Mrs. Ussachevsky or someone else who would arrange an appointment. I don't know what her position was at that time. If she was the secretary, I would say she might have arranged one.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw Mr. Dennett on a number of occasions, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many times, altogether, have you had interviews or conferences with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge of the number of times, Mr. Sourwine, I have had interviews with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ten; a dozen?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say less than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Less than 10?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit him in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where else have you met him, outside your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I have met him at—I think he was down at the IPR

conference in January 1945, and I have testified also that he may have been present at a meeting of the American delegation prior to going to the IPR conference in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Mr. Theodore White?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, as a newspaperman in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he your friend?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an acquaintance. I would not call him a friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know where White is now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he is doing now? I don't mean now in the sense of this instant, but generally this period.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't. I would assume he is in the newspaper business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject, whether he was with the Institute of Pacific Relations. During my time, I don't recall ever running across White.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed with anyone the matter of Mr. White's discharge? Is that your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I am trying to remember, but I can't recall any conversation I had with regard to Mr. White being discharged. I don't know at what time he was discharged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever discuss that matter with your superiors in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I will have to say again, I didn't discuss the discharge of White if he was discharged or when he was discharged. It didn't make any impression on my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never discussed the matter with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have come into the office and discussed it with me, but I am telling you frankly, I don't recall any conversation with Mr. White about a discussion with him over his being discharged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the charge that Mr. Luce was seeking a passport to go out to the Far East, and that you attempted to influence the denial of that passport?

Mr. VINCENT. Do I recall the charge?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't anybody ever discuss that with you before?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody told me I ever tried to interfere with a passport for Mr. Luce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't the Secretary of State ever discuss with you or through an intermediary bring up with you, take up with you, have taken up with you, the problem presented by an allegation that you were somehow mixed up in the denial or refusal of a passport to Mr. Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not to the best of my knowledge and belief. It seems to me it is to my mind such an absurd story. There may have been an allegation of that kind, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Secretary of State ever quoted you in connection with that matter, he was misquoting you, then, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with denial of Luce's passport. There may have been an instance of some kind. I don't want to say here under oath that the Secretary of State would be misquoting me, but I am telling you that I have no recollection of an instance of my having anything to do with the denial of a passport to Mr. Luce.

Mr. SOURWINE. You apparently consider any such charge as absurd, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my position.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Secretary of State had taken up with you the matter of an absurd charge, you certainly would remember it, wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly think I would remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then can't you testify here as to whether it ever was or ever was not taken up with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I can testify to the best of my knowledge and belief it never was taken up with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you can't testify positively that it was not?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify that it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever called upon for an explanation of that matter by any official of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I never was called upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or for a statement in connection with it?

Mr. VINCENT. For a statement in connection with it? No, sir, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs September 19, 1945, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. September 19.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 19 days after you had succeeded Mr. Dooman as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We talked a little while ago about a paper circulating in May, whether there was a paper circulating in May of 1945 with regard to post-surrender policy for Japan. I am asking you now about a paper entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," which was an official State Department document. Do you know anything about that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony on the other paper is exactly the same paper. So I must have given incorrect testimony before, because I had in mind that very paper, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, as to when it was adopted by SWNCC. That is the paper I had in mind in the previous testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying in executive session that that paper which was adopted August 31 had been in the course of preparation for 7 or 8 months?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall testifying. My recollection would be that I testified that I didn't know how long it had been in preparation, because I was not connected with the drafting of that paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that paper communicated to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT. That paper, I think, was communicated to General MacArthur in the first week of September. I have the date here

somewhere. It was distributed to him, but I don't think I have the exact date. My belief would be it was circulated to him sometime between the first of September and the time that the President issued it with General MacArthur's approval on the——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not communicated to him until after it had become a firm United States policy?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my impression, that it was not circulated to him until after it had become a policy of the SWNCC Committee, but it had to be approved by the President and it was circulated to General MacArthur before it was released by the President and his consent or his approval to its issuance was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, General MacArthur's approval was secured?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That testimony would be, would it not, that the paper was not communicated, nor its contents communicated, to General MacArthur prior to the 31st of August 1945; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have no knowledge as to whether initial drafts or others were communicated to him. I can say that after I took over SWNCC, there was quite frequently drafts or suggestions requested of General MacArthur in regard to the drafting of a paper. The War Department member usually was the one who took the initiative in referring matters as we went along in drafting. I would assume that situation prevailed prior to my being Chairman as well as afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether it was communicated to General MacArthur on the 29th of August?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I have no information here from which I could testify as to when it was, whether it was communicated to him before the 29th.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the paper was communicated to General MacArthur, was it changed in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. After it was communicated to him? I have just testified there were some minor changes, which I can read to you here.

Mr. SOURWINE. But only minor changes?

Mr. VINCENT. Only minor changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading Mr. Dooman's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his testimony with regard to this paper?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he testified that this paper was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August, and was on that date telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you read it, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that testimony to be true and accurate?

Mr. VINCENT. For the first time it was telegraphed to him?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I don't want to expand Mr. Dooman's testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have here the exact date when it was telegraphed out to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to SWNCC?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that to be true and accurate? That is the question.

Mr. VINCENT. As to the exact date, I don't know whether it is accurate or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified it was communicated to General MacArthur after the 31st, and you have testified it was adopted by SWNCC on the 31st of August. Now, we have before us Mr. Dooman's testimony before this subcommittee that the paper was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August and was telegraphed out to General MacArthur on the 29th of August as a firm United States policy for Japan. I am asking you whether you believe that testimony by Mr. Dooman to be true and correct?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not correct insofar as the paper was not finally adopted by the top-level, over-all SWNCC Committee until August 31, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it adopted by the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. The paper was sent up by the SWNCC Committee, to the top SWNCC Committee by the other committee, sometime prior to the 31st.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that was on the 29th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the paper was communicated to General MacArthur on the 29th as a firm United States policy for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a fact the day it was communicated to General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was communicated to him at all on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. I have no positive knowledge of the day it was communicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was communicated on the 29th, would it be communicated again after the 31st?

Mr. VINCENT. My own recollection is that it was communicated to him as a policy paper that had been adopted by SWNCC, but as I say, I do not know the date it was communicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have been in error in testifying that it was communicated after the 31st; that it might have been communicated on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been before; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a single communication that we are talking about, regardless of whether it was the 29th, 31st, or some other date?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, with regard to the changes made in that document, do you remember what Mr. Dooman said about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall completely what he had to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember he said, quoting from page 717 of our hearings:

These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had been adopted on the 29th of August (reading):

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends."

And then Mr. Dooman commented:

Please do not ask me to explain what that means.

Was that matter which was inserted in the document subsequent to the time of its communication to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT. That matter was in the paper when it was communicated to General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. That matter was in the paper, was it, at the time it was approved by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That matter was in it by the time it was approved by SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, in that regard you contradict Mr. Dooman's testimony, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Dooman said this:

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry.

He was apparently citing that as one of the changes made in the paper after its adoption. Do you contradict his testimony in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir, and you will recall at the executive session I stated that that language occurred in the paper as early as mid-August.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do.

Did you make any changes or dictate or approve any changes or suggest any changes in that paper after you became head of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the minor changes which I have here of which I have been able to find a few. Would you like me to say what changes were made? I don't recall that I dictated them, but after I became Chairman of SWNCC there were some minor drafting changes made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you accepting responsibility for whatever changes were in fact made after you became head of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I am not accepting responsibility for any changes that were made. The top SWNCC Committee has to be responsible for any changes made. Some of those changes were made at top SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if I recall. But I have the complete thing, if you would like me to read this, of how those minor changes came about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified as to that before?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. From this document here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think we can avoid repetition on that point here. I think the record is clear on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been asked before if you know or have knowledge of Yoshio Shiga and Kyuchi Tokuda?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I did not know them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that they were Communist leaders, Japanese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not refreshed my memory on it at all. You have told me they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have no independent knowledge as to whether they were, or whether they were in jail in early October of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or as to how they got out of jail?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked in executive session whether you had heard the report that John K. Emmerson of the State Department, possibly accompanied by another person, went in a staff car to the prison on the day Shiga and Tokuda were released, and brought them back to their homes in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Did I testify that I knew of that incident?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had no knowledge of that, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never heard that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never heard that report until you gave it to me here.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that action was taken, would it have had any effect on the Japanese people?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me a speculative question there, and I don't know that I can answer what effect it would have had for them to have been taken from prison at what time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If two Communist leaders who at the conclusion of the war were released from prison should be met at the prison gates by an official staff car with an official of the United States State Department, and in that staff car conveyed to their homes, would that have any effect on the Japanese people if that fact became generally known throughout Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. This was a period—wasn't it?—when we were releasing Japanese political prisoners.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I could testify whether it would or would not have an effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an expert on the Far East; are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified I am an expert on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what "face" means?

Mr. VINCENT. I know what the general oriental concept of "face" means.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that oriental concept held in Japan as well as in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give you exact testimony on that, but I would say that the Japanese also have some idea of "face."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it would have given "face" to the Communists to have two of their leaders picked up in a staff car by a State Department official and taken to their homes as soon as they were released from prison?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it would.

MR. SOURWINE. That would, then, have had an impact on Japan if that fact had been known; would it not?

MR. VINCENT. If the fact had been known that they were picked up like that, yes; I would say that it would.

MR. SOURWINE. It would have given prestige to Shiga and Tokuda—would it not?—both in their own party and among the Japanese people generally?

MR. VINCENT. It is possible that it would have. It would depend on what Japanese were doing it, or what was the purpose of picking them up in the car.

MR. SOURWINE. I cannot speak of the purpose and neither can you; but, knowing what you must know about “face” in the Orient, if the very unusual procedure of taking two released prisoners to their homes, conveyed by officials of the State Department in a staff car, had followed, it certainly would have given them face; would it not?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And to say “give them face” is the same as saying it would have enhanced their prestige and the respect in which they were held by their people; would it?

MR. VINCENT. It would have.

MR. SOURWINE. I do not know why we quibble about these things.

Do you recall a broadcast dealing with policy with respect to Japan, in which General Hilldring and Captain Dennison participated, along with yourself?

MR. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you participate in the broadcast?

MR. VINCENT. I did.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you participate in the preparation of it?

MR. VINCENT. Of my own script.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you approve of the entire script of that broadcast in advance of the broadcast?

MR. VINCENT. I don't think I did. The others approved theirs, and I approved mine.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you have an opportunity in advance of the broadcast to see the whole script?

MR. VINCENT. Yes; I had an opportunity to see the whole script when it was finally prepared.

MR. SOURWINE. For what purpose was it shown to you?

MR. VINCENT. To familiarize myself, to see how the thing was made up by Selden Menefee.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he was a Communist?

MR. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was a Communist.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he was a pro-Communist?

MR. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was a pro-Communist.

MR. SOURWINE. If it was shown at the time prior to the broadcast, if you wanted changes made, could you have had them made?

MR. VINCENT. In my own script.

MR. SOURWINE. You could not have had them made in——

MR. VINCENT. In General Hilldring's, or whoever was the third person.

MR. SOURWINE. Captain Dennison.

MR. VINCENT. Captain Dennison.

MR. SOURWINE. You are stating that General Hilldring and Captain Dennison were solely responsible for what they said?

Mr. VINCENT. I am so stating, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this approved by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. These broadcasts were approved by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, their broadcasts were approved, as well as yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who, for the State Department, approved this script?

Mr. VINCENT. The people in the Press Office. They went over them to see if they were all right, but not as to policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not approved as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. They were on a higher level.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did approve it as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say which man.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to approve as to policy? Who approved yours, as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine was submitted to whoever was above me at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it that approved your script as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. On October 6th, who could have approved it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be normally submitted to Assistant Secretary Benton. It could have been submitted to him because he was our public-relations man at that time. It could have been submitted to Mr. Acheson.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that a public-relations man would pass on the policy?

Mr. VINCENT. He would pass on the advisability of taking this thing and looking into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that does not answer my question.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Acheson approved this or not, I don't know. It was the policy not to go out and do things without some approval by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to approve your script, and who did approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. In this particular case I don't recall who approved it. General Hilldring could have approved my script. I could not have approved his.

Senator FERGUSON. You were answering his questions.

Mr. VINCENT. General Hilldring at that time was already an Assistant Secretary of State, and he could, in his position, approve my script.

Mr. SOURWINE. As background, is it not true, sir, that you testified in executive session that you had had a session with Mr. Selden Meneff at which you had, simply talking to him, expressed your ideas, that he had made notes of that, that he had gone away and written a script and brought that back to you for approval?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way it was approved?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but I am speaking now of the whole idea of making this kind of thing had to be approved above me.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that question—who conceived the idea of making the statement. I was talking about the policy that was set forth in that broadcast.

Mr. VINCENT. Who approved the policy set forth in that broadcast?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The policy set forth, as far as I am concerned in this broadcast, had already been approved, because you will find it was taken primarily from approved policy at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who cleared this script for policy?

Mr. VINCENT. For policy?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have just stated that I don't know who would have cleared this script for policy. In this particular case it might have been left up to me to clear it. I was Director of the Far East Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what the Senator is trying to determine, whether you yourself, as the Director of the Far Eastern Office, could have taken responsibility for clearing the script for policy or that it had to go to a higher echelon for policy clearance.

Mr. VINCENT. That could have been decided on the basis of whether I thought it had to have policy clearance.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether this was submitted above me to Mr. Acheson to look over, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you were making no departure from policy and making no new policy?

Mr. VINCENT. If I felt I was making new policy, I would have submitted it above, but I am testifying I don't know whether it was submitted above, to someone else. General Hildring could have cleared the whole memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did submit it above, does that indicate you felt you were making new policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily. It would mean I was sending it to somebody to read to see what they felt about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was submitted any higher, or whether you yourself submitted it for policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was submitted higher, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that broadcast, sir, did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I can almost quote it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want a lengthy answer if you can avoid it, sir. We are going to get down to this detailed broadcast.

Did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the policy of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that broadcast serve notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted, so far as the United States is concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read the whole thing to find out whether that is in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it conceivable to you now that you did so state? Did you, in that broadcast, serve notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not? That is a definite and unequivocal statement; you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, before we discuss this thing in detail, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel if there is in existence any public records with regard to Mr. Selden Menefee?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

In the Second Report on Un-American Activities in Washington State, 1948, Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, under the heading "Appendix—A Comparison of the Communist Party Line and the Activities and Affiliations of Certain Professors at the University of Washington and Officials of the Repertory Playhouse," we find a record of Selden Menefee on the following pages, which I offer for the record:

Pages 341, 344—

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read those, who was Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. Menefee was a young man I met at this time who came in and prepared the transcript for NBC.

Senator FERGUSON. He was working for NBC?

Mr. VINCENT. He was working for NBC, not for me.

Senator FERGUSON. Not for the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for the State Department.

Mr. MANDEL. 344, 345, 346, 347, 359, and 360.

I offer that for the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 385" and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 385

[Source: Second report Un-American Activities in Washington State, 1948. Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities]

[P. 341]

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES AND AFFILIATIONS, AUGUST 1935 TO SEPTEMBER 1939

February 7, 1936—Northwest Veteran—American Civil Liberties Union official speaks at auditorium.

Dr. Harry F. Ward, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, secretary of the Methodist Federation for Social Service and chairman of the American League Against War and Fascism, failed to speak on one of his advertised subjects, that of the undesirability of requiring school teachers to take an oath of allegiance to the National and State constitutions * * *. Included in the list of sponsors for the lecture were four members of the University of Washington faculty; namely, Farquharson, Tyler, Selden Menefee, and Hugh DeLacy.

[Pp. 344 and 345]

* * * * *

[May 8, 1937—Sunday News—volume 3, No. 38, Seattle, Wash.]

TEACHERS FORM STATE FEDERATION

Affiliation with the Washington Commonwealth Federation was one of the first acts of the newly formed Washington State Federation of Teachers, com-

posed of teachers' unions from Seattle, Snohomish County, Tacoma, and Bremerton, when they convened in Seattle last Saturday to form their organization.

The new federation supersedes the smaller informal Washington Joint Council of Teachers, a committee formed a year ago to coordinate the program of teachers' unions in the public schools, the university, and the workers' education projects.

After adopting a constitution the group voted in Hugh DeLacy, councilman-elect and discharged university instructor, as president and Hallie Donaldson, of the West Seattle High School, as vice president * * *.

Resolutions adopted asked release of Tom Mooney; King Ramsey Connor; selection of State Superintendent of Public Instruction Stanley Atwood as speaker at the American Federation of Teachers' national convention; civil-service laws for teachers; and equalization program for State schools; repeal of the Washington, D. C., loyalty oath bill; continuation of WPA projects at union wages; a referendum on war.

* * * * *

The American Federation of Teachers is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Delegates to the Seattle AFL Central Labor Council for the teachers union were Selden Menefee, of the University of Washington, and Victor Hicks, of the WPA educational project.

Comment: Affiliation of Local 401, U. of W. Teachers' Union with the American Federation of Teachers; the Washington Commonwealth Federation and resolutions passed as indicated above, show the beginning of the pattern to be followed by them as their program adjusts to the changing pattern of the Communist Party line. The Washington State Un-American Activities Committee, as well as other agencies, have voluminous files on the radical activities of Selden Menefee, Victor Hicks, and Hugh DeLacy. The Sunday News was the official organ of the Washington Commonwealth Federation and its editorial board, according to its masthead on the above date, included among its members Prof. R. G. Tyler, Prof. Harold Eby, and ex-Prof. Hugh DeLacy, all of the University of Washington.

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[Pp. 346 and 347]

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[April 28, 1938, Daily Worker, statement by American Progressives on the Moscow trials]

(This statement also appeared in the May 3, 1938, issue of New Masses.)

Appendix IX, section 1-6, page 1617. The statement was obviously a document concocted in defense of the line of the Communist Party and undoubtedly originated in the headquarters of the Communist Party. The following excerpts from the statement seem significant: "We the undersigned, are fully aware of the confusion that exists with regard to the Moscow trials and the real facts about the situation of the Soviet Union * * *. The measures taken by the Soviet Union to preserve and extend its gains and its strength therefore find their echoes here, where we are staking the future of the American people on the preservation of progressive democracy and the unification of our efforts to prevent the Fascist from strangling the rights of the people. American liberals must not permit their outlook on these questions to be confused, nor allow their recognition of the place of the Soviet Union in the international fight of democracy against fascism to be destroyed. We call upon them to support the efforts of the Soviet Union to free itself from insidious internal dangers, and to rally support for the international fight against fascism, the principal menace to peace and democracy."

Comment: Among Seattle persons whose names were signed to this statement were the following: Dr. Garland Ethel, Selden Menefee, Albert Ottenheimer, Burton James, and Florence B. James.

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[Pp. 359 and 360]

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[August 31, 1941, Seattle Times]

An article in this issue reveals that Dr. Ralph H. Gundlach of the University of Washington was a visitor in Washington, D. C., the past week end. He attended

sessions of the American Federation of Teachers Convention at Detroit before going to Washington D. C. He will go from Washington to Chicago to read a paper on peace movements before the annual sessions of the American Psychology Society. While in Washington, D. C., Dr. Gundlach has been a guest at the home of Professor and Mrs. Selden Menefee, former University of Washington faculty members.

Comment: The files of the Washington State Un-American Activities are replete with information relative to activities and affiliations of Selden Menefee.

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Mr. SOURWINE. I offer and ask that it be inserted in the record, a photostatic copy of a document, and I ask Mr. Vincent if this is a photostatic copy of the State Department's publication of the text of this radio program.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to compare it with this. [Examining document.]

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 386" and filed for the record and is as follows:)

(NOTE.—Department of State press release No. 732, text of broadcast appears in appendix.)

[Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945]

OUR OCCUPATION POLICY FOR JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS

JOHN CARTER VINCENT, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

Maj. Gen. JOHN H. HILLDRING, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department

Capt. R. L. DENNISON, United States Navy, Representative of the Navy Department on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

STERLING FISHER, Director, NBC, University of the Air

[Released to the press October 6]

ANNOUNCER. Here are headlines from Washington:

General Hilldring Says the Zaiwatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines; Promises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military Fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free Assembly and Free Discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER. This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NEC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U.S.N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They

will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher—

FISHER. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate.¹ But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy.

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by tell us just how that policy is determined.

HILLDRING. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee—SWINC, we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and I sit in an advisory capacity.

HILLDRING. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT. No; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and voice in, the policy for Japan.

DENNISON. We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER. Does that include Okinawa?

¹ Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.

DENNISON. Yes.

FISHER. That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON. No; I believe not. I'd like to add—besides these immediate duties the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee which drafts our occupational policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all objectives?

VINCENT. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER. And how long do you think that will take?

VINCENT. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILLDRING. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We *must* stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?

HILLDRING. That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan.² In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER. Coming back to our first objective—General Hilldring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILLDRING. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER. And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILLDRING. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER. And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON. The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.

FISHER. Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT. That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its

² See p. 545.

hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILLDRING. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER. It seems to me that a key position in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT. Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT. The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.

DENNISON: The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

FISHER: Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON: I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said:

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."³ That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER. That's clear enough. * * * Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national Government in Japan?

HILLDRING. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER. But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese Government we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON. Our policy is to *use* the existing form of government in Japan, not to *support* it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

³ Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.

FISHER. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT. Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.

FISHER. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.

HILLDRING. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING. Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines *must* be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER. What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

FISHER. And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER. Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu". Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farben-industrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we *are not going* to rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not *revive* these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or the Japanese to do so.

FISHER. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a

modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this creat a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER. They'll have to have *some* foreign trade of course to keep going.

VINCENT. Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap-iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our policy be on food?

HILLDRING. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER. Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

DENNISON. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, we expect.

FISHER. And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT. We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER. I take all this to mean that the democratic and antimilitarist groups will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT. It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan." It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored."

FISHER. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT. In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON. We are *not* interested in upholding the *status quo* in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist party. What stand will we take on that, General Hildring?

HILDRING. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military fanatics.

FISHER. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILDRING. We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?

VINCENT. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.

FISHER. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed.

FISHER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON. That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life

they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER. What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON. Simply that they *like* the American way of life better. At seven, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT. Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.

HILLDRING. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT. The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound, democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER. Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one that's aimed at giving *no* encouragement to the imperialists and *every possible* encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send \$1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program * * * Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 386A

STATEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FAR EASTERN COMMISSION TO FORMULATE POLICIES FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE JAPANESE SURRENDER TERMS¹

[Released to the press October 1]

Mr. James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, announced that he has received from Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign

¹ Issued by the Secretary of State in London on September 29, 1945.

Affairs of Great Britain, the consent of the British Government to the proposal made by the United States Government on August 22 for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to formulate policies for the carrying out of the Japanese surrender terms.

The Commission will also be asked to consider whether a Control Council should be established and if so the powers which should be vested in it.

The Soviet Union and China had already given their consent to the establishment of the Commission. France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands will be invited to become members of the Commission. The first meeting of the Commission will be convened in Washington in the near future.

In agreeing to the establishment of the Commission Mr. Bevin stated it was his understanding that the Commission could determine whether it should meet in Washington or Tokyo. Secretary Byrnes confirmed Mr. Bevin's understanding and said that the United States representative would be instructed to vote that the Commission hold meetings in Tokyo.

Mr. Bevin also requested that India be invited to become a member of the Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the United States would agree to the request and that he would submit the request to the Governments of the Soviet Union and China for their approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize the format there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What publication is it?

Mr. VINCENT. State Department Bulletin.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is from the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Mandel, will you state whether that is a photostat of certain pages from the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. MANDEL. That was ordered from the Library of Congress by me, to be photostated.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a photostat of certain pages of the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in this speech say, Mr. Vincent, "The institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it, will have to be radically modified."?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Captain Dennison then quoted part of the directive sent to General MacArthur; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Captain Dennison said:

The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the next paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. I can quote a part of it to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the two paragraphs that Captain Dennison read with regard to the directive to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender.

"Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."

That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

Mr. SOURWINE. That directive was in line with your own views; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you, in that radio broadcast, state:

We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hildring has just said, we intend to break the hold these large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I stated that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not state further along—

This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Fisher asked:

Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

And you replied:

Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city.

Mr. VINCENT. Will you continue?

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; that is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fisher then said:

What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

and you replied:

They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself, so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a delineation of a realistic policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a delineation of a realistic policy that we considered at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had considered that policy at that time to be realistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered that policy to be realistic; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the basis of all that you as an expert knew about the Orient?

Mr. VINCENT. On the basis of all that I knew about the Orient, I thought that was a realistic policy at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider it now to be realistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I think now that Japan has to get back its heavy industries, but at that time we had just finished a war against Japan,

where its heavy industries had been used against us for 4 years of war, and the objective and idea in mind in that statement was to reduce Japan's war-making potential in the future, and at the same time to try to provide the Japanese who had lived off those industries, other means of living, which, as I say, were light industries and other forms of economic activity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your background and experience and knowledge with regard to Japan and the Orient generally lead you to believe that the Japanese nation could exist, turned in on itself, as you here referred to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not an economist, but that was my general belief, and it was the belief, I think also, of the people who drafted the postsurrender policy for Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly, in any event, that was the belief that you were conveying in this radio speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you further along state:

All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you asking whether that was a statement by me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you include in your category of "all democratic parties" the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. Just what I have stated here, that it would place no obstruction in the way of organization of political parties, and that is, if not a quote, a paraphrase on the postwar surrender policy.

Senator FERGUSON. That would include the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That would include the Communist Party. That would not exclude them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say "all democratic parties" using "democratic" as a generic phrase, all parties included within what you spoke of as democratic, including the Communist Party, will be encouraged, will be assured the rights of free assembly, and free public discussion, and the occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of their organization; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have used the phrase here, "the organization of political parties."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you consider the Communist Party a political party?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was then included, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now did you, after Mr. Fisher said:

Then, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?
state:

It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government are to be permitted and favored.

Is that what you said?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that not convey the implicit information that if the Government attempted by force to put down the Communists, that Government's effort would be suppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not draw that inference from it, sir, no. Let me read it again. [Reading document.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; please do.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say here that the inference here is not the Government, but if a political group using gangster methods, were trying to interfere with the ideas expressed in the previous statement, which is that the Japanese would be free to organize political parties, that those gangster methods would be suppressed by General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you thing that Mr. Fisher meant by "gangster methods"? Did he not mean force?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say he meant force.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understood him to mean force, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the nationalistic groups that he spoke of, include the National Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't mean to say here that in Japan we are talking about a nationalistic group from China that was going to try to interfere, using gangster methods, in Japan; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about the nationalistic group in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Talking about the old military group in Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about any nationalistic group?

Mr. VINCENT. That was trying to use gangster methods.

Mr. SOURWINE. Meaning by that, force?

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about Mr. Fisher here. I am trying to figure out what Mr. Fisher meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understood him to mean the use of force when you answered this question?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; gangster methods.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "gangster methods" you meant force?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you were saying was that no nationalistic group would be permitted to use force against a democratic party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what you could read into that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The democratic parties, you have already testified, included the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said that the organization of political parties would have included and not excluded the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said your use of the phrase "democratic parties" included the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying is that no nationalistic group would be permitted to use force against the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Fisher has used the words "gangster methods." You are trying to draw this around to the idea that gangster methods mean force.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said that gangster methods meant force.

Mr. VINCENT. And the Government of Japan would not be allowed to suppress the Communist Party. That is not what this means at all, but gangster methods and nationalistic groups, using gangster methods at that time, would not have been what was expected to happen in Japan, and General MacArthur, according to his own directive—because I quote him here—also says:

Changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government are to be permitted and favored.

Senator FERGUSON. You have answered now that the Communist Party back when you made that broadcast was a democratic party?

Mr. VINCENT. In the general sense of a political party.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, democratic political party.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. I am taking your answer that it was a democratic political party. Do you today hold the same belief?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not say here that I am calling the Communist Party a democratic party. It says:

All democratic parties will be encouraged.

But later on it says:

The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you now want to have the record stand that the Communist Party was not a democratic party?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communist Party was not considered, in my mind, to be a democratic party insofar as I can recall, but the use here would imply that.

Senator FERGUSON. You would include them?

Mr. VINCENT. You include them in the organization of political parties:

The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if it had been a Fascist Party, an Emperor's party, they would have been welcome, because you did not use the word, you said, "democratic," so everything that could be called a political party was included there, is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

All democratic parties will be encouraged.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we are going back to the word "democratic." That is in there, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, the Communists are included in the democratic parties?

Mr. VINCENT. In the context of this thing it would be assumed that the democratic parties at that time were considered to be——

Senator FERGUSON. We will start over again.

Are you of the same opinion now, that they are a democratic party?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have changed your mind?

MR. VINCENT. I have changed my mind; yes.

MR. SOURWINE. These were words of art, were they not?

MR. VINCENT. This was giving a broadcast.

MR. SOURWINE. Yes, but in the context of this broadcast you meant to include the Communist Party among the democratic parties about which you were speaking; is that right?

MR. VINCENT. That would be correct, sir, in the matter of broadcasting.

MR. SOURWINE. Now when Mr. Fisher said:

And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain their objectives—

Did you reply to him:

In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces.

Did you say that?

MR. VINCENT. I did say that.

MR. SOURWINE. Now have you not stated there in two succeeding statements, with only one intervening question, that on the one hand, if a democratic political party, a democratic party—and in that connotation, that included the Communist Party—should be sought to be put down by a nationalistic group, the nationalistic group would be suppressed by the Supreme Commander; and then in the next breath you state that if a democratic party—and that included the Communist Party—sought to achieve its ends by force, our people would not interfere or intervene except where necessary to protect our own occupation forces? Is that not true?

MR. VINCENT. That is what the language here said.

MR. SOURWINE. That is what you said?

MR. VINCENT. But I think you are drawing some very wrong implications from the language here.

MR. SOURWINE. What other implications do you draw?

MR. VINCENT. I certainly do not draw the implication that if the Communist Party became a menace in Japan, that General MacArthur would be prohibited from taking action against them, because, in the broadcast here I had mentioned the fact in a loose context the democratic parties will be encouraged.

MR. SOURWINE. I asked you earlier if it was not true that in that broadcast you had served notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other liberals would be permitted.

I ask you again, is it not true you did?

MR. VINCENT. I say that is a wrong inference from the language of this thing here, Mr. Sourwine, and you know that that is a wrong inference from this thing here.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I do not know that is wrong, or I would not be urging it here.

MR. VINCENT. I can tell you flatly, then, that irrespective of the language here, it was not the intention of this language to in any way

permit the Communist Party to take over control of Japan or to operate in a manner which would be inimical to the occupation of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or to assist in that objective?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not in my mind, and I don't think it was in anybody's mind in drafting this.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can see, can you not, how the language can be so construed?

Mr. VINCENT. I can see how the language can be so construed.

Senator FERGUSON. This was cleared as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. This was cleared—I have testified before that the language of this was not particularly cleared as to policy. I think you will find in the post-surrender paper that it also contains language like that.

Senator FERGUSON. If the language does not clear it, what was cleared? What would you clear in a broadcast if you did not clear the language?

Mr. VINCENT. I would clear whatever there was in over-all policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this state an over-all policy?

Mr. VINCENT. This states an over-all policy in the popular language of making a broadcast; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the policy of our Government at that time, that you made the broadcast, to get rid of the Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. The policy of the Government to get rid of the Emperor?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it to allow the Communists to rise in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not exclude the Communists from this "democratic political parties"?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, we were thinking, in those times, of the old totalitarian party in Japan, which had been running the Government. We were not thinking in terms here of making fine distinctions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not saying in this speech that any liberal party in Japan would even be permitted to use force to gain its ends against the then existing Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Any liberal party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read this again.

That is what I was saying here. He puts the words here in his mouth.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are words you put in your own mouth, are they not?

Mr. VINCENT. My reply to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said:

This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, that included "to achieve ascendancy of the Communist Party," did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I say that the inference you are drawing from that, that there was any intention in my language or in the post-surrender

document—of which I think I have a copy here—in which you find similar language, and to draw the inference from that which can be drawn, is entirely correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, if you, sir, as a State Department official, had desired on a public broadcast to serve notice on the Japanese people that the Communists would be permitted to use force to gain their ends, and that the United States Government would not defend the monarchy, would you have dared to use any more explicit terms than were used in that broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no such intention of making any——

Mr. SOURWINE. Answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. That if I had wanted——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had desired to serve notice in that speech, would you have dared to be any more explicit about it than you were in that broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking a hypothetical question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are an expert on the Far East. Answer it as an expert. It is a hypothetical one.

Mr. VINCENT. It is a hypothetical question. I don't know what I would have tried to do. How can I say what I would have tried to do if I were trying to get the Communists to take over China, which I was not doing?

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you at this time, October of 1945, have said in a radio broadcast that it was the policy of the Communist Party against the use of force by any nationalistic group in Japan, but that the Communist Party would be permitted to use force in the achievement of its ends? Would you have been able to say that? Could you have dared to say that in a radio broadcast at that time, in exactly those terms?

Mr. VINCENT. I would never have even thought of saying it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would not have been permitted, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would never have thought to say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been completely contrary to the policy of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been contrary to the policy of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. What we have is a speech in which you used language which you now say could be construed in a manner which was, at that time, completely contrary to the policy of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I say that you are drawing an inference from statements here which were perfectly understandable at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how those statements were understood by the Japanese people?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I will say that I never had any objections to the speech from the Japanese, General MacArthur, or anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you infer now that Mr. Selden Menefee inserted this in or do you take full responsibility for this language?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Selden Menefee wrote the language, but I will take full responsibility, because I have already testified I went over this broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you seen this record on Mr. Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that may make a difference as to what he intended in this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. From what you have read there it could make a difference, but I doubt it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that Amerasia back on July 28, 1944, was advocating allowing the Communist Party to cause an uprising and take over Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I remember, from that document there.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Who drew that document?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It was drawn up in the special assistant's office, for relations with the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, since the chairman has referred to this, our specialist from the Navy Department is here. Would the chairman like to put him on?

Senator FERGUSON. I do. But first, did you approve it? I do not know the exhibit number, but I want to receive it as an exhibit. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. It passed over my desk and I initialed it.

Senator FERGUSON. It passed over your desk and you initialed it. I ask you whether or not you approved it?

Mr. VINCENT. My initialing of it would approve sending it to the field in response to requests that had come from the field for information as to what publications were saying.

I did not initiate the action.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to say now that you only approved that it might be sent out?

Mr. VINCENT. We were sending out other articles. We were sending out newspaper clippings to Mr. Gauss, over the radio, because of a request from him to get reaction in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know who Susumu Okano was?

Mr. VINCENT. Susumu Okano?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. When I testified, I did not. I think Mr. Sourwine told me.

Senator FERGUSON. When you testified—that means before the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is within a week or 2 weeks?

Mr. VINCENT. A week ago.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know this man?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know the man.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did approve language in this release, as of July 28, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. And this language clearly indicates he was a Communist, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it does.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any question about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you account for the fact in any way that you as an expert on the Far East did not know, certainly, one of the leading Communists, if not the leading Communist, of Japan, by name?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony to you was that I did not know him and I could not recall his name.

Mr. SOURWINE. I say: Do you account in any way for the fact that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I account for it by the fact that 7 years afterward I could not recall the name of a Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might the record show at this point, so there will be no false impression, that while this Amerasia document speaks of using the Japanese Communist Okano in the role of Tito for Japan, Tito at that time was in a much different position than what he is in at the present time?

Is that not true, Mr. Vincent, that at that time, in July of 1944, Tito was a Communist leader, there had been no break with Communist Russia in Yugoslavia at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1944, Tito was, as I recall it, a guerrilla leader in Yugoslavia, but I can't give exact information on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a Communist guerrilla leader?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. and, it is my recollection, by the United Kingdom.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Senator FERGUSON. Now the second line in this describes Okano as a Japanese Communist, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. The second line in what, sir? I am trying to follow you.

Senator FERGUSON. In your release.

Mr. VINCENT. The second line from where?

Senator FERGUSON. The second line from the top.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, "using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He was a Japanese Communist; is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know then that Amerasia was a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think they meant by this statement, if it was not a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. This was simply, as the policy was, even in Yugoslavia, of using people anywhere we could, to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. But this was to do more than fight the Japanese; it was to establish a Communist Government in Japan, was it not? You would not expect the Communists to establish any other kind of government than a Communist Government, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you were advocating that they establish a Communist Government in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I was not advocating anything.

This was sent out.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that Amerasia was——

Mr. VINCENT. That Amerasia, in writing this article, had expressed that opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would be pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we have now our expert from the Navy Department, on distribution coding. May we have him as a witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Will you raise your right hand?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Commander BLENMAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM BLENMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT

Mr. SOURWINE. Commander, will you state your name for the record?

Commander BLENMAN. Commander William Blenman.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position do you hold in the Department?

Commander BLENMAN. I am the Assistant Director of the Administration and Plans Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hand you a document consisting of two pages. Will you read the first couple of lines so we may identify it?

Commander BLENMAN (reading):

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of * * *.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at the lower left-hand corner of the bottom of the second page? Do you find there symbols indicating distribution?

Commander BLENMAN. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us what those symbols mean?

Commander BLENMAN. The first one, Comminch F-O means "commander in chief, and the Chief of Naval Operations."

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, first of all, does the presence of these symbols indicate to you that this document was sent to a number of places or a number of categories of places and persons?

Commander BLENMAN. It indicates to me that it received distribution within the Navy Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Within the Navy Department?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then these are people or officers within the Navy to whom it went?

Commander BLENMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you please proceed?

Commander BLENMAN. First one, "Comminch F-O" is the commander in chief and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is the commander in chief?

Commander BLENMAN. This means the commander in chief of the Navy, sir, who was at that time Fleet Admiral E. J. King.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral King, on July 28, 1944, was the commander in chief?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes, sir.

The next symbol "Comminch F-20" is the assistant for Combat Intelligence.

In July, 1944—I do not have the organization sheets of that particular month—so the incumbent at that time I do not know at present.

"Op-13" refers to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

"Op-13" is the Director of the Central Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who that was?

Commander BLENMAN. Reading from the sheet which is dated August 22, 1944, that was Capt. O. S. Colclough.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the next one?

Commander BLENMAN. "Op-16" is the Director of Naval Intelligence.

"Op-16-1" is the Deputy Director for Naval Intelligence.

"Op-16-F" is the Head of Intelligence Branch in the Naval Intelligence Division.

"Op-20-G" is the Communications Division, the Assistant Director for Communications and Intelligence.

The last I am unable to identify positively, but by the first "Op-16" it indicates that it belonged to the Naval Intelligence Division. I believe it was probably a mailing file section.

Mr. SOURWINE. Considering that paper as a whole, would you say that it is a copy of a State Department document which was circulated within the Navy Department, for the information of high-echelon officers and intelligence?

Commander BLENMAN. Judging from the distribution list, I would say "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. The document appears on its face to be originally a State Department document; is that right?

Commander BLENMAN. I would be unable to positively identify it as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the marking in the upper left-hand corner?

Commander BLENMAN. "Message sent, Chungking, China, July 25 (1945)."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there a name there?

Commander BLENMAN. It says "Hull (Secretary)."

Mr. SOURWINE. He was Secretary of State?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Assuming this document was an official Navy Department document, the presence of that name would indicate it was originally a message sent by Mr. Hull to Chungking, would it not?

Commander BLENMAN. It would.

Senator FERGUSON. Over on the second page, does it not have under "OP-16-A-3-1" "State FC/L"?

Commander BLENMAN. That must be, I believe, some State Department distribution. It is not within the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate that it was distributed in State, also?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, does it indicate in any place that that is a Navy document?

Commander BLENMAN. It has no indication of such.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Vincent, you concede that this was a State Department document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I don't think there is anything very mysterious there. Our communications with Chungking during the war, and the channels being confined, this was made over Navy radio. We have had Navy radio personnel in the Embassy at Chungking. This long-distribution symbol put on—it was put on as it went out over Navy radio.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean if something went out over Navy radio, they had a closed circuit of distribution there to the Navy Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; as the telegram goes from the Navy to the State Department, the State Department would not have put a distribution list for the Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be the practice in the Navy Department, if they sent a State Department message to Chungking, to circulate a copy of it?

Commander BLENMAN. I can't testify that was the procedure done in those days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that to be done during your time?

Commander BLENMAN. I have no experience in that regard.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to put you on the spot, sir. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the date on this is July 28, 1944. The message purports to have been sent on July 25, 1944, to Chungking.

Do you know if that date is correct, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that the date is absolutely correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have reason to believe it is not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to believe it is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you accept the fact that this document was circulated in the Navy Department about the 28th of July?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know if this document quotes from the August 1944 issue of Amerasia? It states: "The July issue."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge if it was quoting from the August issue. It says it was quoting from the July issue; as far as I know anything about it. It is right here, if you want me to read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is this?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a press release that I spoke of this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. That has been ordered in the record, and this document has been ordered in the record, so they will both be in the record for whatever they may speak. But, I would like to ask: Did you not know that, in fact, the text quoted was not in the July issue of Amerasia but in the August issue of Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was in the July issue?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I did not draft this. I have no recollection other than passing over my desk. I don't know whether it was in July. It says "July issue."

A telegram drafted in Mr. McDermott's office would be the July issue; that would be my assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever urging that China would be used as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall making a speech some time or other using a phrase similar to that. I don't recall urging it. You will have to take that whole speech.

Senator FERGUSON. It looks as if we can finish this in 2 hours, but we are not going to try it tonight.

So we will start at 9:30 tomorrow morning and continue for 2 hours and see whether we can finish.

Mr. VINCENT. I have great confidence in Mr. Sourwine, but he has made those 2-hour promises—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I have made no promises as to 2 hours or when we could conclude.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you say that I had made a promise of 2 hours?

Mr. VINCENT. I correct the statement. You have not made a promise. You have said at times you would hope to get through in 2 hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I have expressed that hope with the utmost sincerity, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I might suggest that if you will get a good night's rest and then answer these questions a little more directly, we might save some time.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am informed that the actual order for admission into the record of this press conference transcript which Mr. Vincent has furnished, and this particular document referring to Amerasia, has not been made.

Would you care to make that order?

Senator FERGUSON. I am entering the order now and will also receive what Mr. Mandel read from the Second Report, Un-American Activities in Washington State, in the record.

(The document referring to Amerasia and the press conference transcript referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 387 (content of which appears on p. 2091; distribution numbers identified, beginning on p. 2180) and 388." No. 388 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 388

[Not for the press. For departmental use only]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, JUNE 2, 1950
12:20 PM, EDT

Mr. McDERMOTT. We have a release on the employment of high-ranking scientists in top-level policy posts in the Department and in key foreign posts, which is being handed out to you. I think you will find it interesting (See press release No. 579). It is a nice story when you get it down to small print, and it may be that you would rather work from that and I think you will find something in it.

There is a story from London this morning to the effect that at the recent meeting in London the Western Big Three nations had agreed to let the Western German Government establish an armed federal police force, and I have had a lot of requests on that this morning. The comment on that is, the question of

strengthening police forces in Germany was raised during the meeting of the three Ministers in London. They did not feel, however, that they had sufficient data and information to reach a decision. The matter was therefore referred to the High Commission for study and discussion with the Germans. No decision was reached at London as to the nature or size of additional policy units for Germany.

Q. Mac, is that all?

A. That it all.

Q. What do they mean by saying that they didn't have sufficient data and information? As I recall, out of that three-power meeting there came a very detailed statement on the situation of Eastern Germany.

A. There was a lot of information came out about Eastern Germany, but these three Foreign Ministers felt that they didn't have enough information or data to reach a decision, so they referred it to the High Commission.

Q. There has been no decision as yet?

Q. These stories from London are pretty mutual on that.

A. Yes.

Q. Mac, who brought up the question. Schuman or who?

A. I don't know who brought it up over there.

Q. Can we find out?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't there any rule concerning armed police forces in Western Germany now? They have some sort of arms for the policy force.

A. I suppose so.

Q. They must have federal police forces.

A. I don't know just how the police do that.

Q. Who had the story, Mac?

A. It just came off the ticker and I think there was something before on the ticker about it.

Q. Can we get something about this eventually?

A. I would rather not express any opinion until McCloy has a chance to work it out with the others.

Q. Do they have authority to make any plan or do they have to make recommendations?

A. They will make recommendations which will be discussed with the Government.

Q. It was referred to them for study and discussion.

Q. Was there any decision reached as to the principle involved—whether there should be—

A. (Interposing). The whole thing was just turned over to the High Commission for study and report.

Q. It is under study by them and it looks as though there was agreement in principle.

A. It is under study by the High Commissioners until they make some report to us.

Q. Did the Commissioners receive any guidance at all?

A. Of course, they had the benefit of all the discussions between the Ministers.

Q. That wouldn't affect a policy against rearming Western Germany.

A. That is not the question. This question is about rearming Western Germany. That matter has not been discussed at all. What was covered here was the matter of arming some police.

Q. Is this a new thing? The question has been reported before, but what I can't get is—I can't get an answer to what our attitude is—if we are against the thing?

A. No; I won't even go that far. The whole thing is under discussion.

Q. The report from London was about federal police.

A. I will read the report from London if the UP will give me permission:

"(German Police) London—The Western Big Three Nations have agreed to let the West German Government establish an armed federal police force of about 5,000 men, informed sources said. These sources said the police would be equipped with light arms, including automatic weapons, and be about one-tenth the size of the militarized 'people's police' in the Soviet zone of Germany. Informed sources said the new force was designed to bolster the prestige of the West German Government and give it an instrument to help preserve domestic order. They said it was not designed as a reply to establishment of the Soviet zone 'peoples police.' Informants said the three allied High Commissioners in West Germany had been informed of the decision and instructed to begin dis-

cussions with the Federal German Government on establishment of the force. Negotiations will begin this month in Bonn, where the exact composition of the police will be worked out." (6/2-GMB58A).

Q. Mac, you say then that there has been no decision up to the present time?

A. There has been no decision reached as to the size of the federal force.

Q. The idea of that is that there has been a decision to establish a police force?

A. There has not been any decision to establish or increase it—or how many.

Q. Are there federal police in Germany now?

A. No; there are no federal police.

Q. What was your answer to the query as to whether the Western German police now having arms?

A. I don't know what they carry.

Q. They must carry something.

A. They are not federal police, they are local police. They might have pistols.

Now I am going into a little discourse about practices in the State Department which most of us, of course, know but which some people outside do not. There are hundreds of telegrams in the Department every day. The Secretary of State does not sign all the telegrams but his name appears on every telegram. There are various officers in the Department authorized to sign the Secretary's name and put their own initials under it. That seems to be what happened in connection with a document being discussed in the papers the last two days. There are stores about a message in Chungking, concerning an article that appeared in Amerasia which interested me a lot. I found that the telegram referred to was written in my own office, that it was signed in my own office, and initialed in my own office, and went out as a matter of routine, following a procedure of long standing of keeping our missions abroad informed on what was appearing in the public print in the United States concerning their areas.

I ran through some of my files and found that many for a certain period went to Chungking. These were not secret telegrams at all. The information in these papers has appeared in the newspapers in the United States.

Q. Did any of your telegrams express any information in the Amerasia case?

A. None whatever. Just let me continue. There had gone up to Yen-an a couple of American newspaper correspondents. They were following their professions of observing what was going on. Their stories were reports of their observations to the American people.

Q. Yen-an was the headquarters of the Chinese Communists.

A. I don't know what headquarters this was, but it was in that area. There were many stories written by these correspondents which appeared in the press. Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was well aware of the shift of the correspondents to that part of China. On July 10, he wired the Department—

Q. (Interposing.) What year?

A. 1944 (continuing) that the press correspondents had reportedly returned from their visit to Yen-an and were en route to Chungking. The Embassy had not as yet received from the United States any copies of the press despatches or articles written by them, and accordingly did not know whether it had been possible for them to make comprehensive factual reports. That telegram was referred to my office for action, which consisted of clipping newspapers, leading articles, leading magazines, and writing a digest compressed into a despatch that could be sent by cable, sending the cable to Chungking, and wrapping up the despatches and articles and sending them by air mail. If you want me to, I will read a despatch—one of them: (Washington, July 19, 1944, AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING) "As indicated in following digest, press correspondents who traveled to Yen-an were evidently allowed considerable latitude in their despatches and articles relating to their trip. (Embassy's telegram—July 10.)

"The correspondents in despatches to New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, and Christian Science Monitor, praised Communists' industrial and agricultural achievements, and applauded fighting spirit and military achievements of Communist troops. New York Times' correspondent on July 1 reported finding in Yen-an 'hatred of Japanese and determination to defend their achievements against all interference.' Same correspondent stressed finding realization of nearness of counteroffensive against Japan, in which Communist armies and guerrillas want to participate to fullest. He reported seeing how formerly barren country has been transformed into area of intensive cultivation, stock breeding, and handicraft industry. Harrison Forman in Herald-Tribune on June 23 described Yen-an as 'magnificent symbol of tenacity and determination of people of this border region of China.' He described how this border area, forced by circumstances to become wholly self-reliant since it was cut off from outside world three years ago, 'encourages any and every industry,

small or large, even subsidizing some which admittedly would be unprofitable if products they yield could be imported, Guenther Stein in Christian Science Monitor on June 27 declared that any Allied commander 'would be proud to command those tough, well-fed, hardened troops whose exercises show both high skill and spirit.'

"Harrison Forman in June 23 Herald-Tribune described refreshing, informal atmosphere of place, declaring: 'No one bothers about ceremony, styles of clothing or time. Everything is open and above board, with absolutely no control or restrictions on movements, discussions, interviews, visits or photographs, while every one, from highest government official to lowliest peasant worker, sincerely asks for criticism and advice for betterment of himself and of working conditions.'

"Harrison Forman reported in July 1 Herald-Tribune that Mao Tse-tung stated Communists' attitude on Kuomintang-Communist relations as follows: 'To support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to persist in Kuomintang cooperation as well as cooperation with whole people of China, to struggle for overthrow of Japanese imperialism and to build an independent and democratic China.' Guenther Stein quoted Wang Cheng in June 27 Monitor as asserting that everyone hopes for achievement of full understanding with Kuomintang, 'for we have never ceased to recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as leader.' Communist spokesman, Chou En-lai, according to Harrison Forman in July 9 Herald-Tribune, declared that 'there is still considerable distance between national government's proposal and our suggestions.' Forman in same story says Yen-an hopes that Chungking will send representatives to Yen-an for closer examination of situation and to enter into more comprehensive discussion.

"Correspondents reported from Sian that that city had had three months' notice of their visit, and was 'on its toes.' Guenther Stein in June 1 Monitor related that beggars and dogs had been cleared out, and 'the usually clean city was cleaner than ever.' New York Times correspondent in June 3 despatch said Sian 'looks and feels like a political and military fortress.' He reported that 'one's actions are not one's private business. Everything is traced, checked and counterchecked.' He said he felt like 'a piece on a chess board, with his movements circumscribed by fixed rules.'

"General Hu Chung-nan's chief of staff, General Lo Tse-Kai, flatly told reporters, according to June 3 despatch to New York Times, that Eighth Route Army had never fought Japanese since war began, that they had done nothing except impede attack of Central Government troops, that all guerillas in Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung belonged to Kuomintang, and that if Chungking talks achieved any settlement, 'we don't hope that they will help us fight the Japanese because this is too much to expect. We only hope they will not interfere with us.'

"New York Times correspondent reported on June 2 that General Hu himself declined to answer a question about possible Government-Communist understanding, after representative of Chungking Ministry of Information, who was accompanying party, broke in to say that this question had already been answered by General Lo.

"Harrison Forman in June 4 despatch to Herald-Tribune described Kenanpo and unoccupied Shansi provincial areas still under Marshal Yen Hsi-shan's control as even more Communist than Communist districts adjacent, with which relations are strained, and there is little or no contact.

"Copies of the available despatches and articles are being air mailed to you.

"Hull

"(HMB)

"(SA/M)" (Homer M. Byington)

Q. Mac, was the correspondent for Amerasia in this group?

A. I don't know.

Q. What about this Amerasia telegram?

A. Then on July 25—

Q. (Interposing.) All these things that you have read to us have been by correspondents?

A. That is right.

Q. Did this include Amerasia? Did these reports include everything else that was written by all of them—or was Amerasia reporting?

A. I don't know whether Amerasia was there or not. All I have is the telegrams picked out of the file.

Following that then, the same people who drafted the telegram I have just read to you, and this was not a secret telegram. It was not in the public print. It was sent restricted and coded.

Q. What date was that?

A. July 25. It was about the Japanese——

Q. (Interposing.) Just a second, Mac. Did you say that has been printed?

A. It was printed in part. They have taken quotes out here and there.

Q. How long is it, Mac?

A. I will just read the whole thing to you, it is 2½ pages:

(AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING from Hull: July 25, 1944)

"July issue of Amerasia suggests possibility of using Japanese Communist Susumu Okano in role of a 'Tito for Japan' in helping Japanese people to establish government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department 'will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements in Japan's present ruling class.'

"Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla forces that are now operating behind Japanese lines not only in North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia simply out of deference to current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow policy adopted toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

"Magazine denounces 'incredible and preposterous statement' of General Lo Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Government. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese with not more than 116 tanks, at time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form iron ring blockading Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving that northern guerrilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in that resistance, despite constant 'mopping up' campaigns by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese government. Article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic support of local population.

"Kwangtung Guerilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won support of local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both Japanese 'mopping up' campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

"Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists that immediate recognition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid, and munitions, has become of primary importance for success of our future offensive against Japanese.

"Hull

"(HMB)

"(SA/M)"

Q. Some of the press dispatches commented that this telegram was an instruction to the Embassy concerning action which might be taken against the Japanese.

A. The telegram was in no sense an instruction. It merely relayed to the Ambassador information which had appeared in the magazine Amerasia. I don't think there is any doubt that Ambassador Gauss knew the magazine Amerasia and this was merely a digest of an article in it. The telegram was drafted by a young lady in my office of Current Information and in no way could it be considered an instruction from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss in Chungking.

Q. This was endorsed by the State Department?

A. It was in no sense an endorsement but a transmission of information which had appeared in that magazine.

Q. This is in no case a Department dispatch?

A. No, not at all in the sense you have in mind. It was just a report of what had appeared in the public press. I have gone into this in detail so you might see what the operation was—the Press Office keeping the Ambassador informed of what appeared in the American press.

Q. I noticed that correspondents in China were quoted in these press dispatches. Was Haldore Hanson one of them?

A. I don't know.

Q. I was looking for his name. They refer to an AP correspondent but didn't quote him by name.

Q. AP correspondent?

Q. Can you say why you should deny this so emphatically?

A. Now, look! I am not saying whether this telegram I have just read you exists in any file outside the State Department because I do not know. I do not know whether a copy of this telegram was in the Amerasia file or whether or not it was seized there. What I have is the official State Department file and I am giving you the information from that file.

Q. Would it be possible for Amerasia to obtain the file?

A. I don't see how.

Q. I was wondering what the operation was.

A. I do not make public press digests sent to the Embassy for their information.

Q. That was signed by Acheson, wasn't it?

A. No. It was signed by Hull.

Stories in the newspapers have said that this telegram was a secret one from Hull to Chungking. That is just not true, and I put emphasis on that. Off the record.

Q. What category would it appear in here, or would it be sent out with distinguishable instructions, or what?

A. It was marked restricted and not to be shown to anybody except in paraphrase. That was because the material was not secret, it having appeared in public print, but it was transmitted in code to save money. We did not want to prejudice the code; hence, the stamp that it was restricted.

Q. It was signed "Hull" though, wasn't it, Mac?

A. It was signed "Hull," just exactly at this one. They are all the same.

Mr. WHITE. Every telegram that has gone out of the State Department has been signed by the Secretary of State, so far as I know, from the inception of the Department.

Mr. McDERMOTT. It has to be signed by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary in his place, or otherwise it doesn't go out.

Q. That doesn't mean that he sees everything with his signature?

A. He never sees them—he wouldn't have time. Mr. Hull never saw all the telegrams. The yellow telegrams are incoming, the green one are outgoing.

Mr. WHITE. The question was asked as to who brought up the question of the German police at London and whether the Ministers gave the High Commissioners any guidance.

Prior to the London meeting a letter had been received by the three Governments from Chancellor Adenauer requesting 25,000 central police. This letter had not been answered nor had it been discussed prior to the London meeting. At that meeting Chancellor Adenauer's letter was brought up by the British. Mac has told you the position that the Ministers took—namely, that they did not feel that they had sufficient information to make any decision on it whatsoever. Accordingly, the High Commissioners were asked to study the problem and to come up with recommendations. In other words, in answer to the second part of the question, the High Commissioners did not, NOT, receive any guidance from the Foreign Ministers.

Q. Link, have the High Commissioners been told to make any recommendations by any particular time?

A. So far as I know, no. The question was dumped in their lap and they were told to work it out.

Q. Thank you, sir.

M. J. McDERMOTT.

* * * * *

SA/M: AW

Senator FERGUSON. We will now recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:30 a. m., Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, some of the newspapers report to have discovered what they appear to have thought was a contradiction in our testimony toward the end of yesterday's session. I don't believe it was, but I want to be sure that the record speaks true and that we have an opportunity to discuss it on that point. There also has been an indication that perhaps you were—on yesterday—bulldozed or browbeaten or overcome to the point where you said something you really didn't mean to say, and if that is the fact I want to give you an opportunity to correct it this morning. If I seem to you perhaps to oversimplify this, bear with me for a moment.

When you were making this talk that we discussed—

Senator FERGUSON. I think he ought to be given an opportunity now. Do you want to change or alter or make any explanation of any of your testimony as of yesterday?

MR. VINCENT. Senator, I would like to see, if I can, the transcript, but it isn't here, is it, of my testimony yesterday?

MR. SOURWINE. It has not been delivered yet. It should be here this morning by about 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you may proceed. You may see the transcript.

MR. SOURWINE. When we were talking about this radio speech on the occupation policy for Japan I had asked you about your use of the phrase "democratic parties," and again about your use of the

phrase "liberal parties," and whether that included the Communist Party of Japan. It is true, is it not, that at that time there were more than one political party in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in this speech endeavoring to divide the political parties of Japan roughly into two groups, the monarchistic-nationalistic on the one hand, and the democratic-liberal on the other; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't agree with me if it is not right.

Mr. VINCENT. That was my general intention, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply were using a label for each of those two groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have called them group A and group B, and written a long thesis about what you meant by group A; but you were making a radio speech and you chose a label for group A and a label for group B, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The label that you chose for one group was democratic parties or liberal parties.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The label you chose for the other group was monarchistic parties or nationalistic parties, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Is that the label I chose [referring to paper]? I was just wondering whether I used that or whether I used reactionary parties.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, reactionary parties; for the other group?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I used the word "nationalistic" here, I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right. In which of those two groups did you intend that the Communist Party of Japan should fall? In which of those two groups did you consider it to be, for the purpose of the discussion that you were here undertaking?

Mr. VINCENT. The Communist Party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If you are asking me in the context of this, I didn't consider that it fell in either.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we are trying to find out, because subsequently you were asked if you thought that the Communist Party was democratic, and of course you very properly said you did not, but you were not then talking about the same thing as you were in this speech, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that? I am just trying to get it straight.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, indeed. You were asked if you thought that the Communist Party of Japan was a democratic party, and you said you did not.

Mr. VINCENT. I correctly testified I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that sense you were not talking about the same thing as you were when in the speech you attempted to classify the parties of Japan into one of two groups, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So in that sense you were not contradicting yourself at all, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. When you say that the Communist Party does not fall in either of these two groups would you explain that a little?

Mr. VINCENT. I would explain that in this way: That in making this speech I did not have in mind the Communist Party as falling in either group. In other words, I was thinking of democratic parties as parties as we think of them, as democratic-liberal parties in this country, and in making this speech there was no intention in my mind to include Communist parties among democratic parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, Mr. Vincent. You knew there were Communists in Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that they wanted to bring back to Japan a Communist Japanese according to the press release that you had prepared and sent out.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't prepare it, sir, but you are speaking of the Amerasia press release.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved it, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I had passed it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Amerasia was advocating that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew there was a Communist Party in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew it was active?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you excluded it entirely?

Mr. VINCENT. In speaking of democratic parties I did not have it in mind. In speaking of political parties—

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not exclude it by words? You told us yesterday, as I recall your testimony, that it was included in that.

Mr. VINCENT. Included among the political parties. That was my testimony yesterday, sir, that I did not have in mind—I haven't the testimony here now—that I did not have specifically in mind, but I did not exclude the Communist Party specifically as you have said, but I do not think that it can be interpreted here that because I did not exclude the Communist Party from a mention of democratic parties that it necessarily follows that I included it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it possible that the man who wrote that speech had something in mind different than what you had in mind?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, sir, what he had in mind. It is possible, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it is fair to the people of the United States to have a State Department official, a high official have his broadcast written by a person connected with the radio station and then for him to repeat it on the radio?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I think that is done quite frequently. As long as it is gone over.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking, do you think that is the proper thing to do?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it is improper. I think it is done regularly.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard this read about the man who prepared your speech.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was a good thing to do it?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I had no suspicion—

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now. I am not talking about then.

Mr. VINCENT. I think now it would be, to have a man like that prepare a script.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it would be now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, on the basis of the information I now have about Menefee.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you would do it now?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. So a man has to be careful who he has work on his speeches, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you don't want us to believe, do you, that in making this speech you were unaware of or unconscious of the existence of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not wish you to.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were attempting to draw a line, and it is always a very difficult thing to draw a line, but you were attempting to draw a line which would divide the political parties of Japan into two groups, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that you didn't mean to include the Communist Party of Japan in either of those two groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly would not include the Communist Party of Japan in the monarchistic or nationalistic group, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that the Communists in Japan, as elsewhere, always refer to themselves as democratic, the "real democrats," as the "true liberals," that the words "democratic" and "liberal" are always applied by the Communists to themselves?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I am; that they quite frequently do that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that when they are used that way by the Communists they are understood as including the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That when the Communist Party uses it, that they frequently refer to themselves as a democratic party.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you ever have any thought at all that your use of the words might be interpreted in Japan as including the Communist Party in this group that you call democratic or liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it could have been interpreted as that, considering what you just said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without considering any argument that I may have made, on the basis of your own knowledge of Japan, of the Far East, do you think that the general use of the phrase "democratic parties" or "liberal parties" of Japan would be interpreted by the Japanese hearer or reader as including the Communist Party of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it could have been interpreted as including it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, the subcommittee hearings mentioned the following published paragraph, that is, the hearings of this subcommittee on a previous date. I read:

With the assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWNCC, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee theretofore so that the set of directives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur and apparently ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.

If I tell you that that paragraph was published about October of 1945, could you comment on it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would comment on that paragraph as being a misstatement of fact. I testified yesterday with regard to the development of the postsurrender policy and I can testify again today if you would like me to. I testified also in executive hearing that that is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, who could have revealed the information contained in that paragraph, that is, as to who was out and what directives were being held up and what was being forwarded?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was referred to in that paragraph by the mention of "the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist"?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a part of the so-called anti-imperialist forces in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no such designation, and I don't—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who replaced Mr. Dunn as Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think, sir, that anybody actually replaced Mr. Dunn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who replaced Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who replaced Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. On the SWNCC committee, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday I had just started to ask you about another address which you made. I refer now to the address which you made at the Foreign Policy Association forum in New York City on October 20, 1945. I believe the subject of the forum was Between War and Peace, and your address was called The Post War Period in the Far East. Do you recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that address urge that China be used as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union in the Far East?

MR. VINCENT. I would like to get the exact phrase (referring to paper). Would you like to know exactly what I said or do you have it there?

MR. SOURWINE. I have a copy of the speech and intend to put it in the record, but I don't want to let that summary stand if you think it is an unfair summary.

MR. VINCENT. What I said here is "China is in a position to form a buffer or a bridge in our relation to the Soviet Union in the Far East."

MR. SOURWINE. Read a little more to get it in context.

MR. VINCENT (reading) :

We will all agree, I believe, that the bridge concept is preeminently preferable and that that it should be our policy to make it a fact. I would go further and say that only through the cooperation of China, the U. S. S. R. and ourselves can the objectives of our policy in the Far East be achieved.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you in that speech say anything that might be construed in China as semiofficial notice to the Chinese Nationalist government that the United States would never cooperate with that government in any move against the Communists?

MR. VINCENT. I would have to look at the speech, I do not recall saying any such thing.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you in the speech say :

In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against the other.

MR. VINCENT (reading). "Antagonistic toward the other."

MR. SOURWINE. You said, "Antagonistic toward the other"?

MR. VINCENT. That is what this press release from the State Department has.

MR. SOURWINE. May I see that, sir?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What position would that place you in? We couldn't be anti-Communist, could we?

MR. VINCENT. I was not speaking of anticommunism. I was speaking of the relations of states, Mr. Chairman, and I did not there have in mind any ideology. I had in mind that we did not wish to cooperate with China in a policy which would bring about friction or antagonism with the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. But don't you understand that the Russian State and communism are one thing?

MR. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, in this speech——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. My question has nothing to do with the speech now. I just asked you the plain question whether or not the Russian State, the U. S. S. R. State, and communism are not one and the same thing.

MR. VINCENT. It operates differently, but yes, it is one and the same thing in its effect.

Senator FERGUSON. In effect.

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How would we fit our policy of not allowing communism to expand, if that was our policy in the State Department, and you use this language?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I am getting at here. We ourselves recognized the U. S. S. R., but we do not cooperate with communism. In this case I was speaking of the relations of states, which means China, Russia, and ourselves, in an attempt to avoid friction in the Far East. This was immediately at the close of the war, and anything that could have avoided friction and difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that meant that we would have to play along with the Communists in China.

Mr. VINCENT. That was also a part of our policy at the time, of trying to get the National Government and the other parties to settle their political differences under the National Government of China, that was part of our policy.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you make this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I made this speech on the 18th of October. I think it is—

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe it was the 20th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The 20th of October. What year?

Mr. VINCENT. 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. After the war was over.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That meant that our policy after the war, when the fighting was over, was to play along with the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't put it that way, sir. The policy was very clear. It has been put in General Marshall's directive, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would put it just as I have said before, that there was a serious threat in China, I will have to repeat this, of an outbreak of civil war which would have disturbed relations throughout the Far East, and which has disturbed them. At that time it was my idea and it was the idea of the other people in the Government of the United States, including the President and General Marshall, that the best way to avoid that kind of difficulty was to bring about some kind of political settlement in China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I asked you this before, whether or not there were any places in history that you were able to consolidate Communists with anti-Communists in a government and not have the Communists take over.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have testified before that in France and in Italy at the conclusion of the war Communists came into both governments, and that they were eventually eliminated. I have testified also that there was never any intention to allow the Communists to take over control of the Chinese Government, and the very fact that the negotiations broke down was on the basis that the Communists were trying themselves to get a greater degree of power in the Government than we or the National Government of China, which was really conducting the negotiations, were prepared to grant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record may speak very truly, will you look at this, which is—let me identify it first. Mr. Mandel, is that a photostat and of what publication?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Department of State Bulletin dated October 21, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certain pages thereof?

Mr. MANDEL. Certain pages thereof.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at that paragraph where we differed on the language? Will you look at it as it appears in the Department of State Bulletin, which is what I was quoting from, that paragraph that begins "In August." Will you read it as it appears there?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't know whether you had made any point of the difference of the words "directed against" or "antagonistic toward."

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I was just correcting your statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. You see I was reading from the Department of State Bulletin and you were reading from the mimeographed release, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they not both furnished by the Department of State. Do you know which was the way you spoke when you made the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I made it the way it is here. It is much more like I made it the way it is here.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "here" you mean in the press release?

Mr. VINCENT. In the press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using the word antagonized?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of the State Department's instrument, the photostat?

Mr. VINCENT. It hasn't a date there.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is marked on there in red pencil, I believe, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. You have "23½" in red pencil. This seems to have no date on it. Down at the bottom.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is hard to read. October 21, 1951. Is that the correct date of that instrument?

Senator FERGUSON. How could it be 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the date of it, Mr. Mandel?

Senator FERGUSON. Unless they reprinted it, this was back in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. October 21, 1945, would be very close to being correct. It is certainly subsequent to the press release.

Senator FERGUSON. About the same time.

Mr. VINCENT. This was released to the press on the 18th of October but to be held until October 20, when the speech was given. I can't account for the discrepancy there. There may be other discrepancies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider it important?

Mr. VINCENT. I consider it of no great importance. I prefer the word antagonistic to that, and that is the one I used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar, Mr. Vincent, with the statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China under date of December 15, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you referred to that here as being the same thing as the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. It is generally called the Marshall directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Marshall directive consisted really of several separate documents, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It consisted of a memorandum to the War Department which was included with—

Mr. SOURWINE. From the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a letter to General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. And a letter to General Marshall from the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a statement by the President, a copy of which was included in the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a copy of a press release, I think, also.

Mr. VINCENT. The press release became, or the press release was, the directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Substantially the same. But Mr. Marshall, General Marshall, was given all three of the documents with his letter of transmittal; was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you stated what part you had in the drafting of that directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I have, in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does your testimony boil down in substance to this, that you initially prepared a rough draft, that that rough draft was taken over to the military, the War Department, that a new draft was prepared expanding your draft from two pages to about six pages, that that came back to the State Department and you had an opportunity to go over it for changes, and that some few changes were made in the State Department, that it then went up and when it came back for final approval you had a chance to see it again in its final form before it went to the White House.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I amend that in one respect just for clarity?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please do.

Mr. VINCENT. The paper that I drafted originally was drafted with a different idea in mind than what finally came out in the form of a press release or directive. I had drafted a short paper to have for Mr. Byrnes something as to a statement of what I considered to be the problems that faced us and how we might solve them in China, as a basis for his discussion. I am trying to get why the other was expanded because I didn't have in mind writing a directive for Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours did not purport to be a directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine did not purport to be a directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Alternatives?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you are speaking of a paper which I composed about a month earlier.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Which I would like to mention. That was not the one that I wrote as of November 28. I am speaking of the alternative one which set forth four alternatives for the Secretary with regard to what course we might follow in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. So there were two papers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; there were two papers. The other one has no connection with the eventual directive other than the fact that one of these four alternatives was substantially chosen as a starting point for what developed into the policy under Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. When you drew the second paper did you choose the alternative that was put in the directive?

Mr. VINCENT. That had already been chosen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who chose it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall except that I know it was submitted to the President. Whether the President chose it, whether General Marshall chose it, whether the Secretary of State chose it, or whether they chose it in consultation. I did not choose it; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when it came back to you again, it came back from the War Department as a drafted directive?

Mr. VINCENT. It came back as a drafted directive, called United States policy toward China, as I recall it. I am trying to make that distinction, because that isn't what I called my small paper, which was just an outline.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write a memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which was the basis for the approximately 6-page directive which came back from the War Department? Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to get the word "basis." I want to be more exact. There has been so much discussion of this whole thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, have you not, that you did write a two-page memorandum as to what should be in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the six-page—

Mr. VINCENT. No; not what should be in it, but what should form the basis for a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't, sir. It is among the papers in the State Department. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event, you did write a two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I have described what its contents were here before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the directive which came back from the War Department—

Mr. VINCENT. I testified—and I would like to have it the same way—I testified that it did incorporate some of the phraseology and some of the ideas in my November 28 thing, but it was an expansion and it contained many other matters which were not taken up in mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have stated that it contained nothing which was contrary to or at odds with what had been your original memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you also draft the memorandum which was signed by the Secretary of State, which was one of the three documents that went along with the letter of transmittal to General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory on that one.

I don't think I am going to be able to testify from knowledge whether I drafted, whether it was drafted in cooperation or after discussion with Army officers or not. If I knew factually whether I drafted it, I would tell you I drafted it, but then I would add also that it was a result of discussion which took place between State and War and General Marshall. I would make the same statement that if somebody else drafted it, I had also had a part in its preparation.

Senator FERGUSON. You never had any doubt that General Marshall understood and had a part in the drafting of his directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had any doubt but what General Marshall knew what was in the directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and had a part in drafting it.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, we sat for a matter of 3 hours on a Sunday morning in December discussing it with General Marshall. We read it over. There were minor phraseology changes made in it, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. He was part and parcel of the making of this directive; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there another question pending?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. He wants to know whether I drafted it, and I am afraid I cannot testify as to whether I drafted this memorandum by Secretary Byrnes for the War Department. I think a reading of it would make it clear that it is in a sense a military—it first sets forth what the Secretary of State had said. Then it goes on to enumerate certain things which were supposed to be a guide, I think, to General Wedemeyer, which came out of the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean where it says:

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating—

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I recollect clearly that that also came into the discussion on this Sunday morning on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was strictly a State Department document, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. This memo, yes; except that it was discussed with General Marshall in that morning meeting there, because General Marshall also had quite an interest in what kind of directive or what kind of advice was going out to General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. This directive, though, did not go to the War Department for redrafting and then come back to State; did it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot testify, whether the War Department had seen it or not. It was an attempt to get instructions out to Wedemeyer, and I would say just from knowledge of how things developed there, that the War Department did have, not, we will say, a matter of drafting, but that they had seen it before and it was a matter of agreement as to what kind of memorandum they were going to get as a basis for Wedemeyer to operate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you please from the white paper here identify by page which of these documents, or which two if more than one, you were referring to when you spoke of the expanded directive that came back from the State Department after your two-page memo had gone over? Is it that first one?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it is the one that is marked "62. Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the one that you wrote an original two-page memo that went to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That went to the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Went to the War Department, came back to the State Department for changes?

Mr. VINCENT. Went back to the War Department and came back to State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Came back for a high-level conference at which it was approved in the State Department and then finally went to the President, Mr. Byrnes taking it over?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Byrnes taking it over.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think General Marshall went with him.

Mr. VINCENT. The two of them I think went over on whatever day it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did write a two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which dealt with the subject matter of this statement by President Truman, which contains some of the ideas that were found in this.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And with which the President's statement was not at odds or in controversy.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; as a matter of fact, as I said here in executive session, from recollection there was the matter of assisting the Chinese to take back Manchuria, the matter of the urgency of bringing about some kind of truce to stop the civil war, there was the matter of assisting the Chinese insofar as it was feasible to bring about a political settlement after they ceased fighting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what became of the original of your two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the original?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen testimony that Mr. Byrnes handed it to General Marshall and General Marshall took it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a photostat of a document, sir. I ask you if you recognize that document.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that document?

Mr. VINCENT. This document is the memorandum by Secretary Byrnes to the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not the memorandum as so transmitted, is it? That is an earlier draft of the memorandum, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. This one?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is, that is not the particular draft which was transmitted to the War Department, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to compare this word for word.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean that. I mean as a draft, this is a draft which preceded the formal document that was actually transmitted to the War Department, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. From my examination of this, this looks like it is the document which was transmitted.

Mr. SOURWINE. It looks like the document actually transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it is initialed by Mr. J. F. B.; whether there was a subsequent redrafting I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do your initials appear on that?

Mr. VINCENT. They do, as the drafting officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you did draft that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I did draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is, then, the original of the document for the War Department which appears on page 606 of the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I can testify. This looks exactly like it is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did draft two documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. A two-page memorandum which formed——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I won't use the words "formed the basis". A two-page memorandum which was in some way, the ideas of which were, incorporated into the President's statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this two-page memorandum for the War Department which the Secretary of State signed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this memorandum may be laid in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will become part of the record and received in evidence.

(The document referred to, marked "Exhibit No. 389," is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 389

[Declassified December 9, 1945]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions."

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the

Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance;

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

[s] J. F. B.

[s] JCV.

FE: VINCENT: ALM.

December 10, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator McCarran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was admitted as exhibit No. 390, and read in full as follows:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like permission to read this letter.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951, requesting "A draft of General Marshall's directive which he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wedemeyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, September 15, 1950; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive. According to your letter of September 19, General Wedemeyer testified that he saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive.

I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum to which, I believe, General Wedemeyer referred.

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that this photostat which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was submitted with this letter from the State Department.

This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter of December 15, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written directive for a China mission.

A search of the Department's files reveal that none of the other documents of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John Carter Vincent.

As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, Mr. John Carter Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence the responsible subordinate officer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should be pointed out, however, that in important memorandum of this kind it is generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the

record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible subordinate officer. Since this particular memorandum was addressed to the War Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the President may have had a hand in the drafting.

In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to General Marshall was never returned to the State Department file? Would you assume that from this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that from this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your name, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It did.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not in the State Department files in October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The original never came back to the State Department, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern Office files and had never gone into the regular State Department files.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you identify that so that we might request it?

Mr. VINCENT. I could identify it by date and I could describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you do that?

Mr. VINCENT. I will put it this way: You don't have to identify it, because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the difficulty there has been about the draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot of confusion.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have it. If you would write the State Department there will be no difficulty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent testified here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in getting it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't promise that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You at least are anxious that we should have it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to have it now. That I think would clarify one other thing in General Wedemeyer's testimony, what document did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am inclined to think that what he saw was my November 28 memo when he testified that he saw something over my initials.

Mr. SOURWINE. Rather than the one—

Mr. VINCENT. Rather than this, because although he may have seen this here, from the contents too great significance—and I am not trying to avoid responsibility—too great emphasis is being placed on the fact that my initials are on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the question of the significance of this, to what extent did you shape the requests of the War Department with regard

to the stipulations that they wanted made, the directive that they wanted given to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I had my part in them, and I remember the discussion on the 9th of December, but I do not recall exactly which idea in there is mine and which is General Marshall's or—

Mr. SOURWINE. Just on the chance that you might recognize one of these paragraphs of one of the ideas advanced, it says:

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops.

Did you have anything to do with putting that into this message?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified, that was one of the recommendations in my memorandum of November 28. Therefore, whether I put that in there or not, it was an idea that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your memorandum of November 28 a forerunner of this message of Secretary Byrnes as well as a forerunner of the President's statement of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a forerunner in time, but I don't think that it was the memorandum that was consulted in connection with this. As I say, you asked if we were discussing the matter of should or should not we send troops to Manchuria, and I was already on record in my memorandum of November 28 as favoring that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be a fair assumption, then, that since you had placed that in your memorandum of the 28th of November, and since it is in here in a memorandum which you drafted, you can claim some substantial share of the credit for putting it in here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I could claim some substantial share. I would like to have here what were General Wedemeyer's requests. You see, that refers to General Wedemeyer's telegram. General Wedemeyer probably could also claim a considerable share to everything that is in there, because I believe that that was something that General Wedemeyer wanted, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. These points were in compliance with his request, in other words?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 2:

He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China Theater.

The same answer, it got in there the same way?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how. That would be something I could have put in on anyone could have put in, because it was a matter of generally agreed policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 3:

Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to North China, except as North China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance.

Mr. VINCENT. The same answer to that one, that it was a matter resulting from general discussion and I was in agreement with that

idea. Whether I proposed it, whether General Marshall proposed it or somebody else, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. That also was in response to a recommendation of General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say it was, but I say what we lack here is General Wedemeyer's telegram to see whether that was what he wanted to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 4:

Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, that resulted again from the discussion on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any—

Mr. VINCENT. From the general discussion on the 9th. I would say just purely hazarding a guess, that the latter one is no doubt, or seems to me to be, General Marshall's contribution primarily, because he was undertaking this mission and he wanted to know what were the circumstances under which he was going to undertake it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the purpose or intent of the group that engaged in that general discussion to stymie General Wedemeyer in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in anyway the purpose or intent to give him unrealistic directives, directives which he could not successfully carry out or which, if carried out, would render ineffectual if not actually ineffective his efforts in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that crossed anybody's mind. There was no intent of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that this directive in any way ran at cross purposes to what General Wedemeyer had reported?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, but I say in the absence of having General Wedemeyer's telegram, which we should have here, we can't reach any conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was discussed at top level in the State Department in connection with General Wedemeyer's recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. With General Wedemeyer's recommendations, and in connection with General Marshall's forthcoming mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hadn't General Wedemeyer, in point of fact, said that it was absolutely impossible for Chiang to make any success in Manchuria, that he should concentrate his efforts in North China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, Mr. Sourwine. I don't know whether he had or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had said that, what would be the effect of this directive which said he could proceed to take Chinese troops into Manchuria, but he couldn't take any into North China?

Mr. VINCENT. If he had said it this would be just the reverse effect of what he wanted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at page 131 of the white paper, please, and follow as I read:

GENERAL WEDEMEYER'S REPORTS

On November 14, 1945, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, China Theater, reported to Washington that the National Government was completely unprepared for occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition. He also reported his recommendation to the Generalissimo that the Chinese should adopt the immediate objective of consolidating the areas south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze and of securing the overland line of communications in that area prior to entry into Manchuria.

Again on November 20, 1945, he reported as follows:

"I have recommended to the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in North China and upon the prompt execution of political and official reforms designed to remove the practice of corruption by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes."

General Wedemeyer also recommended the utilization of foreign executives and technicians, at least during the transition period. He then added:

"Chinese Communists guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if present activities are reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. * * * Logistical support for National governmental forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept."

Among General Wedemeyer's conclusions at that time were the following:

"1. The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent, civilian officials.

"2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months or perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in paragraph 1.

"3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

"4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist and possibly their own plans in North China and Manchuria. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Russian Treaty and related agreements.

"5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government."

How do you now, having read it, understand that report by General Wedemeyer? Do you think it counsels moving Chinese troops into Manchuria?

Mr. VINCENT. On the contrary, this counsels not sending them into Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. And what did the directive from the War Department by the State Department say on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. It said it authorized moving troops into Manchuria. It told him also to proceed with his plans for North China, but not to operate under them until General Marshall had gotten out there and figured out the chances of his success.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did that overruling of General Wedemeyer originate; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. It was a military matter, I should think, and it was one of Pentagon Building or General Marshall himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Couldn't it have originated with Chiang Kai-shek himself?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have. Chiang Kai-shek was anxious to move troops into Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he is the one that overruled Wedemeyer in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify factually on that, whether the Generalissimo—

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that this directive here, which is made by the Secretary of State to the War Department, originated in the Pentagon or at a high military level?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think that those military provisions there were the result of discussion between the War Department and the State Department. You are speaking now of these four points there?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. And with General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wherever they originated, is there any question in your mind now that this directive was contrary to what General Wedemeyer had himself recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was contrary to what he recommended here. Whether there was a subsequent recommendation from him I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you going to pass to another subject?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

(The material following was ordered printed in the record at this point, by the chairman on April 8, 1952.)

OUTLINE OF SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION IN CHINA

(Drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945)

1A (1) The United States is prepared to assist the Chinese National Government in the transportation of troops to Manchurian ports to enable China to reestablish its administrative control over Manchuria as an integral part of China. The United States and the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Declaration, are committed to the return of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., in adhering to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to the return of Manchuria to China; and by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945 the U. S. S. R. pledges itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. All of these Governments recognize the National Government of China as the only legal government in China. Resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can therefore be properly effected only through reestablishment by the recognized National Government of China of administrative control in Manchuria.

2A (2) The United States is prepared to assist the National Government of China in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China. United States marines are in north China for that purpose and stand ready to act more directly and effectively in accomplishing that purpose. Quite apart from the United States commitment to assist the Chinese National Government in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, the United States feels that it has a responsibility of its own, deriving from its adherence to the principles and policies which brought it into war against Japan, to effect the removal of Japanese troops from China.

3A (3) The United States recognizes and supports the National Government of China on an international level, but it cannot support that Government by military intervention in an interneecine struggle.

4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2) above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies of the Nationalist Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arrange,

if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the opposing forces.

5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) above could have long-term advantage for China only if accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national conference to seek and find a peaceful solution of China's present political strife. The United States is committed to assist the Chinese National Government, in every appropriate way, in the achievement of unity, stability, and democracy in China by methods of peaceful political negotiation. The United States is prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to reaffirm that they also are committed to such a policy. The United States is cognizant of the fact that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that it would be conducive to peace, unity, and democratic reform in China if the bases of that Government were broadened to include other political elements in the country. Furthermore, the United States is convinced that the existence of autonomous armies such as the army of the Communist Party, is inconsistent with and makes impossible political unity in China. It is for these reasons that the United States strongly advocates that the Chinese National Government call as soon as possible a conference of representatives of the major political elements in the country for the purpose of agreeing upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. To be consistent, the National Government should at the same time announce the termination of one-party "political tutelage." Upon the institution of a broadly representation government, the Chinese Communist forces should be integrated effectively into the Chinese National Government army.

6A (6) The United States is prepared to encourage and support the Chinese National Government in its endeavors to bring about peace and unity by the creation of a government representative of the various political elements in the country. It is also prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to give similar encouragement and support to the Chinese National Government.

7A If the Chinese Government is able to bring about peace and unity along the lines described, the United States is prepared to assist the Chinese Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, to initiate constructive measures for improvement and progress in the agrarian and industrial economy of the country, and to establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. Specifically, the United States is prepared to give favorable consideration to the establishment of an American military advisory group in China; to the dispatch of such other advisers in the economic and financial fields as the Chinese Government may need and which this Government can supply; and to Chinese requests for credits and loans, under reasonable conditions, for projects which contribute toward the development of a healthy economy in China and the development of healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

FE: J.C.Vincent : hst.

11-28-45.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA, DECEMBER 15, 1945

(Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945)

1B The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations Organization.

2B It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united, and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation.

3B The Government of the United States believes it essential:

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

4B (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

5B The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

6B The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

7B In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States marines are in North China for that purpose.

8B The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

9B The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.

10B The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party "political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

11B The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

12B In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be marked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace, a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

13B As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial

economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN
ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD
CHINA, DECEMBER 15, 1945

(Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945)

1B The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations organization.

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1A (1) The United States is prepared to assist the Chinese National Government in the transportation of troops to Manchurian ports to enable China to reestablish its administrative control over Manchuria as an integral part of China. The United States and the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Declaration, are committed to the return of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., in adhering to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to the return of Manchuria to China; and by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945 the U. S. S. R. pledges itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. All of these Governments recognize the National Government of China as the only legal government in China. Resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can therefore be properly effected only through reestablishment by the recognized National Government of China of administrative control in Manchuria.

2A (2) The United States is prepared to assist the National Government of China in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China. United States Marines are in north China for that purpose and stand ready to act more directly and effectively in accomplishing that purpose. Quite apart from the United States commitment to assist the Chinese National Government in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, the United States feels that it has a responsibility of its own, deriving from its adherence to the principles and policies which

6B The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

5B The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

7B In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States

OUTLINE OF SUGGESTED COURSE OF
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brought it into war against Japan, to effect the removal of Japanese troops from China.

3A (3) The United States recognizes and supports the National Government of China on an international level, but it cannot support that Government by military intervention in an internecine struggle.

4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2) above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies of the National Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arrange, if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the opposing forces.

5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) above could have long-term advantage for China only if accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national conference to seek and find a peaceful solution of China's present political strife. The United States is committed to assist the Chinese National Government, in every appropriate way, in the achievement of unity, stability, and democracy in China by methods of peaceful political negotiation. The United States is prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to reaffirm that they also are committed to such a policy. The United States is cognizant of the fact that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that it would be conducive to peace, unity, and democratic reform in China

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Marines are in North China for that purpose.

9B The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.

8B The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and co-operate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

3B The Government of the United States believes it essential:

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

2B It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the

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if the bases of that Government were broadened to include other political elements in the country. Furthermore, the United States is convinced that the existence of autonomous armies such as the army of the Communist Party, is inconsistent with and makes impossible political unity in China. It is for these reasons that the United States strongly advocates that the Chinese National Government call as soon as possible a conference of representatives of the major political elements in the country for the purpose of agreeing upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. To be consistent, the National Government should at the same time announce the termination of one-party "political tutelage." Upon the institution of a broadly representation government, the Chinese Communist forces should be integrated effectively into the Chinese National Government army.

6A (6) The United States is prepared to encourage and support the Chinese National Government in its endeavors to bring about peace and unity by the creation of a government representative of the various political elements in the country. It is also prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to give similar encouragement and support to the Chinese National Government.

7A If the Chinese Government is able to bring about peace and unity along the lines described, the United States is prepared to assist the Chinese

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people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation.

10B The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party "political tutelage," established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen.

11B The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

4B (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

12B In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace—a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

13B As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Govern-

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Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, to initiate constructive measures for improvement and progress in the agrarian and industrial economy of the country, and to establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. Specifically, the United States is prepared to give favorable consideration to the establishment of an American military advisory group in China; to the dispatch of such other advisers in the economic and financial fields as the Chinese Government may need and which this Government can supply; and to Chinese requests for credits and loans, under reasonable conditions, for projects which contribute toward the development of a healthy economy in China and the development of healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

ment in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to inquire about this: Yesterday I asked you some questions in relation to an investigation of the Amerasia case, that is, the taking of the paper from your office.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall when that investigation was made by the security office?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that I could not recall the exact date of it, it was a matter of days after the Amerasia case broke, because I had left—this is my recollection now—that I had left for San Francisco by the middle of April. I don't think it took place after I returned.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us whether it was before or after you made the donation to the defense fund for Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I could not. No; I couldn't place the date.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would make a donation to a defense fund of Mr. Service, one of the people involved in the removal of the papers from your office if the security office was making an investigation of your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I among others made such a donation.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you donate?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I gave \$40 or \$50, among others, to assist him in hiring a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. That is his defense fund. I did not misname that; did I?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was to defend him, to get a lawyer to defend him; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would give that money after your office was being investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said I do not know when I gave it; yes. I would have given it—

Senator FERGUSON. Even after—

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was an old friend, because he had not yet been indicted. He was a man who was being accused.

Senator FERGUSON. You say he wasn't indicted?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; he was not. He was brought before—I am working on recollection—he was brought before the grand jury.

Senator FERGUSON. He was arrested.

Mr. VINCENT. He had been arrested; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after he was arrested—

Mr. VINCENT. That I couldn't say. I must have given it before I went to San Francisco. I would have to get the date of when he was arrested, but some time within a matter of a week or 10 days.

Senator FERGUSON. Within a week or 10 days after he was arrested.

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think your office was investigated during that period?

Mr. VINCENT. During that period, yes. I don't place the date.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't it have been very embarrassing to you to be a witness in the case and at the same time be a donor to the defense of one of the defendants, you being a State official?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; it would not have been embarrassing.

Senator FERGUSON. It wouldn't have been?

Mr. VINCENT. A contribution to assist a man who had no funds to hire a lawyer would not have been embarrassing to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say who the lawyer was to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall who the lawyer was. Did who say?

Senator FERGUSON. The man who collected the fund.

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't recall who the lawyer was, and I don't—

Senator FERGUSON. You couldn't give us the name before of the man who collected the funds.

Mr. VINCENT. I told you I did not recall it, but Mr. Mandel recalled it to me. That it was a man named Mortimer Graves.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember now that it was Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the incident of Mortimer Graves collecting it, but I am quite prepared to say that Mortimer Graves did collect it. As I told you before, I didn't recall who physically collected the money.

Senator FERGUSON. Overnight have you thought anything about the matter of the investigation in your office? Could you give us more help as to that investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am afraid I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, how well did you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Solomon Adler I met first in 1941 or early 1942, when he came to China to be an assistant to Manuel Fox, who was handling the Stabilization Fund in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get to know Solomon Adler well?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew Solomon Adler well, as one would knowing an official who was working with me in Chungking, where we were rather a small community.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn that Solomon Adler was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I never learned that Solomon Adler was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know of the testimony Miss Bentley gave before the Federal grand jury in 1947 to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any testimony of Miss Bentley, but if she had given any it would not be indicative to me that he was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any information ever given to you while you were an officer in the State Department, from the Government, that certain people were or were not Communists or were not such that you should avoid them as Communists or Communist sympathizers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no idea, then, that there may have been subversive agents around?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody ever informed me. The State Department had its own Security Division, that was supposed to look into subversive agents in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. But a Security Division that does nothing would not help you, would it? I mean, as far as you were concerned, it did not give you the names of any people that were Communists or had Communist leanings?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall——

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall ever getting a name like Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure they never gave me Mr. Alder's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, Mr. Alder's name was mentioned in a public session of the House Un-American Activities Committee as a member of an espionage ring.

Mr. VINCENT. When?

Mr. MORRIS. In 1948.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me whether I knew Solomon Adler as a Communist? I did not know Solomon Adler as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hear that testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear Whittaker Chambers' testimony before this committee that Solomon Adler was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, in executive session, do you remember being asked the question as to whether it was in any sense the tenor of the Marshall directive to invite the Republic of China to agree to the Communists' terms for a coalition government, or face the prospect of getting no more aid from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it in those terms; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, let me ask now: Was it implicit in this Marshall directive that the Chinese Nationalist Government should have pressure brought to bear on it to come to terms with the Communists, and was there the clear implication in the directive that until there had been a settlement with the Communists there would be no more aid from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Those were the general ideas under which General Marshall went out and started operating. When I say "no more aid,"

there was during that period, and I say this just to make the record clear, some aid given in south China. I remember money was given to build the railroad. But there was to be no military aid. It was to be withheld while General Marshall was carrying on. This is quite correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not talking about anything that happened afterward, but only about what was in the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment on that. Do I understand that the idea of the directive was that General Marshall was to go out there, and there was to be no aid to the Nationalists until he had made or carried out the directive of having a consolidation?

Mr. VINCENT. The whole matter was entirely in General Marshall's hands, sir. And during the period that he was trying to assist the Chinese in getting together, military aid was not to be given.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I say.

Mr. VINCENT. Unless he himself suggested it; other than the military aid of getting and assisting General Chiang Kai-shek to get troops into Manchuria.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of putting troops into Manchuria, the Nationalists were to get no aid.

Mr. VINCENT. Of a military character.

Senator FERGUSON. Of a military character, while this was going on.

Mr. VINCENT. It was to be withheld until General Marshall himself changed. He was authorized to operate under that kind of basis.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be quite a pressure, would it not, on a Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. It would.

Senator FERGUSON. To be told, "You either make this settlement, or else you do not get any military aid?" That is what it amounted to, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the putting of troops into Manchuria was simply putting the Nationalist forces in a position which, according to General Wedemeyer, was completely untenable, without a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists; isn't that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what is in this telegram, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record may show the portions of the directive which counsel had in mind in asking that question, I ask leave to read two paragraphs from President Roosevelt's letter of transmittal, which, together with the other documents, constituted the directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and concurrently to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

He was telling them to stop fighting, wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a little later on:

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly you may state in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance, in the economic field, and military assistance—I have in mind the proposed United States military advisory group that I have approved in principle—that a China

disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I say those are the particular paragraphs counsel had in mind. There are perhaps other passages which would carry out the same general intent. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think now, from your vantage point of the years, that it was correct to urge a coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. In the light of the situation as it obtained at that time, I still think it was the most feasible part of the policy.

I have testified many times that it was not the perfect solution, but it seemed in our minds, considering the situation in the best light we could, that it was better than civil war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Civil war was actually under way, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It hadn't broken out all over the place yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the Communists weren't all over the place. They didn't get all over the place until after the truce was brought about in 1948. At this time the Communists were in north China.

Mr. VINCENT. And scattered around Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is where the hostilities were going on?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And those were the hostilities that Chiang was told in this message to cease?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, sir, that it was an official Soviet policy as early as 1938 to demand coalition in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no distinct knowledge of that being Soviet policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Soviet Ambassador at that time had demanded such coalition as the price of Soviet aid?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the Nationalist Government had refused?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in 1938, the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists were cooperating to a rather effective degree in fighting the Japanese. I don't know whether you are speaking of coalition, now, in the form of bringing about a constitutional government, but so far as the military operations were concerned, in 1937 and 1938, and on into 1940, there was quite effective cooperation between the two military groups.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, I believe, that you did not see, read, or know about, the G-2 report on the Communist Party which was delivered to the State Department on July 25, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing it. That was the one the chairman showed me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That was made a part of the appendix of this record at an earlier session.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Byrnes' part was in this particular directive? Had you any personal knowledge about it? Or on what Wedemeyer was to do, or Wedemeyer's report, or anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that he sat in and took part in the discussions on December 9, which finalized the documents, and he chairmanned that meeting. It was in his office. Other than that, I had no discussions with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that his language, or his thought, to your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge, I could not testify that Mr. Byrnes himself has language in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read, if the chairman will permit, one paragraph from page 88 of that G-2 report, which is already in the appendix to our record, because I want to ask you if this accords with what you knew to be the fact at that time.

Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that the Central Government military leaders hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the Government, Soviet Russia would come directly to China's aid. The correctness of this attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in 1938 after the first rift in the united front. At that time, the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. In other words, that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That does accord with your understanding of the situation at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The situation at that time, yes. I think it does; although I have no distinct recollection of the situation at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this directive to General Marshall, or any part of it, or any draft in connection with it, submitted at any time to Mr. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Dean Acheson was present at the December 9 conference with General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether he saw it. I would say it was certainly quite likely that he did see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it submitted at any time to Mr. Ben Cohen?

Mr. VINCENT. That I could not say. He was not at the meeting on the 9th, and I never heard of his name being mentioned in connection with the directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything, sir, of a Russian demand in 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending an undetermined number of troops to Hokkaido?

Mr. VINCENT. Hokkaido?

Mr. SOURWINE. Hokkaido.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, at that time, I was not in charge of Japan affairs, but I do recall the whole matter of discussion as to the basis on which troops would be contributed to the general allied occupation of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to revert for once, and I apologize to the witness for breaking the thread: I have a document that got out of place and should have been placed in the record when we were discussing the question of moving troops into Manchuria and north China. I hold in my hand a publication, American Policy Toward China, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, statement before a joint Senate committee, June 4, 1951, Department of State Publication 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, released June 1951, and from page 24 thereof, I read:

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, although this is a transcript from a previous congressional hearing, to avoid reading at length here and so that there may be no question of taking out of context, that we insert in the record at this time, all of page 24, which will show the date and the context in which that paragraph appears.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted.

(The material referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 391" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 391

By the end of 1946 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties; and both the Government authorities, the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

(Source: Department of State, Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, Released June 1951, p. 24.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, reverting to the question of Hokkaido, sir, did you know whether advice was sought in the Department of State by Secretary Byrnes with regard to that demand, that is, the Russian demand of 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending troops into Hokkaido?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of it being sought.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever asked for advice on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall being asked for advice. That was a period, I think, prior to my association with Japanese affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that Russian demand was accepted?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became a Foreign Service officer, class I, in December 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, I would have to look that up. I assume you have looked up the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply trying to peg the chronology. That record was taken from the Department of State register.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Frederick V. Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified before that I met him at the IPR conference in Hot Springs. I never knew him even well. I had no close association with him at all. I may have met him at a meeting preparatory to going down to Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever visit your home?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit his home?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever visit you elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him by appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. Never by appointment, sir, that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with him on Forty-eighth Street in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never met with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information of a confidential or security nature?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information with the knowledge or expectation or reason to believe that it would be passed on directly or indirectly to the Soviet Government or to an agent of the Soviet Government or to the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. I have testified that I never had any conversations with him other than just casual.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever discussed Japanese policy with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never discussed Japanese policy with him; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for appointment, for promotion, or for a commission in the Armed Forces of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that he had made application for such a commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever reading anything that Field wrote, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified in executive session, have you not, with regard to your failure to recall a man by the name of Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked whether you knew a man by the name of Joseph Greenstein?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall your asking me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't sure whether I had asked. I will tell you that Joseph Gregg and Joseph Greenstein are the same person. But did you know a man under the name of Joseph Greenstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of a plan to assassinate Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. No, unless they are speaking of the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek in Sian in 1936. But I didn't hear of any plan to assassinate him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a memorandum or memoranda concerning such a plan in 1945 or 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing such a memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge did such memorandum or memoranda ever circulate from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said I didn't recall it, so I can't say that I have any knowledge of it circulating.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think, Mr. Chairman, I should state this for the record, in fairness to Mr. Field. At occasions through this hearing, questions are asked which may to the witness seem preposterous. I do not mean by asking questions to make assertions. It was my understanding from the witness himself that he desired here an opportunity to testify with regard to any and every charge that had been made against him, and I want to say that so far as the staff of this committee is able to do so, we are throwing at him everything that we have found that has been thrown, and giving him an opportunity to answer with regard to it.

Mr. SURREY. Did you mean making it clear to Mr. Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I was going to correct that. You intended to say "Mr. Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended to say "Mr. Vincent."

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that?

Mr. VINCENT. I understand that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the report made by Mr. Pauley after his visit to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I have seen it. I am not familiar with it, now. It was an economic report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Generally speaking, what did that report propose?

Mr. VINCENT. Generally speaking it dealt with the matter of Japanese assets, as I recall it, in Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't it propose reduction of Japan to an agricultural community, essentially, with only light industry?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you are using the same phraseology that was in my speech, there. I don't recall that phraseology in Pauley's report. I couldn't testify whether that is in his report or not, or whether it recommended that, sir, because I have no distinct recollection of his recommendations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't attempt to quote either from Mr. Pauley's report or from your speech, and I don't want to foist that upon you. I intended merely to ask if that was a summarization of what the Pauley report recommended.

Mr. VINCENT. And I have testified that I am not familiar enough with it now, after 5 or 6 years, to say whether that was in it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall now whether you had any reaction to that report at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall now whether that report was in line with the views which you had expressed in your radio broadcast in October of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say that I do recall that it was in line with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the Pauley report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not anything that I can recall sir, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates have anything to do with that preparation?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean my associates in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or elsewhere.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Owen Lattimore have anything to do with the preparation of that report?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, are you describing Mr. Owen Lattimore as an associate now? He was on the Pauley Commission, and I have testified in executive session that I had no knowledge as to what he had to do with the report, but I would assume since he accompanied him that he had some part in helping draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that report with Mr. Lattimore at anytime?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you I never had any discussion with Lattimore on the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in any way responsible for Mr. T. A. Bisson's appointment to the Pauley staff?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the appointment of anyone else to Mr. Pauley's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I can recall. I had nothing to do with the Pauley administration that I can think of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a man named DuBos, D-u-b-o-s?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know such a man.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a man named DuBois, Du-B-o-i-s?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection, I don't know a man named DuBois.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying with regard to Far East Commission 230?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a paper submitted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Far Eastern Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean it was formally approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, I think, that I have no recollection as to formal approval. Sometimes they went over to FEC, to the Far Eastern Commission, without formal approval, I don't recall whether it had what you would call formal approval. But normally it would have been sent over by General Hildring to the FEC.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who prepared that document?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, I think, that a working group in the FE., SWNCC, prepared it on the basis of Edwards' report back from Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it come before the Far Eastern Subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that it did, but I would assume that it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a deputy on the Far East Commission then, and he approved it or I approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. Penfield was the man, James K. Penfield.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you identified him here?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did in executive session, yes, sir, as the Deputy Director of the Far East Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how this paper reached Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not know how it reached Japan, but I am trying now to recall the statements in executive session, where I made the assumption that it reached Japan through the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it supposed to reach Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. My understanding at the time was that the War Department kept General MacArthur pretty well informed step by step as to the type of thinking, the type of papers and the thinking on them.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was to reach Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in any sense an official State Department paper?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean when it reached him? No, I would not call it official.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever made an official State Department paper?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether it would be called a State Department paper or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that designation, "FEC 230," indicate it had such status?

Mr. VINCENT. No, because FEC was not under the State Department. And, you see, all of this is a period after I left the Department, this whole matter of the FEC 230; and from knowledge of the way things went then, the designation of FEC 230 would not have made it a State Department document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who sent this paper or a copy of it to Japan, or to anyone in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. I have testified that is probably went through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Went through? Were you finished?

Mr. VINCENT. Went through the War Department channels, and the War Department kept in pretty close touch, so I understood at the time, with General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this the same document as the document known as State Department Document FEC 230?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen that designation of it, but if it was called State Department Document FEC 230, that would have been its designation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would such a document have required your endorsement as Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified it would not have required it. It would have required the endorsement of the SWNCC committee, of which General Hildring was the Chairman, the top committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this contain clauses directing General MacArthur to effect wide distribution of income and of the means of ownership and trade?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to the document, sir, before I could say that it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this document subsequently printed by James Lee Kauffman, a New York lawyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have seen testimony to that effect, but I have no knowledge myself, that it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this, sir, a photostat of the document that we have been talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, were you familiar before with FEC 230?

Mr. SURREY. I never read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that look like the document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have no reason to believe this was not a photostat of it. I was not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I offer this document, with a letter of transmittal, showing how it came into the possession of the subcommittee, and I ask that they be put into the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. They may be received.

(The material referred to is marked Exhibit No. 392 and is as follows:)

Telephone Rector 2-6541
Cable Address: "KIVORLEE"

JAMES LEE KAUFFMAN

COUNSELLOR AT LAW

55 Liberty Street

NEW YORK 5, January 29, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: At the request of Mr. Eugene H. Dooman I am enclosing a copy of FEC-230. When it has served its purpose I would appreciate your returning it to this office.

Sincerely,

(Signed) MARIA McDERMOTT,
Secretary to Mr. Kauffman.

McD: MO
Enc.

FEC-230

Confidential
FEC-230
12 May 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States Representative, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission and is referred to COMMITTEE No. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

2. Enclosure "A" is the statement of transmittal of the United States Government. Enclosure "B" is the text of the proposed policy.

3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON, *Secretary General.*

ENCLOSURE "A"

STATEMENT OF TRANSMITTAL

The United States Government desires to present herewith to the Far Eastern Commission a report of its mission on Japanese combines, and concurrently to recommend for adoption by the Commission certain policies with respect to the concentration of economic power in Japanese industry, finance, and trade.

It is the belief of this Government that the existence of the Zaibatsu, and the monopolistic controls exercised by these giant combines over Japanese economic life, have been a major factor in fostering and supporting Japanese aggression. The dissolution of excessive private concentrations of economic power is essential to the democratization of Japanese economic and political life. It therefore constitutes, in the United States view, one of the major objectives of the occupation.

This basic occupation policy with respect to the Zaibatsu is stated in *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* (FEC-014), and is reaffirmed in *Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan* (FEC-015). Substantial steps to implement this policy have already been undertaken by the appropriate Japanese authorities, at the direction of or with the approval of SCAP, in the organization and operations of a Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission, in providing for an economic purge, and in initiating other measures with respect to combines, control associations, and cartel arrangements.

To aid in formulation of comprehensive policies, standards, and procedures a mission headed by Corwin D. Edwards was dispatched to Japan in January 1946. Its report is submitted herewith.

On the basis of that report, the United States Government has prepared the following statement of broad policy with respect to the Zaibatsu question, which it desires to submit for approval by the Far Eastern Commission. In many respects, this statement incorporates measures which already have been or are being implemented by the appropriate Japanese authorities at the direction of or with the approval of SCAP, in accordance with the directives referred to above.

ENCLOSURE "B"

POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN

1. *Objective.*—The over-all objective of occupation policy in dealing with excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan should be to destroy such concentrations as may now exist, and to prevent the future creation of new concentrations. Especial care should be taken to avoid the futile gesture of destroying one Zaibatsu class only to create another: a drastic change in the nature as well as the identity of the groups controlling Japanese industry and finance should therefore be effected. Realization of this change will require achievement of the following specific objectives:

a. Dissolution of all excessive concentrations of economic power, unless technological considerations require their continuation (paragraphs 2, 3, 4, below).

b. Elimination of the excessive economic power of persons formerly exercising control over these concentrations, and of certain individuals close to such persons (paragraphs 5, 6, below).

c. Support for varied and diffused types of private ownership of elements of these dissolved concentrations, as well as support for government ownership of such of these concentrations as cannot be dissolved and of such elements of the dissolved concentrations as do not lend themselves to competitive operation (paragraphs 7, 8, below).

d. Elimination of financial support for excessive concentrations—through the divestiture of Zaibatsu holdings in banks and insurance companies, through an increase in the number of sources of credit, through the termination of alliances between financial and nonfinancial institutions, and through elimination of government favoritism toward certain financial institutions (paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, below).

e. Destruction of legal support for excessive concentrations—through the termination of control legislation, through the creation of an antitrust law, through changes in the patent law, through amendments to corporate law, and through alterations in current tax law and practices (paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, below).

f. Strengthening of the instruments necessary to effect the above policies—through financial and technical aid to preferred types of purchasers, through the creation of public support for anti-Zaibatsu actions of the Japanese Government, and through measures to assure the independence of government personnel from Zaibatsu influences (paragraphs 18, 19, 20, below).

It is considered that the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration will not have been fulfilled until the objectives listed above have been met through the application of measures specified in succeeding paragraphs. It is also considered,

however, that the means to be employed in compelling the Japanese Government to effectuate these measures, and the timing of such means, are matters for executive decision by SCAP. In general, the Japanese Government should be required to take such administrative, legislative and judicial measures as well be consistent with its structure and constitutional powers and will accomplish the policy set out herein.

2. *Definition of an excessive concentration.*—For purposes of the policies set forth in this paper, an excessive concentration of economic power should be defined as any private enterprise conducted for profit, or combination of such enterprises, which, by reason of its relative size in any line or the cumulative power of its position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the opportunity for others to engage in business independently, in any important segment of business.

In applying this standard, it should be presumed, subject to refutation, that any private enterprise or combination operated for profit is an excessive concentration of economic power if its asset value is very large; or if its working force (i. e., the working force required to operate its facilities at capacity as evidenced by its peak past employment figure) is very large; or if, though somewhat smaller in assets or working force, it is engaged in business in various unrelated fields, or if it controls substantial financial institutions and/or substantial industrial or commercial ones; or if it controls a substantial number of other corporate enterprises; or if it produces, sells or distributes a large proportion of the total supply of the products of a major industry.

Absolute size, as well as position within a given industry, is to be considered grounds for defining a specified concentration as excessive. It is desired to eliminate not only monopolies but also aggregations of capital under the control of a given enterprise which are so large as to constitute a material potential threat to competitive enterprise.

All larger Japanese enterprises should immediately be surveyed by SCAP in the light of the above standards. Uncertainty as to whether any specified enterprise is covered by these standards should be resolved in favor of coverage since it is intended that ownership of the bulk of Japanese large-scale industry should be affected by the policies set forth in this paper. It is understood that SCAP's *Schedule of Restricted Concerns*, as amended from time to time in accordance with the procedures provided for that purpose, comprehends the Japanese enterprises considered to be excessive concentrations within the meaning of this paper.

3. *Dissolution vs. nondissolution of excessive concentrations.*—Excessive concentrations of economic power should immediately be dissolved into as many nonrelated units as possible, no one of which would be covered by any of the definitions of an excessive concentration presented in paragraph 2. Such dissolution should not be effected, however, where the technological need for large scale operation is such that dissolution would clearly cause a drastic reduction in operating efficiency. It should be presumed, subject to refutation, that such a drastic reduction would not result from the dissolution of holding companies; or from the severance of ties of ownership, directorship, and officership between operating companies; or from the severance from operating companies of portions of such companies, where these portions are in unrelated industries, or where they have had a separate corporate existence within the last five years, or where they are so separated from one another physically and technologically that they do not in fact have a common operating management. Treatment of concentrations which are to be dissolved is specified in paragraph 4; treatment of concentrations which are not to be dissolved is specified in subparagraph S a. The provisions of paragraph 5 should apply equally to persons and holdings in concentrations which are, and are not, to be dissolved.

4. *Policy with respect to excessive concentrations which are to be dissolved.*—The following measures should be undertaken with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power which are to be dissolved:

a. All concerns in these excessive concentrations which are merely holding companies should be dissolved and divested of their security and property holdings.

b. The units, other than those described under a above, into which these excessive concentrations are broken down should, in the case of nonfinancial enterprises (insurance companies being considered financial enterprises), be divested of any securities which they may hold in other concerns, including concerns not a part of any excessive concentration of economic power.

c. All officers (auditors are to be considered officers) and directors of these operating units, and of operating units in the financial field as well, should surrender all offices and directorships except those in the company in which they are principally engaged, and should be forbidden to acquire any offices and directorships outside of whatever company they may be principally engaged in at any time in the future, except as provided in paragraph 16. This policy does not apply to persons specified in paragraph 5, who will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph.

d. Certain contractual and service arrangements between the units into which these excessive concentrations have been dissolved should be terminated, including arrangements for performance of central office services, interchange of personnel, executive agency, and preferential or exclusive trading rights. Resumption of similar arrangements should be prohibited for a time sufficient to ensure bona fide severance of the arrangement.

e. The operating units into which these excessive concentrations are dissolved should grant licenses on nondiscriminatory terms to all applicants under patents which they now hold and under licenses which give them rights to sublicense; should surrender any exclusive or preferential rights which they now enjoy under patent licenses granted them by others; and during the period of transition, should make available to all comers on nondiscriminatory terms any technology and patent rights which they make available to other concerns which have been a part of the same combine. Where the units in question hold license under Japanese patents owned by foreigners under terms incompatible with the sense of this paragraph, these terms should be renegotiated. Where the licensor will not agree to renegotiation, the Japanese unit should cease utilizing the license, so that the Japanese government can cancel the patent or open up the patent to licensing on nondiscriminatory terms pursuant to Chapter II, Article 41 of the Patent Law.

f. Mergers of any portions of divested or dissolved concerns should be prohibited, except when permission is granted after an affirmative showing of public interest.

5. *Treatment of personnel in excessive concentrations.*—All individuals who have exercised controlling power in or over any excessive concentration of economic power, whether as creditors, stockholders, managers, or in any other capacity, should be:

a. Divested of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets, and business properties.

b. Ejected from all positions of business or governmental responsibility.

c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings or from acquiring positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during the next 10 years.

All other persons likely to act on behalf of the individuals described above should be subjected to the measures specified below. In determining who such persons may be, such factors as ties by blood, marriage, adoption or past personal relationship should be taken into account. (The phrase "past personal relationship" is used in the previous sentence chiefly in reference to persons who have been placed in positions of substantial responsibility in holding companies or their subsidiaries by the Zaibatsu families, but it should also be taken to refer to persons otherwise associated with the Zaibatsu whom SCAP may consider to be acting as "fronts" for the latter.) Such persons should be:

a. Divested of liquid assets and business properties, where they possess such assets or properties in amounts of any significance; and divested of all corporate security holdings in any excessive concentration of economic power and corporate security holdings representing an interest of more than 1 percent in any other major private enterprise.

b. Ejected from all positions in business or government which might be used to favor Zaibatsu interests.

c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings, or from acquiring positions in business or government which might be used to favor Zaibatsu interests at any time during the next 10 years.

Where any doubt exists as to whether a given person should be covered by the above policies, that doubt should be resolved by SCAP in favor of coverage, since it is desired to divest a sufficient number of holdings to effect a thoroughgoing transformation of the ownership and control of large-scale Japanese industry.

6. *Compensation of divested holdings.*—Individuals covered by the definitions in paragraph 5 above shall be indemnified, provided that such indemnification

shall be made in such manner and degree as will prohibit their buying back a place of power in the Japanese economy. In order to bring this about, it is essential that certain measures be taken in the dissolution of excessive concentrations and in the sale of the assets of these persons. The measures set out below have been designed with a view to preventing the payment of excessive indemnification to the persons covered in paragraph 5 without affecting to the same degree and manner the compensation of others who have invested in enterprises considered to be excessive concentrations. The determination of what is an excessive indemnification shall be made on the basis of the objectives of these measures. Accordingly:

a. Policies which facilitate the conveyance of divested holdings to new owners should not be modified by an effort to obtain any specified degree of compensation for the former owners of these holdings. The overriding objective should be to dispose of all the holdings in question as rapidly as possible to desirable purchasers; the objective should be achieved even if it requires that holdings be disposed of at a fraction of their real value. In negotiated sales of divested holdings to desirable types of purchasers, the purchasers's ability to pay, rather than the real value of the holding, should affect the fixing of prices and terms of payment.

b. A tax of not less than 90 percent should be levied on any amount by which the gross sales price exceeds the August 1945 market price (in the case of securities having a market), or the book value as of the same date (in the case of other securities or property). To prevent this tax from resulting in injury to non-Zaibatsu individuals, the following priority should govern the disposition of funds secured through the sale of divested assets:

First priority: All taxes due, other than the 90-percent tax referred to above, and all liabilities should be paid in full.

Second priority: All non-Zaibatsu equity holders, where such exist should be paid up to the amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market).

Third priority: The 90-percent tax described above should be paid in full.

Fourth priority: All the Zaibatsu equity holdings should be paid up to the amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market), and remaining funds should be distributed among all equity holders in proportion to the amount of their holdings.

To prevent observance of the priorities cited above from resulting in total expropriation of Zaibatsu shareholders, proceeds of the 90-percent tax should be partially refunded to Zaibatsu shareholders where necessary to provide such shareholders with a total compensation not exceeding 15 percent of the August 1945 market value (or book value where no market existed) of their divested holdings.

In lieu of the 90-percent tax specified above, a steeply progressive tax may be specifically imposed (in addition to capital levy) on funds which are assigned to the individuals described in paragraph 5 as a result of the sale of assets divested from such individuals.

c. A 75-percent tax be levied on any gain realized through resale of divested holdings within 2 years and a 50-percent tax should be levied on any gain realized through resale within 4 years.

d. Sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above as compensation should be invested in government bonds, whose total par value will not exceed the sum thus credited and which will pay a rate of interest no higher than the lowest rate being paid by comparable government bonds. Such bonds should not be saleable, transferable, or usable as collateral, but should be acceptable for taxes, when all other sources of liquid assets have been dissipated, for 10 years from the completion of the sale of such holdings. During this period, cash payments, even of interest, should be limited to sums required for accustomed living expenses, in order that there may be no surplus for investment.

e. After the process of dissolution and liquidation has been well advanced, and before the end of the 10-year freeze period, the program should be reviewed to determine whether the sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above will be so large as to make probable a revival of Zaibatsu power. If it is determined that the probability of such a revival still exists, added measures appropriate to the circumstances existing at the time should be applied to remove the probability.

f. Before the freeze is terminated, succession by the owner's heirs should be required, coupled with payment of steeply graduated inheritance taxes.

7. *Liquidation of Divested Holdings.*—Liquidation of divested securities and properties should be effected rapidly in a period of about 2 years from the organization of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The plan of liquidation should allow for:

a. Pro rata distribution of security holdings to individual stockholders of the holding concern other than those specified in paragraph 4 (and in some cases to financial institutions which own the holding concern's stock).

b. Exchange and cancellation of securities between companies which hold each other's stock.

c. Negotiated sale of securities and properties.

d. If necessary to complete the liquidation within about 2 years, invitation of bids upon securities from eligible purchasers, and acceptance of the highest bids however low such bids may be.

Liquidation should be effected by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, a wholly public agency of the Japanese Government operating under close supervision of SCAP. Especial care should be taken not to allow representatives of large-scale business, large-scale trade, or large-scale finance, or of political groups, sympathetic to such business, trade, or finance, to have any place on this Commission. All nominations to the Commission should be approved by SCAP, its personnel should be removable by SCAP, and it should be required that all sales effected by the Commission be revocable by SCAP. Public announcement should be made of the terms and conditions of all sales.

8. *Sale of divested holdings.*—In the sale of divested security and property holdings, the overriding objective should be to transfer ownership and control of these holdings to groups and individuals in such a way as to secure, in addition to the requisite managerial skill, protection against the future creation of excessive concentrations of economic power, through a wider distribution of income and of ownership of the means of production and trade. In order to achieve this objective, the following criteria are set forth as a guide to the selection of purchasers and should be given priority, in this connection, over the purchaser's present ability to pay:

a. Divested holdings in excessive concentrations of economic power which are not to be dissolved for technological reasons, and in other enterprises such as public utilities which do not lend themselves to competitive operation, may be subjected to purchase by the national and local governments of Japan, provided, such purchases are accomplished and approved through democratic processes. Where such concentrations or enterprises are not purchased by these governments, their rates and profits should be subjected to open and effective regulation by impartial public commissions. When the National Government or a local government purchases divested equity holdings in a given concern, it should also give consideration to the concomitant purchase of non-Zaibatsu equity holdings in that concern. Every effort should be made, however, to dissolve all excessive concentrations of economic power, rather than to assign them to government ownership or regulation, until and unless the democratization of the Japanese Government has proceeded sufficiently to render it a truly trustworthy instrument for economic control.

b. In connection with nongovernmental purchases, sales to wealthy and economically powerful persons and corporations should be held to a minimum, in order not to lay the groundwork for the creation of a new Zaibatsu class. A decided purchase preference, and the technical and financial aid necessary to take advantage of that preference, should be furnished to such persons as small or medium entrepreneurs and investors, and to such groups as agricultural or consumer cooperatives and trade unions; whose ownership of these holdings would contribute to the democratization of the Japanese economy. Every encouragement should be given such persons and groups to purchase divested holdings, even if they only wish to buy a small proportion of the holdings offered for sale in a given enterprise. In the case of negotiated sales, prices should be fixed with special reference to such purchasers' ability to pay, as should the time period allowed for payment of these prices.

c. No single person, or enterprise, or group of allied persons or enterprises, should be allowed to purchase a number of divested holdings so large as to render probable the future creation of a concentration of economic

power approaching in size or character those concentrations defined as excessive under paragraph 2.

d. The purchase of divested holdings in ex-Zaibatsu concerns by the employees of such concerns should be encouraged only if a vigorous effort is made to disperse ownership widely through the working force in question, rather than to concentrate it in a few top executives. To render such dispersion possible, provision should be made for financing these purchases at low prices over a long period of time, possibly through wage deductions. Especial care should be taken to prevent the use of groups of employees in ex-Zaibatsu concerns as purchasing screens for persons disqualified from making these purchases themselves.

e. All sales should be screened to exclude cloakes for Zaibatsu and for other groups who fall under way of any purge directives or purge paragraphs of the Basic Directive.

The criteria specified above should be adhered to regardless of the wishes of non-Zaibatsu stockholders in the enterprises concerned.

9. *Liquidation of Zaibatsu Financial Enterprises.*—Divested holdings in Zaibatsu financial and insurance enterprises should be liquidated and disposed of in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 for the liquidation of nonfinancial enterprises. Policyholders in Zaibatsu insurance companies should be aided in buying stock of these concerns which is now owned by the Zaibatsu, where the condition of these concerns is sufficiently strong so that the policyholders desire to make such purchases. Purchase should be facilitated, under these circumstances, by liberal loans on policies, or payment should be permitted in the form of a reduction in the face value of policies. Zaibatsu insurance companies which are insolvent should be mutualized by cutting back the face amount of outstanding policies, where sufficient assets still exist to render this procedure practicable. In the reconstitution of insolvent financial enterprises, stock held by Zaibatsu holding companies and Zaibatsu individuals should be subordinated to that of other stockholders.

10. *Sources of credit.*—As a fundamental measure to encourage competitive operation of the Japanese economy, the number of independent sources of credit should be increased substantially, although not to the point where the individual banks would be so small as to be unable to secure the diversification of loans necessary to banking safety. The strengthening of local savings banks, and of rural and urban credit cooperatives, as well as of independent local banks, should be encouraged. To this end, the following policies, among others should be adopted:

a. Former owners of independent financial institutions which have been merged with Zaibatsu concerns should be encouraged to reestablish their old enterprises by forced divestitures. In this connection, a procedure should be set up whereby former owners of merged banks, trust companies, or insurance companies should have the opportunity, for a limited period of time, to compel the institutions into which their organizations were merged to divest themselves of assets and liabilities to the extent necessary to reconstitute the absorbed institutions in adequate size.

b. Banks over a size to be specified by SCAP should be required to split themselves into two or more independent units within a stated period, as should other banks deemed by SCAP to enjoy a monopolistic position in the field which they serve. The permissible size should be set at a level sufficiently low to force a significant number of such actions and thus greatly increase the number of independent sources of credit, but sufficiently high to guard against the dangers of financial insecurity associated with excessively small banks.

11. *Financial alliances.*—Alliances between any financial and nonfinancial enterprises, and alliances among any financial enterprises, should be broken. To this end:

a. Banks and trust companies should be prevented from investing more than 10 percent of their capital and reserves in the securities, loans, bills, advances, and overdrafts of any one company.

b. Such concerns should not be permitted to hold, either as an owner of record or as the holder of a beneficial interest, in their proper, savings, or trust accounts, the stock of any other company in an amount which exceeds 5 percent of the outstanding shares of that company, nor to vote any such stock which they may hold. Nor should they be permitted to own any stock in a competitor. Exemption should be made to the percentage rule for stock acquired in connection with bona fide underwritings and to the per-

centage and voting rules for stock acquired in default of loans, but any such exemptions should not run longer than one year.

c. Officers and directors of any bank or trust company, and persons holding 5 percent or more of the stock thereof, should be ineligible to hold any office or directorship or similarly large percentage of stock in any other company. Exception should be made for part-time non-policy-making employees, such as attorneys and certifying accountants, but such exceptions should be defined as narrowly as possible.

d. No bank or trust company should be allowed to redeposit more than 10 percent of its deposits in any one institution other than the Bank of Japan.

12. *Elimination of financial discrimination.*—To eliminate discrimination in favor of Zaibatsu banks:

a. A system of deposit insurance should be instituted, to diminish the belief among depositors that accounts in Zaibatsu banks are safer than elsewhere. A limit (e. g., of the order of magnitude of ten billion yen) should be set to the total amount of deposits which will be insured for a single bank. A limit should also be set to the amount of deposits which will be insured for a single account.

b. The Postal Savings System should ultimately be required to deposit its funds in ordinary banks, allocating at least 90 percent of what it receives in any regional grouping of prefectures among the banks having head offices in that region in proportion to the assets of such banks. A bank ineligible for deposit insurance should also be ineligible to receive the deposits of the postal savings system.

c. Legislation should be introduced to improve the standard of commercial banking and to prevent banks from undertaking business considered unwise for commercial banks. (Performance of investment banking functions by commercial banks should not be prohibited, however, until suitable alternative agents for these functions become available.) Such legislation should also assign to the Bank of Japan, or to some other suitable public agency, powers of direction and inspection over other banks, whose activities would be required to conform to statutory provisions regarding capital, reserves, investment policy, and other matters. The discretion which the laws now entrust to the Minister of Finance, in this connection, should be greatly reduced, and his functions clearly defined by law and made subject to check and review by the Diet. His powers to legislate by ordinance and regulation should be strictly curtailed and limited to genuine emergencies. Bank examinations should take place at least every 2 years.

d. The functions and powers of special banks should be defined and limited by law, and these banks should not be allowed to engage in ordinary banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be reviewed, in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert to the status of ordinary banks.

e. All vestiges of private ownership of the Bank of Japan should be eliminated. The Board of Directors should be made representative of finance, trade, industry, agriculture, and of large, medium, and smaller size business.

f. Competition among banks for customers should be restored through such measures as the abolition of the designated bank system and of the financial control associations.

g. Employees performing responsible functions in the Ministry of Finance and government banks should be forbidden to hold the securities of any financial institution, and should be ineligible for employment by private financial institutions for 2 years after they leave government employment.

13. *Government support of industrial monopolies.*—Laws and practices through which the Japanese Government has favored the growth of private monopolies should be terminated; although that Government should not be deprived of its power to regulate the Japanese economy in the public interest. To this end:

a. Laws and ordinances establishing existing control associations or special companies should be generally repealed and the associations or special companies abolished. The future assumption, by nongovernmental agencies, of powers formerly exercised under these laws, should be prohibited. The future assumption, by governmental agencies, of such of these powers as have no major use other than to support monopolistic bodies and practices

should also be prohibited. Necessary governmental functions formerly performed by control associations or special companies should be transferred to appropriate governmental agencies, which agencies should be created where they do not now exist. In cases where SCAP is satisfied that current conditions prevent the government from effectively performing these functions, and is further satisfied that effective performance of these functions is necessary for public purposes, he may allow temporary delegation of these functions by the government to the old control associations or special companies or to similar new quasi private bodies, provided that final decisions are made by the government and the rights of appeal to the government against abuse of powers are provided. All quasi private bodies exercising such delegated functions should be liquidated as soon as their functions can be transferred to appropriate government agencies, or at such sooner time as SCAP may find the exercise of their functions to be no longer necessary. (For example, where these functions relate to allocation, or price and trade control for reconversion purposes, their performance could be terminated upon the expiration of the reconversion period.)

b. All legislation which forbids, or requires governmental approval of, the entry of any new business into an industry, or the expansion of any business, should be terminated, except insofar as:

(1) The right to effect such a restriction is implicit in the antitrust legislation suggested below.

(2) The right to effect such a restriction is necessary in order to comply with SCAP directives dealing with industrial disarmament and other subjects.

(3) Nondiscriminatory restrictions for generally accepted public purposes, such as protecting the public against fraud, and protecting the public health, are concerned.

(4) Fields of business activity reserved to the national or local governments are concerned. In this connection, prewar laws which set up clear-cut government monopolies should be left undisturbed; but, to prevent the use of this type of law to evade other portions of the anti-Zaibatsu program, the creation of new government monopolies during the period of the occupation should be permitted only in cases where they are in the public interest or where their creation is in accordance with the policy for sale of divested holdings to the national and local governments described in paragraph 7a above. The petroleum and alcohol monopolies, which were instituted for war purposes, should be terminated as soon as possible.

c. All laws and practices under which the government has favored specific private or quasi private enterprises, to the detriment of potentially or actually competitive enterprises, should be systematically reviewed, and such of these laws and practices as do not have a demonstrable public purpose should be terminated. Insofar as any subsidies are allowed to continue, or are granted in the future they should be controlled by the legislative branch of the government, and provision should be made that hereafter their amount, purpose, and effect be disclosed in public reports.

Principles such as those set forth in the preceding subparagraphs should be made effective, not only by changes in substantive law, but also by provisions giving aggrieved persons the right to attack in the courts any discriminatory subsidy, preference, or other practice.

14. *Antitrust law.*—A Japanese antitrust law should be enacted, prohibiting, among other things:

a. Concerted business activity which burdens trade, including, but not by way of limitation to, such activities as fixing of prices, restriction of sales or output, and allocation of markets, commodities, or customers.

b. Individual or concerted activity which has the purpose or effect of coercing business enterprises to conform to business policies, or participation in programs carried on by the coercing concern or group which are designed to drive selected enterprises out of any line of business, through means which include but are not limited to intimidation of a rival's customers or sale to a rival at discriminatory prices.

c. The creation of excessive concentrations of economic powers, as such concentrations are defined in paragraph 2; (where considerations of structural or technological unity require the creation of large concentrations,

government ownership or strict regulation of these concentrations should be provided for).

d. Types of industrial growth and of intercorporate connection which are particularly likely to lead to monopoly or to excessive size, including mergers (i. e., acquisition of any substantial portion of the capital assets) of going concerns of other than negligible size which are in competition with one another, or mergers of noncompeting concerns which might lead to the creation of large scale enterprises capable of developing into an excessive concentration of economic power, where such mergers are not explicitly found to be required in the public interest.

e. Types of intercorporate relations (e. g., those described in paragraph 4 d) which restrain competition.

This antitrust law should be enforced by a specialized agency operating at a high governmental level and exercising broad investigatory and remedial powers. Consideration should be given to including in this agency representatives of the groups most likely to be aggrieved by excessive corporate growth; in any event, special care should be taken not to allow representatives of large scale business, or of political groups sympathetic to large-scale business, to be named to this agency.

Exemption from the provisions of this law should be provided for the joint activities of cooperatives, where such activities are not coercive or monopolistic, and where they are conducted according to the democratic principles characteristic of genuine cooperatives. Similar exemption should be provided for labor activities other than those involving the restriction of commercial competition, and for natural monopolies and public utilities insofar as they are owned or closely regulated by the government.

15. *Patent law.*—The provisions and the manner of enforcing Japanese patent law should be revised to ensure that patents in Japan cannot be used to support the establishment or perpetuation of concentrations of economic power.

16. *Corporate Law.*—The following changes in Japanese corporate law should be effected:

a. Disclosure of relevant facts in selling corporate securities should be required, and the fraudulent practices in connection with such sales should be prohibited.

b. Before any call to a meeting of the stockholders of a corporation, the management of the corporation shall make full disclosure of all the facts necessary for the stockholders to appraise intelligently the proposals to be placed before the meeting.

c. Misleading practices in corporate accounting should be forbidden, and minimum standards of disclosure in such accounting should be required.

d. Interlocking officerships should be prohibited, and officers of one concern should be prohibited from serving as directors of another. Interlocking directorates should be prohibited in the case of competing concerns and in the case of concerns which rent, sell, or buy goods or services to or from each other in significant amounts. In the case of other concerns, interlocking directorates should be allowed to the point where no more than one-fourth of the members of any Board of Directors are at the same time directors of other corporations. No one person should, however, be allowed to serve on the Board of Directors of more than three corporations. Nothing in this paragraph should be taken as in any way modifying the provisions of paragraph 11 c. Officers and directors should be prevented from having holdings of shares in competing or supplying concerns, and should be prevented from having holdings of shares in any other enterprises representing more than 5 percent of their liquid assets or more than 5 percent of such other enterprises' outstanding shares. Officers, directors, and persons having a beneficial interest in or control of any equity issue of a corporation in excess of 1 percent of the total issue should be required to report their holdings and transactions in all issues of the corporations, and such reports should be publicized. Profits of corporate insiders derived from short-term transactions in the corporation's securities should be subject to recapture by the corporation.

e. An ultra vires action by a corporation should be grounds for remedial action by a stockholder or punitive action by a public agency. Moreover, a corporation should be specifically prohibited from entering partnerships, either directly or indirectly, or in other respects avoiding the limitations on intercorporate relationships.

f. It should be required that all shares having par value should be fully paid, and that equal voting rights attach to all shares of the same issue. The use of no par-value shares should be permitted; such shares to be offered for sale at any time at a value to be decided by the company's board of directors. All corporations should be required to adopt the principle of preemptive rights in offering new shares.

g. Every effort should be made to assure the independence of Japanese auditors, who should be prevented from having direct or indirect affiliations with management and from having conflicting interests in other concerns.

h. With stated exemptions for banks, investment trusts, insurance companies, and possibly other types of financial institutions, the Japanese company law should be amended to forbid one corporation from holding the stock of another. The use of 100 percent owned subsidiaries should be permitted, however (subject to the restrictions on mergers outlined under paragraph 14 d).

i. Stockholders should not be unduly hampered in bringing suits against management for money damages or for equitable remedies.

17. *Tax and inheritance laws.*—In connection with current and impending revisions of Japanese tax law, every effort should be made to favor the wide distribution of income and ownership envisaged in this paper, through the following means:

a. Income and inheritance taxes should be very much more steeply graduated than they are at present.

b. Property inherited by the head of a house should be subject to the tax rates applicable to other heirs.

c. Diffusion of inherited wealth should be assured by provision for reasonably equal distribution among heirs, insofar as estates aggregating considerable wealth are concerned.

d. Members of a house should be prevented from deriving significant tax advantages from the insolvent status of other members of the house.

e. The present discretionary power of the Minister of Finance in tax matters should be greatly reduced. Tax rates should be fixed by the Diet.

18. *Policy concerning preferred purchasers.*—Measures specified below should be taken in order to strengthen and democratize preferred categories of purchasers of divested holdings:

a. In order to qualify Japanese cooperatives for purchase preference in connection with divested holdings, such cooperatives should be freed from governmental influence and should be relieved of public functions. They should be subject to government supervision, only insofar as such supervision is necessary to prevent fraud and to ensure compliance with the provisions of this paragraph. Membership in these cooperatives should be voluntary, and requirements for membership therein should be nondiscriminatory. (In this connection, the minimum contribution or entrance fee should be reduced to the point where it will form no obstacle to the membership of low income persons.) All participating members should have equal votes and officers should be selected by majority vote. The proceeds should be divided equally among members or in proportion to the relative volume of business, without allowance, beyond a low fixed dividend, for contribution of capital. In addition to being converted into genuinely democratic instruments through these and other changes, cooperatives should be freed from all legal restrictions which prevent them from engaging in various kinds of activities. Specifically, consumers' cooperative societies should be recognized and afforded the same type of privilege as other cooperative societies. The minimum number of members qualifying for registration under the Cooperative Societies Law should be raised from the present figure of seven to levels which will vary for different types of societies but which should be sufficiently high in each case to prevent domination by minorities. Genuine cooperative societies should receive such public financial technical aid as may be necessary to their expansion.

b. Where the possibility exists that trade unions might purchase Zaibatsu holdings, all possible technical and financial assistance should be furnished the trade unions concerned, provided that these unions are genuine labor organizations, and are not acting as cloaks for former owners. As a means of providing for trade union ownership of divested holdings, consideration should be given to assigning ownership of divested holdings to cooperative societies organized especially for this purpose, with a membership parallel to that of trade unions.

c. Small entrepreneurs desiring to purchase divested holdings should be given all possible public assistance so that they may compete on more advantageous terms with large scale business. The Japanese Ministry of Commerce should establish a bureau specifically devoted to aiding such small business. This bureau should give special support to the performance of joint activities of an unrestrictive character by such mutual-aid organizations of small entrepreneurs as manufacturers' guilds and export guilds. Precautions should be taken, however, against domination of these guilds by the government or by the larger firms; nor should they be permitted to engage in such of their former activities as were in restraint of trade.

19. *Public support.*—Vigorous efforts should be made by SCAP to create Japanese public understanding of, and support for, the anti-Zaibatsu program through such means as:

a. Provision for access to recent literature in English about the problems of industrial organization.

b. Publication of SCAP's factual findings about the Zaibatsu.

c. Encouragement of the organization of a Japanese commission of inquiry, representative of a wide range of interests and opinions, to investigate the facts about the Zaibatsu and make public its recommendations.

d. Attention to the problems of industrial organization, and the dangers of monopoly and excessive concentration of economic power in the revision of the Japanese educational system.

e. Provision for contact between the Japanese antitrust agency and similar bodies in other countries.

A special attempt should be made to furnish relevant data to and to secure the support of, those groups whose economic interests are most acutely promoted by the dissolution of the Zaibatsu; consumers, small and medium-size businessmen, trade unions, and cooperatives.

20. *Japanese Government.*—An attempt should be made to deprive the Japanese Government of its former pro-Zaibatsu character, and to prevent renewed alliances between the bureaucracy and business interests:

a. SCAP should make every effort to see that new public agencies established in order to carry out the anti-Zaibatsu program envisaged in this paper are staffed with individuals not previously associated with or sympathetic to large scale business or its political spokesmen. Economist and other intellectuals or technical experts hitherto debarred from government work because of their anti-imperialist or anti-Zaibatsu views would be desirable recruits.

b. In view, however, of the limited availability of such persons, and of the uncertain political complexion of the present Japanese bureaucracy, SCAP should reduce the discretionary policy-making authority of that bureaucracy insofar as the more important issues related to this program are concerned. In economic matters at least, the Japanese bureaucracy should not be left in a position to usurp the functions of the legislative branch of the government.

c. Existing government officials performing responsible functions relating to the control or regulation of private industrial, commercial, or financial enterprises should be discharged where, because of their past employment in Zaibatsu concerns or other previous private or public actions, they are believed sympathetic to Zaibatsu interests.

d. Government officials performing responsible functions relating to the control or regulation of private commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises should be prohibited from holding the securities of any one such private enterprise in an amount which would represent more than 5 percent of the official's total wealth, or more than 1 percent of the enterpriser's capital value. Reports of all security holdings by such government officials should be made public. Such officials should also be prohibited within a period of 2 years after their leaving of government employ, from accepting private positions which involve their representing, directly or indirectly, private enterprises before the government bureaus with which they were formerly associated, or from holding positions in any private enterprise which is the object of legal action as a result of its alleged violation of any of the measures specified in this paper.

e. Special procedures should be set up to make public the names of government officials holding responsible positions relating to the control or regulation of private, commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises, so that anti-Zaibatsu groups and persons may scrutinize their past records and protest publicly against appointments which they consider unsuitable.

f. The principle of private redress for injury suffered as a result of governmental action should be recognized in Japanese law.

21. *United Nations and neutral interests.*—In the application of measures specified in this paper, SCAP should protect the interests of nationals of members of the United Nations in Japan, insofar as this can be accomplished without limiting the effectiveness of these measures. In general, his objective should be to provide adequate, prompt and effective indemnification for property taken from such interests to the extent feasible. He should also keep full records of any change in the status of such interests which may result from the application of these measures.

22. *Nonprofit corporations.*—An exception should be made to the provisions of this paper affecting interlocking officerships and directorates insofar as these provisions concern nonprofit corporations which are devoted to public, charitable and cultural purposes and which do not hold securities of other corporations.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that, as far as you know, this is the first time this has been made public?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know. I have never seen it outside of the State Department, and it has been years since I ever saw it. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a rally—

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me. The testimony here when asked if I had knowledge of MacArthur receiving FEC 230 in any form—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you did; the channels through which it went.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mentioned MacArthur? I would be glad to have your testimony on that point.

Mr. VINCENT. My purpose is here to show a letter which he wrote to Senator McMahon on the 1st of February 1948, in which he states that he had received FEC 230. This is a photostat of a letter from Douglas MacArthur to Senator McMahon.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a photostat of a printed copy of that letter, isn't it? Where was that copy printed?

Mr. SURREY. It is printed in the Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at page 783 of the document appendix F.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Do you adopt that testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I adopt the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no objection to counsel stating the fact, but counsel hasn't been sworn. Where did you get this photostat?

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department.

• Mr. SOURWINE. Did you order it made, or did someone make it and bring it to you?

Mr. VINCENT. The regular photostat work there; yes. I ordered having it made, from the regular people who make photostats.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had aid in the State Department in preparing your case here?

Mr. VINCENT. I have had aid in collecting documents.

Senator FERGUSON. You have had a private counsel as well as counsel in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see him between sessions?

Mr. VINCENT. I go back and see the people in the State Department; not regularly.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they a copy of the transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. That comes out from day to day? Yes, the State Department has gotten a copy of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you discuss with them the transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't even seen this transcript, myself.

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't my question.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not discussed the transcript with them.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the last you have been in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten. I didn't go yesterday. The day before yesterday, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the State Department's counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw people in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I wouldn't say the counsel. People in the Legal Advisers' Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask that this document that Mr. Vincent has just handed over and identified be placed in the record at this point. I have not seen it, but in justice to the witness, it should go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it in the record right now.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 393

LETTER FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR TO SENATOR BRIEN MCMAHON FEBRUARY 1, 1948

Reproduced in "Political Orientation of Japan" [report of Government section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, September 1945–September 1948]

Appendix F: 43

LETTER TO SENATOR BRIEN M'MAHON DEFENDING ECONOMY POLICY

Tokyo, Japan,
1 February 1948.

DEAR SENATOR MCMAHON: I have your letter of January 22nd and the pages from the Congressional Record subsequently received under separate cover, for which I thank you.

The discussion of Senator Knowland covers a policy paper of the United States formulated by the State, War, and Navy Departments and referred to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration by the other ten governments represented on that body and to the supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for guidance. As the sources of origin, authorship and authority are all in Washington and my responsibility limited to the executive implementation of basic decisions formulated there, I am hardly in a position ten thousand miles away to participate in the debate.

For your information, however, I did publicly state my views with respect to the underlying purpose of the policy paper known as FEC 230 on New Year's Day last and subsequently on January 6th, 1948 at San Francisco the Secretary of the Army in an address before the Commonwealth Club, with marked clarity summed up the situation as it presently exists. It is somewhat difficult to understand why these published views did not figure in the discussion of the subject matter upon the floor of the Senate, and against the possibility that the texts of such statements did not come to your attention I am inclosing herewith copies thereof which I should be only too glad to have inserted in the Record as you have suggested.

In any evaluation of the economic potential here in Japan it must be understood that the tearing down of the traditional pyramid of economic power which has given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all commerce and industry, all raw materials, all transportation, internal and external, and all coal and other power resources. is the first essential step to the estab-

lishment here of an economic system based upon free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known. Even more it is indispensable to the growth of democratic government and life, as the abnormal economic system heretofore in existence can only thrive if the people are held in poverty and slavery.

The Japanese people, you may be sure, fully understand the nature of the forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand that this economic concentration not only furnished the sinews for mounting the violence of war but that its leaders, in partnership with the military, shaped the national will in the direction of war and conquest. And they understand no less fully that the material wealth comprising this vast concentration at war's start increased as war progressed, at the forfeiture of millions of Japanese lives, as resources of Japan theretofore only indirectly controlled came under direct control and ownership. Those things are so well understood by the Japanese people that apart from our desire to reshape Japanese life toward a capitalistic economy, if this concentration of economic power is not torn down and redistributed peacefully and in due order under the Occupation, there is no slightest doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood bath of revolutionary violence. For the Japanese people have tasted freedom under the American concept and they will not willingly return to the shackles of an authoritarian government and economy or resubmit otherwise to their discredited masters.

With expressions of cordiality.

Faithfully yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Mr. REA. That letter makes reference to——

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you going to testify?

Mr. REA. No, sir. I was just calling attention to the fact that that letter makes reference to a longer letter expanding on the views of the shorter one, of which you already have a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion that that also should be in the record at this point?

Mr. REA. I was going to suggest that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you identified yourself for the reporter?

Mr. REA. My name is Howard Rea.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you are associated with Mr. Surrey?

Mr. REA. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to adopt that as my testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are offering is this entire three-page photostat? It comes from the same source; is that right, Mr. Rea?

Mr. REA. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a meeting of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you remember being asked to speak on behalf of the Department or to designate a speaker to discuss State Department policy toward Japan at that rally?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. I didn't speak before it, and I have no recollection of being asked to send somebody to speak before it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a Mr. Hugh Borton?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Identify him.

Mr. VINCENT. He was an officer in the Far Eastern Office while I was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Borton did speak at the rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just testified that I have no recollection of his speaking before it. It is not a matter that is in my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you suggested to Mr. Borton that he make this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you did.

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is possible I did. It certainly is quite possible that I had a discussion with him, because he was in my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you referred to Mr. Borton a request which had come to your desk for a speaker to represent the Department at that rally?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say that I have any recollection of it, but I am perfectly sure that if one came, I probably would have referred it to one or the other of the people in my office handling Japanese American affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time know that the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy was a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that the Department was at the time sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't there an investigation of Mr. Borton as a result of his having made that speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. When was that speech made? In 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. January 24, 1946.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Andrew Roth was going to be on the program of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the State Department cleared the speech which Mr. Borton gave on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply don't recall the speech or the incident, so I don't know whether it was cleared or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did not clear the speech before he gave it, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall clearing the speech before he gave it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see it?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply don't know, Mr. Sourwine. I just don't recall that whole incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall ever having heard of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall, sir, having anything to do with that. As I say, Borton was in my office, and if you can refresh my memory, I would be perfectly happy to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter written by Mr. Hugh Borton to Mr. Victor Lasky of the New York World Telegram, under date of September 14, on the letterhead of Columbia University in the city of New York, dated September 14, 1950.

In answer to your inquiry of September 13, I am glad to have this opportunity of explaining the circumstances of my appearance at a rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946. An invitation had been received in the Department some weeks earlier for a speaker at the meeting to speak on our policy toward Japan. My immediate superior in the Department, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was unable to go and referred the matter to me, suggesting that I make the speech. None of us in the Department were aware at that time that the committee was described as a Communist-front organization. It was with considerable embarrassment that upon arrival in New York upon the evening of the 24th I found that the Department was being accused of sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization. So far as I can remember, we were not aware in the Department that Mr. Roth was to be on the program. The speech which I gave on Japanese policy was cleared by the Department prior to my giving it in New York.

After my return to Washington, the Department was naturally upset over the matter, but it was too late to rectify the situation. As a result of the newspaper articles on the matter, it was read into the Congressional Record. The Department felt, therefore, that a further investigation of me was necessary. I was reinvestigated by the Department's security officers. I was not aware of this until after the investigation was over, as the Department did not take any action in reference to my position, because of the incident.

Hoping that this answers your questions and if not, you will communicate with me further, I am,

Sincerely yours,

HUGH BORTON.

Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it doesn't. That incident is completely out of my mind. It does to the extent that such an incident must have arisen. But Borton's letter—

Senator FERGUSON. January 24, 1946, you were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings up the same question I asked you this morning, about your Security Branch, whether or not there were any questions raised about Communist fronts or espionage or espionage agents, around the Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I had no knowledge that this was a Communist-front organization or that there was an investigation going on of Mr. Borton.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was at the very least a teapot tempest at the time, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I should have remembered it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether anyone else in the State Department contributed to Mr. Service's defense fund?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody else. I have mentioned Mr. Gauss, but he was outside the State Department at that time, Ambassador Gauss.

As to the others, I don't recall who may have contributed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that there was a solicitation in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall there was something in the Foreign Service Journal about sending money to Jack Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, even the Foreign Service Journal—

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody wrote a letter in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Suggesting contributions from people in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Foreign Service officers.

Senator FERGUSON. And at that time there was an investigation of Mr. Service in relation to removing papers?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Mr. Service now has been removed from his service in the Department; and I think, while the document will speak for itself, it shows that it was on account of giving unauthorized papers out in the Amerasia case.

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you that I have not read it, have not read the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. You do not know why he was removed, then?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was removed for just the reasons you do.

Senator FERGUSON. For giving these papers; is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. The ruling of the Loyalty Review Board that there was a reasonable doubt. And they based that as I understand it, on the Amerasia case.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that there was also a solicitation of funds in the State Department when Mr. Hiss was accused?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And that certain donations were made by people in the State Department and other branches of the executive branch of the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never solicited. I was in Switzerland. But I did not know there was any solicitation.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your security branch very active, to your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was active. I had no knowledge of its activities. It operated as a distinct branch in the State Department and carried on its activities without my knowledge, which I think would be the appropriate way for them to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Had it ever struck your mind while you were in the Department that there may be Communist agents at least trying to get things out of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. When you ask whether it ever struck my mind, yes. It is a reasonable question to ask. But I don't recall, myself, being conscious of the fact that there were or that there was a need for it. That was the Security Division's job.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the Security Division's job. Well, they didn't have a man in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And it now turns out that Mr. Roth, who was connected with the Amerasia case, was coming into your Department to see Mr. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. But it never struck you that you would give it any care, about agents being around trying to get information?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no reason at that time to suspect Roth.

Senator FERGUSON. To even think about the matter. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not think in terms of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other cases where they raised money in the State Department or put it in the Foreign Service Journal, to contribute to some one that was accused of a very serious matter like the removing of papers or information from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Senator, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything in the Journal about the Alger Hiss case?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony is that you recall nothing about any investigation of Mr. Borton in connection with attending this rally?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that, sir. Until it was brought to my attention. I do now say that the instance is one that I was certainly conscious of at that time. You asked me now whether I could recall it, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can recall now that there was some measure of furor in the Department about this matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I can, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the question of the newspaper report of it, Mr. Chairman, I have an article which appeared in the New York World-Telegram of the 23d of January 1946, headed "State Department sending speaker to pink rally."

I ask that that be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394," and is as follows:)

[New York World-Telegram, January 23, 1946, p. 1]

STATE DEPARTMENT SENDING SPEAKER TO PINK RALLY

(By Frederick Woltman, World-Telegram Staff Writer)

Possibly its right hand isn't aware of what its left hand is doing. Or maybe the State Department just thrives on punishment.

At any rate, the State Department is sending an official representative, Dr. Hugh Borton, to address a "Rally for a Democratic Japan" in Manhattan Center tomorrow night, where its policies are sure to be lambasted.

A cospeaker with him on the platform will be Andrew Roth, former lieutenant in Navy intelligence now awaiting trial in Washington on a Federal indictment charging him with conspiracy to take confidential Government military records. Mr. Roth was relieved of active duty last year following an FBI investigation instigated by the State Department itself.

The rally is being staged by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy, which lately has been active in promoting the Japanese Communist movement, demanding the immediate recall of all American troops in China and assailing what it terms our undemocratic foreign policies in Asia.

The committee, which was started 3 years ago by loyal Japanese-Americans, has become heavily larded with Communist influence. Its advisers include such well-known Communists or fellow-travelers as Lewis Merrill, president of the CIO United Office and Professional Workers, Michael Obermeir, Katherine Terrill, Abner Green, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.

Its announcements list Dr. Borton, former teacher of Japanese at Columbia University, as representing the United States State Department.

In addition to five speakers, including Dr. Borton and Mr. Roth, there will be an added feature, a dramatized narration by Canada Lee, the actor. Mr. Lee's latest appearance was January 15, when he was given star billing in a Madison Square

Garden Lenin memorial meeting run by the New York State Committee of the Communist party.

The main speaker will be Representative John M. Coffee, Democrat, of Washington, who, with one or two exceptions, has managed to get his name on a greater number of Communist fronts than any Member of Congress.

Last summer he joined three other Representatives with the avowed aim of putting pressure on the State Department for a more pro-Soviet stand. This time, according to the JACD's announcement, Representative Coffee will take up the problems of the Indonesians, the Annamese, the people of India, Japan and China.

REGULAR TICKET OUTLET

To distribute tickets for the rally, the committee has chosen the regular bookshops which the Communists always use as outlets for their literature and ticket agencies for their affairs. These are the Worker's Bookshop at the party's headquarters, 50 East Thirteenth Street, the Jefferson Book Store of the party's Jefferson School, the Forty-fourth Street Book Fair and the Guild Book Center.

In its bimonthly News Letter, the JACD is strongly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and favors the Communist regime in China. Last November it protested to President Truman against the State Department's role in China as "in ugly contradiction between our stated policies and our actions."

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand a copy of the program for this rally, or what purports to be a copy of the program for this rally.

I will ask Mr. Mandel: Is that a photostat of the program for the rally in question?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of the announcement of the rally.

Mr. SOURWINE. I stand corrected. A photostat of the announcement for the rally. The second page says: "Program" and indicates that Dr. Hugh Borton, of the State Department was No. 3 on the program and the first speaker, that Andrew Roth, author of *Dilemma* in Japan, was No. 5 on the program and the second speaker; the space between them, No. 4 on the program being a soprano who was to give two selections. On the next page, endorsers include Israel Epstein, Michael Obermeir, and Max Yergan, among others. There is also a statement bearing beneath it the facsimile signature of Harold L. Ickes, saying:

There are those in Japan who are struggling to achieve a democratic type of government in place of the military tyranny which plunged the nation into war and led it down the path to defeat. It is deeply encouraging to me that many Japanese-Americans are anxious to further this movement to foster the growth of freedom in Japan. This "Rally for Democratic Japan" can be important in bringing about a better understanding between our countries, and in encouraging Japan on her new road. I send you my greetings and my hope that you will carry forward the ideal for which our soldiers fought and died, a world in which all people will live in freedom and without fear.

I don't offer that for the record, but on the basis of all of this there is no question in your mind, Mr. Vincent, that there was such a rally?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you refresh my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that Mr. Borton spoke?

Mr. VINCENT. That Mr. Borton spoke.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any question in your mind that he was subsequently investigated by the State Department, whether it was a thorough investigation or just a gesture that there was an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any knowledge of that. You would have to ask the Security Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Borton in your Division?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the far-eastern office; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been an investigation of him at the time, would you have known about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think I would have. Not necessarily. The Security Division procedures were not known to me. They carried out their investigations.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise anyone in the Department at that time that you had suggested to Mr. Borton that he make the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I can't recall the instance. I don't recall whether I told anybody I advised him to make the speech.

Senator FERGUSON. If there has been an investigation of this matter—and you assume here this morning that Mr. Borton was right, that you had received the invitation, and you could not go, and you had in effect obtained him as the speaker.

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. Should not that investigation have included what you knew about it, that you had the invitation? Why did you not know that this was a pink organization? And why did you ask one of the men under you to go and make this speech? Would not any kind of an investigation have included that?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, you will have to get security people here to testify.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about security. I am asking your opinion as a Foreign Service officer. Should not any investigation have included that much at least?

Mr. VINCENT. An inquiry?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; as to what you knew about it.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it should have.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you were the man who had the invitation. You were the man who handed it over to Borton.

Now, could there have been an investigation without at least doing that much?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I can't testify on that, to say whether it should or shouldn't. The Security Division operated on its own.

Senator FERGUSON. What you are saying about the Security Division leaves this committee, as far as I am concerned, in the position that it certainly must conclude that Division was not functioning, when it would not make an investigation of this matter and at least ask you some very critical and personal questions. I cannot understand it. Can you understand it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not testified that they did not ask me. I have no recollection of their asking me any questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot understand a man's memory on an important matter like that failing him. I do not understand your telling me that you cannot remember if they did. You would not say they did not. You would not say they did. Now, if you were questioned about sending a speaker to a pink organization, do you not think that you would remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I do not remember it. To ask me whether I think I would remember it or not is another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, in justice to the witness, I think perhaps it should be pointed out that the only evidence we have that there was an investigation is a statement by Mr. Borton in a letter which is not under oath.

Senator FERGUSON. I am certainly trying to be fair to the witness. Borton wrote to the paper and said there was an investigation. And I think it is even worse for the State Department if there was not an investigation at all. I was giving them the benefit of the doubt, that they did conduct some kind of an examination.

If it turns out that they did not, I think it is even worse for the State Department and the Security Branch of it.

Do you not also?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was an investigation, according to Mr. Borton.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think there was, now?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to doubt that there was one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in February 1946, attend a luncheon given by the American Council of the IPR in honor of Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I think the record ought to be clear that any investigation that the State Department has made on the question of loyalty or communism is not available to this committee. We are helpless along that line.

Mr. VINCENT. It is not available to me, either, Senator.

You asked about a luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you, in February of 1946, attend a luncheon given by the American Council of IPR in honor of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I have to testify again that I don't recall the luncheon. But I went to many luncheons, and I could easily have gone to this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall such a luncheon on February 21, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, no. There were many luncheons I don't recall, and I don't recall the occasion of this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many luncheons honoring Owen Lattimore have you ever attended?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not talking about honoring Owen Lattimore. I am just thinking of the luncheons one attends, and I don't recall this.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your good friend, is he not? He is your long-time friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had attended a luncheon in his honor, do you not think you would have remembered it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily. I don't see why I should remember now, in 1952, a luncheon in honor of Lattimore. Whether I did or didn't is a matter—

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you ever have attended any luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore, but I could easily have attended a luncheon in honor of Owen Lattimore, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious. I am trying to help your memory on this. Do you remember a luncheon of that nature at which Mr. William L. Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations acted as chairman?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember such a luncheon in the pan-American room of the Mayflower Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you have broadened my memory; yes. Because I was just in the Mayflower yesterday, and I, myself, was trying to recall the last occasion I was there, in the pan-American room.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember ever having been in the pan-American room of the Mayflower Hotel at a luncheon honoring Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. When you say "honoring Owen Lattimore," I don't recall that it was honoring Owen Lattimore, but it may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having been there in 1946 at a luncheon given by the IPR Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember the date, but I do know that on some occasion I was there in that Pan American room. I would be perfectly willing to tell you, "Yes, I have been there." But I am trying to tell you I don't recall the circumstances of the luncheon, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an appointment book? Do you keep an appointment book?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not keep an appointment book. When I am working in the office, I have a pad on my desk.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not keep a diary?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever kept one?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for many years. I kept one when I first went to China; in 1924.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you do not yourself remember attending this luncheon, it would be useless to ask you about any of the other officials of the Department who might have joined you at that time in paying tribute to Owen Lattimore, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, on or about February 23, write a letter under that date, to Mr. Edward Carter, executive vice chairman of the American Council of the IPR, advising him that you did not feel you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I had no recollection of the particular method by which I ceased to be a member of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you a photostat of a letter, and I ask you if it refreshes your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a letter which you wrote to Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have just read that letter. Did you in that letter state that it was your belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to have on its board of trustees two official members from the same office in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the other official member from the same office in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Abbott Moffat, who was mentioned there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, of which I have a photostat, be placed in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 395" and is as follows):

EXHIBIT No. 395

Address Official Communications to the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 23, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Executive Vice Chairman, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I understand that my office has gotten in touch with your IPR office here in regard to my nomination for the Board of Directors of the American Council, but I shall confirm what I asked them to tell your office here.

I appreciate very much the nomination for a second term but feel that, in as much as Abbot Moffat has also been nominated and has been advised by me to accept the nomination, I should decline the nomination. I do this because of my belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to have on its Board of Directors two official members from the same office in the State Department. I shall of course continue to follow with interest the work of the Council.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Carter Vincent
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in that letter, state that you would, of course, continue to follow with great interest the work of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, continue to follow that work with great interest?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I followed it with great interest; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you on or about April 1, 1946, asked to lend your name and support to a membership appeal by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall such an appeal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact lend your name and support in the spring of 1946 to a membership appeal by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Since I say I don't recall I was asking, I don't recall lending my name to it; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the Washington advisory committee of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel what is that a photostat of?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document headed "Meeting of Washington IPR advisory committee at the Lattimores' home, March 25, 1946," from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this the second page of that photostat, of the same document?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these, as identified, may go in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 396" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 396

Meeting of Washington IPR Advisory Committee at the Lattimores' home,
March 25, 1946

Present: Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, Edward C. Carter, Mrs. Lilian Coville, Mrs. Shirley Jenkins, Mr. and Mrs. William Johnstone, Mr. and Mrs. Mortimer S. Graves, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Abbott Low Moffat, Catherine Porter, Mrs. Elizabeth Ussachevsky, Mr. Pollard.

Main points discussed during the evening were:

1. A definite campaign should be developed to point up and increase the quality of the Washington program in order to—

(a) Bring in new members to increase the Washington total to approximately 500.

It was felt that many Government workers in the Far East field would join in response to a form letter or a personal request. The letter should indicate specifically what IPR has to offer this special group: inter alia, periodic publications and a list of books which are subject to members' discount.

Chairman of international relations committees of clubs and organizations, and members of local college and university faculties, could also be circularized.

We should consider a form of membership for people who could pay between \$10 and \$100 annually.

(b) Strive for income and a budget of from \$15,000 (Johnstone) to \$25,000 (Carter).

2. In order to get the funds needed for a full-scale program in Washington, it was suggested that—

(a) Several first-class programs be built around headliners and headline topics, such as:

Harold Ickes (or Abe Fortas), plus a Navy official (or Senator Hart) and Sir Carl Berendsen, to discuss Pacific Island bases. Invite, along with regular members, a selected group of prospective Supporting Members. (A possible alternative to an Ickes meeting would be to have a half dozen former Navy officers discuss the question, men who have seen service in the Pacific and are full of ideas. Miss Cora Du Bois at ORI or Miss Clare Holt could suggest people for this program.) John Usene and Lowell Hattery were mentioned, along with James Roosevelt.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, perhaps on some phase of the colonial question. (E. C. Carter to invite by cable after Eleanor Lattimore consults John Carter Vincent.)

Clarence-Gauss on China; Benjamin Gerig on trusteeships; Clarence Ropes on the Soviet Far East.

Other speakers under (a), or under (b) following, might include: on Japan—Gen. Ken R. Dyke, John Emmerson, or John Embree (May); on China—Michael Lindsey or Edwin A. Locke; on Mongolia—Mr. Cammon (ask through George Harris); on Thailand—Kenneth Landon or Howard Palmer (May).

(b) Invitation luncheons (pay as you come) be arranged on other occasions if A-1 speakers and topics can be provided. Invited groups would include leading editors, writers, and radio and news commentators. Purpose: Attract new members from this group and strengthen IPR's "good press."

(c) New literature to be prepared, usable in Washington and other IPR centers, to help pave the way for showing membership prospects how IPR can serve them as it served the Government and regular members during and before the war.

3. That the whole financial and membership campaign be integrated by and be made the responsibility of Mr. Pollard, with the immediate help of a List Committee (Mrs. Bolton, Mr. and Mrs. Graves, Mrs. Lattimore, Mr. Moffat, Mrs. Moorhead, Mrs. Ussachevsky) and a Program Committee (Mr. Barnett, Mr. W. D. Carter, Mr. Johnstone, and Mrs. Lattimore).

4. That top sponsorship be provided by inviting Mr. Sumner Welles to be chairman of the Washington membership appeal; and that other leading foreign-affairs personnel, in and out of the Government, be asked to lend their names and support also.

A few such might include:

Frances P. Bolton
Marquis Childs
Helen Gahagan Douglas
Herbert E. Liston
Walter Lippmann

Eugene Meyer
Raymond Swing
Ellert D. Thomas
John Carter Vincent
Henry A. Wallace

Mr. SOURWINE. Because of the desire to conclude today, instead of laboring this point, I simply leave it as a part of the record. (Handing document to witness.)

(After pause, witness and counsel reading document.)

It seems that we gain nothing this way. We might as well read it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is pretty long. Let them read it. I think we can save time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps counsel can read it.

Now, do you remember whether you knew, or do you now know, Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, B-u-n-c-e?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified, I think, when you asked me—you helped my memory—that he was the economic man sent to Korea about the 1st of January, some time in 1946. I don't recall the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted from Mr. Bunce in his capacity as economic adviser criticizing both the military government and United States policy in Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy of that dispatch requested by Mr. Philip Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Requested by anyone connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy furnished pursuant to such a request?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify, since I don't know about the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information to Mr. Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. To others in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have already discussed Mr. Penfield, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. James K. Penfield; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask Mr. Mandel what this is a photostat of.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations of a letter dated September 3, 1946, to Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal from Arthur C. Bunce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, as identified, may go into the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 397

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADVISER,
September 3, 1946.

Mr. PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. LILIENTHAL: Your two letters of June 13 and June 22 were waiting for me when I returned from a brief trip back to Washington. If I had visited New York, I was planned to call on you; however, I did not have much time because I was recruiting civilians for Military Government in Korea and also for my staff.

When my staff arrives, I may find time to write an article for you dealing more narrowly with economic matters. At present, I am too rushed trying to catch up with affairs occurring in my absence. The reason that my article was not

acceptable for publication was that it criticized both Military Governments and United States policy as well as U. S. S. R. policies and programs. This was not felt to be desirable under the hope that the Joint Commission might reconvene. The article was sent to the Department as a despatch, however, and Mr. Vincent or Mr. Penfield might send you a copy for your own information if you asked them.

In reply to your letter of August 20, I believe I can help you considerably. There is a large amount of unclassified material available in the War Department and in the State Department. This material covers the monthly reports from Military Government, all press releases, translations of Korea press comments and reports on public opinion trends. I am sure these could be made available to anyone making a study of Korea.

A complete set of all unclassified materials has been sent to the Hoover Library of War Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, and you should contact Dr. H. H. Fisher regarding the use of this material. The first lot was shipped August 8 and additional shipments will follow every three months.

From your letter I was not sure whether you wanted materials available in the United States or in England. I have spoken to Mr. Carmode, the British Liaison Officer, and he tells me that he has not been forwarding materials in bulk to London. It would, therefore, appear essential for the study to be made in the United States unless the Royal Institute asked Mr. Carmode through the Foreign Office to supply them with a complete set of documents.

Mr. Snuages of the Public Information Division in the War Department is coming to Korea to see what further materials can be sent back to Washington in order that they may do a better job of informing the public about Korean affairs. I will show him your letter and ask him to do what he can to make materials available to you.

In addition, I am asking that the Institute be placed on the mailing list for current materials and that any available back issues be forwarded to you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Arthur C. Bunce

ARTHUR C. BUNCE, *Economic Adviser.*

Mr. SOURWINE. You have had a number of questions about Solomon Adler. I don't think you have been asked this question in just this way.

Do you now or did you ever know that he was a member of the Silvermaster spy group?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took over from Mr. Dooman as head of the Far East Committee of SWNCC on the 1st of September, 1945; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the first time I acted as chairman of FE-SWNCC; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who recommended your appointment to that post?

Mr. VINCENT. The Secretary of State or Mr. Acheson; I don't recall which.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified you were called back from a vacation to take that job.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that Mr. Acheson was the first one to speak to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. About the change.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am hurrying along here, and if I seem to give inadequate treatment to any of these, please stop me and expand as you think desirable.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in the fall of 1946, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to stop the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It was drafted in my office.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate he was going to fail?

Mr. VINCENT. In the fall of 1946, I did anticipate it, and others did, too.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after he had been out there did you anticipate that he was going to fail?

Mr. VINCENT. Some time during the summer or early autumn of 1946, I was afraid it was going to be a matter of failure, although I wouldn't want to say now that he was conscious he couldn't pull it out. But it looked like that then.

Senator FERGUSON. And he had been there how long then?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been there 9 months then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you present, or were you instrumental in presenting, a draft of such a statement to Secretary Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that it would have been logical for me to present that draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that draft recommend withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory. The draft is right here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would, and I wish you would identify the draft, if it is to be found in the white paper, as the one you prepared.

Mr. VINCENT. It was prepared, as I say, in the Far Eastern Office, but in consultation, as my testimony was before, with Army people, with economic people.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking now about a draft you prepared in the fall of 1946, if there was such a draft. Where is it to be found in the White Paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, we are talking about the paper here. I have told you before that the thing was a matter of consultation with economic people and covers a wide range of subjects. It is a general review.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, the draft that is in here is not a draft which is identifiable as something which you prepared, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't recall how many stages.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you identify that document in the white paper as the one that you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. I can identify it that this was the draft that was prepared. When you speak of "draft," these things go through many drafts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's identify what you have in the white paper first, and then I think we can clear it up with a few questions. What page? Are you talking about document 63 on page 609? No; I am in error. Which one are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am talking about the document of December 18, 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does it appear?

Mr. VINCENT. It appears on page 689.

Mr. SOURWINE. Document No. 114 in the white paper, a statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is its date?

Mr. SOURWINE. December 18, 1946.

Is that the one you are referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the one I am referring to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, to what extent is that the outgrowth of fruition of any memorandum which you prepared in the fall of 1946, or any draft which you prepared in the fall of 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified several times that the draft was a composite thing that was prepared. I don't know just what would be the fruition of drafts that were prepared and finally approved.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it refresh your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. Does this? Yes. But you are speaking here of the draft that I prepared. What I am trying to get at is that this draft, by its very nature——

Mr. SOURWINE. You did prepare a draft in the fall of 1946, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Of this?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, no.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that I personally prepared a draft. It was a composite——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you personally, in the fall of 1946, as early as October or earlier, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his effort to end the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall preparing the draft myself, but, yes, there was a draft prepared, in anticipation of this very thing that came out.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was trying to get at. There was a draft prepared that early?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you helped on it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no doubt I helped on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did that draft subsequently become the document you have identified, document 114 from the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. It became, in substance, the document here in the white paper, so far as I can recall. You are speaking of a draft now that was prepared in anticipation of this, and this was the thing that was prepared at the time we realized Marshall was coming home.

Mr. SOURWINE. We realize that the draft prepared in your division in October may have been thrown in the wastebasket, and this substituted. Did that happen?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the draft prepared in your office in fact disapproved, rejected?

Senator FERGUSON. Or approved?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have gone through other drafts, and other drafts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the initial draft rejected? Or was it sent back for correction? Or did it go along up?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the exact process of what happened to the drafts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Look at that document. Is that the substance of your draft? So that we can move along.

Mr. VINCENT. It is the result of the thinking that was done in the Department, in the War Department, and in the Economic Division,

as to what should be done. This is the result of the thinking. What form some of the earlier drafts took, I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the point I was getting at. This original draft, the first one submitted, back in October, prepared in your office under your direction; was that a draft which included a recommendation for withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, without seeing the document, whether it recommended that or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't say whether that was recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you can't say whether that initial draft statement was in fact approved?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether that original draft statement was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The whole drafting business was a matter of give and take.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the draft of President Truman's letter to Chiang in August of 1946? That is on page 652 in the White Paper, Document No. 86.

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly think that I participated in the drafting of that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was referred to in the fifth paragraph of that letter as the assassinations of distinguished Chinese Liberals at Kunming recently?

Mr. VINCENT. It referred to an incident in Kunming at that time where certain Chinese Liberals and intellectuals had been removed and killed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the intellectuals and liberals who were killed, assassinated?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to the files in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of them Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time whether any of them were Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at the time whether any of them were Communists, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a pretty tough letter, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know whether you would describe it as tough or not. It was drafted with the idea in mind of great disappointment over the failure or the apparent failure of General Marshall to achieve his objectives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the sixth paragraph, where it says:

There is a increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by failure to understand the liberal trend of the times.

What persons or groups were referred to there?

Mr. VINCENT. What particular militarists were referred to I don't know. It would probably be such people as among the other groups; what we called the Chen Li-fu clique.

It would have been, we will say, Gen. Hoy Lee Chin.

I am just speaking from memory now of what groups we had in mind there. They probably had figured in General Marshall's reports back of his mission and would be the groups that he himself had indicated to us in his telegrams he thought were interfering.

Mr. SOURWINE. It refers to a small group of political reactionaries. Do you know who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. I just referred to some of them as, we will say, the Chen Li-fu group. I can't identify any others at the moment; but it would have been groups. Because, mind you, this is all based on General Marshall's own attitude and own thought of what was happening to his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think there would have been any possibility that the Chinese Government construed this language as an intimation that the President of the United States regarded Chiang and his immediate surrounders as a small group of political reactionaries obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be so construed without the inclusion of Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it so intended?

Mr. VINCENT. It was so intended to indicate that there were small groups.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it intended to indicate to him that his government was being criticized by this sentence?

Mr. VINCENT. It was. And, as I say, based upon the disappointment of the failure of not accomplishing the objective.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a similar letter written to the head of the Communists criticizing them for not cooperating?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the last paragraph:

It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America.

How do you interpret that statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I interpret that statement to mean it is critical of the failure for them to get along, that Chiang Kai-shek, at that time, according to General Marshall's report, was himself, or his Government, responsible for the breakdown of the truce negotiations.

The truce negotiations had broken down, and it was the general feeling of Marshall and the rest of us that the responsibility for the reopening of the civil war at that time was with the National Government, more than it was with the—

Mr. SOURWINE. The President is saying there, is he not, "I hold you and your Government responsible for the failure to effect an agreement with the Communists and if the agreement is not effected pretty quick, I am going to tell the American people that that is the fact."

Mr. VINCENT. That was that the American people would have to know the facts, and which finally was drawn up in the September 18 memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Arthur Behrstock?

Mr. VINCENT. Arthur who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Behrstock, B-e-h-r-s-t-o-c-k.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. A former chief of the Planning Section, Civil Information and Education, Tokyo.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of knowing him.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never worked with you at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at any time that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making an address at Cornell University on or about January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is the approximate time I made it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in the course of that address, state that it would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I made that speech from notes, and I think I have testified that I do not recall what I said in that speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have here a clipping of an Associated Press dispatch date-lined Ithaca, N. Y., January 22, and reading:

John C. Vincent, head of the State Department Far Eastern Division, declared tonight that the United States should avoid relying on a preservation of the status quo in China and other areas.

In an address at Cornell University, Mr. Vincent said, "We should use strength for our security on short-term expedience. There will be times" he said, "When in the short view it will seem advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo. Such a course," he added, "might prove short-sighted because it would fail to encourage progressive elements."

Do you think that is a fair report of your speech at Cornell, sir, so far as it goes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would say that is a fair report of the speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you were accurately quoted, to the extent that you were quoted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I think I was accurately quoted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you, in that speech, advising against throwing the weight of the United States and its influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not have China particularly in mind there. That was a generalized statement, and status quo, from my point of view, was economic as well as political.

It had to do with the areas of southwest Asia, where the colonial areas are, there. It was just a general philosophical approach to the problem that a continuation of the status quo, in the sense of not having progress, which is very clear there, was not good for the defense of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you include China in your thinking in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. The idea was directed primarily on the idea of Southeast Asia. But the status quo in China would have possibly had the same connotations there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it clear in your own mind that you did not intend to advocate that we should not throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it depends on what you speak of as the status quo.

Mr. SOURWINE. The status quo was Chiang, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. We recognized the Government of Chiang Kai-shek, but we were at that time still working, or Marshall had gone there

with the very idea of assisting the Chinese in working out a coalition government, after adopting a constitution.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to argue with you. I am simply trying to find out whether you included China in your advice there, with regard to our not supporting the status quo, or whether it was clear in your own mind that you did not include China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not include the National Government of China as something that was to be overthrown, if that is your implication. But certainly our own policy at that time was to assist the Chinese in bringing about a more progressive situation, both in the economic as well as in the political field, to adopt a constitution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Excuse me, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Go ahead, I am through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making a speech before a luncheon session of the thirty-third annual foreign trade commission on November 12, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. National Foreign Trade Council?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Annual Foreign Trade Convention, I believe.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I know the speech you have in mind. It is the one on November 12?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I remember making a speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember in that speech stating:

What is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital. It is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I am just reading it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That was at a luncheon meeting at which Ambassador Wellington Koo was present, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Wellington Koo, as I recall it, also spoke.

Mr. SOURWINE. He followed you, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether he came first or I came first, I think he was the main speaker.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you happen to have there the text of that address?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you offer it for the record?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want that copy back?

Mr. VINCENT. Not particularly. I can get plenty more of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397A," and is as follows:)

AMERICAN BUSINESS WITH THE FAR EAST

(Address by Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, before the Thirty-third Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, Tuesday, November 12, 1946, at 2:00 p. m., E. S. T.)

American business with the Far East began 162 years ago. The *Empress of China*, out of New York, put into Canton on August 30, 1784, after making a tortuous six-month voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The vessel's cargo,

made up of furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, was exchanged at Canton for tea, silk, and chinaware. The total investment in the venture was \$120,000. The promoters cleared \$30,000. This was good business; it was private enterprise; and it was mutually beneficial. I hasten to say here that I do not actually know how much the Chinese made out of the furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, but having had some knowledge of Chinese businessmen, I still think I am safe in saying that the benefit was mutual.

In the course of the 19th century American business with the Far East expanded. Gradually our trade extended to other portions of the Far East: Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Siam, and adjoining areas of Southeast Asia. Throughout this period American trade with the Far East was based on sound business considerations. We asked for no concessions or special rights; nor were our business dealings based upon exploitation associated with political privilege or pressure.

During the 19th century the basic factor in our close ties with the Far East was trade. Our early treaties with China and Japan were framed largely with American business in mind. After the Spanish-American War and our assumption of territorial responsibilities in the Pacific, notably in the Philippines, political and strategic factors gained weight, but on into the 20th century commercial and cultural considerations were still to the fore in shaping our policies toward the Far East. Our enunciation of the Open Door and our insistence on non-discriminatory and most-favored-nation treatment were motivated largely by a desire to promote American business and expand international trade relations.

In his radio address last month Secretary Byrnes gave voice to traditional American trade policy in the following words:

"The United States has never claimed the right to dictate to other countries how they should manage their own trade and commerce. We have simply urged in the interest of all peoples that no country should make trade discriminations in its relations with other countries."

By 1936 our foreign trade or business with the Far East was valued at close to one billion dollars. In the 20-year period from 1915-35 the Far East's share of our total exports increased from 5 percent to 16 percent. In 1936 our total direct investments in the Far East amounted to roughly \$335,000,000.

In making this brief sketch, I have in mind a recent tendency toward taking an unbalanced viewpoint of our role in the Far East. Political and military considerations, as important as they are, seem to me to occupy a disproportionate share of present public attention. It is accepted that an all-important objective of our policies is to provide for the security of the United States and the maintenance of international peace, but I think we also have another objective of equal importance; that is, to bring about in the relations between ourselves and other states mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges which will promote international welfare and understanding.

These are interrelated objectives. I feel strongly that we cannot be successful in achieving the kind of security we want, or in maintaining the kind of peace we want, unless we take an active and leading part in international commercial and cultural life. I will go further and say that a strong element in our security, and in the maintenance of peace, will be the development of commercial and cultural ties with other peoples.

At the same time, it is my conviction that a strong national defense is essential to the pursuit of our broader objective of developing commercial and cultural relations. We must be equal to the task of encouraging and supporting democracy and progress. There may be times and occasions when, in the short view, it will seem advantageous to our security to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo; on the side of those forces calculated to bring about immediate or early stability. But history, I believe, will show that strength lies on the side of progress.

In Chicago last April the President said:

"In the Far East, as elsewhere, we shall encourage the growth and the spread of democracy and civil liberties. * * * The roots of democracy, however, will not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern countries."

Today we are faced with the problem of a return of American business to the Far East under conditions which are, to state it mildly, uninviting. Japan is a defeated country whose economy must perforce remain under Allied control for some time to come. Korea is a liberated country split in half at parallel 38 between us and the Russians. In China internal strife seriously retards steps

toward economic recovery. In the independent Philippine Republic we are faced with a new situation, to which we must adjust ourselves. In Indochina and Indonesia a return to normal trade conditions awaits a solution of problems presented by the self-governing aspirations of the peoples in those countries. In Siam—well, Siamese in Washington tell me that they will be glad to do business with any or all of you who will show an interest in their country.

But the over-all picture is not encouraging and it is not my intention to dress it up in attractive colors. In the brief time allotted me I want to say something of what we are doing in the various areas of the Far East to brighten the outlook.

General MacArthur has demilitarized Japan, but it is impossible to proceed with plans for postwar Japanese economy until some decision is reached with regard to the amount and types of industry that Japan will be allowed to retain and the amount that is subject to removal as reparations. We have reason to hope that a decision on the problem of reparations will be reached before the end of this year. Our main purpose shall be to achieve a healthy balance in Far Eastern economy for the benefit of commerce in the Far East and at the same time to insure the effective industrial disarmament of Japan.

As you know, Japanese overseas trade is controlled on a government-to-government basis. An Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan was recently established by the Far Eastern Commission at the request of the United States. Its purpose is to advise on the disposition of Japanese exports and on sources of imports.

Among the present obstacles to a change-over to private trading are in inflated and unstable currency and the inadequacy of transport and communications facilities. Although it is not possible to say how soon these obstacles can be overcome, I might hazard the guess that a resumption of private trade with Japan will be possible some time during the latter half of next year, possibly sooner.

In Korea, we are now estopped from putting into operation an over-all economic plan by the inability of the Russians and ourselves to reach agreement on a unified administration for the country. We want a united Korea and we want to assist the Koreans toward self-government and independence. But while we continue our efforts to bring about a resumption of discussions in the Joint Soviet-American Commission, we cannot mark time. Therefore, we are taking measures to improve economic conditions in southern Korea and to bring Koreans more and more directly into the administration of their country. In doing so, however, we do not lose sight of the fact that a united self-governing Korea is the goal we are determined to achieve.

From what I have said it will be apparent to you why private trading in Korea is not now feasible. But the development of a healthy trade relationship between Korea and Allied nations is our aim, and consideration is now being given to measures which may soon make possible limited trade relations between Korea and private business concerns. We hope that American business will take an active interest in Korea.

Foremost among the problems facing the Philippines is reconstruction. Congress has approved two measures: the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the Philippine Trade Act of 1946.

The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of \$620,000,000 for the payment of war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and training projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition, Congress has authorized a loan of \$75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet a serious budgetary situation.

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The Philippine Trade Act provides that the Philippines shall continue to enjoy free trade with this country for a period of 8 years, after which a graduated tariff will apply until full duties are levied at the end of 20 years.

We expect to cooperate with the new Republic in meeting the manifold problems facing it as an independent state. It may be anticipated that, with a return to more normal conditions, the Philippines will again represent a substantial and expanding market for American products.

From the standpoint of business, the areas of Southeast Asia have been of interest to the United States primarily as a source of supply for such products as rubber, tin, and petroleum. Because of our large purchases of these items

our prewar trade was in a chronic state of imbalance, our sales in most years being only about one-tenth of our purchases.

You may recall a recent press statement by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Will Clayton, to the effect that the United States should give greater support to foreign investments of its nationals in strategic minerals that are in short supply. This statement has a special application to the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Far East generally, as sources of supply of a number of strategic and critical materials. Investment along the lines proposed by Mr. Clayton should have the effect of increasing the importation of American materials into the areas concerned.

Last but far from least we have China.

We have signed with China a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Most-favored-nation treatment is provided for individuals and corporations.

The Treaty is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commercial treaties in a number of respects. For instance, Article 19 provides for fair and equitable treatment as regards the application of exchange controls and Article 20 embodies certain commitments with regard to monopolies. It is designed to meet the needs of present-day commercial relations with China.

China is expected to collaborate in the establishment of the proposed International Trade Organization and is one of the "nuclear" countries which have agreed to negotiate for the reduction of trade barriers. China will also be urged to enter into other multilateral economic conventions having as their objectives a promotion of international trade and the solution of international commercial problems through consultation and collaboration. Constant effort is being made to discourage other countries, including China, from adopting temporary measures in the fields of tariffs, trade barriers, and other domestic legislation of a type which might jeopardize the successful attainment of this long-range economic collaboration.

Restoration of stability and direction in Chinese economy is retarded by the unhappy politico-military situation. The press, I feel, has made abundantly clear to you the ups and downs of General Marshall's mission. The National Assembly is scheduled to meet in Nanking today for the purpose of considering a constitution and reaching certain political decisions in regard to government organization. General Marshall hopes, and so do we, that wise counsels—the wisdom of China—will prevent the disaster of continued civil discord. Chinese economy and the Chinese people are already suffering acutely from the ravages of 8 years of Japanese aggression and occupation. They cannot stand much more adversity.

Premier Soong has been reported recently as stating that upwards of 80 per cent of China's expenditures are diverted to military purposes. Because of the wide gap between revenues and expenditures China has had to resort to large note issues with the inevitable result of accelerating inflation and a progressive rise in prices. The foreign exchange that might normally be expected to accrue from exports has been negligible in the relation to outgo for imports. Consequently China's current balance of payments position has continued to deteriorate.

The exchange and foreign trade regulations adopted by China, UNRRA's relief and rehabilitation program, and surplus sales and enemy property disposals are only temporary palliatives. The Chinese must resolve the present political impasse before any substantial improvement can be expected in China's economic situation.

In this connection I think it worth while to mention what I feel has been in some quarters a misinterpretation of General Marshall's mission as being solely political in its objective. Chinese economy is in a vicious circle. General Marshall is fully aware of this state of affairs and it has been his purpose to encourage the Chinese to break the vicious circle by reaching a political settlement that would result in a cessation of civil strife and make possible a revival of economic activity. Sooner or later this must be done, and be done by the Chinese.

Military measures will not accomplish an enduring settlement. That is why General Marshall has advocated with such persistency settlement by the democratic method of negotiation and agreement.

In making this brief sketch of current conditions in the Far East I cannot be accused of optimism. But I do think the potentialities of an expanding American business with the Far East exist and can be developed if we go about it in the right way. This brings me to a thought which I would like to express and

emphasize. When I use the term "American business" I have in mind all American business irrespective of whether it has a private, semiofficial, or official character. I do not believe that we can have one standard for private business and another standard for official business.

A recent editorial in the New York Times states that our Government should base a loan policy upon the important principle "that loans are not gifts, and that any country applying for a loan must furnish, like any prospective private borrower, convincing proof that by virtue of its political, economic, and trade policies it is a good credit risk."

Generally speaking, what is unsound for private capital is unsound for Government capital; that is, for the taxpayers' money. I believe it is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide-spread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling.

In expressing the foregoing views, I do not of course ignore the advantages of cooperation between government finance and private trade or the fact that there are fields for the investment of government capital into which it is not feasible or attractive for private capital to venture. I have in mind large-range and long-term projects, which are basic in character and are fundamentally sound from the standpoint of the economy of the country.

Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden stated some weeks ago in Chicago that "the purpose of lending should be to create a net increment to the economy of a borrowing country. Therefore, he went on to say, "loans should not be made if they enable another government to acquire or displace existing efficient free enterprises, whether they be American in ownership or not."

In stressing the economic and trade features of our position in the Far East, I do not wish to give the impression that I am overlooking other factors. In this complicated world in which we are living we must give full consideration to the interrelation of the political, cultural, economic, and security factors in our foreign policy. For our policy to be effective there must be harmony among all these factors—the teamwork we find in a good basketball team or a fine string quartet.

The President, in establishing the Committee for Financing Foreign Trade, said: "* * * I am anxious that there shall be fullest cooperation between governmental agencies and private industry and finance. Our common aim is return of our foreign commerce and investments to private channels as soon as possible."

I look upon this statement as a recognition of and a challenge to American business. I am in Washington to do my part in carrying out the cooperation of which the President speaks. Please call on me if I can be of help to you in meeting the challenge.

Mr. SOURWINE. In discussing that speech, sir, do you recall that the newspapers regarded that speech, and particularly the portion which I read, as being directed at China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; some of the newspapers so interpreted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it so intended?

Mr. VINCENT. It was intended to be a generalized statement which would include China as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were simply stating, in general, certain truths about policies; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I was stating in general my attitude toward a general situation, which was the conditions under which you wouldn't invest capital.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to take just a few minutes to analyze that statement that I read. You said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital; is that right? You may use this [handing document].

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you not think that other factors should enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors which enter into private expenditure or investment?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there was a following statement right after the one you have quoted. Would you repeat your question?

Mr. SOURWINE. You said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital; did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I ask you, do you not think that other factors should enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors which enter into private expenditure and investment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I do. But for a political reason. I am speaking here before a bunch of businessmen on the matter of investment of capital. This is a business meeting I was speaking at, and to my mind, if you will take it as a general statement, it was sound, that the government capital should not go into unsound investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about government capital as against private capital?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital?

Mr. VINCENT. I still think that is true, unless there are political objectives to be attained, and then I would not call it investment, I would call it political assistance, such as the loans to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recognize that there might be political considerations that would make a difference?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly do.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, dollars are frequently used as instruments of policy or economic warfare by this country?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think we have made investments or loans to countries where, at the time, it was unsound policy to make investments?

Mr. VINCENT. I think we have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been the policy of the State Department to recommend against such loans or policies in all cases, as a matter of principle?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been the State Department practice or policy to recommend against such loans or advances in all cases, as a matter of principle?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall; no, sir. The State Department, where there is a political objective to be attained—that is what the State Department would do—such as making advances to Greece or Turkey.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, would you not say now, that it is often entirely sound for Government capital to be invested in a place where the investment of private capital would be unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from a businessman's point of view, and here I—

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you speaking up there as a businessman or as an official of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I was speaking to businessmen and trying to lay down what I thought were certain general ideas that would guide the investment of capital on the part of the taxpayer without any political connotations.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you made that clear in the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you said it is unsound to invest the private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that was true?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly think it was true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to qualify that statement now in any way? Do you still think it is true?

Mr. VINCENT. That it is unsound to invest—

Mr. SOURWINE. It is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles.

Mr. VINCENT. I think, as a general statement, it is quite true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has the United States ever invested public capital in loans or grants, or in any other form of assistance, in any such country?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall where you would make that description of the country.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that, in your opinion, in all of the countries to which the United States has provided military or economic assistance, loans, grants, or otherwise, they were countries where there was no corruption in business or government circles?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, what countries were you referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. I was making a generalized statement about the whole Far East, which would have included China, northeast Asia, Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. And any other countries?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, the Philippines are in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What country were you referring to in that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to just a general—I am making a generalized statement, and that would have applied, as you will see earlier in this dispatch, where the Chinese were using at least 80 percent of their entire budget in military expenditures.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you hold to that statement as true, that it is unsound to make public or private investments in countries where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament?

Mr. VINCENT. If you will define the word, and remember I am speaking to businessmen as a matter of investment, and I am trying to make clear that this was a matter of investment of capital rather than the use of capital for political objectives—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you made it clear in the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Speaking to businessmen, I think they would have accepted it, that I was speaking of investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What percentage of the total national income may a government spend for armament for the purpose of resisting, or pre-

paring to resist, Communist aggression without reaching the point of wasting its substance on excessive armament?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. What percentage of its total national income does this Government spend on armament, present and past wars, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no figure that comes to my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to guess what it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any absolute standard with regard to what is wasting substance on excessive armament, or does it make a difference what the armament is for?

Mr. VINCENT. It would make a considerable difference as to what the armament was for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider that factor, of what the armament was for, in connection with this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Again, I was speaking of a generalized situation; I was generalizing here. The whole objective of this was, as I say, a speech before an American businessman, laying down certain general principles, and I did not have in mind political objectives or a political situation.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it, just a speech to please these businessmen?

Mr. VINCENT. This speech?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like for you to read the whole speech.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you, was that the purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. It was to respond to a group of American businessmen called the National Foreign Trade Council.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you say it to please them?

Mr. VINCENT. Most speeches are made with the idea of pleasing, but it was supposed to give some general ideas that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were speaking on policy as a State Department official, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't call this policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that it is unsound to invest private or public capital where the threat or fact of civil war exists; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that is a true statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is a true statement, when you consider that you are speaking of investment of capital, private or public.

I am not now speaking of whether you might want to use political loans or other kind of loans that the Government would give.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, this Government does not have a policy of making investments for profit in foreign nations, does it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for profit, but the Export-Import Bank, for instance, makes advances to countries, which you would call investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For the specific purpose of promoting trade or development projects.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Export-Import Bank in existence in 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And were you referring, then, to the Export-Import Bank when you made this statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Not specifically; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other agency of the United States Government that invested public funds in a comparable manner?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you could not have been talking of the investment of public funds for profit in the same sense that private funds would be invested when you used the term "investment of public funds," could you?

Mr. VINCENT. Other than, we will say, like the Export-Import Bank would make funds available.

Mr. SOURWINE. The investment of public funds necessarily connotes a public purpose; does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The two are inseparable?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you stated that the investment of public funds is unsound where the threat or fact of civil war exists?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any nations to which the United States Government has extended economic or military aid at a time when the threat or fact of civil war existed in that nation?

Mr. VINCENT. Greece, for instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yugoslavia?

Mr. VINCENT. But that was an appropriation in Congress, it was not an investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department recommend against that appropriation?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department recommended for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it was not an investment?

Mr. VINCENT. It was an investment from the standpoint of investment in policy. But it was not an investment from the standpoint of businessmen's idea of investments.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have stated that in connection with public funds there could not be investments from the businessmen's standpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I said that the Export-Import Bank could make investments, not for profit.

Mr. SOURWINE. But for a public purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For a public purpose, but governed by sound business principles.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Yugoslavia?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true. We recently made an investment in Yugoslavia, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it was unsound to invest public or private capital where tendencies toward government monopolization excludes American business. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any country today where tendencies toward Government monopolization exclude American business?

Mr. VINCENT. You have just mentioned Yugoslavia. I don't know whether they exclude American business, but I can't imagine American business can get into Yugoslavia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Iran?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with conditions in Iran.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we aided Iran?

Mr. VINCENT. We have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Egypt?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Government monopolization?

Mr. SOURWINE. Where tendencies toward Government monopolization exclude American business.

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with conditions in Egypt.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Great Britain?

Mr. VINCENT. Not toward Government monopolization, I shouldn't say. Well, Government monopoly, yes, of the industries.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have aided Egypt, have we not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have aided Great Britain?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it was unsound to invest public capital where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling. Is that still true?

Mr. VINCENT. You have just mentioned that we have invested money in Yugoslavia, so it is not still true. I don't think you can apply this paragraph—

Mr. SOURWINE. But it might be true, we still are making unsound investments?

I am asking whether you think it is still true, or whether you changed your mind about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Again I say that I am not speaking of political loans in this particular paragraph, and the whole tenor of things now is along the lines, more than it was then, of making loans.

We have had the Marshall plan—not loans but voting money. That was not in my mind in making this speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be possible that you were just speaking of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I was speaking generally about the Far East. But the application to China is very obvious from the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is not true that you, in this State Department memorandum, it was your idea since the Marshall mission had failed in China, that there was going to be no more aid?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And could that be the reason for making this speech, right about that time? Was it not that reason?

Mr. VINCENT. It was in line with that policy; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew at the time, or right after the speech had been made that it was widely interpreted in the press as directed at China, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything at that time to correct that misconception, if you thought it was a misconception?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified at length about Israel Epstein, have you not, and your lack of knowledge of him?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't testified at length. I don't know Israel Epstein, haven't read his book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he wrote a book called The Unfinished Revolution in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard that he did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have the manuscript of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a copy of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever seeing a copy of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether a copy of that book was sent to you by someone in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall their sending it to me, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything at all to assist in the preparation of that book?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any recollection of doing any assisting in that, not to my knowledge and belief.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call that book to General Marshall's attention or direct it to his attention?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say now that I am asking questions based on exhibit No. 116, page 464, par. 2, before this committee, put in the record on August 15.

Do you know whether General Marshall ever saw or read that book?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that he ever saw it or read it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see Owen Lattimore's review of the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing his review.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recall seeing a review of the book by Frederick Vanderbilt Field in The New Masses?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any other writing by Mr. Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read an IPR publication Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, I don't remember reading it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that that study had a supplement called "Labor in Nationalist China," by Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Friedman call that to your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified here fully with regard to your participation in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff before they left for the Far East in July of 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland in July of 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. That is when I took the oath of office; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated your appointment as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became a part of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information at Geneva in 1948?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that an investigation had been made by a State Department investigator, an investigation of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have asked you about that before, have I not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that there had been such an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Investigations are carried on at all times.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that you had never seen it, if there had been one and it was not sent to you, would not that surprise you a little?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it would, if I had any connection with it at the time. But I don't know when the investigation you are speaking of took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have here copies of, first, a letter addressed by the chairman of this committee to the Secretary of State under date of January 12, 1952, as follows. To save time, let me summarize this and then ask that both of these letters go into the record. I also have the reply of Mr. Humelsine under date of January 21.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received after you have summarized it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman asked for a report submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare of the State Department, an investigation of IPR, and the State Department reply indicates the existence of such an investigation, but says that, "The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty program, and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March 13, 1948."

(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 398 and 399" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 398

JANUARY 12, 1952.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am informed that in 1948 a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations was submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected with its New York City office.

In view of the fact that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee now has the Institute of Pacific Relations under study, the State Department findings should be of considerable importance. We therefore make a formal request for a copy of this report.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 399

JANUARY 21, 1952.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 12, 1952, to the Secretary in which you requested "a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations" which "was submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected with its New York City office."

The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty program and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March 13, 1948, a copy of which is attached.

In accordance with this directive, the Department must respectfully decline your request for a copy of the report and has referred your letter to the Office of the President.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

MR. SOURWINE. You did not know about that at all, Mr. Vincent?

MR. VINCENT. No; I did not know about it. I was in Switzerland, and I have no recollection of it having been brought to my attention.

MR. SOURWINE. You were not in Switzerland in January of 1952, at the time that this request was made?

MR. VINCENT. No; I was speaking—you said in 1948, and I told you I was in Switzerland in 1948.

MR. SOURWINE. Then I intended to ask if you knew about this request and the State Department refusal.

MR. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know why the State Department concludes that this report contains investigative material of a confidential nature?

MR. VINCENT. No; I do not.

MR. SOURWINE. This was an investigation of the IPR, by its terms; would not that necessarily imply that that investigation of IPR concerned Government personnel?

MR. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to read any implication to the letter at all. I think it speaks for itself.

MR. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the President's directive that they referred to there?

MR. VINCENT. The President's directive about loyalty files?

MR. SOURWINE. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. I haven't read it recently, but I know what it is.

MR. SOURWINE. It concerns loyalty files of Government employees and officials, does it not?

MR. VINCENT. By its name I would think it does; but, as I say, I can't testify to that.

MR. SOURWINE. This is in the record; is it not?

MR. MORRIS. Yes; that is in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the State Department was making an investigation?

MR. VINCENT. Of the IPR?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Mr. Clare?

MR. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, I don't know a Mr. Clare.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you think the State Department would investigate the IPR? Have you any reasons for knowing?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't any reason for knowing why they investigated the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a former trustee, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they consult you about making an investigation of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that would lead you to believe that if the State Department did make an investigation it should be kept secret because it would disclose questions of loyalty as to State Department employees?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you have discussed the notes that you prepared for the State Department on the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in those notes, or in any memorandum to the Department, refer to the fact that Mr. Wallace had sent a cable to the President from Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't recall that that is in the notes at all, because the notes were prepared purely on the basis of the conversation with Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any other memorandum to the Department refer to the Kunming cable?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge. You mean from China?

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would have referred to it after I got back to the Department, in some memorandum or other, probably, using it as a reference or background.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, then, you did write at least one memorandum about the Wallace trip other than the notes which are printed in the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That is not the way you put the question, sir. I wrote the memorandum of the conversations.

What I said was that I had no recollection of any other memorandum on the Kunming cable. But it is quite possible that the contents of the Kunming cable were referred to, or something in them in subsequent memoranda of other telegrams referring to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not mention them in your notes that are printed in the white paper, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you did not mention the Kunming cable in those notes?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out if you did subsequently write a memorandum to inform the Department of the fact that the Vice President had sent a cable to the President from Kunming.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any particular reason for wanting to keep the Department in the dark about that?

Mr. VINCENT. The Kunming cable had gone to the Department, sir, from Kunming. I am trying to get at what——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it go to the Department or to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was addressed to the President, but it certainly would have been distributed to the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been distributed to the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that you did not find it necessary to make any separate reference to it at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I assumed that it would go to the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, is your testimony that, aside from the notes which are in the white paper, you made no other memorandum at all about the trip with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have discussed here already, sir, I believe, a number of basic Communist documents, and you were asked if you had read any of them. Do you remember that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will not go over them individually. The list includes the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels; State and Revolution, by Lenin; Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder, by Lenin; Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin; Problems of Communism, by Stalin; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), authored by the Central Committee of the CPSU; the Program of the Communist Internationale and Its Constitution.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. You said you had seen none of them; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I had no recollection of reading any of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had not seen the G-2 report on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the one that the chairman showed me? I had no recollection of seeing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the American Bar Association brief on Communism-Marxism-Leninism?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a copy of it.

Have you ever recalled seeing it in that format or any other format?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge have I even seen it in this form.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was printed previous to that time as part of the proceedings of the American Bar Association, I believe, which would be a different format.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of the writings of Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall reading it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked those questions, Mr. Chairman, because they go to the question of Mr. Vincent's knowledge of Communist documents and, in that sense at least, to the question of his knowledge of Communist principles, aims, and objectives.

It was not intended either as an implication that this committee felt he should have read those documents, or demands to know why he did not study communism, but simply to ascertain the fact of what information he had, as background?

When were you transferred to Tangiers, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. The transfer came through, I think, in February, but I didn't go until June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why you were transferred to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No one expressed an opinion to me other than the—they expressed the opinion to me that Mr. Patterson was going to be assigned to Bern, and that I would have to leave.

Senator FERGUSON. You were named, were you not, as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, I was Minister to Switzerland.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but your appointment was sent up to the Senate.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1947, as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was never approved?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, it was approved, in 1947. I went to Switzerland as Minister, and was there for $3\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Senator FERGUSON. You were named to some other post? Or were to be named to some other post?

Mr. VINCENT. You are speaking of the statement that I was going to be named to Costa Rica as Ambassador?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Had you heard that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had been informed. I hadn't been consulted. I had been informed.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you named?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was not named.

Senator FERGUSON. Your name was never sent to the Senate on that one?

Mr. VINCENT. My name was never sent to the Senate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why you were sent to Tangiers instead of to some other post?

Senator FERGUSON. Or to Costa Rica?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. I don't recall that they have.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no explanation, then?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was a great deal of press statement.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am talking about the State Department or the Government. Did they ever tell you why you were not going to be sent to Costa Rica?

Mr. VINCENT. They simply told me they were not going to send my name up for confirmation in the Senate, and I would go to Tangiers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say why?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not say why, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is "they"?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chief of Personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would that be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not the Chief of Personnel. It would be Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any correspondence on that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any cablegrams on it?

Mr. VINCENT. No. There was a telephone conversation with Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the telephone conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Humelsine simply telephoned me that I was going to be sent to Tangiers, asked me if I was prepared to go to Tangiers, and I said I was. He said that the Costa Rica appointment was off.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all he told you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all he told me.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not ask him why it was off? The ambassadorship was a much more important position than going to Tangiers, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was a more important job from the matter of title. But the Moroccan job is just as important.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a difference even in the salary, is there not?

Mr. VINCENT. There was no difference in salary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having achieved the rank of Minister, you retain that, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. In Tangiers.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are a career foreign officer, Foreign Service officer, are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. And having obtained the rank of Minister, you retain it as Minister?

Mr. VINCENT. I remain a career Minister.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your pay?

Mr. VINCENT. At the present, \$15,000.

Senator FERGUSON. What would have been the pay as Ambassador?

Mr. VINCENT. \$15,000.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you receive from Secretary Acheson a letter with regard to your appointment to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Or anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I received my orders to go to Tangiers, formal orders. I never received a letter from anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get any communication from Mr. Acheson with regard to that matter, either before or after the fact?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return to the United States from Tangiers on October 16, 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think. But we will not quibble over that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you interviewed by reporters on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; the reporters came to the boat.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked to comment on reports that you were returning to testify before this subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you then state that you were not in any defensive position?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you then state to reporters that you would be willing to testify if you were asked to do so, but that you had not been invited and that you would not volunteer?

Mr. VINSON. That I don't recall, whether I said all that to them or not. The general idea was that I had already written to—let me finish this—I had already written, as you know, to Senator McCarran expressing my willingness to testify.

Whether I, at that time, said to these people that I was not going to ask to testify or not, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had already offered to testify?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already offered; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold here a newspaper story, an AP dispatch, and the particular clipping is from the Washington Star, and it is dated New York, October 16, AP. The headline is: "John Carter Vincent Back in United States—'not on defensive'."

John Carter Vincent, United States Minister to Tangiers, Morocco, charged with pro-Communist leanings by Senator McCarthy, returned yesterday on the liner *Constitution* and said he was "not in any defensive position." After conferring with a State Department official, he was asked about reports he was returning to testify at congressional hearings into internal security. "I am coming back strictly for a vacation after 4 years aboard," Mr. Vincent replied. Pressed further for comments on accusations that he was a Communist sympathizer, Mr. Vincent said, "I am not in any defensive position. I certainly would be willing to testify any time they wanted me to. I have not been asked yet, and I am not volunteering."

Do you think that is an accurate report, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it is an accurate report of what I had in mind at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not a fact?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that was a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not write to the Senator before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I wrote to the Senator on September 7, expressing a willingness to appear before the committee. I had not at that time requested a hearing before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You say the willingness was different than a request. Did you ever request?

Mr. VINCENT. I made the request to the committee on November 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did send a letter to Senator McCarran under date of November 9, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that that letter, Mr. Chairman, be inserted in record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be inserted.

(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 400" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 400

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 9, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: You may recall that I wrote to you on September 7, 1951, from my post in Tangier in regard to Louis F. Budenz' testimony before your subcommittee on August 23, 1951. Budenz swore that from "official reports" he had received I was a member of the Communist Party. I assured you that I was not and never had been a Communist, that I had never worked in the interests of other than our own Government and people, and that, if you had any doubts on that score, I desired to appear before your committee. I have received no reply to my letter.

On October 5, 1951, Budenz, still under oath, repeated his allegations before the subcommittee.

I am now home on vacation and have had an opportunity to read the Budenz testimony. I am shocked at the devious manner in which he attempted to support his false testimony.

Convinced that establishment of the facts is essential in a democracy, I request and shall welcome an opportunity to meet with your subcommittee to testify publicly under oath.

I must return to my post and official duties after Christmas and therefore would appreciate your arranging a public hearing before members of the subcommittee some time this month or early in December.

Believe me, this is not simply a matter of self-defense. The issue far transcends personal considerations. We cannot defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies.

Sincerely yours,

[s] John Carter Vincent
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. That letter has been released by the State Department, has it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It has.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Senator McCarran reply under date of November 16, 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. He did. I assume you have the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the text of his reply?

Mr. VINCENT. I have it here. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this be inserted in the record at this point.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 401" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 401

NOVEMBER 16, 1951.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
*Office of the Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. VINCENT: Your letter of November 9 has been forwarded to me here in the hospital.

I would be happy to hear your testimony, but due to the fact that Congress is not in session it may be difficult to do it at the time you desire. I have, however, advised my staff of your request, and please be assured that if it is at all possible your request will be carried out.

Sincerely,

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you if that letter was mailed to Senator McCarran, the letter of the ninth, your letter of the ninth?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before, and it is still my recollection, that it was brought down here to the office of Senator McCarran by hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you at that time know that Senator McCarran was ill in a hospital in Reno, Nev.?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any help in drafting that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. In drafting this letter of the ninth?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of November 9.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had some help in drafting the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who helped you in drafting?

Mr. VINCENT. I made most of the draft myself, but the letter was drafted in the Legal Division of the State Department, there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who originally suggested drafting that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom did you discuss the letter before it was sent, other than the Legal Division of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. With my own wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. With anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disclose to the Legal Division of the State Department that you knew Senator McCarran was in a hospital in Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have to, sir. They knew it themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. If they knew it and you knew it, why did you send the letter down here instead of sending it out to Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. As I testified before, I thought that this was the best place to get it, quickly, to his office, where he had a staff here and they would see that it was transmitted to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the release of this letter by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. The State Department released it with my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you suggest the release of it, or did the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I suggested the release of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that release was decided upon?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have been decided on at least as early as the 17th, must it not?

Mr. VINCENT. When was it released?

Mr. SOURWINE. The release was given to the press on the 17th for release on the 19th, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it was. That would be a Saturday, I think it was. It was decided then——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, to get the break in the Monday morning papers. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had had it delivered here on the 9th, is that right? The date that it was written?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had delivered it to Senator McCarran's office here on the 9th, a letter, knowing that he was in a hospital in Reno, and on the 17th you were consenting to a release of a protest to the Senator's failure to answer your letter. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't call it a protest. It was my request to appear before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that the State Department release was not a protest against the failure to answer the letter? That is, the State Department release under the date of the 19th, which was handed to the press on the 17th? Was that not a protest against Senator McCarran's failure to answer your letter of the 9th?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have qualified it as a protest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the State Department release? (Pause.) Did you see that State Department release?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw the State Department release; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not that release state, in effect, that your letter was being released because of the Senator's failure to answer it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten. I didn't draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw it, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You assented to whatever was in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I assented.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was played up in the newspapers as a protest of the Senator's failure to answer your demand to be heard, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not intend that it should be so played up?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not intend for it to be so played up. But it was played up that way.

What I wanted primarily to do was to put on notice the fact that I wanted to appear before the committee. Many people had asked me, "Why don't you appear before the committee; why don't you appear before the committee?" and I wanted it known that I had made a request. I don't like for it to be interpreted that it was a protest over the failure to release that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not think it was so intended by either you or the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not intended as a protest against his failure to answer. It was intended by me to put on notice, through the papers, that I had made a request to appear before the committee.

Now, it could be interpreted that way, as you have, too, but I am speaking quite frankly here that my idea was to respond to what was a general desire that I let it be known that I wanted to come before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you expect Senator McCarran to have an answer in your hands within a week after you delivered the letter here to his office, when he was in a hospital in Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you before that I thought probably the staff here in his office could give an answer by telephoning him, and giving an answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. That the staff would answer that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I suppose you thought that the staff would sign his name to it, too?

Mr. VINCENT. No, that the staff would notify me that I could appear and set a time. But I thought that 10 days was a sufficient time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn of Mr. Budenz' testimony before this subcommittee on August 23?

Mr. VINCENT. I learned of it through the press in Tangiers, I should say, along the first week in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when did you learn of his testimony on August 5?

Mr. VINCENT. Pardon me. What was the first?

Mr. SOURWINE. He testified here twice, August 5 and August 23. Did you learn about his testimony on both occasions at the same time, or did you learn about it at two different times as it occurred, shortly after it occurred?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know of the two, I don't know but two times that Budenz appeared before the committee, to my recollection, August 23 and again October 5.

But you, I think, identified them both as August, August 5 and August 23.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, if I am in error, when did you first learn about his testimony on October 5?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. When I got back to the States, in November; November 15, I was told.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not learn about it until you got back to the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had no knowledge, as I recall it, because I had taken the boat on the 8th or 9th, and I did not know of the October 5, so far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. Had any testimony been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. In Tangiers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never received any testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had never seen any of the records of this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Or reports of the testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I think the first time was reports in the press.

Senator FERGUSON. Just press reports?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I had nothing from the State Department, unless there was something in the State Department bulletin at one time. But my recollection is that I saw it in the press.

Senator FERGUSON. When was his arrival?

Mr. SOURWINE. His arrival here was October 15.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, from October 15 to November 9, you did not make any request?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear that Senator McCarran, the chairman of this committee, went to the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, if you would identify the date, I would say I heard of it, reading in the papers, the day it was announced. I have forgotten the date that he went to the hospital.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before you wrote the letter of the 9th did he go to the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it had been very few days before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now that the fact that he went to the hospital had anything to do with your writing of that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing whatsoever, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing whatsoever?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not considered?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not considered. It was already decided to send the letter before we knew that he had gone to the hospital. I had.

Senator FERGUSON. You had. Had the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department did not make the decision. I made the decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not talk to them about it until after you knew he had gone to the hospital, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. If you would identify when he went to the hospital—I have forgotten.

Mr. SOURWINE. From your own memory.

Mr. VINCENT. That I did not talk with them until after he had gone to the hospital? Yes, I talked with them before he went to the hospital.

Mr. SOURWINE. About the matter of the release of this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Also about the release of the letter, and the drafting of the letter. I can assure you that the release of the letter and the drafting of the letter did not have anything to do with Senator McCarran going to the hospital.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it have anything to do with the fact that the Senate was out of session, even though at the original time when the Senate was in session you said you were not requesting a hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. It had nothing to do with the fact that the Senate was out of session.

Senao^r FERGUSON. Whom did you discuss it with in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. People in the Legal Division, but discussed it not as to the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Who? I want the name.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. McJennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else?

Mr. VINCENT. A young man named Mr. Ousley. They are the only two that I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they in the Legal Division of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. They are attached to it; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are not in the Public Relations Division?

Mr. VINCENT. They are attached to it. I don't know what their actual relationship comes from, but that is where I met Mr. McJennett and that is where I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the Legal Division?

Mr. VINCENT. That is where I had seen him, the first I met him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not an unusual thing, to put Public Relations people under the title of lawyers in the Legal Division, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not unusual?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it is unusual or usual, sir. I only know that I met Mr. McJennett in Mr. Fish's office.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought he was in the Legal Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I thought he was in the Legal Department. I, myself, have since heard that he draws his salary from some place else.

Senator FERGUSON. They usually do not put them under Public Relations, and it is easier to get them through the appropriation if they are in the Legal Division.

Mr. VINCENT. I also notified Mr Humelsine in the State Department I had intentions of doing this, and I also notified Mr. Webb.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Humelsine and Webb say?

Mr. VINCENT. I asked them if they had any objection to me, as a Foreign Service officer, taking this action. I wanted to clear with them first, and they said "No objection."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you show them the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether they actually saw the letter, I have no recollection of showing it to Mr. Webb. I don't know whether it went to Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that the chairman of the committee was ill in the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir, I think they knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you talk about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; we didn't talk about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were just assuming, then, that they knew it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have assumed that they read it in the papers, sir.

And I would like to make my testimony again as clear as I can, that the Senator being in the hospital had nothing to do with my decision to request an appearance before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Carl Humelsine know about this release before it went out? Did he see it before it was released?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that Carl Humelsine saw it before it was released. I don't know whether he knew it was going to be released.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive those two letters for the record.

(The letters referred to appear on pp. 2273 and 2274.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a man can be an American Communist without being a traitor to the Government of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person who is an employee of the United States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor?

Mr. VINCENT. He cannot be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person who is an official of the United States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he cannot be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it then your belief and contention that to become or remain a Communist while an employee or an official of the Government of the United States is a traitorous act?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And by "traitorous act," you mean treason?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, I am not a legal person so I don't know what the charges would be on treason. But in a general sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. To you it means a traitorous act?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I think that this letter from Mr. Vincent to Senator McCarran should also be put into record; and it should be read, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. It is November 19, 1951?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 401A

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have been informed that you interpreted my action in making public the letter I addressed to you on November 9 as being in some way critical of the subcommittee. I regret that you had that impression.

As you know, Budenz has publicly and falsely called me a Communist in testimony before your committee. In my position as an official of the American Government his charge is tantamount to saying that I am a traitor. This, you will agree, is a very serious matter, not simply for me, for my country and my friends. Under such circumstances, I believe you will understand my motive

in making known that I am ready and anxious to appear publicly before your committee to refute under oath the Budenz allegations.

I trust you are recuperating from your illness and will soon be in good health.
Sincerely yours,

JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. Vincent, before we close, and I have no more prepared questions for you, I will say to you that I would like to give you an opportunity to correct any false impressions that you think may have been created, if you recall any.

Mr. VINCENT. Over the length of the whole——

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; and I don't mean that I am trying to put you on the spot to remember all of the testimony. It is just if there is anything that rankles in your mind, I want to give you an opportunity.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't be too sure here that I have used the same phraseology in answering in the executive hearing and down here.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that that ought to be put in the record. You have no objection, have you, that the transcript of your executive session become part of the public record?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no objection, sir, but I am pointing out at this time that I can not say that in executive hearings of last week, which lasted 3 days, that I have answered exactly the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we ought to make that part of the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been recommended by the staff and assented to by Mr. Vincent and his counsel. But the committee has to meet and act on it.

I believe it will take a majority of the committee to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will recommend to the committee that it be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you realize, do you not, that your testimony has, in some respects, contradicted the testimony of other witnesses, just as it has, in some respects, corroborated it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Wallace; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Alsop; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Budenz; that you have, in some respects, affirmed what Mr. Budenz says.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall affirming anything that Mr. Budenz says.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize that you have established, by your testimony here, that you did have a very substantial influence over Mr. Wallace and over the conduct of his mission?

Mr. VINCENT. True, that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. And which was one of the points that Mr. Budenz made, and something that Mr. Wallace appeared to seek to negative.

Mr. VINCENT. Did he? I have forgotten that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply mention those things.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I know. You are not trying to say that the influence I had over Mr. Wallace was of the nature of Mr. Budenz' statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply calling to your attention possible fields in which you might feel that further clarification was needed so that if you think you want that opportunity you can do it now.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't think of any particular.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter——

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had a full hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. I have had a full hearing, sir.

I think I have had a very full hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that it was a fair hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; in all intents and purposes a fair hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. And there is nothing that you know now that you would want to add?

I will give you this opportunity.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I have nothing to add, sir, except that my counsel here failed to get these documents into the record. When we were speaking of that FEC and Japanese policy.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive them.

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 402" and is as follows:)

COMMENT OF FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY DECISION*

13 JULY 1947.

The policy decision just adopted by the Far Eastern Commission dealing with the postsurrender treatment of the Japanese problem is one of the great state papers of modern history. It establishes definitely the type, the extent, and the scope of Japan's future, and the position the Japanese nation shall occupy in relation to the world at large. It not only ratifies the course which thus far has been taken, but signifies a complete unity of future purpose among the eleven nations and peoples concerned. It at once sweeps aside fears currently felt that the great nations of the world are unable to reconcile divergent views on such vital issues in the international sphere and demonstrates with decisive clarity that from an atmosphere of conflicting interests and opposing predilections may emerge common agreement founded upon experience and shaped to a realistic appreciation of world conditions and the basic requirements of a progressive civilization. For in this agreement have been firmly resisted two insidious concepts, poles apart but equally sinister—the one which would seek harsh and unjust treatment of our fallen foe, and the other which would seek partially to preserve and perpetuate institutions and leadership which bear responsibility of war guilt. The first would have produced a mendicant country dependent upon charity to live, while the second would have encouraged the regrowth of antidemocratic forces with the consequent revival of international distrust and suspicion. It confirms by the considered action of the representatives of the Allied Nations a sound moderate course based upon a concept embodying firmness but justice, disarmament but rehabilitation, lower standards but the opportunity for life—a concept shunning both the extreme right and the extreme left and providing for the great middle way of the ordinary man.

The basic and easily the most essential requirement of the policy—disarmament and demilitarization—has already been fully accomplished. Even were there no external controls, Japan could not rearm for modern war within a century. This primary objective has led all aims in the occupation of Japan. Japanese military forces have been disarmed, demobilized, and absorbed in peaceful pursuits, and Japan's remaining war potential has either been destroyed or completely neutralized. The political and economic phases of the disarmament program have been effected through the dissolution of the alliance long existing between government and industry, the breaking up of monopolistic combines and practices which have suppressed private enterprise, and the raising of the individual to a position of dignity and hope, with provision made for a new leadership untainted by war responsibility and both mentally and spiritually equipped to further democratic growth. The transition stage of destroying those evil influences which misguided Japan's past has been virtually completed and the course has been set upon which Japan is now embarked toward a peaceful and constructive future. We thus see here the transformation of a state which once proclaimed its mastery of war into one which from material impoverishment and spiritual dedication now seeks its destiny as a servant of peace.

*The policy decision, adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947, as FEC 014/9 and transmitted to SCAP through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS Directive Serial No. 82, is a restatement of the *United States Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan* of August 29, 1945 (Appendix A: 11).

This action representing the agreement of the Allied Nations engaged in the Pacific war not only confirms the postsurrender policies previously evolved and largely implemented, but it establishes at the same time a norm for the restoration of peace. Resting squarely upon those same principles and ideals written at Potsdam, reaffirmed on the *Missouri*, and subsequently translated into action in the occupation of Japan, this accord provides the entire framework for a treaty of peace—a treaty which, if it is to be faithfully honored, should constitute within itself a charter of human liberty to which the Japanese citizen will look for guidance and protection, rather than shun with the revulsion of shame—a treaty which, without yielding firmness in its essential mandates, should avoid punitive, arbitrary, and unrealistic provisions, and by its terms set the pattern for future peace throughout the world. It should in full reality mark the restoration of a peace based upon justice, goodwill, and human advancement. Such a treaty may now be approached with the assurance of complete understanding in principle and full unity of purpose evolving its detail.

Viewing this international accord in the light of the great strides made by the Japanese themselves toward the achievement of those very objectives which it prescribes, without confusion, without disorder, and with steady progress toward economic recovery despite the destruction of war and defeat, it becomes unmistakably clear that here in Japan we shall win the peace.

Appendix F : 39

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

1 JANUARY 1948.

TO THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN :

The design of a remodeled and reconstructed Japan is nearing completion. The pattern has been etched, the path has been laid. The development now lies largely in your own hands. Success or failure will depend upon your ability to practice the simple yet transcendental principles which modern civilization demands.

No occupation, however benevolent and beneficial, can substitute for the spiritual uplift which alone can lead to an invincible determination to build a future based upon the immutable concepts of human freedom—a social status under which full consciousness of individual responsibility must ever remain the keystone to the arch of success and progress.

Individual hardship is inevitable. Your economy, due to the disastrous war decisions of your past leaders, is now impoverished. This can only be relieved by employment to the maximum of the energies of your people, by wisdom and determination on the part of your leaders, and by the restoration of peace with its removal of existing limitations upon international trade. So long as your needs continue to be greater than your productive capacity, controls upon your internal economy will be essential lest the weaker segments of your population perish. Such controls must, however, only be temporary and subject to ultimate removal in favor of free enterprise.

Economically, Allied policy has required the breaking up of that system which in the past has permitted the major part of the commerce and industry and natural resources of our country to be owned and controlled by a minority of feudal families and exploited for their exclusive benefit. The world has probably never seen a counterpart to so abnormal an economic system. It permitted exploitation of the many for the sole benefit of the few. The integration of these few with government was complete and their influence upon governmental policies inordinate, and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruction. It was indeed so complete a monopoly as to be in effect a form of socialism in private hands. Only through its dissolution could the way be cleared for the emergence of an economy conducive to the well-being of all the people—an economy embodying the principle of private capitalism, based upon free competitive enterprise—an economy which long experience has demonstrated alone provides the maximum incentive to the development of those fundamental requirements to human progress—individual initiative and individual energy.

Politically, progress toward reform has been equally encouraging. Your new constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing evidence of a growing understanding of the great human ideals which it is designed to serve. Implementing laws have reoriented the entire fabric of your way of life to give emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and opportunity which the individual now holds and enjoys. Government has ceased to be totalitarian and

has become representative, with its functions decentralized to permit and encourage a maximum of individual thought and initiative and judgment in the management of community affairs. Control of every political segment has been shifted to permit the selection of a new leadership of your free choice capable of advancing democratic growth.

Socially, many of the shackles which traditionally have restricted individual thought and action have been severed and action has been taken to render the exercise of police power a matter for individual and community, rather than national, responsibility. The judicial system has been freed from executive and legislative controls, and laws have been enacted to temper inordinate bureaucratic power by requiring all public officials to justify the trust of public responsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people.

Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and go where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land. This means that you can select your own work, and when you have completed it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment, and on your day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can criticize and express your views on the actions of your Government. This is liberty. Yet inherent in it are its obligations to act with decorum and self-restraint, and become acutely conscious of the responsibilities which a free society imposes upon its every segment.

The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and go on—if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither and go under. The line of demarcation is a simple one, understandable to all men—the line between those things which are right and those things which are wrong. The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and dangers, but it is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you will not falter.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Appendix F: 42

REPLY TO CRITICISM OF ECONOMIC POLICY

1 FEBRUARY 1948.

(The following was sent as a letter to Mr. J. H. Gipson, The Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, under date of 24 January, 1948, in reply to Mr. Gipson's letter of 27 December 1947, relative to a December release from the Committee for Constitutional Government in New York stating that the Occupation is fostering socialization of Japanese industries, etc. Permission was later requested on 31 January 1948, by Mr. Gipson for release to the press and approval was radioed on 1 February 1948.)

Thank you so much for sending me the extract of comments on Japan from the December release of the Committee for Constitutional Government in New York, with your letter of December 27 which has just reached me.

I have never heard of this Committee and know nothing about its purpose or composition, but its estimate of the situation here is amazing in its complete inaccuracy. The existing Government of Japan is fully representative of the popular will, elected under thoroughly democratic processes in accordance with the provisions of a constitution patterned in essential respects after our own. The only "private enterprise" which has heretofore existed in Japan was neither free nor competitive—two fundamental qualifications of American economic philosophy which it is my firm purpose to see entrenched in the Japanese system before the occupation withdraws.

Japan has long had a system of "private enterprise"—but one which permitted ten family groups comprising only fifty-six Japanese families to control, directly or indirectly, every phase of commerce and industry; all media of transportation, both internal and external; all domestic raw materials; and all coal and other power resources. The "private enterprise" was thus limited to a few of feudal lineage, who exploited into virtual slavery the remainder of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life to others only through sufferance, and in search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest. The record is thus one of economic oppression and exploitation at home, aggression and spoliation abroad. As early as 1930, these Japanese industrial combines veered in the direction of armaments production and geared the country for war. This portrays the private enterprise to which the Committee refers.

As you will see, the very start toward free enterprise is dependent upon tearing down so abnormal a structure. For so long as it remains undisturbed, it is a standing bid for State ownership, and a fruitful target for Communist propaganda and collectivist purposes. The Japanese people, with the exception of those who covet the opportunity to exploit this situation for ideological purposes, and those who have been entrenched within its orbit of political and economic power, are overwhelmingly in favor of destroying such a system, and unless its destruction is effected peacefully and in due order under the occupation, there is little doubt but that if necessary the way would be found even through the violence of revolutionary means once the occupation is withdrawn.

In all of these measures in the reformation of Japan, it must be clearly understood that we are here dealing with fundamental realities. It does not suffice merely to issue an edict that there shall be no socialism, or that there shall be no advance of communism or other ideologies opposed to the one in which we ourselves firmly believe. For the strength of such an edict would find its measure in the power of Allied bayonets alone. The need has called for positive action which, while we yet have time, will superimpose here upon a decadent and discredited past a system of government and economics which, because their very processes generate a more healthy and virile society, will even after our controls are lifted stand as an invincible buttress against the inroads of any conflicting philosophies of life.

In the accomplishment of this purpose, two difficult barriers have stood out to bar any progress. The one has dealt with the feudalistic system of land ownership under which practically all agricultural land has been owned by a relatively few persons of feudal heritage, with all agrarian workers exploited under conditions of practical serfdom. This archaic system of land ownership is being torn down in order that through sale in small lots those who long have worked the soil may have the opportunity substantially to profit from their toil. Thereby there will emerge in Japan, from a field theretofore fertile to the spread of communism, a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalistic economy of which it will then form an integral part. Needless to say, the communists and the land barons alone oppose this reform.

The other barrier is the one which I have heretofore described, popularly known as the *Zaibatsu*, and in neither case, even despite war enrichment at the sacrifice of American blood, has there been any confiscation of property, as the principle of just compensation throughout has governed, with untrammelled recourse left to judicial appeal in the Japanese courts. The effect of its dissolution will be to transform a small number of monopolistic combines into numerous competing units and to bring about widespread ownership of the instruments of production and trade, thereby erecting a solid bulwark against the spread of ideologies and systems destructive of both free enterprise and political freedom under democratic capitalism. Otherwise, if business in Japan were allowed to continue with its concentration of economic power, it would lead to concentration of power in government, and from there the transition to socialism of one form or another would be natural, easy of accomplishment, and inevitable.

The statement of the Committee that "prominent leaders including many outstanding friends of freedom have been ousted from the control of industry and their places have been taken by incompetent visionaries" finds no basis in fact. Apart from action taken with respect to the *Zaibatsu*, wherein the family members and their appointees are removed from positions of influence in the identical enterprises they have heretofore controlled, there have been in all less than two hundred and fifty persons removed under Allied policy from positions in the economy under the purge program. The removal of these persons was due to their close identity with the causes which led to war. In the implementation of this phase of the occupation program, I have in the exercise of the normal discretion accorded a field commander, pursued far less drastic measures than were called for by my policy directives from the Allied Powers, shifting the emphasis from punitive action to action merely designed to provide for a more healthy leadership and one unattainted by war responsibility. Even in those cases of persons removed from positions of power, involving the most aggravated circumstances, I have, against strong Allied opposition, permitted no property confiscation, no deprivation of liberty, no forfeiture of political rights, and where restriction upon future economic activity is involved embracing but a relatively few persons, I have insured that policy-makers rather than technicians were affected, and have left undisturbed a broad field of economic activity in which even they might continue to engage without the slightest

restriction. If within this small group of persons affected, there are any outstanding "friends of freedom," they are unknown to this headquarters, and all have had the opportunity, through exhaustively fair hearings before screening committees of the Japanese Government and on appeal, to prove any such contentions. The statement that the places of those few removed have been taken by incompetent visionaries is absurd. Such places have in all cases been filled by junior executives of long service in the enterprises concerned, who have moved up into opportunities which otherwise would not have been available to them.

The Committee's statement that "the government has been flooded with a horde of bureaucrats," not unlike the situation in other capitals, is probably true. Even so, on the national level of government there are less than 350,000 persons so employed, which is not disproportionate to Japan's population of seventy-eight million, should standards elsewhere be accepted as a general guide. It is not the quantity, however, which has given me most concern, but the quality and the inordinate power which the bureaucracy traditionally has arrogated to itself in Japan. To cope with this evil, we are now in the process of assisting the Japanese Government toward a civil service reform. The pattern already has been set through wise and farsighted legislation, the implementation of which will be completed within the present year. The basic purpose and effect of this reform is to require that all public officials justify the trust of public responsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people.

The general statement that the money is unsound, that foreign trade is restricted by a maze of regulations, and that production is paralyzed is wholly misrepresentative in its failure to recognize the following fundamental and controlling facts, i. e., (1) that Japan is a totally defeated nation, still technically at war with the Allied Powers and under the controls of military occupation; (2) that a primary objective of war and cause of defeat was the destruction of Japan's industrial capacity to wage war and ability to transport its sinews on the high seas; (3) that Japan has always been dependent for the bulk of the raw materials essential to sustain the industrial capacity upon procurement from abroad, now denied by the economic blockade inherent in the present situation; (4) that Japan's shipping afloat has been destroyed, and Manchuria, Formosa and Korea, former sources of direct procurement of essential raw materials, have been taken away; and (5) that Japanese money, not unlike that even of all of the victor nations, is suffering the severe strain of war-caused economic dislocations.

Finally, the statement that "the net result has been so to paralyze production as to leave the Japanese people on the verge of starvation, and that the Americans are now called upon to furnish hundreds of millions of dollars to relieve the hunger for which our representatives are primarily responsible" is completely lacking in realism and false as an indictment. The wonder is that despite the lack of needed raw materials, widespread destruction of plant facilities, and seizures under Allied policy for reparation payments, the industrial output has risen from complete paralysis at war's end to over 40 percent of prewar levels. It must be understood that the Japanese people before the war suffered a deficiency in indigenous food resources which compelled the importation from abroad of approximately 20 percent of food requirements. Add to this natural deficiency the fact that over six million Japanese citizens have been repatriated to the home islands, with none permitted to leave during the occupation, while Manchuria, Korea and Formosa have been removed as sources of food supply, and you can understand the actualities which exist. During the occupation we have contributed food partially to cover this deficiency, but such contribution has not even approximated the importations required during the prewar era when industry was at full capacity and there was a smaller population to feed. Such action has not been entirely altruistic as under Japan's present status the Japanese people are in all practical aspects our prisoners of war, and as such entitled to our protection under the international conventions which we ourselves historically have never failed to respect. Even so, the Japanese people have made diligent effort themselves to solve this deficiency problem, and once a healthier economic structure has been erected, there will be seen, through the release of long-suppressed energies of a people enslaved, the building of that higher productivity which alone comes from a people who are free.

The foregoing will give you the facts as they exist for comparison with those stated by the Committee, which you have been good enough to quote. The prescription for Japan's economic ills is as crystal clear as it is simple—a structural redesign to make possible the emergence of an economic system based not solely

upon the formula of "private enterprise" to which the Committee alludes, but to free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known, and which alone will maximize the energies of the people. Even more, the conclusion of a treaty of peace which would permit the reopening of the channels of trade and commerce to make available essential raw materials to feed the production lines, world markets to absorb the finished products, and food to sustain working energy.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a notebook. I wonder whether or not we could not receive that notebook. You have been reading from it as part of this record.

Mr. VINCENT. That notebook, sir, contains scratched out places and everything else. I would rather keep it to myself, because I have taken practically everything there is out of it. I would prefer to keep it to myself, as my own notes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been reading from it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you do not want the notebook made part of the record?

Mr. VINCENT. I have made all of it that I want to as part of the record, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you let the committee have the notebook for study, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. If I do not need it, I have no objection. But I would rather not have it in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman, I think, was asking for it not to be made as part of the record, but asking for it just as the committee asks for certain other papers to be examined.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel can look at the notebook and may decide on more questioning, if he does.

We will now recess. Is there any particular time to reconvene?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Tuesday at 10 o'clock is the date, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. We will now recess until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952, the hearing was recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 5, 1952, at 10 a. m.)

APPENDIX I

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL: The following correspondence from the President to the Vice President and attachments thereto are for automatic release at 7:00 p. m., E. D. T., Sunday, September 23, 1951. No portion, synopsis, or intimation may be published or broadcast before that time.

PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION OR ANNOUNCEMENT

JOSEPH SHORT,
Secretary to the President.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1951.

The Honorable the VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with certain documents, which I recently received from Mr. Henry A. Wallace.

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944, and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its committees. I am there-

fore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you deem appropriate.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

FARVUE, SOUTH SALEM, NEW YORK, *September 19, 1951.*

Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN,

President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the last three weeks there has been considerable newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition you care to make of it the complete file of my reports to President Roosevelt on my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the United States.

The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part of various individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to China but China, where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were contained in two related documents:

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China, on June 26, 1944, but which, because of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first part being a quick résumé of the political situation in China and of my talks in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and the second part, a résumé of the military situation, its implications and requirements.

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944.

These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recommendations of mine resulting from the trip. Mr. Vincent, of course, transmitted to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Department White Paper.

There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Lattimore, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or the formal report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political advice any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of a common interest such as the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes with the settled peasantry.

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi. In Kuoming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presentation and in response to Chinag Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I

decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted, and concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was disturbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections. Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28.

On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican places on the Export-Import Bank Board.

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most important contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that *China be separated* from the command of General Stilwell, that General Wedemeyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China, and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of "*Personal representative*" of the President of Chungking. The name and record of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recommendations was the opposite of pro-Communist.

Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared the terrible enfeeblement resulting from the disasters, the chances are good the Generalissimo would have been ruling China today.

The political section of Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the Japs," and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China, but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war." Chiang Kai-shek for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of Chiang-Kai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand," I was, of course, warning against the possibility of a Communist political triumph in China.

The July 10 report does not recommend any political coalition between the government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese communists. It was written, however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all positions of political, military, and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely driven from power that Dr. T. V. Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had been dismissed from all command some months before. These factors are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant" that

"T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the Generalissimo) except as interpreter," while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July 10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead President Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the "progressive banking and commercial leaders," the "large group of western trained men," and the "considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I urged President Roosevelt to help the Generalissimo's government to help itself, by bringing back to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their own feet, were somewhere more independent of the Generalissimo than the extreme pro-Asia groups. Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roosevelt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist government, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity," and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administration. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short, my proposed means of avoiding the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control and Dr. Soong and General Chen Chang were brought back to power by the Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to President Roosevelt.

Such were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in 1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kuning-New Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roosevelt of July 10 as presented by me to him.

Wishing you health and strength in shouldering the tremendous burdens ahead, Mrs. Wallace joins me in asking you to convey to Mrs. Truman and Margaret our best regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

H. A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

SUMMARY REPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S VISIT IN CHINA

Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province. The Governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent (90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension between Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang.

There seems little reason to doubt that the difficulties in the early spring on the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle Kazak nomads who fled into Outer Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer Mongolia stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for Chinese bombings in Outer Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding the situation now.

Soviet officials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their difficulties in Sinkiang but our Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willing or unwittingly. Sinkiang is an area which will bear close watching.

Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for 2 hours at the large 20th Bomber Command (B-29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese.

Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were: (1) Adverse military situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo; (2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and requested our good offices in arranging for conference); (3) Chinese Government-Communist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced against the Communists that there seems little prospect of satisfactory or enduring settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in Chungking; (4) Dispatch of the United States Army Intelligence Group to north China, including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much indication of personal interest.

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something "dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that is was "five minutes to midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half year.)

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated discouragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership in China.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack of popular support for government; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace to speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China. Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for leadership but the fact that he is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential front for liberals.

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under whom he thought a liberal coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent but not a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself into a race against time: that new hope and help before the end of the year might be effective in holding things together.

Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist. General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-communist, is influential as a political rather than a military general. Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives which he is endeavoring to bring under his control to prevent their becoming a liberalizing social influence.

Conversations with provincial government officials were also without much significance. As an indication of political trends, there were unconfirmed reports that the provincial officials in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces were planning a coalition to meet the situation in the event of disintegration of central government control. In Szechuan province the Governor, Chang Chun, is a strong and loyal friend of President Chiang. The loyalty of military factions, however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the Governor, Ku Cheng-lun, is a mild appearing reactionary who, during his days as Police Commissioner in Nanking, earned the title of "bloody Ku."

Developments subsequent to conversations with General Chennault and Vincent in Kunming and Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with regard to the military situation in east China. There was almost uniform agreement among our military officers that unification of the American military effort in China, and better coordination of our effort with that of the Chinese, was absolutely essential. It was also the general belief that, the Japanese having during recent months made China an active theatre of war, it was highly advisable to take more aggressive air action against such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton, Nanking and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of Chinese life at those places was recognized as an important consideration. It was the consensus that Chinese troops, when well fed, well equipped, and well led, can be effectively used. A number of Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially good leaders. Among them were Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi.

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of the capable Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war.

Specific conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation in China were incorporated in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 28 (copies attached).

We should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a nonfighting people, have resisted the Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship and uninspiring leadership have induced something akin to physical and spiritual anemia. There is widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang government. But there is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence in victory.

Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts; and neither of which he can control by military commands. He hoped that aid from foreign allies would pull him out of the hole into which an unenlightened administration (supported by landlords, warlords and bankers) has sunk him and China.

Chiang is thorough "eastern" in thought and outlook. He is surrounded by a group of party stalwarts who are similar in character. He has also, reluctantly, placed confidence in westernized Chinese advisers (his wife and T. V. Soong are outstanding examples) with regard to foreign relations. Now he feels that foreign allies have failed him and seeks in that and the "communist menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. His hatred of Chinese communists and distrust of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. The failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn away from his uncongenial "western" advisers and draw closer to the group of "eastern" advisers for whom he has a natural affinity and for whom he has been for years more a focal point and activating agent of policy than an actual leader.

At this time, there seems to be no alternative to support of Chiang. There is no Chinese leader or group now apparent of sufficient strength to take over the government. We can, however, while supporting Chiang, influence him in every possible way to adopt policies with the guidance of progressive Chinese which will inspire popular support and instill new vitality into China's war effort. At the same time, our attitude should be flexible enough to permit utilization of any other leader or group that might come forward offering greater promise.

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.

POSSIBLE POLICY LINE RELATIVE TO LIBERAL ELEMENTS IN CHINA

Our policy at the present time should not be limited to support of Chiang. It is essential to remember that we have in fact not simply been supporting Chiang, but a coalition, headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the warlord group most closely associated with the landlords, and the Kung group of bankers.

We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of forming a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion and better qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition could include progressive banking and commercial leaders, of the K. P. Chen type, with a competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary Western world; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of China; and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting both American military aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and statement of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions adjacent to China.

The future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If not, the new coalition will in the natural course of events produce its own leader.

PARAPHRASE OF VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, DRAFTED IN KUNMING JUNE 26 AND DISPATCHED FROM NEW DELHI ABOUT JUNE 28

Message No. 1

The discussions between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely discouraging. The morale of the Chinese is low and demoralization is a possibility with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. With regard to the military situation, I can only say that it might be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but there is a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. Morale in remaining free China would of course be affected by such a development.

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a U. S. Army observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be organized. After receipt of your telegram I again discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. General Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General Stilwell's Headquarters at Chungking, was present and we obtained what should prove to be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective operation of the group.

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation; bewildered regarding the economic situation, and, while expressing confidence in his army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented military reverses. He has assured me that the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States Government representation in China. In its military and related political aspects our effort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the Japanese.

Message No. 2

There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be prevented by unforeseeable chance. There are various estimates with regard to the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within three or four weeks.

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless determined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerilla in character probably.

It is necessary also to consider political forces. Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand.

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton de Wiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American General officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the final paragraph of my previous message.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Bern, Switzerland, March 7, 1950.

Hon. JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JACK: I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary have my full confidence and support, if needed.

A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20. I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at a Department washroom and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the oversight and called the Building Guard Office, where I learned that the coat had been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The coat was returned to the Far Eastern Office. When we moved from Old State to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's story.

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement, I must profess complete ignorance. I have never acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the kind ever came or was brought to my attention.

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history" on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarthy.

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon, Georgia; and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother is a banker in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Sister is married to Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, who recently rescued the USS *Missouri*. I have various and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in the Armed Forces during the late war.

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, are respected and sturdy Republicans. My wife's parents have been dead for many years. So much for family.

As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or otherwise. For one year, I think it was 1945, I was made an honorary or noncontributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made it impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian democrat, a Lincolnian republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and the Baptist Church.

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-Lai, for instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Regime), I met in the house of Chang Kai-shek. He was head of a Liaison Mission to the Chungking

"Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where official business had to be transacted.

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to China. I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The purpose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in China, extending back over 20 years.

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (September 1945-August 1947). During that time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, not to make them. It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a position where it was incumbent upon me to do so.

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many times during my twenty-five years of service. The last time was in 1947, as U. S. Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. One is free to question my ability; but they cannot, in truth, question my loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience.

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me.

With best regard and best wishes.

Sincerely,

JOHN CARTER VINCENT, *American Minister.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
January 6, 1947.

For the press. No. 8.

Following is the substance of a note delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow on January 3, 1947, to the Soviet Foreign Office. A similar note has also been delivered by the American Embassy at Nanking to the Chinese Foreign Office.

"The American Government considers it desirable that the current unsatisfactory situation with regard to the status and control of the port of Dairen be promptly considered by the Chinese and Soviet Governments with a view to the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945, in regard to Dairen. This Government perceives no reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chinese administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned agreement.

"The Government of the United States, while fully appreciating that this is a matter for direct negotiation between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, feels that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to raise the question with the two directly interested Governments. It hopes that the abnormal conditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and that normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.

"In the foregoing connection this Government also wishes to express the hope that agreement can be reached soon for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese Changchun Railway.

"It is believed that prompt implementation of the agreements with regard to Dairen and the railway would constitute a major contribution to the reestablishment of normal conditions in the Far East and the revival of generally beneficial commercial activity. This Government therefore would be glad to have the assurance of the Chinese and Soviet Governments that all necessary steps to this end will be taken in the near future."

ENCLOSURE TO LETTER, JANUARY 22, 1952, TO SENATOR McCARRAN REGARDING JOHN CARTER VINCENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
October 5, 1945.

For the press. No. 732

Confidential release for publication at 7 p. m., e. s. t., Saturday, October 6, 1945.
Not to be previously published, quoted from, or used in any way

Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast from the State, War, and Navy Departments, the 34th in a series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

Subject: "Our Occupation Policy for Japan."

Participants:

1. Major General John H. Hildring, Director of Civil Affairs for the War Department.
2. Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.
3. Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. Navy, representative of the Navy Department, on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee.
4. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

ANNOUNCER. Here are headlines from Washington:

General Hildring says the Zaiatsu, or Japanese big business, will be broken up; states we will not permit Japan to rebuild her big combines; promises protection of Japanese democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department forecasts end of National Shinto; says that the institution of the Emperor will have to be radically modified, and that democratic parties in Japan will be assured rights of free assembly and free discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department says Japan will not be allowed civil aviation; predicts that Japanese will eventually accept democracy, and emphasizes naval responsibility for future control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER. This is the 34th in a series of programs entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY, featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan." Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Major General John H. Hildring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department, and Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher. * * *

FISHER. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate. But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy. Here in the studio are three men who help to formulate or to execute this policy from day to day. General Hildring is an executive in his capacity as Director of the War Department. Tonight the general is substituting for the Honorable John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who was originally scheduled to speak but who is not now in Washington. Mr. Vincent is chairman of the Far Eastern subcommittee which formulates our Japan policy for the approval of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee, and Captain Dennison is a Navy member of this same Subcommittee. All three of our guests are "up to their ears," so to speak, in the spadework of formulating our occupation policy for Japan.

General Hildring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is determined.

HILDRING. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it is made. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee—"SWINC," we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspect, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy, and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hildring is associated and which Captain Dennison and I sit with in an advisory capacity.

HILDRING. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three Departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, a lot of people would like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT. No; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and voice in, our policy for Japan.

DENNISON. We have a vital interest in it. The large part that the Navy was called upon to play in the defeat of Japan is a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by a broad expanse of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in Civil Affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese Mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER. Including Okinawa?

DENNISON. Yes.

FISHER. That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON. No, I believe not. I'd like to add that besides these immediate duties, our Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan, where necessary, long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as Chairman of the Subcommittee which drafts our occupation policy, to give us in a word a statement of our over-all objectives.

VINCENT. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER. And how long do you think that will take, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue

until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER. General Hildring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILDRING. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, participate in formulating occupation policy and in carrying out the actual occupation?

HILDRING. That is not a question which the soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT. Immediately following the Japanese surrender the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced from London that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan. In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER. Coming back to our first objective—General Hildring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILDRING. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed troops to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER. And the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILDRING. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER. And what is to be done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON. Such remnants as are left might well be destroyed.

FISHER. Now, there are some other less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, antimilitarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT. That vicious system will be abolished. Not only the top chiefs, but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILDRING. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER. It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese government from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT. One of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible only to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT. The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified.

DENNISON. The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

FISHER. Can you give us the sense of the directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON. I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said, "1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force." That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER. That's clear enough. Now, General Hildring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILDRING. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national government in Japan?

HILDRING. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese government available to our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of seventy million people. These people differ from us in language, customs and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER. But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese government, we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILDRING. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

FISHER. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent. Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT. The old gang is on its way out. The Higashi-Kuni Cabinet resigned this week, of course. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, of course, he will go out.

FISHER. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Even Cabinet status would be no protection.

HILLDRING. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists, and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING. Under our policy, all fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER. What do you say about the Zaibatsu, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, to name the most prominent.

FISHER. And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER. Well, there's no feeling of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu" here. * * * Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, the Zaibatsu or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we *are not going to* rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or Japanese to do so.

FISHER. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing, and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction

work to do in every city. And we have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries that Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER. They'll have to have some foreign trade, of course, to keep going.

VINCENT. Of course, but not the unhealthy sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade well below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hildring, what will our policy be on food?

HILLDRING. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transports planes to resume operations.

DENNISON. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic base. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, I have no doubt.

FISHER. And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT. We'll encourage the development of trade unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER. I take all this to mean that all democratic and antimilitarist groups will all be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT. It would be wiped out. One of General MacArthur's directives calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored."

FISHER. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT. In that event, the U. S. Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON. We are *not* interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist Party. What stand will we take on that, General Hildring?

HILDRING. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.

FISHER. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILDRING. We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, will we do anything about reforming Japan's election laws?

VINCENT. The Japanese themselves have already advocated some reforms in the election laws, to reduce the age of male voters from 25 to 20, and to permit women of 25 years and over to vote. We'll give every encouragement to such reforms; but they can be brought about by the Japanese people themselves, if they have a government that does more than pay lip service to democracy.

FISHER. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that is called National Shinto?

VINCENT. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the Japanese Government, and is a measure enforced from above by the government, is to be done away with. People would not be taxed to support National Shinto and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. Shintoism as a state religion—National Shinto, that is—will go.

FISHER. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed. And the Japanese Government will be required to cease financial and other support of Shinto establishments.

FISHER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalist leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON. That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii used to send their children to Japan at the age of about seven, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER. What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON. Simply that they *like* life in America better. At that age, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like. Well, I believe that the people in Japan will like our ways, too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT. Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if they're to have a real, working democracy.

HILLDRING. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT. Well, recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or hustle General MacArthur, too much. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER. Well thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one which is aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialistic, and *every possible* encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Captain R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. * * * This was the 34th of a series of broadcasts on OUR FOREIGN POLICY, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send \$1.00 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish to write it down: Send your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, \$1.00 for a series of thirteen reprints.)

NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from Washington, D. C. * * *

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS**

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 7A

Appendix II

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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APPENDIX II

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APPENDIX II

(Secret classification changed to Unclassified—authority Director of Intelligence, 23 August 1949)

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 5 JULY 1945

(MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.)

1. THE PROBLEM

The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the problem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary statements of fact.

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in China and in the Pacific. A major project was therefore initiated at the end of 1944, under which the most competent analysts—both civilian and military—were assigned to the examination of *all* material available, and to the compilation of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books.

2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS

Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy, (2) The Chinese Communist Movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea and probably North China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. (5) In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

3. PRÉCIS OF CONCLUSIONS

A. HIGH MORALE

The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.

B. POLICY OF ESTABLISHING COMMUNISM THROUGH "DEMOCRACY"

The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: first, the change of the Chinese semi-feudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must have "the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy".

C. "SOVIET DEMOCRACY"

While the Chinese Communists call their present political system "democracy", the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist

Party than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship" of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, it weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China.

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.

D. PART OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."

E. DESIRE FOR U. S. SUPPORT AGAINST JAPAN AND THE KUOMINTANG

This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims; the subjugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communist-controlled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and the Chungking Government.

F. DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE

The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing territory, (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth of China Proper), a population of probably more than 70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient.

G. RIVALRY WITH THE KUOMINTANG

(1) Failure of the "Entente Cordiale"

During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*, 1923-1927, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, national, democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

(2) Development of the "united front" movement.

The ensuing civil war, 1927-1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties

in the capitalist democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.

Under the terms of the united front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

(3) *The "war within the war"*

The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies in obedience to the Chinese High Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called "traitors" by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called "united front governments," which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "anti-democratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases.

Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

II. ROLE IN WORLD WAR II

In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi-war, the Chinese Communists have contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of North China's resources in food-stuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.

Contrary to the widely advertised report of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the National Government troops. The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested in the war against Japan.

I. MILITARY CAPACITY SMALL

The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communists regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles available. Rifles were available for only about 250,000 men in October 1944.

J. THE ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENTS OF THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST PROBLEM

(1) *General*

As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists; a "settlement" which would be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be

united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

(2) *Generalissimo sponsors the National Assembly*

Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the Communists.

(3) *Chinese Communists sponsor idea of coalition government*

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

(4) *Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake*

Here the matter rests (3 July 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan.

K. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

(1) *Common policy of U. S. and U. S. S. R.*

It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement in China depends largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on.

(2) *Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China*

Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination (along somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe), in the areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia; that is in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper. A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers."

The Chinese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably further this aim in that North China and Manchuria might "legally" become the exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend China an outward appearance of unity.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet's Russia's apparent willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived in Moscow and was received by Stalin on 30 June. An agreement between Moscow and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reducing the danger of immediate disagreement between the U. S. S. R. and the United States.

(3) *The U. S. and the situation in China*

(a) *The post-war peace in the Far East depends on re-establishment of Chinese independence and unity.*—The type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain complete independence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Similarly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China Proper in the 1930's.

The independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, including Manchuria, have been key points of U. S. policy and interests in the Far East. During the past eighty-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been demonstrated several times. The rivalry between Russia and Japan has centered on Manchuria and Korea.

(b) *With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the sole military land power in Asia.*—Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when the rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past.

(c) *Prevention of a repetition of the "Polish situation" in Manchuria and Korea is essential to post-war stability in the Far East.*—The problem of post-war peace in the Far East revolves, in so far as the United States is concerned, around two major questions: (1) How can the military-political vacuum in the Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United States promote internal unity in China?

The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russia, and by the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with Soviet Russia. If it be assumed that Soviet Russia will join in the war against Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into

an American-British and a Soviet zone of military operations. For the elements of uncertainty as to Soviet Russia's intentions in China and in regard to the Chinese Communists are very similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe during 1943 and 1944. Many of the fears and speculations current at that time, to the effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for similar fears in regard to North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American and British forces in these areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan to create a Soviet sphere of influence in North China, Manchuria and Korea, find herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her exclusively or even predominantly as a zone of military operations against Japan.

On the other hand, if American forces cooperate on equal terms with Soviet Russian, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the terms of the Cairo declaration of 1 December 1943 can much more readily be achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us in control of Japan, and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control of Central and South China, while Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist forces held the controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement in regard to these areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms of the Cairo declaration. In that case, the plan of the Chinese Communists for a "coalition government" might well be the only feasible way of settling the situation in China; North China and probably also Manchuria and Korea would come under the control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet Russian support, and in these areas there would be established the now typical "united front" or "democratic" coalition administrations in which the Communists hold the dominant power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources of North China and Manchuria the present National Government of China would find itself unable to compete with the Communists in the North and to establish a strong and stable state. For this reason it is necessary, for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and for the long range interests of the United States, that the Cairo Declaration be implemented without modification.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

P. E. PEABODY,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, July 1945

(Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.)

STATEMENT OF REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS

1. POLITICAL

a. The Chinese Communists *are* Communists. They are the most effectively organized group in China.

b. The "democracy" which the Chinese Communists sponsor represents "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the Soviet Union rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship"

of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that there have always been several groups in opposition to the Government in Kuomintang-controlled China, and in spite of severe Government restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech these opposition groups have always managed to make their voices heard. Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while small parties friendly to the CCP are permitted to exist in Communist-controlled China, real opposition groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be more true of the Communists if they ever attain supreme power in China.

c. The Kuomintang is a nationalist party. The CCP on the other hand is international; it is part of the international Communist movement which has been sponsored by the Soviet Union since 1919 when the Communist International was established. Although the Communist International has been dissolved, the CCP still follows the Soviet Russian "party line."

d. During the period of the Soviet-Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's, the Kuomintang and the CCP cooperated with each other. The Communists promised to support the revolutionary program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, edged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. The Kuomintang, therefore, in 1927 turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. The ensuing civil war between the armies of the two parties bore all the marks of bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars.

e. In 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. What saved it was the acceptance by the Kuomintang of the idea of a united front with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea, which applied to Communists in all countries, had been developed in Moscow as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies. Under the terms of the united front agreement in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves in 1937 to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish the Chinese Soviet Republic, to support the National Government, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

f. This pledge was never kept. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. As a sign of its trust and goodwill the Government even established a new army composed of Communists, the New Fourth Army, to operate between Nanking and Shanghai. The leaders of the Kuomintang spoke highly of the Communist forces during the first year of the war. There was considerable cooperation between the armies of the two parties in fighting Japan. The Communist armies, however, refused to stay within their assigned defense areas. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to orders from the Supreme Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang defense zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them the exceedingly limited resources of their base areas they were called "traitors" by the Communists. Whenever they refused to permit the Communists to set up, in Kuomintang areas, their own separate civil administration which flouted the authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from Yen-an, the capital of the Chinese Communists, the Communists called the Kuomintang troops "anti-democratic" and "experts in dissension." These tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought against both the Communists and the Japanese for the defense of their bases.

g. This internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would, in their opinion, obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

h. The expansion of Communist areas demonstrates the remarkable military and political skill of the Chinese Communists. But it has created an explosive situation between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The Kuomintang leaders feel that the Communists have cheated them in that they have used the united front as a means of fighting the Kuomintang rather than the Japanese. The Communists feel that they have been justified in their policy since the Kuomintang has, in their opinion, never intended to grant them legal rights and has been waiting for the end of the war against Japan to renew the civil war against the Communists.

i. As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the CCP; a "settlement" which will be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it may ultimately settle the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National Assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations. (See p. 2394.)

Many observers believe that neither of these latter two alternatives is feasible of execution. Both the Kuomintang and the CCP aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and the reestablishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved as long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance to this demand conditional to any political settlement between the Kuomintang and the CCP.

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established. While at present the Communists do not permit Kuomintang armies and anti-Communist Kuomintang members in their areas of control, they insist that the Kuomintang, in fulfillment of its promise to institute democracy, should permit Communists to operate freely in Kuomintang-controlled areas and should allow Communist armies to operate in Kuomintang defense zones. Following this practice, the coalition government, if established, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord legal status to present Kuomintang areas. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

j. Here the matter rests (4 June 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the "coalition government." Both parties are insisting on their own plans. It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement depends greatly upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. For were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on. Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. It seems possible, however, that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the reestablishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always

avored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war.

2. ECONOMIC

The Chinese Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in north and central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of north and central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are non-existent, roads and motor transport are practically non-existent, communication facilities—radio, telegraph, telephone—are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

3. MILITARY

In October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The Communists claim in a press report of 17 May 1945 that their regular forces have been increased to 910,000. This increase has probably been achieved by incorporating part of the militia, which numbers more than 2,000,000 men, into the regular forces. The degree to which this increase of strength represents an actual increase in fighting potential depends, however, upon the number of rifles available: the militiamen have an undetermined number of old rifles. Rifles were available for only slightly more than half of the regular forces in October 1944.

The Communist Army is a volunteer force of comparatively young men in excellent physical condition, adequately clothed and fed. The troops are fairly well trained for their type of guerrilla warfare, and have considerable experience in it. Observers report a high level of general intelligence and morale is very high. Lack of equipment constitutes the most serious problem of the Communists.

Up to the present time, the scale of effort of the Communists has been extensive and of serious concern to the Japanese, but does not represent the maximum of which the Communists are capable. Operations have generally been purposely restricted in order to conserve arms and to avoid provoking the Japanese to strengthen the barriers protecting their lines of communications, which would further restrict Communist movement. Part of the Communist forces have also been engaged in fighting the Chungking forces rather than the Japanese.

Improvement in the Communist strategic position, either by receipt of supplies or by an operation which would destroy the strategic initiative of the Japanese in China, would doubtless result in an all-out effort on the part of the Communists. Their forces are not capable of decisive independent operations to drive out the Japanese, but are capable of rendering strong support to an Allied operation against the Japanese in China.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1919-1945, VOLUME I

1. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

A. MOST EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZED GROUP IN CHINA

A question of first importance in connection with the Chinese Communists is: how effective are they in comparison with the Nationalists of the Chungking Government, as an instrument for developing China into a strong, progressive nation? The answer to this question has almost uniformly been in favor of the Chinese Communists.

An American observer stated recently after his first meetings with the Chinese Communist leaders in Yen-an, the Chinese Communist Capital, that "they are displaying a degree of initiative and planning ability which I have never before encountered in China." This observer has had long experience in China. Another American who visited Yen-an at the end of 1944, summed up his impressions of the Chinese Communists by stating that he found himself "continually trying to find out just how Chinese these people are," and in another report commented, "Their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more American than oriental." He noted the open, direct, and friendly relations between the officials and the people. He saw no signs of desperate poverty. He emphasized that there is no defeatism, but rather confidence. "There is no war weariness . . . There is a surprising political consciousness . . . There is no tension in the local situation . . . There is no feeling of restraint or suppression . . . The leaders make excellent personal impressions. The military men look and act like capable military men." All of this contrasts sharply with conditions in Chungking-controlled China. The foregoing observer concluded: "I think now that further study and observation will confirm that what is seen at Yen-an is a well integrated movement, with a political and economic program, which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. And that while the Kuomintang¹ has lost its early revolutionary character and with that loss disintegrated, the Communist Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, has kept its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and moderate maturity. One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed."

Practically all impartial observers emphasize that the Chinese Communists comprise the most efficient, politically well-organized, disciplined, and constructive group in China today. This opinion is well supported by facts. It is largely because of their political and military skill, superior organization, and progressive attitude, which has won for them a popular support no other party or group in China can equal, that they have been expanding their influence throughout the past seven years. This expansion has now reached the point where many of the best informed observers believe that no anti-Communist group in China can longer hope to eliminate them. Some of the keenest observers go so far as to predict the ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists in China "if the present reactionary groups in Chungking are allowed to continue in power." The present trend is definitely in favor of the Communists. The growth of Communist power has been perhaps the most outstanding factor in the development in China during the past two years. It has led several of our observers to question whether we are not "backing the wrong horse" in China.

B. HOW RED THE RED?

(1) "*Chinese Communists*" a misnomer for "*Agrarian Democrats*," according to some

If the Chinese Communists should develop into the leading political power in China, how would this affect American and British interests in the Far East; could we continue to deal with China as an independent nation, or would a Communist China find its political and economic interests to be linked, predominantly, with those of Soviet Russia?

There is no clear answer. The majority of Allied observers agree, however, that there seems to be little to fear on this account, because "the Chinese Communists are not Communists," they have given up their socialist revolutionary tenets and have become mere "reformers" who can in no way be compared with

¹ The Kuomintang (National People's Party) is the Chungking Government Party.

the bolsheviks of the Soviet Union. Thus the British Ambassador to China said in 1938 that the Chinese Communists are really Keir Hardeians,² and he added that it was regrettable that their name unnecessarily frightened conservatives. More recently Brooks Atkinson, N. Y. Times' correspondent in China, expressing a widely-held opinion, has emphasized that although the Chinese Communists "began as followers of the Russian system, they abandoned their sovietization program about eight years ago when they concluded that China was not ready for socialism and would not be for at least a half century . . . Their system now might be described as agrarian or peasant democracy, or as a farm labor party . . ." An American official report from Chungking, also reflecting a widely-held opinion, states that "it is unfortunate that the present day Communist Party [in China] bears that name. As a misnomer it conjures up all the hatred of the capitalistic nations—a bogey of yesterday—the 'Red Menace' that almost lost us Russia as an ally in this war. The [Chinese] Communists adhere more closely to the basic . . . fundamentals of Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood—than does the Kuomintang." Finally, Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, subscribed to this opinion when he stated during the summer of 1944 that Chinese Communism was not Soviet Communism, and that when the Chinese Communists achieved a greater degree of economic prosperity they would no longer be Communists.

(2) *Those who believe that the Chinese Communists are not Communists are doomed to disillusionment*

If mere statements constitute proof, we have here ample proof that the Chinese Communists are not Communists but Democrats. There are, however, some who object strongly to this viewpoint. Edgar Snow, for instance, one of America's foremost sympathizers with the Chinese Communists who is considered by many an authority on them, wrote in 1941 that some Chinese publicists, foreign diplomats, missionaries, and other pro-China people "did their best [during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war] to convince the world that the Chinese Communists were 'not real Communists' . . . Some think that because the Chinese Reds are now fighting for democracy and national independence they cannot be bolsheviks but are 'only a peasant reform party.' How all these people reconcile such interpretations with the Chinese C. P.'s loyal adherence to the Comintern I do not know. But if I understand Mao Tse-tung [the leader of the Chinese Communist Party] correctly he would not be bothered about these aspersions cast upon his Marxism. He would chuckle and say that if it would solve the contradiction in the sentiments of liberals who want to be known as pro-China but anti-Stalin they might call him anything they liked—as long as they did something to . . . [help] China and the [Communist] Eight Route Army to win victories. My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are 'different' and 'only reformers' who have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their program, are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. These men are nationalists because they are in a nationalist united-front phase of revolution, and they are perhaps strong enough in their own right not to fear becoming submerged as puppets of anybody. But their religion remains international socialism and if conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in order 'to stay on the locomotive of history.'"

A Dutch refugee, who soon after Pearl Harbor escaped from Peiping through Communist areas in North China, stated that he gained a decided impression "that the Chinese Communist leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te [C-in-C of the Chinese Communist army], and in general the teachers, doctors, commissars, etc., are devoted Communists as we [Westerners] understand it, "but that this does not mean that they are convinced that their communistic ideas can be applied to China at present.

(3) *Chinese Communist tenets: democracy a means to achieve socialism*

A study of the writings of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves fully supports the above analysis. They themselves do not agree with the contention of some of our observers that they are not "real" Communists. In his booklet *New Democracy*, published in January 1941, Mao Tse-tung has given a frank

² The Keir Hardeians were nineteenth century constitutionalist labor reformers in Great Britain.

and accurate outline of the tenets and policies of the Chinese Communist Party. A reading of this booklet is as essential to an understanding of the Chinese Communists as is reading *China's Destiny*, by Chiang Kai-shek, to an understanding of the Kuomintang Nationalists. The following condensation of the New Democracy provides a basis for comparing, and judging the accuracy of, the various and conflicting characterizations of the Chinese Communist offered by foreign observers.

China's revolution is part of the world revolution. But the Chinese revolution must pass through two stages: first, the change of our colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society; second, the establishment of a socialist society. The first is our present goal, a new bourgeois-democratic revolution. But do not confuse this with the bourgeois-democratic revolution in capitalist countries. Although the objective of the first stage of our revolution is the destruction of feudalism and imperialism and the development of capitalism, it is certainly not the establishment of a capitalist society dictated by the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, our objective is to establish a New Democracy based on an alliance of several revolutionary classes, but led wholly or partially by the proletariat. After the accomplishment of this first stage, the revolution will be developed into the second stage—the establishment of a socialist society in China.

The outline of and basis for the New Democracy is found in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924, long forgotten by the present Kuomintang. This Manifesto embodies Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. It provides for democratic, representative government from lower grades to the higher, and for free universal suffrage. The same Manifesto lays out our economic platform. Big banks, industries and monopolistic enterprises are to be owned by the Republic, non-monopolistic private enterprises are to be free. Large landholdings are to be distributed to land-tilling peasants to hold as their own private, not communal, property.

Now there are some "obstinate elements of the bourgeoisie" [the reactionary Kuomintang elements] who come forward and say: "Well, since you [Chinese] Communists have put aside the social system of socialism for a later stage, and since you have declared 'The Three Principles of the People are a necessity today, and our party is willing to struggle for their thorough realization,' why then don't you pack up your Communism for a while?" This only shows the lack of common sense on the part of some bourgeois elements, for they should know from the history of the Chinese revolution that without the guidance of Communism, even the democratic revolution in China cannot be a success, not to mention the final stage of the revolution, socialism. Once Communism is "packed up" China will face ruin. The world now depends on Communism for its salvation, and so does China.

We Chinese Communists must not neglect establishing a united front with the Chinese bourgeoisie, which still maintains to a certain degree the revolutionary characteristic of opposing imperialism as well as the bureaucratic warlord government of its own country [the Kuomintang dictatorship]. But it must be remembered that the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, even in the process of revolution, is never willing to break with the imperialists completely, nor to overthrow imperialism and feudalism thoroughly. For instance, from 1927 to 1936 the bourgeois elements surrendered to the imperialists;³ and allied themselves with the feudal forces and opposed the revolutionary people. Again, during the present anti-Japanese war, a part of the big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching-wei, surrendered to the enemy, illustrating a new betrayal of that class. "In view of this, is it not a dream to expect that China can establish a [democratic] bourgeois society ruled by her own bourgeoisie?" The bourgeois revolution needs the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance. It was with regard to this kind of united front between the Communists and the bourgeoisie that Sun Yat-sen said: "Communism is the good friend of the Three Principles of the People."

³ A reference to the change in China's policy after Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet Russian Kuomintang-Communist government at Hankow during 1926. The new Kuomintang Government established by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking adopted a friendly policy toward Great Britain and the United States and other imperialist and capitalist nations. It broke off relations with Soviet Russia.

⁴ A reference to the landlord and merchant classes in China.

The "obstinate elements" are practicing their principle of "one party" [the Kuomintang doctrine] and denying the united front today, so they utter such fatal absurdities as renunciation of Communism. "To tell you frankly, it is useless to urge us [Chinese Communists] to 'pack up.' It is much better to urge us to make a contest. If there is somebody who beats us in the race, we shall admit that it is our fate. If not, you had better 'pack up' your anti-democratic, 'one-principle' style as early as possible . . . Whoever prepares to oppose the Communists has to prepare to be crushed."

Our [Communist] kind of democratic revolution is a great blow to imperialism and is therefore opposed by the imperialists. On the other hand, it is permitted by socialism and is assisted by the Socialist State and the international socialist proletariat. It is the result of the Russian October Revolution which, as Stalin said in 1918, ". . . promotes the liberation work of the Western and Eastern oppressed peoples, and attracts them into the common, victorious anti-imperialist course . . ."

Mao Tse-tung concludes: "We [Chinese] cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anti-capitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany . . . [The aid of] the Soviet Union [is] an indispensable condition for the final victory of China's war of resistance . . ." And, again, ". . . If we forsake the policy of allying with the Soviet Union and cooperate with imperialism instead, then the word 'revolution' may be cancelled, and the Three Principles of the People will become a reactionary doctrine."

China's revolutionary policy must therefore be (1) alliance with the Soviet Union; (2) cooperation between the bourgeoisie and the Chinese Communists; (3) protection and assistance to the peasants and workers.

That this policy has not been changed even though the Comintern was dissolved in May 1943, was confirmed by Mao Tse-tung in the summer of 1944 when he told a British correspondent, then visiting Yen-an, that "the Chinese Communist Party has not changed its fundamental policy which is 'New Democracy . . .'" General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, made a special point of emphasizing after the dissolution of the Communist International that the "Chinese Communists are Marx-Leninists . . . The Chinese Communists will certainly continue to apply and develop Marxism-Leninism dialectically in accordance with our own conditions."

This does not, of course, prevent the Chinese Communists from taking a very strong pro-American attitude at present, and offering us full cooperation both in the war against Japan and in the postwar period. This is fully in line with Mao Tse-tung's statement in NEW DEMOCRACY that the Chinese Communist "revolution, due to the variations in the condition of the enemy [meaning the capitalist nations and the Chinese "big bourgeoisie"] and in the conditions of this alliance [between the Chinese Communists and the bourgeoisie] may be divided into a certain number of stages during its process, but no change will occur in its fundamental character, which will be the same until the arrival of the socialist revolution."

Strategic considerations may make it desirable for America to establish military cooperation with the Chinese Communists. Because of their political control over large areas of eastern China, it may also become desirable for us to establish some kind of official diplomatic relations with them. But it is obvious from the foregoing that it is completely unrealistic to deal with the Chinese Communists on the assumption that they are not Communists. If we speculate that it will take "at least half a century" before the Communists have achieved the objective of their present democratic bourgeois revolution, we may just as well speculate that it will take only five or ten years. We may even speculate that this democratic trend in Communist China may in time become so strong that the Communists can no longer control it and use it as a means of introducing communism in China. The Communists themselves realize this, and have stated that the only "danger" is that the country may "go democratic."

However, all that we know is that at present the democratic movement in Communist China is fully controlled by the Communists in fulfillment of the policy expressed in Mao Tse-tung's NEW DEMOCRACY. We have no reason to suppose that their policy has changed. In the words of Wang Chia-hsiang, at present Director of the Political Department of the Eighteenth Group Army: The Chinese Communists "will never abandon their ideals and the theories of

Marxism and Leninism . . . The whole program of the Chinese Communist Party consists of two parts: (1) the maximum program, for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism, and for racial emancipation through the elimination of classes; (2) the minimum immediate program of the national democratic revolution . . ."

2. OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

A. PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST COOPERATION, 1923-27

(1) *Formation of Chinese Communist Party*

The Chinese Communist movement found its origin in the Student Movement of 1919, which reflected Chinese indignation against the decision of the "Big Four" of the Versailles Conference to concede to Japan all the rights which Germany held in Shantung Province before the outbreak of the first World War. It led to a new awakening of national consciousness, particularly among the Chinese literati, and focussed the attention of the students on the need of organized resistance against imperialist aggression, and of instituting reforms in the Chinese political and social system to start China on the road to modern progress. While most of the students entering political work enrolled with the Kuomintang, the Nationalist party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, many became imbued with Marxian doctrines and established small Socialist societies, which formed the nucleus of proletarian political organization in China. Many Chinese went to Moscow and Irkutsk to investigate the Soviet system of government. Many became Communists and entered Russian universities.

Then, in 1920, Soviet Russia determined to organize the Communist Movement in Asia. This decision was accepted at the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient (Sept. 1920), presided over by Zinoviev, President of the Executive Committee of the Third or Communist International (Comintern). In the same year Lenin sent his secretary, Marin, to China as the first delegate of the Comintern in China. Marin secretly organized the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter written CCP) as a branch of the Communist International. In May 1921 the foundation meeting of the CCP was held in Shanghai. It was attended by 12 Chinese delegates, among them Mao Tse-tung, the present leader of the Communist Party in China. The first Central Party Committee established in Shanghai included Ch'en Tu-hsiu, scion of an Anhwei mandarin family and one of the foremost literary figures in China of his time. He was elected General Secretary of the Party. Another member of the Central Committee was Ch'en Kung-po, the present leader of the Nanking puppet government. CCP branches were also organized during 1921 and 1922 in several foreign countries. Among the founders were: in France, Chou En-lai, one of the most important Communist leaders today; in Germany, Chu Te, present C-in-C of the Chinese Communist armies; in Japan, Chou Fu-hai, at present one of the chief collaborators with Japan in the Nanking puppet government. The CCP was organized as a secret society. It started its activities by conducting an intensive campaign among students in Peking and laborers in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

(2) *The Soviet Russian-Chinese "Entente Cordiale."*

The first of the Communist Party's problems was the question of its relations to the bourgeois Nationalist Kuomintang. Cooperation with the Nationalists was considered essential, since the Comintern program was based on Lenin's thesis that, in the imperialist epoch, the national liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries could be led to merge with the main stream of the international proletarian revolutionary movement. After Sun Yat-sen had rejected the idea of a two-party Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Chinese Communists began at the end of 1922 to enter the Kuomintang while secretly maintaining their membership in the Communist Party. It was not until May 1926 that they appeared on the Kuomintang registration lists as Communists, after Chiang Kai-shek in an effort to counteract subversive activities of the Communists, had prevailed upon the Kuomintang to accept a ruling that the CCP should cease to be a secret organization and that a list of Communist members should be filed with the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

In 1922 the Soviet Government sent Adolf Joffe to China with the delicate mission of establishing official diplomatic relations with the internationally recognized Chinese Government in Peking while at the same time arranging for Soviet support of the revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang, which aimed at overthrowing the Peking Government. He did not meet with immediate

success in Peking, but during a meeting with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai (Jan. 1923) he was able to arrange an *Entente Cordiale* between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang. In talking with Chinese, Joffe made a point of "admitting" that what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. When a Chinese asked him whether Communism could be realized in Russia in ten years' time, Joffe said "No." "In twenty years?" "No." "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps," said Joffe. Joffe's method of assuaging Chinese fears of the "Red Menace" bears a strong resemblance to present Chinese Communist methods in regard to America. General Ch'en I, Acting Commander of the (Communist) New Fourth Army, said to an American official observer in Yen-an (Sept. 1944): "... it will be many years before (Communism) can possibly be adopted in China. It may take a 100 years or more for China to achieve a state of democracy such as exists today in the United States . . ."

Joffe returned to Russia and was succeeded by Leo Karakhan, the foremost Soviet expert in Oriental diplomacy, who in 1924 obtained official recognition of the Soviet Union from the Peking Government. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, having failed after repeated efforts to obtain any promise of aid from either Britain or America, wrote to Karakhan in Peking requesting him to send a representative with whom Sun might discuss mutual relations. Karakhan sent Michael Borodin, who arrived in October 1923 in Canton, where Sun had established a Kuomintang government. Soviet Russia now maintained two types of relations with China. The Soviet Government dealt with the Government in Peking on the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The Communist International dealt with the Kuomintang. Borodin's task was to reorganize and pump new life into the Kuomintang.

(3) Chinese Communists accepted into the Kuomintang

The first Kuomintang Party Congress in January 1924 endorsed the admission of Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang on condition that they accept Kuomintang principles. Great numbers of Communists now joined the Kuomintang while still secretly maintaining their Communist Party membership with Soviet Russian money and backing they organized and directed the Hong Kong strike against the British. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers left Hong Kong. The trade and shipping of the colony were practically brought to a standstill. The workers from Hong Kong were quartered in Canton where they served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the Communists against the Chinese merchants and the Kuomintang "reactionaries." The Communists likewise organized a nation-wide anti-British boycott and anti-foreign demonstrations and strikes in Shanghai and Canton. These led to clashes with British and French police and military forces—the "May 30 incident" (1925) in Shanghai, and the "June 23 incident" (1925) in Canton. The rapidly growing influence of the Communists alarmed many Chinese, however, and in August 1924 the first violent outbreaks occurred between pro- and anti-communist groups in Canton. Nevertheless, since Soviet Russia was the only power willing to support the Kuomintang, the Nationalists became increasingly dependent upon her aid. Because of this the Kuomintang had to accept Borodin's advice, even though many objected to the Russian-Chinese Communist influence. Borodin rose to the position of a quasi-dictator.

He saw that the first task was to reorganize the Kuomintang and forthwith reconstructed it along the lines of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. Borodin was able to have young and hardy men, most of them Chinese Communists or men sympathetic toward the Communists, appointed to pivotal positions in the Kuomintang machine and in the new Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-shek. This army was being trained by Russian advisers, headed by General "Galen" (Vassily Bluecher) at the Whampoa Military Academy. Auxiliary societies were also organized to strengthen the Kuomintang, such as the "Federation of Farmers, Workers, Soldiers, and Students to Promote the Revolutionary Movement," "The Youth Movement," etc. In all of these the Chinese Communists obtained the leadership. Borodin also brought from Russia experts for each type of organization who trained the Chinese to assume new leadership in the Kuomintang.

In the years that followed, up to the spring of 1927, the revolutionary movement swept like wildfire over south and central China. It was focussed on two immediate objectives: first, the undermining of the influence of the Imperialist powers in China, foremost among them Great Britain; second the defeat of the independent warlords and the forces of the Peking Government. Before the advancing Nationalist armies, Kuomintang propaganda agents infiltrated into

the areas of the opposing forces. They concentrated their attention on organizing the impoverished peasants and laborers, and while the peasants were encouraged to loot and burn the estates of their landlords, strikes and boycotts were organized in the large industrial cities where foreign economic interests were concentrated. The Chinese Communists played the dominant role in organizing this popular unrest. It greatly contributed to the success of the Nationalist armies, since it disrupted the administration and the economic life in strategic areas of the opposing forces. Before the end of 1926 the revolutionary armies had reached the Yangtze River. The Kuomintang government was transferred to Hankow in November 1926.

(4) The Kuomintang-Communist split

The tensions within the Kuomintang between pro and anti-Communist groups had approached the breaking point. In the course of 1926 most of the Nationalists realized that the Communists were gaining the leadership over the revolution. The strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and violent acts of the mass organizations, which in 1924-25 had been directed primarily against British nationals and interests, in the course of 1926 became increasingly focussed on Chinese social classes with vested interests as well. This in turn led to a realization among the Chinese Nationalists that the Chinese revolution under Soviet Russian-Chinese Communist influence was rapidly turning into a social class war, or a Communist revolution, instead of a nationalist-democratic revolution as originally envisaged by Sun Yat-sen. The rapid increase of Communist influence was shown by the growth of the membership of the CCP from less than 1,000 in 1926 to 60,000 in April 1927.

Chiang Kai-shek⁵ and the Kuomintang had never favored a course like this, and in 1926 Chiang began to take an open stand against the Communists. By the end of the year he had completely disassociated himself from the leftist Kuomintang government in Hankow. His headquarters at Nan-ch'ang (Kiang-si) assumed the status of a rival government, challenging the authority of the Hankow regime. While the Kuomintang leftists and the Communists rallied under Borodin, the conservatives rallied under Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang's forces occupied Greater Shanghai in March 1927, Chiang received from Chinese banking groups assurances of financial support which relieved him from any need of further reliance on Soviet Russia. After this it was only a matter of months before the power of the Hankow government was broken. Many of the political and military leaders of the Hankow regime shifted their loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.

While Chiang Kai-shek initiated the policy of suppression of the Chinese Communists by force (beginning with the labor massacre in Shanghai, April 1927), neither he nor the conservative Kuomintang groups were chiefly responsible for the disintegration of Communist influence in the Hankow government. This was caused primarily by a split between leftist Kuomintang leaders and Communists, in the course of the first half of 1927. After Great Britain had signed, in February 1927, an agreement with the Hankow government for the restitution of the British concessions in Hankow and Kiu-kiang, several leftist Kuomintang leaders wanted to adopt a friendly policy toward Great Britain. Borodin opposed this. Opposition was also developing among leftist leaders against the Communist-sponsored policy of land confiscation, which was assuming increasingly violent forms. In May 1927 these confiscations led to anti-Communist riots among troops of the Hankow government at Changsha, and after this the movement against the Communists spread throughout China. Borodin lost his hold over the Hankow government and was treated with increasing distrust.

The anti-Communists movement also spread to North China, where the so-called Christian General, Feng Yü-hsiang, had been won over and converted to Communism. The Peking Government took drastic action against Soviet Russia. On 6 April 1927, armed with a warrant countersigned by the Dean of the Diplomatic Body, Chinese police and troops entered the Legation Quarter and raided the Soviet Embassy. Many documents were confiscated proving that Soviet diplomatic officials were actively supporting the Chinese Communists. On the same day, the Peking Government broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.

⁵ Chiang Kai-shek together with the leftist leader Wang Ching-wei had assumed leadership of the Kuomintang following Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition from Canton in the spring of 1926, Chiang was appointed C-in-C of the Nationalist forces.

The final break with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists came in July 1927 after an Indian representative of the Third International, M. N. Roy, had revealed a Soviet plot which practically amounted to ousting the Kuomintang from power. Roy confided to Wang Ching-wei, the Kuomintang leader in Hankow that he and Borodin had received orders from Stalin to instruct the CCP to push the policy of land confiscation. Stalin had also advised the reorganization of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee with a view to increasing the proportion of pro-Communist labor and peasant leaders. The CCP was advised to build up a regular army of its own of 20,000 men, in addition to forming a force of peasants and workers detachments, 50,000 strong, to be used against the loyal Kuomintang forces. Following this, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Hankow formally adopted a resolution on 15 July for the expulsion of the Communists.⁶ At this meeting Borodin's resignation was also accepted. With the growing anti-Communist movement, the Communist Party in Soviet Russia had begun a strong propaganda attack on the Kuomintang and the Hankow government; in view of this the leftist leaders in Hankow found the *entente* between the Kuomintang and Moscow impracticable.

At the end of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had formed, at Nanking, a new Kuomintang government which started military operations against the leftist government at Hankow. Hankow fell to the Nanking forces in November 1927. In December Chiang ordered all Soviet Consulates in central and south China to be closed. By the end of the year thousands of Communists and their sympathizers among farmers and laborers had been killed throughout China. Most of the Communists had been routed from the large cities. Their labor and peasant unions had been dissolved. While many Communists fled to Russia, those remaining in China either went into hiding in the foreign concessions in the treaty ports or fled into rural districts to rally the support of the peasants. The period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was closed.

B. PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CIVIL WAR, 1927-1936

(1) *Comintern orders policy of attack on cities by Chinese Reds*

When the great anti-Communist reaction set in during 1927, the Communists at first planned to occupy some of the larger cities and use them as bases from which to counter the armed opposition of the Kuomintang. They had become greatly impressed by their past successes and especially by the power they had wielded through the unions of peasants and workers. There were about 10,000,000 members in the peasant unions and nearly 3,000,000 workers in trade unions in 1927, and they counted upon these as effective instruments to maintain the power of the CCP. Some Communist leaders, among them Ch'en Tu-hsiu, did not consider the peasants' and workers' unions sufficiently strong to fight the well-armed forces of the Kuomintang without the support of an army, and therefore advised a policy of caution. But the majority of Communist leaders, following orders from Moscow, decided on a policy of "direct action," that is, in the words of the Comintern, "to unfold mass political strikes and demonstrations, to expand the partisan warfare . . . and to turn the militarist war into class civil war" for the establishment of the rule of the "Workers', Peasants', and soldiers' Delegate Councils," or Soviets.

In August 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu was ousted from the leadership of the CCP for his objection to this insurrectionist policy. In 1929 he was expelled from the Party and subsequently joined the small Trotskyist Left Opposition that developed in China during the early 1930's. He was succeeded as head of the CCP by Li Li-san who was assisted, among others, by Chou En-lai in the Political Bureau of the Party. The Comintern appointed Lominadze to succeed Borodin, and after him Heinz Neumann, to guide the Chinese Communists in organizing the insurrectionary movement for taking possession of city bases.

Until the end of 1930 the main attention of the Communists was focused on gaining control of such cities as Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, and other industrial and trading centers. While the Communists were comparatively successful in rural areas, where they established several bases and built up relatively strong peasant armies, they wasted the strength of these armies in costly attacks upon the cities. The majority of the Communists, though anxious to make use of the peasants in attacks upon the cities, actually despised the peasants, for they feared that the Communist movement might "degenerate" into a peasant move-

⁶ In August 1927, the left-wing Kuomintang government in Hankow declared the CCP an illegal organization.

ment. They considered this as contrary to the aims of the international Communist movement which was to establish "proletarian hegemony," not "peasant hegemony." The peasant armies were scornfully referred to as "lumpen proletariat."

Futile attempts were made in 1927 to occupy Nan-ch'ang, Swatow, and Canton. Communist soldier and labor forces actually held Canton for three days in December 1927 before they were driven out by the combined armies of the Nationalists (Generals Li Chi-shen, Chang Fa-k'uei, and Hsüeh Yüeh). Some 600 people were reported killed during the days of the "Canton Commune," as the short-lived Communist regime was called. But after the Communists had been driven out, the Nationalists massacred thousands of the city's population (according to one account 5,700 men and women) in an effort to eradicate all Communists and Leftists. This was the pattern followed in all the cities and rural areas under Nationalist control. The Communist-sponsored labor and peasant movement was literally killed in blood purges of hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. Few were killed in the actual fighting between Communist and Kuomintang forces, in comparison with those killed in Kuomintang massacres.

The result was that the Communist labor movement of the 1920's collapsed within a few months. No one dared to belong to a Communist labor or peasant union. In spite of this the Communists continued their efforts to keep the labor movement alive. When the Kuomintang began to organize labor unions of its own, the Communists started a program of forming secret "red" unions in opposition to the "yellow" unions of the Kuomintang. But in their efforts to incite the workers to strikes and armed uprisings they alienated the sympathy of the workers, because of the terrible retribution from the Kuomintang authorities which every one of these uprisings caused. At the end of 1928 the Communists had to admit that "the trade union organizations have shrunk to almost nothing. The Party organizations in the cities are scattered and smashed. In the whole country there is not one healthy nucleus of industrial workers." In the summer of 1930 a Communist source claimed that there were some 64,000 members in the "red" trade union federation, but the totals for the principal cities amounted only to some 5,700. The rest were scattered throughout the country-side. These figures showed the staggering defeat of the peasant and worker union movement, which had been 13,000,000 strong in 1927. In the same year, 1930, Chou En-lai stated that the CCP numbered 120,000, among them only 2,000 factory workers.

The policy of "direct action" had proved a complete failure. Li Li-san was made the scape-goat. He was ousted from his position as head of the CCP by the Comintern Headquarters in Moscow and was replaced in January 1931 by Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), a special protégé of the Comintern.

(2) *The Chinese Soviet peasant movement*

Attention was shifted to the hitherto despised peasants, who from this time came to play the dominant role in the Chinese Communist movement. With this shift in policy, which gained Moscow's approval, the emphasis in the Chinese Communist movement was also directed toward the strengthening of the Red Army, rather than the development of peasant and labor unions, and the employment of this army in protecting Communist rural areas rather than in attacking the Kuomintang strongholds in the cities.

The Chinese Communist army had a humble beginning. When the anti-Communist terror began in 1927, scattered peasant and worker detachments in the Kuomintang labor corps fled to the hills and assumed the role of partisan bands. They joined with local bandits and with a few companies and regiments of Kuomintang soldiers who had mutinied and taken refuge in the mountains. From the fusion of these elements there emerged in 1927 and '28 a number of Red armies. The first and most important of these, the "First Peasants' and Workers' Army," was formed by Mao Tse-tung, who had fled from Hankow where he had served as the head of the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. In 1927, with a motley force of peasants, bandits, workers, and soldiers he led the so-called Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan, aimed at occupying Changsha and other larger Hunan cities. When it failed he led what was left of his band to the mountain stronghold of Ching-kan Shan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. At this time his force numbered only about 1,000. Here the first Soviet in China was set up in November 1927 (in Tsalin), and the first Soviet Government was elected. In this Soviet the Communists promoted a more democratic program, with a moderate policy based on slow but regular development, and with emphasis on agrarian reform.

It was Mao Tse-tung who dictated this policy of moderation. He was aware that the Communists were not strong enough to launch attacks upon the cities and that their campaign for land confiscations, strikes, and widespread upheavals would only serve to intensify the Kuomintang terror and weaken the Communist forces in China. Born of a peasant family, he realized that China's strength was in her rural population, not in the insignificant industrial proletariat in the cities. He believed that only a movement for rural rehabilitation, combined with gradual elimination of the excessive abuses in the system of land ownership, could win for the Communists a wide-spread following among the Chinese people. Because of this he disagreed with the Comintern policy of centering attention on the conquest of the cities. He also opposed the policy of looting and burning the property of landlords, and urged a moderate policy in regard to land confiscation. He made an arbitrary distinction between big landlords and rich peasants. While he favored confiscation of the land of the big landlords, he counselled leniency toward the rich peasants. Until the Communists were strong enough to take charge of the political and economic administration of the country themselves they were still, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, dependent upon the landlords and merchants, for they alone knew the intricate system of rural administration, and they controlled the tax collection, the money market and the trade. No matter how evil was the rule of the landlords, they were the only group with sufficient education to keep the administration and economy of the country running. To kill the landlords or to cause them to flee was tantamount to introducing anarchy, for whereas the ignorant peasants could loot and burn and confiscate the land of the landlords, they could not survey the land and re-divide it equitably, nor could they set up and run rural administration and economy by themselves.

The answer to these problems was the establishment of Soviets. But these Chinese Soviets could not entirely follow the pattern of the Russian Soviets, which provides a platform for discussion and the right of voting for workers and peasants only, for the establishment and maintenance of a Soviet government of the proletariat. In China the basis of the Soviet had to be broadened to include the landlords and other moneyed classes. In this respect the Chinese Soviets became more democratic than the Russian. The landlords were even admitted into the Party.

This policy of moderation was by no means adopted by all Chinese Soviet districts. Landlords, together with their families and their large retinue of tax collectors, police agents, court runners, servants, and friends were killed in most Soviet areas. In many cases the Communists perpetrated mass executions on a scale comparable to the Kuomintang massacres. But in the Kiangsi-Fukien area (the largest Communist base area) where Mao Tse-tung led the Soviet movement, his policy of moderation was practiced. It bore fruit in that in time many landlords came to cooperate with the Communists. Communist sources stated in 1931 that two-thirds of the Soviet Government in China was in the hands of rich peasants and that rich peasants were also in all the Party posts. Since they often favored their own interests at the expense of the poor peasants, Communist leaders complained frequently about their influence. Even Mao Tse-tung complained in 1934 that "Many landlords and rich peasants put on a revolutionary coloration. They are very active and rely on their historical advantages—they can speak well and write well—and consequently in the first period they steal the fruits of the agrarian revolution . . ." Party leaders frequently disciplined the landlords by seizing their land and imposing fines on them. On the whole, however, the system of democratic cooperation between landlords and peasants in the Soviet central district (Kiangsi) worked well. It should be emphasized that landlord participation in the Party and in the Soviet governments—both central and local governments—was permitted only as a temporary expedient during the "first period," or the "bourgeois-democratic period" of the revolution, until such time as the masses should be sufficiently educated to take over control by the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship.

Because he counselled moderation and a "go slow" policy, Mao Tse-tung earned the disfavor of Moscow. Soon after the failure of the Autumn Crop Uprising he was repudiated by the Central Committee of the CCP and dismissed from the Politburo, and also from the Party Front Committee. It was not until Mao's peasant movement had proved to be the only successful Communist movement that he was again accepted into the grace of the Party and rose to its highest leadership. It is not known when he succeeded Ch'en Shao-yü as Party leader. However, in September 1933 Ch'en himself referred to Mao Tse-tung as "Presi-

dent of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars."

The Chinese Soviet movement and the Chinese Red Army began under purely Chinese leadership. They did not, in fact, obtain Moscow's approval till after the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July 1928. Following this the Sixth Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in July and August 1928, gave its approval of the agrarian movement. But the Party, obeying Moscow's dictates, persisted for two more years in its policy of using the peasant movement and peasant armies for the conquest of city bases.

(3) *Growth of the Red Army and of Soviet base areas*

In May 1928 Chu Te joined Mao Tse-tung at Ching-kan Shan with the remnant, less than 2,000 strong, of the forces which had participated in the attack on Swatow.⁷ Mao and Chu combined their forces into the famous Fourth Red Army, of which Chu became commander and Mao political commissar. Another army, the 11th Red Army, was formed out of the remnant of the forces which took part in the Canton uprising. Uprisings in southern Kiangsi, around Chi-an, in the spring of 1928 led to the formation of still another army, the Third Red Army. More troops arrived at Ching-kan Shan in the winter of 1928, following uprisings and mutinies in General Ho Chien's Kuomintang army in Hunan, and out of these emerged the famous Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai, a former Kuomintang officer. In the winter of 1927 other Communist armies were formed in eastern Hupeh under Ho Lung and in eastern Hupeh and southern Honan under Hsü Hai-tung. At the same time Soviet bases were established along the northeastern edge of Kiangsi, on the border of Fukien.

The armies at Ching-kan Shan broke through the cordon of Kuomintang troops at the beginning of 1929 and spread over southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In the course of 1929 and '30 Communist power was consolidated in these areas as well as in large sectors of northern Kiangsi and Hunan. The army was constantly enlarged, drawing its recruits partly from the peasantry, partly from troops who left the Kuomintang army. By the beginning of 1930 Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated in Kiangsi to permit the establishment of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. The Red armies in Kiangsi, Hunan and Fukien were united into the First Front Army with Chu Te as C-in-C and Mao Tse-tung as Political Commissar.

With this growth of power, however, the Comintern and Li Li-san pressed for an early attack upon Changsha and Hankow to win the first large city bases. All available forces were concentrated upon Changsha, and the Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai actually succeeded in occupying the city on 28 July 1930. But the Communists were soon driven back with heavy casualties. In this battle of Changsha, the foreign powers offered active support to the Kuomintang forces. American, British, Japanese, and Italian gunboats, having evacuated foreigners, steamed up the Hsiang River and bombarded the occupied city.

(4) *Beginning of Kuomintang "extermination" campaign*

The attack on Changsha marked the last attempt during the 1930's on the part of the Chinese Communists to invade any of the large cities. It also marked the end of the "Li Li-san line," as Mao Tse-tung scornfully called it, the Chinese policy laid down by the Comintern of "direct attack" upon Kuomintang forces.

In the years that followed the tactics of guerilla warfare as developed by Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung became standard for the Red Army. It was based on four principles:

- (1) When the enemy advances, we retreat.
- (2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them.
- (3) When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
- (4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue.

The warnings of Mao Tse-tung against the policy of "direct attack" were now amply justified. The attack on Changsha fully aroused the Kuomintang to the danger of the growing Communist power. Chiang Kai-shek began to pour reinforcements into Hunan and Kiangsi, and in December 1930 he began the "First Bandit Extermination Campaign" against the Red Army in Kiangsi. According to Mao Tse-tung the Kuomintang forces totalled over 100,000 troops, but were defeated in little more than a month by 40,000 Communist troops. In

⁷ Chu Te's force comprised the remnants of the Kuomintang 20th Division under Ho Lung, and of the 4th Army (under Chiang Pa-k'uei), and Yeh Ting's Division of the 11th Army, which had revolted on 30 July 1927 and occupied Nan-ch'ang for a few days. Driven out of Nan-ch'ang, this force marched south and attacked Swatow where it was defeated.

May 1931 the Kuomintang launched its Second Extermination Campaign with forces exceeding 200,000 troops⁸ under General Ho Ying-ch'in. It, too, was quickly defeated. In June 1931 Chiang himself took command of the Third Campaign with an army of 300,000 men.⁹ He was assisted by Generals Ho Ying-ch'in, Chu Shao-liang, and Ch'en Ming-shu. By September this campaign had been successfully countered by the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his troops.

The Red Army now entered a period of comparative peace. It had gained strength through the capture of vast quantities of modern equipment from the Kuomintang armies. The Red armies established their capital deep in the hills of south Kiangsi in the village of Jui-chin and there, on 7 November 1931, they proclaimed the creation of the "Chinese Soviet Republic." The First All-China Soviet Congress was called in December 1931, and the Central Soviet Government was established with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. Chu Te was elected C-in-C of the Red Army. "The Soviet Government in China," read the Constitution adopted by the First Congress, "declares its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally."

In the same month in which the First All-China Soviet Congress was held, over 20,000 troops of the 28th Route Army of the Kuomintang revolted in Kiangsi and joined the Reds; they were reorganized into the Fifth Army Corps. The Red Army, now having a strength of five Army Corps, began small offensives of its own. It expanded into southern Fukien and northern Kwangtung. In this same year, 1931, Red forces became active in Shensi Province, where two years later a new Soviet base was established. This, the smallest of all Soviet bases, was destined to become the refuge of all Communist forces in China.

The pattern of the Communists' control in Kiangsi and neighboring provinces resembled their control in present Japanese-occupied areas. While Kuomintang troops held the roads and the main cities, defended by thousands of pillboxes, barbed wire and trenches, the Communists held surrounding rural areas. While the size of these areas was constantly changing with the fortunes of war, the Communists laid claim in 1932-33 to 70 of Kiangsi's 81 *hsien* (counties). The most important Red Army area, the "Central Soviet District," comprised 17 *hsien* astride the Kiangsi-Fukien border, with a total population of 3,000,000. The other Soviet districts, in the Hupeh-Hunan, Hunan-Kiangsi, NE Kiangsi, Honan-Hupeh-Anhui, and Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi border areas, were all smaller, less stable, and more frequently compelled to dissolve under the pressure of repeated attacks.

The Red Armies, themselves varied no less in size and strength, both in their more or less regular formations and in the auxiliary corps of peasant Red Guards. In 1932 it was estimated that the grand total of all Red armies operating in all districts was 151,000, of whom only 97,500 had rifles. In 1934, at the beginning of the Nationalist Fifth Extermination Campaign, the Red Army in the Kiangsi-Fukien areas numbered 180,000 with perhaps 200,000 partison and Red Guards.⁹ But altogether the Reds had only about 100,000 rifles. Ho Lung's forces in the Hupeh-Hunan area numbered about 10,000. The other scattered forces were even smaller. (79)

That these insignificant peasant forces could hold out for seven years in central China, against Kuomintang forces two to seven times their number and vastly superior in armaments, is strong testimony to the capable leadership of the Communist commanders and the loyalty they enjoyed from the people. It also goes to prove the remarkable endurance and fine soldierly quality of the Chinese peasant soldier when and if he is lead by capable officers, which has been commented upon by many American military observers.

(5) *Defeat of Soviet movement in Central China*

The continued growth of Communist power, however, prompted the Nationalists to renew their efforts to win back Kiangsi. In April 1933 they began the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek appointed his best field commander, General Ch'en Ch'eng, to direct the campaign. On the recommendation of the late Gen. Von Seeckt (former C-of-S of the German army and for a time chief military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek) Ch'en Ch'eng

⁸ According to Mao Tse-tung.

⁹ One Communist source claimed 350,000 "Red Army regulars" in 1933, and about 600,000 partisans. (154) These figures, however, seem too high.

began the use of the blockhouse and fortification system against the Communists. But this campaign failed like all the previous ones. Ch'en Ch'eng is said to have stated that fighting the Reds was a "life-time job" and a "life sentence."

Finally, in October 1933, the Fifth and last Extermination Campaign was launched. Communist sources claimed that Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 900,000 troops, of whom perhaps 400,000 actively took part in the campaign in Kiangsi-Fukien and Honan-Anhui-Hupeh. This time Chiang Kai-shek built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, with interconnecting fields of machine-gun or artillery fire. His defensive-offensive strategy diminished the Reds' superiority in maneuvering, and emphasized the disadvantages of their smaller numbers and lack of resources. The Reds were unable to resist the slow advance of the Kuomintang forces which in effect ringed them in within a wall which gradually moved closer around their central base.

Nevertheless the Fifth Campaign proved inconclusive. The Kuomintang won back Kiangsi, but it failed to exterminate the Red Army. In January 1934 the Second All-China Soviet Congress convened at Juichin, and it was decided to transfer the Red Army to a new base. Preparations were made soon afterward for the "Long March." It began on 16 October 1934, just a year after Chiang Kai-shek launched his Fifth Campaign. The main forces of the Red Army, about 90,000 men, concentrated in southern Kiangsi, broke through the Kuomintang lines of fortifications in Hunan and Kwangtung, put the enemy to flight, and then started its long march westward.

The price in life paid for the reconquest of Kiangsi reached a staggering figure. The Red Army, according to Chou En-lai, suffered 60,000 casualties during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There is no figure available for the Nationalist losses. But the military casualties were nothing compared with civilian casualties. The Kuomintang is reported to have admitted that about 1,000,000 people, mostly peasants, were killed or starved to death during the Fifth Campaign. Tang Yü-jen, Secretary of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, stated in May 1934 that 9,000,000 people had been killed in Kiangsi during the period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war. The Chinese Postal Administration estimated the population of Kiangsi as 27,560,000 in 1926, the Kuomintang Government estimated it as 20,320,000 in 1936—a decrease of 7,240,000.

(6) *The Long March*

After the break-through into Kwangtung and Hunan, the Red Army, accompanied by thousands of peasants, marched through Kwangtung and Hunan. It was under constant attack. By the time it reached Kweichow it had lost one-third of its troops. Prevented by Kuomintang forces from marching north for a crossing of the Yangtze River, the Red Army turned southward and in May 1935 entered Yunnan, where Chiang Kai-shek and Governor Lung Yün were preparing to ambush them. They passed within 10 miles of Kunming in their march toward a crossing of the Yangtze River. After a famous forced march of 85 miles in 24 hours to avoid and deceive the Nationalist forces, they suddenly descended on the Chou P'ing Fort at the Yangtze River, disarmed the unsuspecting Nationalist garrison, and secured a crossing of the river.

Thence they marched through the Lolo (aborigines) forest and mountain country in western Szechwan and Sikang. Befriending the Lolos and obtaining their aid as guides, they made a rapid march toward the Ta-tu River where they defeated the forces of the Szechwan warlord, Gen. Liu Wen-hui, at An-jen-ch'ang in present Sikang. While part of the army forced a crossing of the river at this point, the main body marched 130 miles west along the Ta-tu gorges and forced a crossing of the river over an old iron bridge. The crossing of the Ta-tu bridge has gone down as one of the most famous exploits of the Chinese Red Army, for it was done under constant attack by Kuomintang airplanes trying to bomb the bridge. The bridge also had to be conquered from well-emplaced opposing forces. Many a Chinese rebel army had met its end attempting to cross the turgid Ta-tu River in face of enemy opposition. Here the last of the Tai-p'ing rebels, an army of 100,000 had been surrounded and destroyed in the 1860's. The Red Army was the first to have lived through a crossing of the Ta-tu while under fire.

From the Ta-tu River the Red forces continued their hurried march over the high mountains of western Szechwan. At Sung-p'an in northwestern Szechwan they finally paused for a rest (July 1935). The original force of 90,000 now numbered 45,000. Here the Reds reached a Soviet base which had been established in 1933 by partisan forces under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui Soviet district. Defeated by Kuomintang forces, they had marched across Honan

and Shensi to Szechwan. When the Kiangsi Reds arrived in Sung-p'an, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien commanded a force of 50,000, so that the combined Red force in western Szechwan in July 1935 was nearly 100,000.

In August 1935 the main force from Kiangsi, the First Front Army, continued its march northward. Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, remained behind with Hsü's Fourth Front Army in Szechwan for another year, to be joined by Ho Lung's Second Front Army before undertaking a march northward to Shensi. With the First Front Army went Commanders Lin Piao, P'eng Te-huai, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, and a majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Party. Under incredible difficulties, the Red forces marched through the grassland of southeastern Tsinghai, thence fighting their way through Kansu against the combined forces of the Kuomintang, the Moslems, and the "Tungpei" (northeastern) warlords in Shensi.

On 20 October 1935, one year after the start of the Long March, the Reds entered the Soviet base in northern Shensi, just below the Great Wall, and made contact with the Red armies of Shensi, 5,000 strong, under Liu Tzu-tan. The Red forces had marched 6,000 miles from their base in Kiangsi-Fukien. At their entry into Shensi they numbered less than 20,000. A year later, when Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien brought the forces from Szechwan to north Shensi, the combined Red Army totalled 90,000. At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, it numbered 100,000.

The Red Army had given a brilliant account of itself. It is doubtful, however, that it could have continued to maintain itself if the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, had pursued his policy of military annihilation of the Red forces. The only Soviet base which remained in 1936, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border area, was one of the poorest, most arid regions in China. At the end of 1936 the Generalissimo was preparing a new "blockhouse-fortress" campaign around the Soviet base in Shensi along the lines of the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi. Had he decided to open this campaign, the Communist forces would almost certainly have been either "exterminated" or forced to begin a new "long march," probably across Mongolia to Soviet Russia.

What saved them was the growth of the United Front movement against Japan, and the acceptance by the Generalissimo at the beginning of 1937 of an all-party alliance in China for united resistance against Japan.

C. PERIOD OF THE UNITED FRONT AND AFTER, 1937-1945

(1) Chinese Communist Party and Comintern sponsors of the united front movement

The first suggestion of the united front idea in China came from the Chinese Communists following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In April 1932 the Chinese Communists "declared war" on Japan. This was probably an effort to exploit the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Kuomintang armies, as a means of diverting their interest in continuing the anti-Communist campaigns. On 10 January 1933 the Chinese Red Army offered a united front to any armed force that would join it in battle against Japan. This offer was in line with the directive of the 12th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, September 1932. In regard to the Communist Party of China it directed, among other things, that it should "mobilize the masses under the slogan of the national revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and other imperialists and for the independence and integrity of China," and should work for the establishment of "an elected people's government."

These first suggestions for a united front in China did not, however, contemplate the inclusion of the Kuomintang. The program of the CCP as laid down after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria committed the Party to continue its fight for the "overthrow of the Kuomintang as the government of national betrayal" and at the same time to promote a movement for a "national revolutionary war of the armed nation against [Japan]." The Chinese Communists made it plain that they expected to emerge as the ultimate victors not only over the Kuomintang but also over Japan, for the Party declared in 1932 that "only the Soviet Government and the Red Army of China can . . . lead the national revolutionary war against the Japanese and other imperialisms and achieve full national liberation." In his report to the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July-August 1935, Ch'en Shao-yü made it plain that up to that time the Chinese Communists still did not contemplate any united front with the Kuomintang.

The Soviet Union was, however, adopting a different policy toward the Kuomintang, and in the end the Chinese Communists changed theirs to conform to

that of Soviet Russia. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a threat to Soviet Russia as much as to China proper, in addition the Soviet Union felt the threat of the rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment throughout the Western World. Therefore it became the object of Soviet diplomacy to ward off any possible attack on the Soviet Union. In the midst of her first Five-Year Plan, and seething with internal political unrest as a result of the Trotsky opposition and Kulak resistance to the collectivization campaign, Soviet Russia was in no position to take a strong stand against the aggressive nations on her frontiers in Europe and Asia. The Special Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union was, in 1932, only three years old, and it had, so far, little industrial basis. The first Five-Year Plan, 1928-1933, aimed only to establish an industrial base in western Siberia. The industrial development of eastern Siberia was projected for the second Five-Year Plan. Soviet Russia needed time.

These factors induced Soviet Russia to give up, in 1928, her policy of inciting world-wide unrest. She became increasingly a sponsor of international peace. The Communist International accordingly lent its support by serving as an instrument to neutralize the growing anti-Soviet movement in capitalist countries, and to focus the attention of all groups in the democracies on the growing danger of fascism instead of communism. The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International (1928) gave the first hint of their methods of attaining these objectives, the development by the Communist proletariat of a "temporary co-operation with the bourgeoisie." This was the first indication of the Soviet-sponsored world-wide united front movement.

In regard to the Far East, this policy at first found its expression in the discontinuance of active Soviet participation in the internal political struggle in China, and likewise in a considerable decrease in direct support of the CCP by the Comintern. When, for instance, Mr. and Mrs. Noulens were arrested in Shanghai in 1932 and convicted in Nanking as chief Far Eastern agents of the Comintern, the complete evidence which the Chinese police produced showed that total out-payments for the whole Orient (not just China) had at most not exceeded the equivalent of about U. S. \$15,000 per month. This was a pittance compared with the amounts expended during the time of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance. After 1928 the Comintern acted mainly as the directing agent, not the supporting agent, of the Communist Party of China. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Soviet Russia began to temporize with Japan while at the same time adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the Kuomintang Government in China. The crisis in Manchuria also made the Kuomintang somewhat more favorably disposed toward Soviet Russia. Diplomatic relations between China and Soviet Russia were re-established in December 1932.

It would seem that both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists believed in 1932 that Soviet China would soon emerge as the victor over Kuomintang China. The Comintern was at this time playing up the Chinese Communist movement as gaining tremendous victories, and although most of this was pure propaganda, the Chinese Red Army had proved its ability to defeat Kuomintang armies, and the new Soviet base in Kiangsi and Fukien was entering a period of considerable expansion.

However, by 1935 the world situation was developing unfavorably for the Soviet Union and Communism in general. Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese aggression were in the ascendancy. The power of the German Communist Party had been smashed by the rise of Hitler. The Chinese Red Army had been forced out of its base areas in central China. The tide against Communism and the Soviet Union was rising in all capitalist countries, with the fascist countries taking the lead in fomenting this anti-Communist movement. The fascist countries, therefore, became the chief threat to the Soviet Union and the Communist World Movement. Drastic measures were considered necessary by Communists all over the world to save the situation.

When the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International met in Moscow in July-August 1935, the united front idea was carefully developed. Among the many speeches and resolutions, the following extracts suffice to indicate the methods and aims of the united front. The "Communist International puts itself at the head of the campaign for the defense of peace and the Soviet Union." "If, thanks to the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union and the toilers of all capitalist countries, war can be delayed . . . this also will better enable the proletariat to strengthen its position in the capitalist countries, to strengthen the power of the Soviet Union . . ." While the united front movement aimed chiefly at establishing unity between all working class organizations, a prominent speaker at the Congress emphasized that ". . . under certain condi-

tions we [Communists] can and must bend our efforts to the task of drawing these parties and organizations [i. e. non-Communist organizations, rich peasants, big businessmen, petty shopkeepers, etc.] . . . to the side of the anti-fascist people's front, despite their bourgeois leadership." Since fascism was the immediate threat, the point was to create a united front between the Soviet Union and the capitalist democracies to oppose fascism and thereby weaken the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union movement in the world. However, whatever the "temporary cooperation" with the bourgeoisie which the Communists might arrange, it "must never lead to renouncing the class struggle, i. e., it cannot and must not ever be a reformist cooperation. It is the more necessary to stress this because the bourgeoisie . . . even if it is compelled at a given moment to take up arms in defense of national independence . . . is always ready to go over to the camp of the adversary in face of the danger of the war being converted into a people's war and of a mighty upsurge of the masses." This point was, as we have seen (pp. 2315-2316), endorsed and developed by Mao Tse-tung in his outline of the policy of the CCP in his booklet *NEW DEMOCRACY*.

While the Communists were urged to unite temporarily with the democratic elements and even with "big business" in the capitalist countries, it was emphasized that this did not mean that the Communists would become bourgeois-democrats. "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers. . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate." This became a cardinal point in the united front movement of the Chinese Communists. While they offered their support even to the reactionary Kuomintang, they became the foremost advocates of democracy in China—but with the purpose of turning the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

In regard to China, the Congress adopted a resolution stating that the CCP and the Chinese Red Army "must exert every effort to extend the front of the struggle for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists." Ch'en Shao-yü explained in his report to the Congress that this was to be achieved by the organization of "an All-China United People's Government of National Defense and an All-China United Anti-Japanese National Defense Army."

The Congress elected Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-tao, and Mao Tse-tung members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, with Po Ku and Kang Sin as alternate members. China and Soviet Russia had an equal (and the largest) number of representatives on the executive Committee, which shows the great importance attached to the Communist movement in China. Ch'en Shao-yü was elected a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee along with Stalin and 17 other members.

The united front principles of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern were soon put into practice by the Chinese Communists. During the time of the Long March (1935) they had tried in vain to build up a united front with the dissident Nationalist groups more or less opposed to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang dictatorship. Foremost among these groups were the Kuomintang liberals (Dr. Sun Fo, Mme. Sun Yat-sen and others), the Kuomintang (National People's Army) under Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang, the Kwangsi Military Clique under Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and the Northeastern Army (Manchurian) under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang. The failure of the united front movement in 1935 was not because of lack of response. The popular sentiment in China was strongly in favor of discontinuing the Government's anti-Communist campaign and concentrating the nation's united power against Japan. But none of the dissident Nationalist groups dared in 1935 to subscribe openly to the Communist idea of a united front. In so far as any one could see at that time the Chinese Communists were on the losing side. The Kuomintang was winning.

Following the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International the Chinese Communists changed their tactics. In January 1936 Mao Tse-tung publicly offered "the hand of friendship" to Chiang Kai-shek if he would take up arms against Japan. To those who expressed doubts concerning the avowed democratic spirit and sincerity of the Communists in offering a united front, Mao Tse-tung replied in August 1936 that the "Workers' and Peasants' Government had been renamed the People's Soviet Government" and that "the former laws about workers' control and leadership in the various enterprises have been repealed. The workers have been advised not to put up demands which may be in excess of what can be granted . . . In the non-Soviet districts it is our intention not to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle, though we are in favor

of improving the standard of living of the workers . . ." On 26 August 1936, the Chinese Communist Party wrote the Kuomintang that "We are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during . . . the great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 . . . [That] is the only proper way to save our country to-day . . ."

(2) *The Sian incident. Formation of the United Front*

Chiang Kai-shek was still not willing to accept the united front idea, but many of his field commanders were. The army opposing the Communists in the Northwest was composed of two groups. One group consisted of regular Nanking, or Central Army troops; this was the First Army under General Hu Tsung-nan, an inveterate foe of the Communists. The other group comprised former independent provincial armies, the Northeastern ("Tungpei"—Manchurian) Army under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, C-in-C of the "Bandit Suppression Commission," and the Northwestern Army ("Hsipei"—mainly Shensi provincials) under General Yang Hu-cheng. This latter group, comprising about 170,000 troops, strongly opposed continuing the anti-Communist campaign. A virtual truce with the Communists existed in their sectors, and they offered no support to the First Army in its campaign against the Communists. Partly as a result of this, the First Army suffered a severe defeat during November 1936.

A strong wave of nationalist feeling was sweeping through China at this time. The Japanese were continuing their invasion of Suiyuan Province of Inner Mongolia, which they had started in the spring of 1936, and they were expanding their influence in eastern Hopeh (including Peiping and Tientsin) and in Tsingtao. The anti-Japanese agitation among the Chinese people and Army rose to a new high pitch. The danger from the Japanese seemed much greater than that from the Communists, confined as they were to the semi-waste lands of north Shensi and adjacent areas in Kansu and Ningsia. In November, Chang Hsüeh-liang appealed to the Generalissimo to permit him to shift the Northeastern Army to the Suiyuan front to take up the defense against the Japanese.

The Generalissimo, however, insisted upon continuing the anti-Communist campaign. He had been preparing for several months for the Sixth Extermination campaign, planning to use the same blockhouse-fortress tactics as in the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934. After Hu Tsung-nan's defeat in November 1936 Chiang Kai-shek became convinced that the only requirement for final success against the Communists was unity among the army groups opposing them. It was for this purpose that Chiang together with his whole personal staff arrived at army headquarters in Sian on 7 December 1936. He talked to the Tungpei and Hsipei commanders and tried to persuade them to "destroy the Reds." "I told them," said Chiang in his own diary, "that the bandit-suppression campaign had been prosecuted to such a stage that it would require only the last five minutes to achieve the final success."

Finding no response to this viewpoint, Chiang then decided to summon a General Staff Congress on 10 December. At this Congress final plans were formally adopted to push ahead with the Sixth Campaign. It was announced that a general mobilization order for the Tungpei, Hsipei, and Nanking troops in Kansu and Shensi was to be published on the 12th. It was also openly stated that if Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang refused to comply with these orders his troops would be disarmed by Nanking forces, and he himself would be dismissed from his command. On the 11th, Chang Hsüeh-liang conferred with the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies. They agreed to take matters into their own hands. Early in the morning of 12 December Sian was occupied by their troops. Chiang's personal staff (including many of the highest Government officials), the Governors of Shensi and Kansu, and a number of members of Chiang's secret police (the "Blueshirts") were arrested. A detachment of Tungpei and Hsipei troops went to the Lintung hot springs, 10 miles from Sian, where the Generalissimo stayed. He was captured and brought back to Sian where he became the involuntary guest of Marshal Chang and Gen. Yang Hu-cheng.

On the same day the rebel headquarters at Sian issued a circular telegram to the Chinese Government and people demanding among other things reorganization of the Government to admit all parties, an end of civil war and immediate adoption of a policy of armed resistance against Japan, the guarantee to the people of liberty of assembly and pardon of political prisoners. The Communists announced their support of this program. On the 14th the rebels announced from Sian that all orders for war against the Red Army were cancelled and that an

anti-Japanese Army had been formed comprising Tungpei, Hsipei and Red Army troops.

It is unnecessary to go into details on the events of the following days in Sian. Suffice it to state that Chiang Kai-shek for the first time in 10 years met with Communist delegates, among them Chou En-lai. Chou greeted him as C-in-C. Several conferences were held between 17 and 25 December between Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng and the Communist delegates. Meanwhile negotiations were carried on between Sian and Nanking for an agreement on the Government's policy toward the rebels, the Communists, and Japan, and for the release of the Generalissimo. Among others, T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, arrived in Sian on 20 December. As a member of the liberal "American" group in the Kuomintang, which sympathized with the united front movement, he was favored by the rebels. On the 22nd Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also arrived in Sian. So also did Gen. Tai Li, the head of the "Blue Shirts." No details of the discussions have ever been officially released, but it seems certain that the rebels and the Communists received assurances from Chiang Kai-shek that the civil war would be stopped, and that Chiang would give his support to the united front movement. This being the case, the Communists and Chang Hsüeh-liang offered him their support. The Tungpei army officers were unwilling, however, to release Chiang. They demanded his death. The Communists dissuaded them. W. H. Donald, Chiang's Australian advisor, who was the first to arrive in Sian from Nanking to arrange for the Generalissimo's release, and who took a prominent part in the negotiations, has stated that Chou En-lai "was actually the one man who enabled Chiang to depart unharmed from the 1936 Sian kidnapping."

On 25 December Chiang Kai-shek flew back to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsüeh-liang. Chang Hsüeh-liang went with the Generalissimo to the capital to "await punishment." It was a typical Chinese gesture aimed at giving the Generalissimo "face" after his humiliating experience in Sian. Chang has been held a prisoner ever since.

The sequel to this was the conclusion of the united front agreement, or rather "understanding" (no signed agreement seems to have been made). In March 1937 the Kuomintang, while announcing that it would continue its policy to "uproot the Communists," laid down its formal terms for accepting the Communists' submission: (1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the Military Affairs Commission (National Military Council); (2) Dissolution of the Soviet Republic; (3) Cessation of all Communist propaganda; (4) Suspension of the class struggle. No written agreement seems to have been made for the recognition or legalization of the Communist party.¹⁰ The Chinese Communists formally acceded to these terms on 15 March 1937.

The Chinese Communists did not, however, accede without Soviet Russian approval. In the Moscow magazine *Bolshevik* of 15 April 1937, Ch'en Shao-yü, member of the Presidium of the Comintern, presented an article giving Moscow's answer to Kuomintang's demands. Ch'en stated that Moscow would be willing to see the Chinese Red Army turned into a National Revolutionary Army, retaining its corps of officers and political workers, and to have it incorporated into a "Chinese United National Revolutionary Army, which would be subordinate to a single command." Moscow would be willing to see the Soviet power in China turned into a "general democratic power acting in concert with the United All-China Central Government," and to regard such a development as a real change in the character of the Chinese Soviets. Ch'en indicated that Moscow was ready to accept the demand for cessation of "red propaganda" provided the phrase would be taken to mean what it says and would not be applied to all sorts of views which have little or nothing to do with real Communism. In regard to the fourth point (suspension of the class struggle), Ch'en pointed out that the class struggle produced the Communist movement and not vice versa, and that "at the present time" the Communists were doing nothing to disunite Chinese society. An official American source commented that

¹⁰ The documents concerning the united front negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists have never been published. It seems, however, that the Communists believed for a time that the Kuomintang had extended legal recognition of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung said at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, 12 Oct. 1938: "... The next day [25 Sept. 1937] the Kuomintang, the Central Government, and the highest leader of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, made public the conversation in which the legal existence of the Communist Party of China was recognized and a united front for national salvation was formed."

Ch'en's article showed that the policy of the CCP not only enjoyed the support of Moscow "but was probably laid down in the Kremlin." Mao Tse-tung stated in 1928 that "the Communist International is in complete agreement with the new political line of the Communist Party of China. For the victory of the Chinese people, the Communist International has called upon all the Communist Parties of all nations to support and give aid to China's Anti-Japanese War."

Although no formal agreement seems to have been signed between the Communists and the Kuomintang,¹¹ the Red Army base was designated by the Chinese Government in September 1937 as a garrison area comprising 23 *hsien* (counties) and designated as the Shen-Ken-Ning Border Region.¹²

By order of the Central Government, the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army with Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Vice Commander, and Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng as division commanders. Chu Te was appointed Deputy Commander of the Second War Zone (including Shansi) under the Kuomintang General Wei Li-huang, in August 1937. The Central Government also decided that the Eighth Route Army should be organized into three divisions (known as the 115th (Lin Piao), 120th (Ho Lung), and 129th (Liu Po-ch'eng) divisions), and that it should be permitted to levy troops until its strength reached 45,000 men. The Government began paying a regular subsidy to the Eighth Route Army on the basis of this number of troops (CN \$600,000 per month, the standard pay allowance for three divisions, plus a meager allowance of ammunition).¹³

Actually, however, the Eighth Route Army seems to have numbered around 100,000 men at the time. (The name of the army was later changed to Eighteenth Group Army, a name which the Communists have seldom used.)

On 22 September 1937 the Communists issued a proclamation from Yanan formally dissolving the Soviet Republic, and affirming their adherence to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and their unity with the Kuomintang. The next day Chiang Kai-shek gave them his approval. By that time the Japanese armies had already spread far into north China and intense fighting raged in Shanghai. In this way the united front was established. It should be added, however, that already before the Kuomintang-Communist united front had been established in September 1937, other dissident Chinese groups had joined the Government for united resistance against Japan. Thus the united front included all resistance groups in China.

(3) *United Front action, 1937-1940*

(a) *Communists expand in North and Central China.*—Following the occupation of Peiping on 28 July 1937, the advance of the Japanese armies through North China was exceedingly rapid. By the end of the year all the main cities and their connecting railways in Hopeh, Shansi, and the provinces of Suiyuan and Chahar in Inner Mongolia had been taken by the Japanese. Tsinan, provincial capital of Shantung, was occupied on 27 December 1937, Tsingtao on 10 January 1938.

The collapse of the Chinese provincial and Central Government armies north and east of the Yellow River was nearly complete by the end of 1937. While the Japanese set up a Chinese puppet administration, and through this and their army authorities maintained a measure of order in their occupied zones in north China, the rural areas around these zones fell prey to ravaging hordes of Japanese soldiers engaged in grain confiscations and "mopping up" operations against Communists and remnants of Chinese provincial forces, roving units of disorganized Chinese soldiers who had turned bandits, and bandit groups formed out of peasants who had collected arms on various battle fields.

It was into this "no-man's land" that the (Communist) Eighth Route Army moved and began to restore order and unity. It fought the Japanese in cooperation with the forces of General Yen Hsi-shan (Governor of Shansi) and other non-Communist Chinese forces. For the most part, however, the Eighth Route Army fought on its own, even though it offered supporting action to other Chinese forces. The regular provincial and Central Army forces preferred to fight the

¹¹ Not having extended legal recognition of the CCP, the Kuomintang does not sign agreements with the CCP. It issues orders or demands which the Communists either accept or refuse.

¹² Between 1937 and '39, Central Government troops invaded and reoccupied five of these *hsien*. By November 1940, the Communists had full control over 16 *hsien* and partial control over 3 *hsien*—total 19—of which three *hsien* were in Kansu, one on the Shensi-Suiyuan border, the rest in North Shensi.

¹³ This was the amount paid during the first three years of the war, until all payments were discontinued in 1940.

Japanese from fixed positions and prepared front-line defenses. This invariably led to their defeat and cost them tremendous casualties, because they had neither air support nor the modern mechanized equipment and artillery necessary to counter the Japanese superiority in fire power. The Communists refused to fight on these terms, and concentrated on the guerrilla tactics and mobile warfare which had gained them outstanding success in the past against the superior Kuomintang forces. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army gained a victory over two Japanese divisions in the famous battle of P'ing-hsin Kuan (Pass) in eastern Shansi, which has been described by German military journals as "a classic of mobile warfare." This victory delayed the Japanese in their advance toward T'ai-yüan, capital of Shansi Province. It netted the Communists considerable quantities of arms.

It was, however, not so much occasional victories over the Japanese that contributed to the supply of arms to the Communist forces, as the defeats suffered by the regular Central Army and provincial forces which opposed the Japanese in the initial stage of the war. Tens of thousands of rifles were left by fallen and fleeing Chinese soldiers on the battle fields in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, and Suiyuan. The Chinese Communists collected vast quantities of these abandoned arms and munitions, and used them to replenish their own supplies and to arm guerrilla units and local self-defense corps which they organized among the peasants. Before the end of 1937 the Communist forces had infiltrated into and restored a measure of order in scattered guerrilla areas in northern and eastern Shansi, southern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, and Central and Southern Hopeh. By early spring of 1938 Eighth Route Army columns had entered Shantung east of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. This was outside the operational limits assigned to them by the National Government (North Shansi, part of Hopeh). At the same time five groups of Communist organizers were operating in the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhui area near Japanese-occupied zones. Next to the Japanese, the Communists held the dominant military power in Shansi and Hopeh.

The Eighth Route Army was, however, not the only factor in the restoration of order in North China outside Japanese-controlled areas, and the organization of guerrilla warfare and of base areas from which to carry on the struggle against Japan. When the provincial and Central Army forces fled, most of the higher government officials and the wealthy families also fled. With the advance of the Communist forces, many more wealthy families of merchants and landlords fled, fearing that they would be killed by the Communists. Most of these latter sought safety in Japanese-occupied cities. Left to themselves, the people improvised some organization. The villagers organized self-defense units against bandits, and in many places the leading men of the *hsien* (or county) called a meeting to elect a new *hsien* magistrate to replace the official who had fled. The National Salvation Association, formed by Mme. Sun Yat-sen and other patriotic leaders in 1932 as a non-partisan organization for the establishment of a united or "popular front" against Japan,¹⁴ and other similar patriotic organizations, also played a considerable role in the re-establishment of order in rural areas outside Japanese-occupied zones. The Communist political agents got in touch with these patriotic societies to re-establish the *hsien* administration. The Communist Party and those patriotic societies became the nucleus for the Mobilization Committees (Tung Yuan Hui) which became the highest local government during the period of the war.

After the fall of T'ai-yüan in November 1937, some of the Shansi provincial leaders retreated with Governor Yen Hsi-shan to southern Shansi, while others fled to the Wu-t'ai Mountains in Northeastern Shansi, where the Eighth Route Army had established a base. One of these, Sung Shao-wen, the chairman of the Civil and Military Training Committee and of the Propaganda Section of the Shansi Provincial Government, conferred with General Nieh Jung-chen, the Communist commander of the region; together they developed the idea of forming a regional emergency government. They obtained Yen Hsi-shan's approval. This led to the famous Fu-p'ing Conference in the Wu-t'ai Mountain region of Western Hopeh, 9-15 January 1934. It was a united front conference attended by 148 delegates from 39 *hsien*, representing 28 organizations. Of the 28, the Communists appear to have had predominant influence in 19 organizations. These included 7 mass organizations (composed of peasants, workers and students),

¹⁴ This organization was banned in Kuomintang-controlled China.

10 military organizations and mobilization committees, the Communist Party (1 vote), and "Local Communists" (1 vote). About 90 of the 148 delegates represented Communist-sponsored organizations. The Conference included delegates from Governor Yen Hsi-shan and from General Cheng Chien, Commander of the First War Zone (including Hopeh) and concurrently Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Although some delegates to this Conference were Kuomintang members, the Kuomintang Party as such was, significantly, not represented.

The Fu-p'ing Conference emphasized the opportunities for guerrilla warfare. Members of both the Kuomintang and the CCP spoke of the cooperation of their parties for the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic China. The Conference passed resolutions for the setting up of a "border government" comprising parts of Shansi, Hopeh, and Chahar provinces, with the status of a provincial government under the Central Government, and for the establishment of a united and armed people's self-defense army. It elected a Central Executive Committee of nine members for the new government with Sung Shao-wen, a non-partisan, as Chairman. Of the other eight members four were non-partisans, one a member of both the Kuomintang and the CCP, one a member of the Kuomintang exclusively, and two (including General Nieh Jung-chen) members of the CCP exclusively. A telegram approving the new government was received from Chiang Kai-shek on 30 January 1938; on 1 February Dr. H. H. Kung, newly appointed President of the Executive Yuan, wired the Government's confirmation.

Thus the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government (Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'ü) was established with its capital at Fu-p'ing. It was the first of several similar Communist-sponsored border governments to be established in North and Central China. Its titular leader was a non-partisan¹⁵, but its real leader was the Communist General Nieh Jung-chen. In fact, an American newspaper correspondent who visited the Border Government area early in 1938 reported as his impression that the new organization was headed by General Nieh.

(b) *Democracy as practiced by the Chinese Communists.*—The system of democratic united front government introduced into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region became the model for all Communist-led areas in China. The government was organized on a non-partisan basis: political parties could be represented, but the party line of each participating party was not stressed. No member of the government administration needed to reveal his party affiliation provided he was willing to cooperate in the anti-Japanese program. The system of government emphasized the principles of democracy, self-government, and united front action against Japan by all parties and population groups. The people were rallied under the slogan: "He who has strength gives strength, he who has money gives money, he who has knowledge gives skill in the united front against Japan."

The basic unit of the political organization was the village Mobilization Committee (variously called Village Committee For Armed Resistance Against Japan, Self Defense Government, People's Resistance Committee, People's Committee). The "village" is composed of approximately 3,000 people and includes between 1,500-2,000 voters. This "village" is the "administrative village" which consists of approximately 10 normal villages. The village Mobilization Committee had its counterpart in each higher administrative unit, the chü (town), the hsien, the sub-military region within each border region, and in the Border Region Government itself, where it was subordinate only to the Border Government Council. Members were elected and included gentry and peasants. In the village Committees only local people could serve. The Mobilization Committee held the supreme executive power. It had power within its area of control to requisition man power, skilled workers, money, food, clothing, and weapons. It fed and housed all loyal troops in its area of control. It maintained guards at every village and crossroad. The local militia was under its command. It issued passports to authorized travellers, and identification cards to local people. As the administration in the Communist-controlled areas became better organized many of the functions of the Mobilization Committees were taken over by the Village Delegates' Assembly.

Parallel to the Mobilization Committees, the Communists promoted the establishment of People's Congresses (or Citizens' General Assembly). Villagers elect their own Congress from among local people, several villages elect the members of the chü Congress, the people of the several chü comprising a hsien elect the members of the hsien Congress, and so on up to the Border Region Congress. The Army also elects a few members to each of these Congresses. All elections

¹⁵ Sung Shao-wen is still chairman of the Chin Ch'a Chi Border Government. Some reports list him as a Kuomintang member. By his own statement in 1938 he is a non-partisan.

are by secret ballot. It took several years, however, to develop the election system, and it was not until January 1943 that the first Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, properly elected by all sub-districts, was held.

These People's Congresses provide a sounding board for public opinion. The Border Region Congress elects the members of the Border Government Council. It ratifies constitutions for various mass organizations. But in so far as is known the several Border Region Congresses have only a limited measure of legislative power, although they claim to exercise the highest legislative power within the Border Regions. Nominally the two main Border Region governments (Shensi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia, the only ones that have obtained official recognition from the National Government) are under the Government in Chungking and are independent of the CCP. Actually they are under the Communist Party, which holds the supreme power in all Communist-sponsored Border Regions. The Communist Party Headquarters (the Central Executive Committee and the Politbureau under the Central Executive Committee) at Yenan is the highest policy making organ. It is the highest authority over the Communist Army. It also plans the social, political, and economic life of the Border Regions. These plans are not, however, handed down as orders to the Border Region Congresses; instead they are submitted through a Communist or pro-Communist member of the Border Region Congress concerned for a vote.

The civil government is linked with the Communist Party and Army by the Political Commissars, who rank with the Military Commanders of each Communist army unit. They represent the Communist Party. Beside their duties in the regular army units, they are responsible for the organization of the people's militia and for the supervision of the political training of the Army and the people in the areas behind the enemy lines. Thanks to this dual influence each Political Commissar occupies the Key position in controlling the military and civil administration of the area to which he is assigned. Thus he is able to insure that the decisions of the democratic border governments do not deviate from the policies laid down by the Communist Party. The strong influence of the Army Political Commissars over the civil government is shown by an example from the (Communist) New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu Province. A report of conditions there in 1944 states that if two villages have some dispute which they are unable to decide between themselves, and which cannot be satisfactorily decided by the regional government, the matter will finally reach the Political Commissar of the New Fourth Army who will then make the final decision. This decision will be returned to the People's Congress and it in turn will vote upon the issue. The report states that the functions of the Political Commissar in such matters might be compared with that of a Supreme Court.

From the very beginning of the Communists' expansion into North China, they took a particularly active interest in the development of mass organizations. When the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government was formed, they had already established the Farmers' National Salvation Association, Women's National Salvation Association, Workers' National Salvation Association, Young Men's National Salvation Association, the Little Vanguard, and the People's Self-Defense Corps, embracing all men between the ages of 18 and 48. Later Communist-sponsored trade unions were developed which by now (March 1945) comprise about 600,000 members in all of China. The purpose of these organizations was to educate the farmers to defend themselves and to share their wealth with the Eighth Route Army. Already by early spring of 1938, after only four months of activities, it was estimated that about 1,000,000 people out of a total of 7,000,000 people in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region had been enrolled in the mass organizations, and that half a million men had been armed and were serving in the local militia forces.

The Communists were no less active in developing the educational system. They organized courses to teach the illiterate masses 1,000 characters which would enable them to read simple books and newspapers, and re-established schools for children, universities and military academies. All textbooks were edited by the CCP. A vast propaganda program was set in motion, utilizing mass meetings, propaganda posters, theatrical plays (probably the most effective method of indoctrinating the illiterate masses), and the dissemination of newspapers, magazines, and books. The central theme of this propaganda was anti-Japanism, but it also emphasized the meaning of the united front, democracy, and the struggle against imperialism and fascism. Eighth Route Army officers gave courses in guerrilla warfare in the towns and villages. Teachers and political propagandists were active throughout the Border Regions. "K'ai Hui" ("as-

semble for a meeting") became one of the most commonly heard phrases in Communist China. Every moment of spare time was used for political indoctrination, school work, and military training. The people came to see the need of these meetings, although at first some accepted them only as a wartime necessity. Questioned in 1938 by an American correspondent, the members of one Mobilization Committee said that the general opinion was that it was a good thing to give power to the people, but that in peace time they did not want to spend so much of their time at meetings.

What in the final analysis won the people for the Communists and the Eighth Route Army was, however, not so much their political program as their economic program. The abolition of the Communist program of land confiscation, as a condition for the conclusion of the united front with the Kuomintang, did not prevent the Red leaders from making some very shrewd bids for mass support. The land of all landlords who had fled to Peiping, Tientsin, Tai-yuan, and the other large cities in Japanese-occupied China (and most of the big landlords had fled) was guaranteed to be the owner's property, but was "temporarily" used by the new Border Government. This land was distributed among the poor and among refugees from villages which the Japanese had burned. The Border Government collected the rents and promised to repay the landlord in full whenever he returned. These rents became a large source of revenue for the new government. The property of traitors who accepted office under the Japanese was confiscated by the Border Government and distributed among the poor. All rents were arbitrarily lowered 25 percent in some areas, more or less in others. A three-year moratorium on all debts was declared in 1938, and interest during the three-year period was fixed at only one percent annually. The maximum interest rate for new loans was set at 10 percent per year, which was a great reduction of the prevailing usury rates. The land of all farmers who had no animals was plowed by Eighth Route Army cavalry horses, and the farmers were assisted by Eighth Route Army troops. Any refugees within the Border Region areas who did not have enough food to last until the harvest were fed by the Mobilization Committee. The system of requisition used by the Mobilization Committee in collecting food and cloth for the army was so organized that the burden did not fall upon the poor. In some areas each member of a family was allowed three *mou* of land (about half an acre) unassessed. In other words, in a family of five, 15 *mou* (a large holding in China) bore no assessment. All people owning more than that minimum shared public expenses proportionately to their holdings. Since more than half of the population had less than the minimum amount of land, the burden of taxation fell on the well-to-do. The Communists called this "Ho Li Fu Tan" (reasonable bearing of responsibility). Without in any way violating the agreement of Kuomintang to abandon their radical land program, the Communists succeeded in winning the support of a large proportion of the poorest farmers, whose land holdings became dependent upon the maintenance of the Communist-sponsored government.

A new taxation system was introduced in 1942 based on a progressive income and property tax, with rates varying from 7 percent of income for the lowest tax paying group to 65 percent for the highest income group. In 1943 the exemption limit was lowered and the rate on high incomes reduced. The taxes were (and still are) payable largely in grain. It should be added that although these rates favor the poor they are not discriminatory against the rich. One wealthy landlord stated in 1943 that his taxes were lower than during the old regime.

As sponsors of such an economic program in a country where the overwhelming majority of the people were debt ridden, and impoverished by exorbitant taxes and rents, the Chinese Communists could not fail to gain a tremendous popular following. The Eighth Route Army in North China came soon to be considered the benefactor and saviour of the people not only against the Japanese, but also against the rule of landlords and the former warlords who had held supreme sway over North China. As one official American observer in Communist-controlled North China recently said, the peasant appears not only willing but even enthusiastic about pay-taxes "because he is doing it for the Army, which is protecting him and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels that he is getting something in return for his money or goods." It is not the ideology of Communism as such that impresses the people. It is the practical results of Communist leadership. A Communist leader said recently: "Communism to the people means freedom—freedom to have meetings, to discuss things with the landlord and government officials, freedom to elect their own representatives. This is a way of life they have never known, and they like it for it has done things for them. This is all that they can understand. This is all Communism really means to them." (142) (143)

The members of the mass organizations and local militia are certain to vote in favor of almost any plan the Communists sponsor. These plans have in general proved of benefit to the people.

The fact of the existence of a state of war helped the Communists to put their economic program into practice. Because of the war the entire economic effort could readily be focussed on support of the Eighth Route Army and other military forces in the Border Regions, for the defense of the people against the Japanese. Had the Japanese followed a policy of conciliation with the Chinese, and of economic reconstruction in ravaged areas, it is doubtful that the Communists could have succeeded so well as they did. There is no question that some of the Japanese military leaders genuinely desired to conciliate the people,

But their influence was not (and has never been) strong enough to enforce conciliatory behaviour in the Japanese Army. When Japanese troops entered a village, one of their first demands was for women. There was usually looting, and even when there was no resistance men of military age were frequently killed. As one private observer who visited the Shansi Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in 1938 stated: "If the Japanese had offered peace and security it would have been hard to rouse the peasants to patriotic self sacrifice, but refugees going to their relatives and friends have spread throughout the country the association of the Japanese with murder, rape, and looting, and the peasant is prepared to defend his home if not his country." The Japanese reply to guerrilla war was a policy of frightfulness. It drove the people into the arms of the Communists, because they undertook to organize the rural areas for defense after the regular Chinese armies had been defeated and had fled. The people subscribed fully to the Communists' answer to those who doubted their ability to fight the superior Japanese forces: "If we don't fight, what happens? The Japanese kill us anyway. If we fight, let's see what happens." By sustaining the anti-Japanese War the Communists won the people's sympathy, and gained immeasurably in political and military power through popular support.

The rapid rise of Communist power in North China induced an American official in China to remark at the beginning of 1938: "Thus the net result of Japan's 'holy war' to insure the peace of the orient by stamping out communism in China has apparently been to place the Chinese Reds in a position many times more favorable than they could ever have hoped to attain under the Chinese Government as it existed before the outbreak of hostilities."

The importance which the Communists attach to their economic program as a political weapon is shown by the fact that they consider it to be basic. The democratic self-government program plays a secondary, supporting role. It brings all classes together, and forces the landlord-merchant class into active participation in and hence support of the economic program. For if the landlords try to obstruct the economic program the people will vote against them and the landlords may lose whatever power and influence they possess. As one observer recently put it: "The landlord-capitalist group was driven to active participation to preserve its own interests."

This economic program explains, in large part, why the Communists can operate their democratic government system with a minimum of direct participation in government organs by Communist Party members, and why, during the first two years of the united front movement, they could leave considerable areas in North China under the control of cooperating Kuomintang generals and warlords without any danger of impairment of their own power.

An example (which may in part explain why Kuomintang generals now fear to engage in united front action with the Communists) is the experience of General Wan Fu-lin, then Commander of the 53rd Army, in the central Hopeh area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. He attended the Fu-p'ing Conference with the remnants of his troops in January 1938. General Wan was an old warlord from Manchuria, but a patriotic man who refused to compromise with the Japanese and put up a stubborn (and costly) resistance along the Peiping-Hankow Railway in Hopeh Province. Returning to Central Hopeh from the Fu-p'ing Conference, he was accompanied by a "political director" from the Eighth Route Army. Together they organized the area and recruited a new army. The work was as much political as military. In the suppression of banditry, at that time rampant in Central Hopeh, fighting was sometimes necessary. Some bandit groups were won over and incorporated into the army and the rest were forced to move east and north in advance of the new government forces. At the end of April 1938 only small areas in Central Hopeh still contained bandits. Simultaneous with this military occupation of Central Hopeh by Wan Fu-lin's forces, political organizers were sent to each village, and they

arranged for the election of Mobilization Committees, the formation of units of the People's Self-Defense Corps, and other mass organizations. These mass organizations gave such support to the Communist sponsored economic reforms that within about a year the Communists obtained the dominant position in Central Hopeh. And since the new 53rd Army was recruited from the local people and obtained its political indoctrination from the Communist political director, it became as loyal to the Communists as the people as a whole. Exactly what happened to General Wan in the course of 1938 is not known. In April 1939, however, he was reported to have been "relieved" from his command. By that time the Eighth Route Army was in full control of General Wan's former areas in Central Hopeh. In 1942 Wan was appointed a member of the National Military Council at Chungking. The remnants of the original (Manchurian) troops of the 53rd Army who refused to accept Communist control were driven out of North China by the Eighth Route Army. They reformed themselves as the 53rd Army in areas outside Communist control. In 1941 this army was in Hopeh. In 1944 and 1945 it fought on the Salween front. This anti-Japanese Manchurian army who had welcomed cooperation from the Communists was driven out from Manchuria by the Japanese in the early 1930's, and driven out from north China by the Japanese and the Communists in separate campaigns in the late 1930's. It marched clear across China toward Burma to continue its fight against Japan. There can be little wonder that experiences like this have made many leaders in the Chungking army distrustful of any united front arrangements with the Chinese Communists.

Units of Central Government forces have, on several occasions, cooperated with Communist forces in fighting the Japanese. But as a general rule, they have maintained their identity only when fighting in Central Government areas. But when they have tried to fight the Japanese in Communist-sponsored border region areas they have either lost their identity through absorption into Communist forces, or been expelled from the Communist areas. (134).

In the border regions it is only the Communist Party which has a large-scale party organization. At present this organization includes over 1,200,000 party members, of whom the Communists claim that more than half are peasants. (152) The Kuomintang is permitted to function in the border regions, and in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government there are still a number of Kuomintang representatives. As late as 1943 there was even a Kuomintang office which ranked as a provincial office, but it had very limited resources. Its only publication was a fortnightly paper which had a small circulation. The Kuomintang contested elections to the Border Region Congress in 1940 (the Congress was not convened until 1943) but it did not put forward any party candidates in the village elections. The Kuomintang lacks a well integrated organization in Communist areas, and since most of the initiative and most of the popular following lies with the Communist Party, it is doubtful that the Kuomintang could expand even if it adopted a liberal policy in Communist areas and tried, in this way, to compete with the Communists. Actually most Kuomintang members in the border region governments are liberals.

The policy of the Communists is to have one-third Communists, one-third upper-class individuals (landlords and merchants), and one-third Kuomintang and non-party progressives elected to government posts. In 1944, of the 47 members of the Yen-an Municipal Council, seventeen were Communist party members, five Kuomintang members, twenty-one non-partisans or members of other parties and groups (or mass organizations), two protestants, and one Catholic.

This system supports the claim of the Communists that they are maintaining a democratic, united front government. But no real opposition toward the Communists could, it appears, develop from any other party or class or group, since the electoral vote is controlled by the masses and the masses are controlled by the Communists. Anyone is free to stand as a candidate, but in practice nearly all the candidates are proposed by the mass movement associations and the choice offered the electors is usually limited. For instance, in one *hsien* which elected six representatives to the Border Region Congress, there were only eight candidates.

The Communists' control of (or loyalty from) the masses, combined with universal suffrage, is the chief cause of Communist power and political and military control. It is also the cause of their great expansion of influence, for the masses welcome the Communists as their benefactors and will support them against their former rulers. But this type of democracy has by its very nature created an atmosphere which rules out opposition and makes it nearly impossible for any other party to exist except as a minority party. A capable

English observer, who is a strong sympathizer with the Chinese Communists and has lived in Communist areas since the end of 1941, recently commented upon the expansion of the influence of the Communists and their growing power in relation to the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. He stated that "If the Kuomintang doesn't reform it seems to me that there is a very big probability of China coming under exclusive Communist control which would be a pity in many ways as I feel that the real weakness of the democratic system here [in Communist-controlled China] is that there is not enough real discussion which comes from having no real opposition party."

In the final analysis, the democratic system in the Communist-controlled Border Regions is predominantly a "democracy of the toilers" (see p. 2327) sponsored and led by the Communist Party. Members of the middle classes are permitted to vote and are not, in so far as is known, discriminated against or persecuted. But they have lost their pre-war positions of leadership, and must now follow the masses, who are under Communist guidance. In January 1941 Mao Tse-tung said that the "bourgeois revolution" should be supported and led by the proletariat under Communist guidance. This objective has been fulfilled.

Non-Communist parties are permitted to exist if they conform to the policies of the CCP as carried out through the Communist-controlled Border Governments. Thus the Kuomintang is permitted to function in the Border Regions. But it cannot establish itself as a party competing with the CCP. Furthermore, the Kuomintang members who participate in the Border Region governments are those in sympathy with the policy laid down by the CCP. Individuals who openly voice their opposition to the CCP and work against the Communists are outlawed. Even Communists must adhere to the prescribed "party line;" Trotskyites get short shrift. When Mao Tse-tung outlined the democratic policy of the CCP in 1938 he declared: "In the new situation of the war the traitors, spies, Trotskyites, and Japanophiles . . . must be suppressed according to law without leniency."

This insistence upon conformity has not been abandoned in the "democratic" program, nor do the Chinese Communists appear to consider it inconsistent with their claim that they permit freedom of thought and expression. A 20-point "Practical Political Program" which was ratified by the first formal People's Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region in January 1943 included as point 6: "Guarantee freedom of speech, association, belief, press, residence; guarantee freedom from illegal arrest." But point 17 states: "Suppress followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, Trotskyites, and other treacherous cliques. Confiscate and use their property." Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the former leader of the CCP, is a Trotskyite. He was released by Chang Kai-shek from a Kuomintang prison in 1937, but he remained until his death in 1942 in controlled China, in Szechwan. In Communist China his followers are outlaws.

The system of democratic united front government as introduced by the Communists emphasizes the political role of the mass organizations and trade unions, rather than of political parties. The mass organizations, in which the Communist Party has predominant influence, sponsor plans for political and economic reform which are then put to a vote in the various People's Congresses and government councils. There again the mass organizations and Communist sympathizers hold the controlling vote. Thanks to this system the Communist Party maintains absolute leadership. The close connection between the people and the Communist Army, and the important role of the Political Commissars of the Army as a link between the military and civil administration, provide additional safeguards for insuring the leadership of the CCP.

The Communists are able to maintain their position of control primarily because of the capable leadership and strong discipline existing within the CCP. In outlining the war-time functions of the CCP in 1938 Mao Tse-tung said: "... we [Communists] must have iron discipline in the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army. Discipline guarantees that we will adhere to our Party policies. Without discipline the Party cannot lead the army and the masses toward victory. . . . It is necessary to place the [Party] organization before the individual, the majority over the minority, upper Party functionaries over the lower, and the Central Committee over the entire Party. This is the Party's centralized democracy."

There is no question that the Chinese Communists have produced the best organized movement modern China has seen, and have knit the people together in support of the Communist Party and Army as no other government in modern China has been able to do. At the same time it is clear that the term "democracy,"

when used to describe the Communist regime, has a meaning different from the ordinary American understanding of the term. While the Chinese Communist system is not altogether a "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is far more akin to Soviet democracy, as outlined in the constitution of the Soviet Union, than to the democracy practiced in the United States and Britain.

(c) *The high point of the Kuomintang-Communist united front; the Hankow Period, 1938.*—It was inevitable that the Chinese Communists, with their concept of a united front movement as involving economic reform, improvements of class relations, development of local self-government, formation of mass organizations of peasants, workers, and students, and democratic cooperation between these and all political resistance parties, should soon clash with the Kuomintang. There were many points in the Communist-sponsored program that agreed with the officially accepted policy of the Kuomintang as laid down in Sun Yet sen's *Sun Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the people—Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood). In a sense the Communists also became more representative of the Kuomintang's officially accepted policy than the Kuomintang itself. For whereas the Communists acted, in many respects, in conformity with the Three Principles of the People, the Kuomintang not only did not put them into practice, but was opposed to any party or group which tried to do so. It had started as the leading revolutionary party of China. It led the great Kuomintang-Communist "united front" revolution of the 1920's. But beginning 1927, in the course of its struggle to prevent the Communists from gaining the leadership of the revolution, it ceased to be a revolutionary party. It became the leader of all the feudal, reactionary forces in China which it had originally set out to destroy. It persecuted and alienated from itself not only the Communists, but also the liberal-democratic groups within the Kuomintang and in Nationalist parties outside the Kuomintang. These groups were genuinely interested in putting the Three Principles of the People into practice, not, like the Communists, as a preliminary to the introduction of communism in China, but as a means of introducing democracy as an end in itself.

The characterization of the Kuomintang given by an American official in China in 1935 is worth quoting, not only because it holds true to this day, but also because it explains much of the inter-party friction which has characterized the united front from its beginning in 1937, and become increasingly acute with the passage of time. "Chiang Kai-shek," he wrote, "is no revolutionary and therein lies the reason for the decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party. If Chiang was a revolutionary at any time he lost that character the instant he came to power or before. He undoubtedly longs for a great, free, and prosperous China. But China must arrive at this state under his personal control.

"What was the reaction upon the Kuomintang of this state of affairs? It was just what might have been expected. As soon as events demonstrated that the revolution was dead as far as the leader was concerned, the revolutionary spirit among the rank and file gave up the ghost. The real revolutionaries withdrew from party activity or went South to set up the rival Canton government of 1931,¹⁰ and left control of the party to the 'practical politicians' and job seekers. The schism of 1931 left not a real revolutionary leader in the Central Kuomintang councils. All that remained at Nanking were personal henchmen of the dictator . . . Some of the old time revolutionists came back to the party after the rape of Manchuria in 1931, driven solely by their patriotic desire to unite in opposition to Japan. How they were betrayed at Nanking is a matter of history.

"To suppress whatever of the old revolutionary idea was left within the party the secret society known as the 'Blue Shirts' was organized within the party itself. This clique is supposed to be animated by but one purpose, complete and unquestioning support of Chiang Kai-shek as dictator. It conducts its operations after the fashion well exemplified by the fascist parties of the West, or better still by the old American Ku Klux Klan. Murder and threat of murder are used to bring into line such party members or officials as cherish ideas inimical to the dictator.

"The Kuomintang at present strongly resembles the political machines in the United States, such as Tammany Hall or the Republican clubs of Pennsylvania.

¹⁰ This refers to the Canton dissension movement which started in April 1931. Dr. Sun Fo and many other liberals left Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Sun, Eugene Ch'en, Chou Lu, Wang Ching-wei (leader of the left-wing Kuomintang), Tang Shao-yi, and other liberals established a new Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Canton, competing with that of the Kuomintang right-wing under Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. Peace between the two groups was re-established after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, following a promise by the Nanking Government that "elected representatives of the people" were to be included in the central political organs. The Nanking leaders never kept this promise.

Nominally devoted to the salvation of China through the principles of Sun Yat-sen it really concerns itself with nothing but the perpetuation in office of and division of political perquisites among its members."

To the Kuomintang the united front movement meant cooperation between all Chinese against Japan, on the basis of the integration of all military forces formerly independent of the Kuomintang into the Central Army, and the subordination of all political parties to the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang-controlled Central Government. Since the Government did not extend legal recognition to parties other than the Kuomintang, it did not deal with dissident parties as such. It could not ignore their *de facto* existence, but just as it worked for the elimination of all independent armies by integrating them with the Central Army, so it worked for the elimination of independent political parties through their integration with the Kuomintang. But it was not interested in democratic reforms or, for that matter, reforms of any kind. In the words of an American observer in China, commenting upon the united front negotiations in 1937: "The Kuomintang will fight for its position of authority and its accompanying perquisites of office, trimming where it has to, compromising when it must, but determined to hold the reins to the exclusion of all other factions."

The system of the united front government as it developed in Hankow during 1938, following the evacuation of Shanghai and Nanking, was also one of compromise, which affected the power of Chiang Kai-shek and his inner circle very little. On 1 January 1938 the Central Government in Hankow was reorganized on a basis that left all key positions with the right-wing Kuomintang members. The American Assistant Military Attaché in China cabled that the reorganization was welcomed as a definite triumph for the conservatives and that it put at rest the rumors that the new government was to include radicals. However, on 4 January Chiang Kai-shek announced his approval of a reorganization of the National Military Council on the basis of equal participation by Communists, the "Southwest Military Group" (Kwangsi-Kwangtung), and the Kuomintang "with all equally responsible" for continued resistance. The promise, or hope, that this approval conveyed was never carried out. The formerly dissident parties were never given "equal" responsibility with the Kuomintang. But for the moment Chiang's announcement helped to offset public reaction against the reorganization of the government on a conservative basis. An American observer in Hankow stated that it also satisfied the Communists, to whom "formal recognition was not vitally important since they had actually gained control of large areas of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopeh. On 5 January the Government announced that it had appointed K'ung Ho-ch'ung, a former Communist General who surrendered to the Kuomintang forces in 1934, as commander of all mobile units operating in North China. He had left for North China in December 1937."

In the following months several moves were taken that seemed to promise a liberalization of the Kuomintang regime. A number of former dissident leaders were given positions in the Kuomintang, the Government, and the Central Army. Several Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Lin Tsu-han, and P'eng Te-huai were "reinstated" in the Kuomintang. Chou En-lai was appointed Deputy Director of the Political Training Department of the National Military Council, and the famous Communist guerrilla fighter, General Yeh Chien-ying, present C-of-S of the Eighth Route Army, was appointed adviser to the guerrilla school which Chiang Kai-shek established in Hankow.

In February 1938 the Supreme National Defense Council was established. It was to function as a supreme political and governmental organ for the duration of the war, providing a unified civilian military control. It was not, *de jure*, a part of the government, since it was established as the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, the Party organ charged with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers in government. Since the composition of the Supreme National Defense Council was a war-time secret, no full list of its membership has been published. It is known, however, that right-wing Kuomintang members held the key positions. Several Communists, among them Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, were reported to be members of the Council, although not of its Standing Committee. Already at the end of 1937 the Communists had been permitted by the Government to establish their own newspaper, the *Ilsin Hwa Jih Pao* (New China Daily), in Hankow. It was later moved to Chungking and is still published there.

¹⁷ Apparently he never succeeded in taking command, at least not over the Communist forces. In 1943 he was reported to be a divisional commander in the 6th War Zone (Hupei).

Between 29 March and 1 April 1938 an Extraordinary National Congress of Kuomintang delegates was convened. The Communist leader Chou En-lai was among the 17 members of its presidium. This Congress resolved that the system of Kuomintang leadership should "be firmly established and the Party Constitution be amended accordingly." It elected Chiang Kai-shek "Tung Ts'ai," or "Supreme Executive," of the Party. The Congress decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of a National Assembly (or National People's Congress) for the adoption of constitutional government. As a consolation to the Communists and democratic groups, who saw in this decision an attempt by the Kuomintang to maintain its dictatorial rule indefinitely, the Congress decided to convene immediately a People's Political Council, a rather powerless organization which was to function as an advisory organ to the Government. It held its first session in July 1938. While the Communist Party was not openly recognized or given official status, the Congress decided that "hereafter the people shall have absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere with the war against Japan." The Communist Party organ, *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, expressed great satisfaction with the results of the Congress. As an interesting sidelight on the general attitude of British and Americans toward the Chinese Communists in 1938 as compared with today, it may be mentioned that one American observer in Hankow, in commenting on the results of the Congress, stated that open recognition of the Communist Party "may possibly have been avoided for fear of possible alienation of support of China's cause by England and the United States." He could hardly have thought at that time that the American Government would one day send an American Military Observer Section to the Communist capital at Yenan.

The united front spirit was strong in Hankow during these days, and the feeling of unity between the Chinese led them to feel more optimistic concerning the future than actual circumstances warranted. The Central Army moved from one defeat to another. The Japanese Army was moving ever deeper toward the heart of China. But the momentary relaxation of the Kuomintang dictatorship, with all its pre-war repressions of popular sentiment, and the genuinely cooperative war effort between all resistance groups in China imbued the people with the feeling that the war was worth its sacrifices. Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as the national leader who had risen above party politics and he emerged as the symbol of the people's aspiration for unity and victory. In the course of 1938 Mao Tse-tung developed a three-point strategy for the war which soon found acceptance among all Chinese resistance leaders and, in fact, became the theoretical basis for Chiang Kai-shek's war plans. Briefly, the theory of this plan, the "three-stage war," as Mao Tse-tung called it, was (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese "retreat in space but advance in time;" (2) Stalemate: The Japanese offensive attains its climax at the foothills of Western China, after which it reaches a standstill. China continues to mobilize while concentrating upon guerrilla warfare to hold the Japanese and diminish Japan's war energy; (3) Japan's internal and international complications reach a breaking point. China attains her maximum mobilization, followed by large-scale counteroffensive and victory. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek predicted a long war.

Even though this plan emphasized the responsibility of the Chinese to build up their own war potential, it counted upon foreign aid especially from Soviet Russia. In his outline of the "three-stage war" Mao Tse-tung said: "On the one hand we have the increasing movement of aid to China in foreign countries, the great power of the Soviet Union and her important aid to China, etc., and on the other, the menace of another European war, the tendency towards rapprochement between Britain and Japan, and the sale of munitions and war materials to Japan, etc."

It was not only the Communists who at this time looked primarily to Soviet Russia as their hope of victory against Japan. Their viewpoint was shared by most Chinese, including Kuomintang leaders.¹⁸ The Soviet Union had entered into

¹⁸ It was, however, not without fear that some Kuomintang leaders accepted the idea of Soviet Russian support. There was a powerful group in the Government, representing Wang Ching-wei, General Ho Ying-ch'ün, and General Chang Ch'ün, which advocated that China take steps to come to an understanding with Germany and Italy. They recommended this course of action during the last session of the People's Political Council, which met from 5 to 12 July 1938. This brought about an acrimonious dispute with the Communist delegates. One of them, Ch'en Shao-yü, hotly replied that Germany and Italy were allies of Japan and that any rapprochement with them would lead to capitulation to the Japanese. The Soviet Union, Ch'en declared, is the natural ally of China. One of the Nationalist delegates thereupon demanded of Ch'en Shao-yü: "Are you a Chinese or a Russian?" A scuffle was avoided only by the intercession of more temperate elements and the appeal of the Chairman, Dr. Chang Po-ling, to remember the united front. (184)

a treaty of non-aggression with China on 21 August 1937, within a few weeks of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. (This treaty is still in force.) Article I, which condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, was viewed by some as the Soviet justification for her policy of assisting China while remaining neutral. Although both the Chinese and Soviet governments denied that a secret agreement for Soviet military aid accompanied the treaty, such aid was given in a variety of forms. The Soviet Ambassador to China stated his Government's attitude at a celebration of the 21st anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1938, as follows: "Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the great Chinese nation is now being united and has presented a united front to oppose the aggressor, and your struggle has won the whole-hearted sympathies of the whole Soviet people." The emphasis on the united front is worth noting.

It is true that America, Britain, Soviet Russia and other countries contributed considerable amounts to Chinese war relief. And an American Volunteer Aviation Corps, organized by Lt. General (then Major, Retired) Clair Lee Chennault (at that time Aviation Advisor to the Generalissimo), was actually fighting the Japanese in China. But Soviet Russian aid vastly surpassed that of any other country. Soviet planes were delivered to China in considerable quantities, and Soviet aviators served in the Chinese Army in a "private" capacity as volunteers. On 26 January 1938 the first recorded Chinese-employed all-Soviet Russian air raid was made on Japanese installations in Nanking. During these first years of the war Soviet Russian loans to China, in the form of barter agreements, were also considerably greater than those of any other country. Up to the time of Pearl Harbor, Soviet Russia is reported to have concluded barter agreements totalling the equivalent of US \$300,000,000, compared with US \$170,000,000 from the United States, and £18,000,000 from Great Britain. When the German military advisers headed by General von Falkenhausen were withdrawn from China in 1938 they were replaced by Soviet Russian military advisers. Not since the days of the Kuomintang-Communist revolution in the 1920's had there been so many Soviet advisers in China.

Although the Chinese were anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Britain and America and made several appeals to these two nations and to the League of Nations for greater support, the response from these quarters was small compared with that from the Soviet Union. The consensus of opinion in Government circles in Hankow was, according to some reports, that China's only hope lay in seeking closer collaboration with Soviet Russia. It was the compelling need of foreign aid, and the fact that Soviet Russia alone of all foreign powers was willing to extend aid in substantial quantities, that influenced the Kuomintang to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Chinese Communists. Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that "the Central Government military leaders hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the government, Soviet Russia might come definitely to China's aid." The correctness of this interpretation of the Soviet attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in October 1938, after the first rift in the united front. At that time the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. Another was that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill. This showed that the policy of Soviet Russia toward the Kuomintang was basically the same in 1938 as in 1923-1927; Soviet Russian support of the Kuomintang was conditional upon Kuomintang cooperation with the CCP.

Soviet-Japanese relations were exceedingly tense in 1937 and 1938, partly as a result of Japanese objections against Soviet aid to China. The Changkufeng incident on the Manchurian-Siberian border in July 1938, involving heavy fighting between Japanese and Soviet forces, raised high hopes in Hankow that Russia had decided to go to war with Japan. Although these hopes were dashed by the news of the armistice on 11 August, the Chinese felt that Soviet Russia had too high a stake in China to permit Japan a free hand in the Far East.

Great as the spirit of the united front had been during the first part of 1938, it began to wane during the last months of the year. Already at the end of July the situation began to deteriorate. The Chinese Communists, availing themselves of the March 1938 resolution of the Kuomintang Congress granting freedom of speech and of formation of associations, etc., began to establish mass organizations in Hankow on the same pattern as in their guerrilla areas in North China. Within a few weeks after this Congress there appeared in Hankow the Communist-sponsored "Wuhan Youth National Salvation Corps", "The

National Emancipation Vanguard," and the "Ant Society." The Kuomintang authorities looked with apprehension on the growth of these mass organizations, well remembering the effective use the Communists had made of similar organizations in the 1920's, and knowing their current use of mass organizations in North China as a means of winning popular support. These organizations were also considered a threat to the development of the newly established *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps, a mass organization sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek to bolster popular support of the Kuomintang.

At the end of July the "Blue Shirts" were reported to be working against the Communists, and this led to a Communist protest in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*. At the end of August the Hankow-Wuchang Defense General Headquarters ordered the dissolution of the three Communist mass organizations mentioned above. The Communists announced that the step was a breach of good faith on the part of the Government and demanded, without result, the restoration of freedom of action to the three organizations.

This first open rift, combined with a return of restrictions on the non-Kuomintang press and increasing suppression of the right of assemblage of non-Kuomintang groups, was generally interpreted as a sign of the inability of the controlling reactionary elements in the Kuomintang to get along, not only with the Communists but also with the Kwangtung-Kwangsi liberal factions, the few Kuomintang liberals, and the large number of non-political military leaders who had united with the Government. With the transfer of the seat of Government to Chungking and the fall of Hankow in October 1938, the Kuomintang seemed to return more and more to its pre-war tactics of dictatorial rule. In October following the Soviet Russian Ambassador's demands, mentioned above, Chiang Kai-shek suppressed several more Communist organizations. As a result Soviet Russia withdrew some of her aid to China. Mao Tse-tung issued a warning from Yen-an: "For the Kuomintang the most important link in the chain of progress is the democratization of its organizational form, making the party itself the people's alliance for resistance against the enemy and for national reconstruction. Judging from the present tendency of the war, if the Kuomintang does not open its doors and admit all the other patriotic parties and individuals . . . the tremendous task of resistance . . . will be too great a burden on the shoulders of the party."

The year closed with a bitter attack on Mao Tse-tung in the Central News, a Government organ, by a Kuomintang leader, Chang Chun-mai. He attacked Mao and the Communists for failure to turn over control of the Communist area in Shensi Province to the Central Government and for not allowing Chiang Kai-shek to command directly the Communist armies in the field, and to direct their training.

(D) THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN BECOMES SUBORDINATED TO THE "WAR WITHIN THE WAR"

1. Basic principles of Kuomintang and Communist wartime policies toward each other.

It is impossible within the limits of this study to enumerate all the incidents in the Kuomintang-Communist inter-party struggle that ensued in the years after 1938. The pattern of the struggle was set within the first 18 months of the war. It has not changed to this day. But the struggle has become more and more intense.

The Communists operated along two lines: (1) Expansion of their areas of military control, in which they established their own special form of democratic united front government, patterned after the "Soviet democracy of the toilers;" (2) Exertion of the utmost possible pressure upon the Kuomintang and the people in Kuomintang-controlled areas for the introduction of democracy more in the Anglo American than in the Soviet sense of the word. This paradoxical policy of the Communists toward the two separate areas of Communist and Kuomintang China was fully in line with the united front policy as laid down by the Congress of the Communist International in Moscow, 1935, which advocated a two-fold democratic program: "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers [in our areas of control] . . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate."

The basic principles of the policy of the Communists toward the Kuomintang were announced on 28 March 1938 in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, Communist Party organ, as follows: "The permitting of existence to only one political party and refusing legal status to other parties is not justifiable, while the abolition of all parties and merging them into one [the Kuomintang] is impossible. Therefore, we propose the organization of a people's revolutionary alliance under the follow-

ing three principles: (1) A joint policy to be adopted by all parties, to be followed by individual parties; (2) Representatives of various parties to organize a united administration to formulate an anti-Japanese program and adjust party affairs; (3) All parties participating in the alliance to retain their political and organizational independence." To this should be added a fourth, and cardinal, point, namely that the Kuomintang and the CCP would maintain their separate armies.¹⁹ There has been no change to this day of this policy of the Communists.

The Kuomintang's answer to this policy followed two main lines of action: (1) Restriction of Communist areas of military-political control; (2) Suppression of Communist activities in Kuomintang-controlled areas.

The one common policy of the two parties was that the war against Japan must be continued. This was the main factor in preventing the resumption of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war on the scale of pre-war days, and the reason why both parties tried to preserve, outwardly at least, the semblance of unity. The Kuomintang Government allowed a few Communist party members to reside in Chungking and some of the other larger cities in Free China, and the Communist newspaper in Chungking was permitted to continue publication, although under Kuomintang censorship. The Communists were also granted a small representation in the People's Political Council. The Communists accepted these "favors" for what they were worth. They gave them a chance to make their voice heard in the capital, to press their demands for democratic reforms and to maintain public interest in the united front idea. In the People's Political Council where Chou En-lai was one of the Communist members the Communists could, in an official capacity, present their criticism of the Kuomintang and the Government.

2. *The Kuomintang enforces a military blockade of the Communist area in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, 1939*

The Kuomintang-Communist inter-party relations in the capital, never friendly although moderately polite, were, however, only a faint reflection of the two-party relations in the provinces. For it was inevitable that the opposing policies of the two parties would lead to clashes between their armed forces. As the number of clashes increased from year to year, the military situation in China became more and more "a war within a war."

In the summer of 1939 the Chungking Government began to enforce a strict military blockade of the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. It had two objectives: first, the prevention of Communist military infiltration and elimination of Communist propaganda in Free China west and south of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region; second, the closing of any possible overland route between the Chinese Communist base areas in North China on the one hand, and Sinkiang and Soviet Russia on the other. The Japanese Army blocked all routes leading north through Inner Mongolia as far as to Pao-t'ou, the western terminal of the Ping-Sui Railway. From Pao-t'ou westwards the Chungking Government generals Fu Tso-i and Kao Kuei-tze maintained a blockade of the northern border of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. The northwestern border facing Ningsia and Kansu provinces was blockaded by Moslem troops of the three Ma Generals²⁰ who in 1937, before the conclusion of the united front, had inflicted on the Chinese Red Army one of its worst defeats. The Moslems in Kansu and Shensi provinces were reinforced by the First Group Army of General Hu Tsung-nan, allegedly the best equipped of all the Central Army forces. It had retreated to Shensi after its defeat and withdrawal from Shanghai at the end of 1937.

Soviet Russian aid to China was still continuing at this time. Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, had become a great transportation center for Soviet supplies brought overland to the Chungking Government via Sinkiang. Since Sinkiang was under Soviet influence, the Kuomintang authorities feared an attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to extend their influence toward Sinkiang with the view of establishing an over-land route to Soviet Russia. These were some of the factors that induced the Chungking Government to impose a blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Frequent border clashes

¹⁹ Mao Tse-tung said in October 1938: "As a result of special historical conditions the Kuomintang and Communist Party have their own armies. This is not a defect but a good point. Their own armed forces enable them to effect a division of labor in the war of resistance so that each does its best to fulfill its own responsibility. They constantly help and encourage each other."

²⁰ Ma Hung-k'uei, Governor of Ningsia.

Ma Pu-fang, Governor of Tsinghai.

Ma Pi-ch'ing, Commander of Moslem troops in Kansu. He has since been forced out of Kansu by Chiang Kai-shek.

occurred. The Communists lost some districts. In time a net work of pill boxes was built by the Kuomintang forces along the southern and western approaches to the Communist base in Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. This blockade is still maintained although it has been slightly relaxed in the past few months.²¹

While the foregoing were important reasons for concentrating large forces of Government troops in the Northwest, not all the troops were there to oppose the Communists. A large part of Hu Tsung-nan's First Group Army was concentrated in the area south of the Yellow River bend to guard the vital Tung Kuan (Pass) against a Japanese offensive toward Siam.

3. The struggle between Chungking Government and Chinese Communist forces for possession of guerrilla bases in east China, 1937-1940

In the guerrilla areas of Eastern China frequent fighting between Kuomintang and Communist forces took place. Who was the actual attacker is in many cases impossible to determine, for both parties accused each other of breaking the peace, and no neutral observers, if present at the scenes of fighting, have submitted any reports of their impressions, in so far as is known. Two examples suffice to show the Communist method of presenting their case. In a press interview with Chinese reporters on 11 September 1939 Mao Tse-tung said: "In North China, Chang Yinwu and Chin Chi-yung are experts in dissension—the former in Hopeh and the latter in Shantung. They have become very rampant and their activities are scarcely different from those of traitors. They have spent very little time in engaging the enemy, but have devoted much time in fighting the Eighth Route Army. I obtained strong proofs in this regard, such as Chang's orders to his troops to attack the Eighth Route Army, et cetera, which we have submitted to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek."

Another typical statement by the Communists reads as follows: "Early in the summer [1940], disputes in North China [between Kuomintang and Communist forces] were fortunately solved through the demarcation of areas of operations [in Shansi and Hopeh] and the door to negotiations between the Kuomintang and Communist parties was thus reopened. Efforts were made in the following months to settle various issues, and the Eighteenth Group Army was doing its utmost to prepare the 100-regiment battle against the enemy. Unexpectedly, Shih Yü-san's troops, having obtained by deceit the support of the Central [Chungking] authorities, again crossed the [Yellow] River and entered Hopeh, and launched attacks in conjunction with the enemy and puppets. Disputes arose as fighting broke out."

This Communist story about Shih Yü-san is probably true. He was shot in 1940 by the Chungking commander, General Wei Li-huang, for working with the Japanese. Another Communist account of how his areas in Southern Hopeh were taken over by the Communists is given by a private foreign observer who has lived in Communist-controlled areas of North China for several years. According to his information, also derived from Communist sources, the army of Shih Yü-san in South Hopeh and Shantung was much better equipped than the Eighth Route Army forces but its leader was "distrustful of democratic mass organization." As a result he was not able to withstand a large-scale Japanese attack and the areas he occupied have now come under Eighth Route Army control.

This version accords with the explanation usually given by the Communists of how they have expanded their areas of control. Piecing together the two Communist stories about Shih Yü-san as quoted above and similar stories, each of which fits its particular case, it appears that (according to the Communists) the Japanese are in the habit of frequently attacking and defeating Kuomintang generals who have been fighting together with them against the Communists, whereupon the Communist armies move in, take over control of the rural areas and start organizing the people for guerrilla warfare.

Exactly why the Japanese should be interested in fighting Kuomintang generals who are cooperating with them in fighting the Communists is not explained by the Communists!

The Communist versions of Kuomintang attacks upon their forces are, however, usually devoid of obvious propaganda distortion. On the other hand, Kuomintang accusations against the Communists are often so full of obvious misstatements that it frequently becomes impossible to distinguish between the

²¹ In January 1945 it was reported that 200,000 Kuomintang troops were still blockading the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Since November 1944 about 20,000 troops had been moved south, presumably to Kweichow Province.

grain of truth and the mass of falsehood. This has, naturally, led to a tendency among many observers to trust statements by the Chinese Communists concerning Kuomintang activities, while almost entirely disregarding those of the Kuomintang concerning the Communists. Mao Tse-tung's statement about the two "experts in dissension" may be true. However, since we have definite proof that General Ch'eng Ch'ien, C-in-C of the North China war area in 1937 and 1938, and General Wan Fu-lin and his troops of the 53rd Army actively cooperated with the Communists in Hopeh, but that they later disappeared from Hopeh, the Kuomintang version of what happened to one of the "experts in dissension," Chang Yin-wu, deserves a hearing.

Chang had a good reputation before the war (and he probably still has) as an honest, simple, and upright person. The son of a Shansi peasant, he was known for his simple manners and lack of pretense. As Mayor of Peiping during the late 1920's and early 1930's he established an outstanding record for honest and progressive administration. Here is the Kuomintang version of what happened to him:

"Skipping over the [Kuomintang-Communist] clashes [in Hopeh] in 1933 . . . we find that large-scale systematic operations began in June 1939 and lasted till the end of March 1940. General Chang Yin-wu was C-in-C of the Hopeh People's Armies [Chungking guerrillas] and at the same time Commissioner of the Interior of the province. His troops occupied a circular area east of Chengting on the Peiping-Hankow Railway . . . It was a flat country; nevertheless the People's Armies had fought seven successful guerrilla encounters with the Japanese in this area. The Communists could and should have been useful allies.

"On the night of June 21, 1939, the headquarters of the People's Armies was suddenly surrounded by two Communist regiments under Ho Lung. The battle lasted two days and two nights until Chang's ammunition was exhausted and his troops were completely disarmed. Then the battle spread over 120 kilometers and over 40,000 Communist troops were employed, under Ho Lung, Liu Po-cheng, and Lü Cheng-chao. Chang's troops escaped toward west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, but the 129th Division of Liu Po-cheng, the 120th Division of Ho Lung, and the Youth Guards of Lü Cheng-chao followed in hot pursuit until they completed the annihilation or disbandment of the People's Army. The Communists pushed further . . ."

It may be true that Chang Yin-wu was the initial attacker. But in the final instance Ho Lung seems just as responsible for the fighting as Chang Yin-wu since he drove Chang out of his war zone. And if we accept Mao Tse-tung's statement that Chang Yin-wu was an "expert in dissension" and that he fought the Eighth Route Army, it must also be agreed that Ho Lung was a more successful "expert in dissension" and fought the Kuomintang forces.

The Communists' version of the inter-party war, namely, that they have been innocent victims of Kuomintang attacks and have been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, has been accepted quite generally among foreign Allied observers. There can be no doubt that in many cases Kuomintang troops have attacked the Communists, forcing them to make counter-attacks in self-defense. In granting this it would seem, however, that simple logic would prove conclusively that the Communists have been the chief attackers against the Kuomintang forces throughout the past eight years. From its tiny original base in North Shansi the Eighth Route Army has spread out into vast areas of the coastal provinces of North China within and beyond the Great Wall, and the New Fourth Army has spread its influence over great areas of Central China. The Communist armies could not possibly be where they are today without having been on the offensive. And it is not without significance that the expansion of Communist control has been at the expense of Kuomintang areas far more than of Japanese-occupied areas.

The contention of the Communists, that they have throughout the war been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, implies that in order to defend their original wartime base area in North Shansi from Kuomintang attacks they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater part of Shansi and Hopeh. In order to defend their "united front" bases in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region from Kuomintang attacks, they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater parts of Shantung and Northern Honan and establish several new "united front" bases in these areas. And in order to defend their original base of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhwei and Southern Kiangsu from Kuomintang forces, the New Fourth Army had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of all of Kiangsu, great parts of Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and Southern Honan. If we accept the justice of this type of self-defense,

we must also concede that the Japanese were justified in conquering great parts of China, and in order to defend their home land and China were forced to conquer the Philippine Islands and Southeast Asia. For the Japanese, just as the Chinese Communists in regard to themselves, claim that they have been "forced" to undertake these conquests in "self-defense."

The Kuomintang and the National Government permitted the Chinese Communists considerable freedom of action at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. The Government assigned to the Communists certain war areas in which they were to cooperate with the regular Central Army troops in the defense against the Japanese. Thus North Shensi adjacent to the Communist base in the Shen-Kan-Ming Border Region was assigned to the Eighth Route Army. When the Eighth Route Army penetrated into Hopeh and began to organize a united front resistance after the collapse of organized resistance by the Central Army forces, the Government also sanctioned this move.

The Communists, however, continued to expand their areas of control, and it soon became evident to the Chungking authorities that they considered it within their right to expand into any war area of eastern China without previous permission of their C-in-C, Chiang Kai-shek, or even consultation with the National Military Council or with the Government-appointed war zone commanders. This was, of course, an open violation by the Communists of their united front agreement with the Kuomintang, for in March 1937 the Communists had formally accepted the Government's terms for a united front, among them the abolition of the Red Army "and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the National Military Council."

While the regular Central Army forces were distributed in the various front sectors according to the plan of the High Command in Chungking, the Communist forces moved anywhere they liked according to plans laid down in Yen-an. And wherever they went they set up their own guerrilla bases and their own type of democratic united front governments which were linked up with Yen-an instead of with Chungking. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that fighting with Government forces would develop. These latter had, after all, full right to be where they were, for they were there by order of the Government. The incursion of Communist power into their base areas and the establishment of a Communist-led administration which flouted the authority of the Chungking-appointed officials reduced the size of the areas of the Chungking forces on which they were dependent for their sources of supply. The Chungking forces became enraged over this invasion of their defense sectors. They had fought against the Japanese for the defense of their guerrilla bases. They fought against the Communists for the same reason, in self-defense.

Soon after the formation of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in January 1938 (which did not include all areas within these provinces), Eighth Route Army forces under Ho Lung moved into Southeastern Shansi to the T'ai-heng Shan (Mt.) area. This lay outside their defense area assigned to them by the Government. Fighting broke out with the Government's forces in which the latter suffered several defeats. Intermittent fighting continued for several years.

During the latter part of 1938, Communist forces under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien invaded Northeastern Shantung and began establishing guerrilla bases on the Shantung promontory south of Chefoo and Lung-k'ou and in the areas around Tsinan, the Japanese-occupied capital of the province. This area also lay outside the defense zone assigned to the Communist forces by the Central Government. Fighting broke out with Government forces under Admiral Shen Hung-ieh and General Yü Hsiüeh-chung who tried to defend their bases. This fighting continued with intermittent pauses until 1943, when the greater part of the Government's forces were withdrawn from Shantung.

After most of the Government's troops had been forced out of Hopeh Province (March 1940), the 115th Division (under Lin Piao) of the Eighth Route Army, supported by several independent detachments, crossed to the south bank of the Yellow River into Western Shantung. This, again, was an invasion of areas which the Government had never assigned to the Communists. Fighting with Government forces broke out. The latter were forced to retreat. Western Shantung became another Communist base.

Following this the Eighth Route Army forces invaded Eastern Honan and Northern Anhwei Provinces (early summer 1940) where they established contact with the forces of the New Fourth Army which had extended their influence northward from the Yangtze River. In August 1940 the Eighth Route Army forces in Northwestern Shantung combined with those under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien

in Northeastern Shantung, and under Hsi's command they launched an invasion of the southern part of the province, fighting the Chungking forces for possession of bases. In October 1940 these Eighth Route Army forces invaded Northern Kiangsu. In full coordination the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies gradually extended their areas of control in Shansi, Shantung, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, Chekiang and Hupeh. The Lunghai Railway became the dividing line between the areas of operations of the two armies.

The nucleus of another Communist armed force had been organized by the New Fourth Army in Kwangtung Province of South China during 1939. The leader of this force, the 3rd Detachment, was Tseng Sheng, a graduate of Chungshan University in Canton. After a short time his force was accepted into the Kwangtung Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps under the Chungking commander Hsiang Han-ping. The 3rd Detachment adopted the name of Hui-yang Pao-an Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps, indicating its area of operations in the Hong Kong region from the coast across the Hong Kong-Canton Railway to Hui-yang (Waiyeung). But in expanding its guerrilla areas it got into trouble with the Chungking forces and in March 1940 General Hsiang declared Tseng Sheng's guerrilla corps an "unauthorized party." Other Communist forces had meanwhile begun to establish guerrilla bases on Hainan Island.

This rapid expansion of Communist influence was new evidence of the capable leadership of the Communist army commanders, political commissars, propaganda workers, and mass mobilization organizers. But when stating this it must also be admitted that the Communist tactics were not conducive to the maintenance of the united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP. To the Communists any Chungking general who refused to welcome their armies into his defense zone and who fought against them for the defense of his base areas was a "traitor" and an "expert in dissension." On the other hand, the Chungking army leaders accused the Communists of unpardonable breaches of military discipline, and of supporting the Japanese by fighting the Government forces.

The Chungking Government repeatedly asked the Communists at least to agree to a clear demarcation of defense zones, as a means of avoiding the hopeless confusion created by the intrusion of Communist armies into the defense zones of Chungking Government forces, and averting the resultant inter-party fighting. The Government finally offered the Communists all of North China north of the Yellow River (that is, the pre-1938 bed of the Yellow River) except Southern Shansi, as their defense zone, provided they would withdraw the New Fourth Army to North China.

In September 1940 Chou En-lai also stated to an American observer in Chungking that although no formal agreement had been signed a settlement had been reached with the Government "to the satisfaction of both sides" involving a clear demarcation of defense areas, the size of the Eighth Route Army, and the exact number of *hsien* to be included in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. According to Chou the Government had agreed to hand over the area north of the Yellow River to the military control of the Eighth Route Army. The Communists had accepted this. But at the very time Chou En-lai made this statement Eighth Route Army forces were successfully fighting Government forces for the possession of their guerrilla bases in Southern Shantung.²²

In December 1940 Generals Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, C-of-S and Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army respectively, sent a telegram to General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Eighteenth Group Army [Eighth Route Army], and General Yeh T'ing, C-in-C of the New Fourth Army, in answer to their complaints about

²² Information obtained in Chungking at this time was often extremely misleading. Chou En-lai let it be known that the Communists were satisfied with the Government's behavior. The Government also seemed satisfied, because the Communists had "more or less" agreed to the transfer of the New Fourth Army from Central to North China. Chou En-lai indicated that the Communists had agreed to this, for he said (Sept. 1940) that the remaining problem to be solved was the transfer of the New Fourth Army to North China. The Government indicated its satisfaction over this settlement by appointing Chou En-lai to the post of Vice Director of the War Areas Kuomintang Affairs Board, an organization which maintains control of Chinese political affairs in occupied provinces of China. In view of this American observers commented that "present-day relations" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party are highly satisfactory and that an open break is scarcely conceivable between the two groups so long as the Communists continue to afford General Chiang Kai-shek full support in his policy of resistance." And yet, at this very time fighting went on between Kuomintang and Communist troops in Shantung and Kiangsu, with the Communists expanding their influence in Shantung and Kiangsu instead of withdrawing to the North. Three months later in January 1941, Kuomintang and Communist troops were involved in the biggest clash of the war-period. (see page 109)

"attacks" of Kuomintang troops upon the Communists and their request that the Government order a cessation of the "attacks." The two Chungking generals said among other things:

"Ever since the days when the present war broke out, the Eighteenth Group Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Second War Zone while the New Fourth Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Third War Zone immediately after the said Army was organized. They have each been given their respective operational areas, and definite operational objectives were assigned them as well. In fact you have failed to carry out the stipulations outlined in the order . . . On the contrary, your troops marched into Hopeh and Chahar without orders from the Government. Then a part of your troops were dispatched to Shantung and finally the New Fourth Army was secretly transferred from areas south of the Yangtze River to the north. As a next step, the troops which you sent to Shantung to create disturbances there were dispatched farther south and they, in coordination with other units of your forces, made a joint attack on Government troops stationed in North Kiangsu.

"What we want to know is whose orders were you acting upon when you moved your troops away from your respective designated war areas and who ordered you to attack your friendly units . . . Whenever your troops went, they treated their comrade units as enemies and attacked them as such . . . Who ordered you to conduct this internecine war? . . . Your troops have succeeded in their plans of occupying territories and disorganizing Government troops to swell your own ranks and you, too, have succeeded in establishing an independent system of administration in the territory under your occupation. These were the actual causes of the so-called 'frictions, controversies, and complications' [of which you complain to the Government] . . . All these incidents [in 1940 of which you complain] occurred either in North Kiangsu or in South Shantung, which had nothing to do whatsoever with the operational areas assigned to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army. If you could really obey orders of the Government . . . such frictions and controversies could never have occurred, a fact which is as plain as a book . . . By pursuing this policy of attacking your own countrymen in an effort to swell your own ranks you have virtually forgotten . . . that what is disadvantageous to us is advantageous to the enemy."

These statements were true. Had matters been reversed, with the CCP instead of the Kuomintang the dominant party in China in control of the Central Government, there can be little doubt that the Communists would have objected to having a Kuomintang army moving around through all the Communist anti-Japanese base areas demanding that the Communists make room for them and accept a Kuomintang-led united front administration.

4. The New Fourth Army "Incident" of January 1941

By the summer of 1939 it was apparent to everyone that the revolutionary struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP had in no way ended with the united front; the contest between the two parties for the supreme control of China was continuing in the midst of the war against Japan. The Government was, however, at a disadvantage in countering the Communist threat, for it could take only limited action. It could not afford an all-out offensive against the Communists. Such a move would have meant the collapse of resistance against Japan and the loss of the war. And it would have deprived the Government of whatever popular following it had and would have incurred the condemnation of the whole world. But while both the Kuomintang and the Communists were determined to continue the war against Japan, it became obvious that each party was fighting to win the war in its own behalf.

In September 1939 General Chang Ch'ün, then Secretary-General of the Supreme National Defense Council, stated publicly that the united front no longer existed. This did not mean that the Government had broken off relations with the Communists. It continued to deal with them and even made some concessions to them. At times there was also active cooperation between Central Army and Communist forces against the Japanese. But the relations between the Government and the Communists assumed more and more the form of a temporary alliance. The united front was recognized for what it was, a truce. In October 1939 when an American observer asked General Chu Shih-ming, at that time Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how he thought the differences between the Central

Government and the Communists could be settled, General Chu said that he felt that when the war with Japan was over the Government would be able to "wipe out" the Communists.

In an interview with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, in September 1939, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the Communists did not recognize the existence of the united front more than the Kuomintang and that they were intent upon building up their own state organization that would challenge the authority of the Kuomintang. He said: "We [Chinese Communists] claim . . . leadership over the peasants and workers, and it is of two kinds, political and organizational. In the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and in the guerrilla districts under the Eighth Route Army we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony." This was an open admission that the Communists had broken their pledge of 1937 not to maintain their own independent political organization but to recognize the authority of the National Government. In answer to Mr. Snow's question as to whether a united front really existed, and Snow's comment that General Chang Ch'ün had stated that no united front existed, Mao Tse-tung replied by referring to Hitler and Ah Q, a character in one of the stories by the famous Chinese Communist novelist Lu Hsün: "There is a certain group of people who attempt to ignore facts, like Ah Q and like Adolf Hitler. You know, Hitler said some time ago that the Soviet Union was only a name, and maintained that there was really no such country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated, and made some progress. On August 23, 1939, Hitler discovered not only the nominal existence of the USSR, but the reality of it."²³ The implication of this remark was, of course, that as the power of the Chinese Communists expanded and more and more areas in China came under their control, the Kuomintang would in time be forced to seek a compromise with them.

The Communists defended their actions in establishing independent base areas on the ground that the Kuomintang and the Government would not treat them as equals and would not accord them freedom of action within the limits of democratic rights. They pointed out that the Government refused to extend legal recognition to the CCP. It refused the Communists representation in the Government and in the National Military Council, in view of which they maintained that it was impossible for them to obtain assurance of a fair treatment. The Government, furthermore, refused to mobilize the people for prolonged resistance against Japan through what was, according to the Communists, the only means possible: "the development of partisan warfare, progress in the process of national democratization, [and] the growth and development of the people's movement."

No matter how justified the Communists may have been in these contentions it was inevitable that they would antagonize the Government, which had no interest in any "process of national democratization" and which saw in the expansion of the Communists' influence only an attempt on their part to use the united front and the war against Japan as a means of increasing and consolidating their power.

The bitter anti-Communist sentiment in Government circles found its most violent expression in the New Fourth Army "incident" in January 1941. The Headquarters of the New Fourth Army at Mao-lin in Southern Anhwei Province was attacked on 6 January by the Chungking forces of the 9th Army under General Ku Chu-tung, Commander of the Third War Zone, and General Shang-Kuan Yün-hsiang, Commander of all Government forces in South Anhwei Province. For eight days a battle raged between the Government forces, numbering nearly 80,000 troops according to a pro-Communist source, and the New Fourth Army Headquarters force, which included 4,000 troops, about 2,000 wounded soldiers and officers, and more than 3,000 political workers, cadets, medical service people and their families. More than 2,000 New Fourth Army fighters were killed and between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded. More than 2,000, including many political workers, were taken prisoner. Commander Yeh T'ing was wounded and taken prisoner (he is still being held) and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying, was killed. The Government forces suffered more than 20,000 casualties according to the Hong Kong "Far Eastern Bulletin." It also reported that several thousand of the local residents were killed.

The New Fourth Army was created in October 1937 by order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was formed out of remnants of the former Red Army

²³ This refers to the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.

which had been left behind in Kiangsi and Fukien after the Communists started the Long March in the fall of 1934. As late as the summer of 1937 these forces were still defending themselves against Kuomintang forces in the lower Yangtze valley. As a sign of his support of the united front, Chiang Kai-shek ordered these Communist guerrilla units to be formed into an army. He appointed General Yeh T'ing, a pro-Communist officer, as Commander of the New Fourth, with Hsiang Ying, an experienced Communist military leader, as Vice-Commander. The army was organized in February 1938 and went into action in April. Its strength at that time was reported as 12,000 officers and men.

Its first field of operation lay south of the Yangtze River in Kiangsi and Fukien. It was later ordered by the Government to operate in the Shanghai-Nanking area. A small force of the New Fourth was sent by General Yeh T'ing to the Tientsin-Pukow Railway front north of Nanking, without authorization from the Government. The Army became especially active in the areas between Shanghai and Wu-hu (southwest of Nanking).

It made an outstanding record. On 26 June 1938 General Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have addressed a telegram to Commander Yeh T'ing, stating: "... you have enjoined upon your subordinates the determination to advance but not to retreat. This precisely manifests your loyalty to the state. This is really worthy of praise and comfort." In December 1939 General Ku Chu-tung, under whom the New Fourth Army operated, sent a telegram of commendation to Yeh T'ing. The New Fourth was also highly commended in 1939 by General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Like the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth received support in money and ammunition from the Central Government. The relations between the New Fourth and the Kuomintang armies in the lower Yangtze were comparatively good.

The New Fourth, however, adopted the same tactics in Central China as the Eighth Route Army used in the North. It began to introduce the familiar and successful system of united front democracy, of the same pattern the Communists were following in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and elsewhere in North China. And the people willingly rallied to the side of the New Fourth Army, partly because of its struggle against the Japanese invaders, partly because of the economic-political program it enforced in areas under its control. In no area of China had the people been more heavily burdened by the abuses of landlords, usurers, and tax and rent collectors than in the thickly populated provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang. And in no areas of China had the Kuomintang been more powerful than in these two provinces. To the common man the Kuomintang was partly responsible for the misery of his existence, for the representatives of the Kuomintang, the Government and Central Army in most villages and towns were the close associates, friends, and protectors of the landlords. Many of them were landlords themselves. In its struggle against the abuses of the native landlord class and the Kuomintang, as well as against the Japanese, the New Fourth Army brought liberation to thousands.

As new areas were brought under its control, the New Fourth Army recruited more soldiers and began to arm the people. By 1939 its strength grew to 35,000. By May 1940 it had grown to over 100,000 troops. In addition some 500,000 guerrillas and local militia were operating under its command on both sides of the lower Yangtze. By January 1941 the regular army numbered 125,000 troops, according to one report. The New Fourth was beginning to assume the same kind of independence in its areas of control as the Eighth Route Army enjoyed in North China. In September 1940 the New Fourth Army was operating in various districts of Anhwei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Hupeh. Thus it had not only expanded far beyond its operational base in the Third War Zone, assigned to it by the Government, but had invaded the Fifth War Zone in Anhwei and Hupeh where it began to compete with the Government's forces for operational bases.

This led to friction and clashes with Government troops who refused to evacuate their base areas to make room for the New Fourth. The Communist propaganda presented this as a case of Kuomintang "attacks" upon Communist troops and Kuomintang collaboration with the Japanese. The Government's viewpoint has been stated in the preceding section of this study: the behavior of the New Fourth Army was in violation of every agreement the Communists had made with the Government.

At the beginning of 1940 most of the New Fourth Army troops were south of the Yangtze River. In line with the informal agreement of 1940, referred to above for the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army to North China, units of the New Fourth began to cross to the north bank of the Yangtze River during the latter

part of 1940. By the end of 1940 they were reported to have transferred about three-fourths of their troops to the north side of the Yangtze and were proceeding north. The Government authorities, however, considered that the Communists were too slow in moving. On 9 December 1940 the National Military Council issued orders specifically directing the New Fourth Army to abandon its positions in the lower Yangtze region and remove northward to join the Eighth Route Army in Hopeh.

In acknowledging the receipt of this order General Yeh T'ing was reported to have requested CN\$500,000 for a mobilization fund and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition from the Government. Communist sources stated in December 1940 that the Government had made "certain grants" in money and ammunition after receipt of this request. At the same time the Eighth Route Army leaders reminded the Government that its allotments for their troops were several months in arrears and that they required increased supplies of equipment for military action against the Japanese forces. This latter request was ignored by the Government. By the end of December, the local Commanders of the Government forces in Anhwei and Kiangsu had become convinced that the New Fourth and Eighth Route Army leaders were not sincere in their promises to move north. Not only was Yeh T'ing remaining with his headquarters staff south of the Yangtze, but both New Fourth and Eighth Route Army forces were pressing their campaigns in North Kiangsu and South Shantung against Government troops for the possession of bases. On 6 January 1941 Government forces launched the attack, mentioned above, on General Yeh T'ing's headquarters. On 12 January 1941 the Government decreed that the New Fourth Army should be disbanded.

This attack was on such a large scale that it attracted nation-wide attention. It brought an avalanche of protests against the Government from the Communists and all liberal groups in Kuomintang-controlled China, who accused the Government of intending to start a civil war and of cooperating with the Japanese against the Communists. The foreign press reflected the same sentiment. When the People's Political Council was convened in Chungking on 1 March 1941, the seven Communist delegates failed to attend. But Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu, two of the Communist representatives of the Council, submitted by letter to the Secretariat of the Council 24 demands of the Communist Party, divided into two parts, "rehabilitation measures," and "measures for a provisional settlement."

The most important among the former included: demands for abolition of the one-party dictatorship and the introduction of democracy; realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People; formation of a combined committee of various political parties, each party and clique to have one delegate, of which the Kuomintang and Communist delegates were to be chairman and vice chairman respectively; appointment of a Communist to the Presidium of the People's Political Council; freedom of speech; release of all political prisoners; and discontinuance of Government censorship of the press.

The group of "measures for a provisional settlement" included demands for discontinuance of military attacks by Government troops against the Communists, withdrawal of the Government's "Communist Suppression Army" from Central China,²⁴ withdrawal of the Government's order to disband the New Fourth Army, punishment of the ringleaders of the New Fourth Army incident, Government sanction of the formation of a new Communist army corps in addition to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army ("the CCP should control a total of 6 armies"), lifting of the military blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and official recognition of the "anti-Japanese democratic political powers behind the enemy's lines." Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te had issued a joint statement in February 1941 stating that unless the New Fourth Army were reconstituted and its leader freed, and unless it were molested no further, the united front could no longer continue.

In a speech before the People's Political Council on 6 March 1941, the Generalissimo refuted these demands. He defended the attack on the New Fourth Army and stated that acceptance of the Communists' demands meant, in effect, that the Government would commit itself not to "suppress disobedient and rebellious troops and that the Government authorities should be punished for so doing." He emphasized that the Communists' demands also implied that "the Government should establish special areas outside the sphere of its authority and restrict its power to check illegal activities."

²⁴ There was no army specifically designated "Communist Suppression Army" in Central China.

In regard to the activities of the Communist armies Chiang Kai-shek said that "the consistent policy of the Government has been to nationalize our armies. That is, under the supreme command of the National Government there is but one system of individual parties or private persons . . . There can be but one source of command. Should a second presume to assert itself, it would be indistinguishable from the 'military council' of Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime . . . All that is required is a complete change in the attitude and actions of the Communist Party in no longer regarding the Eighteenth Group Army as its peculiar possession or as an instrument for the obstruction of other sections of the national forces to the detriment of resistance."

In regard to the Communists' demands for democracy Chiang said that "the political principle of the Government is to democratize the national political system. All citizens . . . should . . . possess all due freedom of action, but sovereignty is indivisible. If a second source of political authority were to be allowed to exist outside the Government—such, for example, as might be called ' . . . a democratic authority behind the enemy lines,' mentioned in these [Communist] demands—it would not differ from the traitorous administration in Nanking and Manchuria. Although as a result of the nation's historical development there is now but one party exercising administrative power, while others of varying size and permanency are 'in opposition,' yet all parties exist in a spirit of equality . . ."

Here the matter rested. Chiang Kai-shek spoke from the point of view of a traditionalist who insists on his legal rights. The Communists insisted on their revolutionary right to question the moral value of the Government's legal rights. Throughout the following years in many negotiations between Kuomintang and Communist representatives for a settlement of their two-party problem, these demands and counter-demands as quoted above were repeated with monotonous sameness.

But while the two parties' representatives kept up their futile negotiations in Chungking, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army (under its Acting Commander, General Ch'en I who replaced Yeh Ting) kept expanding their influence into Government areas, establishing new guerrilla bases wherever they went. The Chungking Government's armies were gradually being forced out of all the coastal provinces of East China north of the Yangtze River.

5. *A virtual truce with the "puppet" armies while the Chungking-Communist forces continue the "war within the war," 1942-1945*

In the years that followed the New Fourth Army incident the Kuomintang-controlled Government in Chungking centered its attention increasingly on the problem of conserving its military strength in order to strengthen its internal position, primarily against the Communists. To this end it became less and less willing to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese. This became especially noticeable after the entry of the United States into the war.

While the Government never ceased to resist the Communists in the war areas of east China, the burden of fighting them there tended to shift more and more to the Japanese and the Chinese puppet armies. Many Chungking Government troops (although few regular Central Army or Kuomintang troops) joined the puppet army to fight the Communists with Japanese support. Before the start of the Japanese offensive in China in 1944, a virtual truce between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops had existed for several years along some front sectors. The majority of the Chungking armies in Shantung and Kiangsu withdrew in 1943 into areas of Free China in Honan and Anhwei, leaving only a few guerrilla units behind. As a result practically all of the coastal provinces of North China came under either Communist or Japanese control. Several times since 1943 Chungking troops have fought Communist forces attempting to expand their areas in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Southern Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung.

Meanwhile the Government has centered most of its attention on strengthening the blockade of Communist areas in the Northwest and on consolidating its power in West China. The Kuomintang had never been strong in this part of China. It felt its position endangered by a number of military leaders who, though loyal to the Government in supporting the war against Japan, felt no loyalty to the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang resumed its pre-war policy of intolerance toward all opposition groups. The reactionary elements gained supreme control, and the Government became increasingly oppressive and dictatorial. The result was that it lost most of the popular support it had enjoyed at the beginning of the war. Its intolerance has driven several of the minority groups in Chungking-controlled

China to consider the formation of a political coalition against Chungking. They seek American support for this coalition not so much as a means of overthrowing the Chungking Government as of forcing the Government to abandon its system of one-party dictatorship. Some of the minority groups within the coalition now contemplate forming a new united front with the Communists against both Chungking and Japan.

The Chinese Communists on their part have greatly expanded their areas of control since the New Fourth Army incident in 1941, partly at the expense of the Japanese but chiefly at the expense of Chungking-controlled areas. From control of about 35,000 square miles with a population of about 1,500,000 people at the beginning of 1937, the Communists have expanded their control to about 225,000 square miles with a population of about 85,000,000 people.²⁵ About 23,000,000 people have been added to their control in the past year alone, mostly through conquest of Chungking-controlled areas.

The Communists have also competed with the Chungking Government in winning the favor of the Chinese puppet forces, and have probably been as successful in this respect as Chungking. Just as in the case of several of the Chungking-Japanese front sectors before 1944, a virtual truce between the Communists and the Japanese has existed during the past two years on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors.

The two chief factors contributing to the growth of Communist power and prestige in the past two years have been the growing anti-Kuomintang movement in Chungking-controlled China since 1943, and the Japanese offensive against the Chungking forces in 1944. Communist forces fought Chungking forces during the Japanese offensive last year. The latest information available indicates that they are at present fighting Chungking in several areas of East China.

The Chinese war effort against Japan became obscured by the intense inter-party rivalry going on in the midst of war. The history of this inter-party struggle, against the background of the war against Japan, presents both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in a most unfavorable light.

The Chungking Government's policy of conserving its military strength led it to keep many of its best armies away from the front in East China, and although some of its better armies were stationed in front areas, many of the front line troops represented military units which were undesirable to the Kuomintang; some were the troops of warlords, like P'ang Ping-hsin and Wu Hua-wen, others of Nationalist leaders who had formerly fought against Chiang Kai-shek, like Li Tsung-jen of the Kwangsi Military Clique, Yü Hsüeh-chung of the former Manchurian (Tungpei) army, and Hsüeh Yüeh of the Kwangtung Military Clique.

After the United States entered the war and American military aid was extended to China, Chungking's unwillingness to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese became even more apparent. American observers came to believe that many leading Chinese Government officials felt that China had done her part in fighting Japan and that it was henceforth up to the United States and Britain to defeat Japan. American officials in China repeatedly complained in their reports about the Chinese Government's lack of interest even in supporting the American war effort in China, and emphasized that Chinese troops "that could be used for the protection of our air bases are stationed elsewhere to blockade Chinese Communist areas." In September 1943 General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Secretary-General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, agreed with an American observer in Chungking that it was "unfortunate" that so many Government troops were immobilized because of the Chinese Communists. He said that "about 20 divisions of good soldiers" were "prevented from fighting Japan." (222)

The prevailing attitude among many Chinese is well illustrated by the following examples. American officers have observed how Chinese troops stationed at American air bases have frequently refused to shoot at Japanese raiding planes. Asked by an American officer for the reason for this behavior a Chinese officer at Lao-ho-k'ou air base in Hupeh answered (November 1944): "Well you see, if we shot down a Jap plane, the Japs would be angry and would take revenge and return and bomb the city and do a lot of damage." Another Chinese officer expressed the opinion that "it is not necessary for the Chinese to take up an offensive against the Japs because soon the United States Forces will surround

²⁵ The Communists claim at present that they control 520,000 sq. miles with a population of about 100,000,000. These figures are considered too high, especially the figure for areas controlled.

Japan and then the Japs will have to retreat without fighting, and so it is better to leave them (Japs) alone, and get along as best we can as we are."

This remark not only shows the reliance which many Chinese have come to place upon the United States to relieve China of the presence of the Japanese, but also indicates the method by which the Japanese will withdraw from China according to the speculation of some Chinese. In August 1944 the *National Herald*, an English-language newspaper in Chungking (reputedly sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), expressed an opinion on this subject which is quite generally held among Chinese: "As we have already had occasion to point out in these columns before, the Japanese militarists will in all probability give up the struggle when Japan Proper has been invaded and they have been crushingly defeated by the Allies in their homeland. However, if the Japanese should keep on fighting on the Asiatic mainland even after their homeland has been occupied, the Allies of course must carry out a land campaign in China . . . Some Americans are right in saying that 'most infantry work can be done by the Chinese . . .'. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the use of the newest weapons of war cannot be learned in a few days or weeks. By the time when it will be possible to bring these weapons to China in large quantities it will be too slow a process to teach the millions of Chinese troops how to use them . . . The best way, we believe, is for the United States to send a large expeditionary force—say, 1,000,000 men—to China as soon as landings in this country can be effected and immediately start to drive the Japanese into the sea."

This question of the withdrawal of the Japanese has occupied the thoughts of many Chinese leaders both in Chungking and in Yen-an for many years, especially since the American Forces in the Pacific started their offensive against the Japanese. The ports on the China coast, the cities along the Yangtze River, the railroads, the mines, and the great agricultural plains in the coastal provinces of Central and North China comprise the heart of China. Their repossession means, to the Chungking Government, the consummation of victory over Japan. These areas, now held by the Japanese, are also essential to the Kuomintang as a base for carrying on the post-war struggle against the Communists.

The Chinese Communists, at present confined to scattered rural areas, also look forward to establishing their control over as many of these Japanese-occupied areas, cities, and transportation lines as possible. Control over these would not only give them the fruits of the victory over Japan, but also place them in an almost indomitable position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang.

Since many Chinese expect that the Japanese will withdraw without fighting from great parts of the areas they now hold in China, the question of whether these areas will go to Chungking or Yen-an depends largely on which of the two armies, Chungking's or Yen-an's, will be the first to move in and take over control.

This vital question has led to an intense competition between the Kuomintang and the Communists in preparing for the re-occupation of Japanese-controlled areas. Their attention has been centered on the Chinese puppet troops whom the Japanese have employed in increasing numbers, especially since the beginning of 1942. They are used mainly as garrison forces, together with Japanese troops, to maintain order in Japanese areas and guard them against attacks from either Chungking or Chinese Communist forces. It is assumed by both Kuomintang and Communist leaders that these puppet forces will remain, after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, in the areas now occupied by the Japanese. The Party that wins the favor of these troops may, therefore, be able to unite with the puppet forces and effect a peaceful occupation of the Japanese-controlled areas.

The puppet army is composed partly of Chinese recruited and trained by the Japanese, partly (and probably mainly) of deserters from the Chungking Government army, and partly of Communist troops. During the interminable struggle during the first four years of the war between Chungking and Communist forces in the guerrilla areas of East China it was inevitable that some of the Chungking Government commanders came to feel that they had here a common cause with Japan, for both they and the Japanese were fighting the Communists. This applies especially to the former warlords in North China who had first been swept away by the Japanese during their defense of the large cities and transportation lines and thereafter, in their efforts to maintain control over rural areas, had been faced by pressure and attacks from both the Communists and the Japanese. These warlords have little feeling of loyalty to anyone. Their main concern is the preservation of their own power. The Chungking Government had little use for them and left them without adequate support to fight either the Japanese or the Communists.

The Japanese, on the other hand, were anxious to develop a puppet army to support their anti-Communist campaigns and to maintain order within their occupied areas. They offered these warlords better pay and more prestige than did the Chungking Government. Denied adequate support from Chungking and unable to cope with the Communists and the Japanese at one and the same time, many of them joined the puppet forces to serve under the Japanese. This placed them in a far more advantageous position against the Communists whom they considered their chief enemy.

In the course of 1942 and 1943 a great number of these warlords joined the Japanese. Among them were the aforementioned General P'ang Ping-hsün, the Chungking appointed commander of the Hopeh-Chahar War Zone, and General Wu Hua-wen, who according to Japanese reports joined them with some 50,000 troops. In 1943 he was appointed commander of the puppet anti-Communist forces in Shantung.

The Chinese Communists maintain that the Chungking Government encouraged the desertion of troops to the Japanese in an effort to support the Japanese anti-Communist campaign. The composition of this anti-Communist puppet army, made up largely of troops who were disgruntled with the treatment accorded them by the Chungking Government, does not support this contention. But there are strong evidences that in the course of the mass desertions in 1942 and 1943 the Kuomintang leaders gradually developed a scheme for making use of the puppet troops, both as a means of fighting the Communists during the war and for gaining control of Japanese-occupied areas after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. An American observer in China, in a report on the "willingness" of Chungking military leaders to become puppets, concludes that the "creation of an anti-Communist army in North China, eventually to be used by the Kuomintang, is probably more of a fortuitous development, as far as the Kuomintang is concerned, than a deep-laid Kuomintang plot with Japanese connivance."

It was apparent to the Kuomintang leaders that the warlords who had joined the Japanese, and their poorly disciplined troops, would hardly be able to defend themselves indefinitely against the Communists after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. They might, therefore, be willing to reaffirm their loyalty to the Kuomintang Government as soon as the Japanese withdraw from China. Meanwhile these puppet forces, operating from Japanese bases and in conjunction with Japanese troops, are in a better position than the Chungking troops to fight the Communists. The North China warlords, who had been of little use to Chungking as long as they served in the Chungking army, became invaluable to Chungking after they joined the puppets.

In December 1943 General Hsi-En-sui, the Vice C-of-S of the First War Zone (including parts of Honan and Shansi), told an American observer that the Chungking Government would use puppet troops to oppose the Communists in North China. He said that General Chang-lan-fang, a former Chungking commander, commanded the best equipped, trained, and disciplined of the puppet forces, numbering about 50,000 troops. These were stationed in East Honan. He stated that General Chang was in close touch with Chungking Government armies and that he was very helpful in supplying Chungking armies with needed supplies and information. General Hsi also mentioned other puppet forces in North China with whom the Chungking Government maintained close relations. At the same time it was reported that on many sectors along the front between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops there existed a "virtual truce."

The Chungking Government also adopted, officially, a lenient attitude toward the puppets who were considered pro-Chungking, anti-Communist, and in a sense also anti-Japanese. In February 1943 a Chungking army spokesman declared during a press conference that the Nanking puppet army of 300,000 men "is threatening to boomerang against the Japanese," because "Free Chinese have filtered into it." In November 1943 Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared during a foreign press conference that Chinese participating in the activities of the puppet regime in China were not regarded by the Chinese Government as war criminals.

This attitude toward the puppets led to a form of indirect collaboration between the Chungking Government and Japan against the Communists. The war areas of North China became more and more divided between the Japanese or their puppets and the Chinese Communists, with the Chungking Government forces either joining the puppets to fight the Communists or withdrawing into Free China areas within the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. Here they tried to stop the penetration of the Communists westward and southward into Chungking Government territories.

In March 1943 it was reported by Chinese sources in Chungking close to the Government that the Government had lost contact with the Kiangsu provincial government and that it was "feared" that the provincial leaders had gone over to the Japanese. In September 1943 General Han Te-ch'in, the Governor of Kiangsu who was at that time a refugee at Kweiyang, stated during a press interview that "Central Government authority in Kiangsu is non-existent due to the withdrawal of Chungking troops from North Kiangsu to Anhwei in the summer of 1945" and that "Chungking has no intention of taking action against the Communists in Kiangsu at this time. Communist forces appear to be in complete control of all points not under Japanese occupation in that part of Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River and in the entire province of Shantung." Chinese sources at Sian stated that while in Kiangsu, General Han Te-ch'in had been taken prisoner by units of the New Fourth Army following a clash late in 1941.²⁶ He had subsequently been released and arrived at Sian in September 1943. Communist sources in Chungking confirmed this, adding that General Han Te-ch'in had been released after he had signed an agreement to withdraw his troops from Eastern Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River.

Han Te-ch'in's statement that Chungking no longer controlled any part of Shantung was confirmed in October 1943, when the American observers in Chungking reported that under orders of the Generalissimo the Chungking armies in Shantung were in process of withdrawal and that no regular troops were left north of the Yellow River, except for the small area in Southeastern Shansi where General Yen Hsi-shan maintains his base. The report emphasized that the important provinces of the north had thus been almost completely stripped of Chungking troops except for a few remaining guerrilla troops. The report sided that the military authorities in the Sian region "apparently" occupied themselves chiefly with more close relations with the puppet forces which, when they feel it is safe, will adhere to Chungking.

According to Communist sources, while in 1941 there were nearly 1,000,000 Chungking troops in the war areas of East China, by the summer of 1944 their number had been reduced to between 20,000 and 30,000. This presumably refers to the war areas in which the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies operate north of the Yangtze River. The Communists also maintained that time that 67 Chungking generals had gone over to the Japanese, and that no less than 62 percent of the puppet troops were former Chungking Government troops.²⁷ The Communists have also made a great propaganda issue of the desertion of Chungking officers and troops to the Japanese, accusing the Chungking Government itself of collaboration with the Japanese.

There is unquestionably a measure of truth in this, in that Chungking and Japan have indirectly cooperated against the Communists. But apparently this cooperation has always been through the puppets, or rather through those groups among the puppets who are anti-Communist. As far as the Chungking Government is concerned there is no indication that its cooperation with the puppets has signified any willingness to come to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. On many occasions, especially since the entry of the United States into the war, the Japanese have attempted, usually through the puppets, to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government. These attempts have always ended in failure.

Failure of the attempts at peace negotiations induced the Japanese in 1944 to launch their greatest offensive in China since 1938. It was, according to their own statements in July 1944, directed against the Anglo-American "encroachment" in China, not against the "Chungking related armies," which would be treated as friends if they would "cast off the Anglo-American yoke." The defense put up by the Chungking armies, especially by the units of the regular Kuomintang or Central Army, was according to all reports poorly planned and executed. There was considerable disunity among the Chinese commanders. But on several fronts, particularly in Hunan, the Chinese put up a stubborn defense which won the admiration of American Army observers. There is no available evidence that the Chungking Government ever considered surrendering to the Japanese during the critical days of 1944. It is important to remember this when faced with the Communist accusations against Chungking (often repeated by some official American observers in China), of "traitorous relations" with the Japanese.

²⁶ Another source states that General Han Te-ch'in was captured by the New Fourth Army during an attack in Northern Kiangsu on Chungking forces in June 1943.

²⁷ Current (April 1945) estimate of the number of puppet troops in China proper is 910,000, of which 374,000 are in the "regular" puppet army and 536,000 in the provincial and local Peace Preservation Corps.

Nevertheless, the policy toward the puppets combined with that of concentrating hundreds of thousands of troops in rear areas, as a reserve against the Communists and other opposition groups in Free China, had disastrous results on the morale of the Chungking armies and people. For hundreds of miles along the front peaceful conditions prevailed for years until the outbreak of the Japanese offensive in 1944, and a flourishing smuggling trade developed which was controlled by the military authorities on both sides of the front. An American observer in Hunan reported in 1943 that "As far as the Chinese are concerned, the [Chungking] military appear to be only too pleased to continue the truce indefinitely, as they control the trade with occupied territory and are growing comfortably rich."

The Chungking armies, in the anti-Communist blockade zone in the Northwest and elsewhere, became an intolerable burden both to the Government and the people. Many of the troops lost their fighting spirit through long inactivity. And the Government lost much of the popular support it had had because of its heavy exactions from the people to maintain these idle troops. An American observer in Shansi-Province reported in March 1944 that the relations between the population and the Chinese military and civil authorities in the San-yuan area in the anti-Communist blockade zone in Shensi were extremely unsatisfactory due to the imposition of onerous grain and fuel taxes, miscellaneous exactions, and the ever-increasing corruption and graft on the part of officials. He concluded that "A continuation of the present practices of the officials is likely to result in the peasants' welcoming the Communists who went to great efforts to conciliate the populace when they were in this area in 1936 and 1937. The situation in San-yuan is typical of conditions in many other areas of Shensi, Honan, Anhwei, and other provinces."

When the Japanese launched their great offensive in 1944 the Chinese peasants in some areas turned on their own army. This was the case in Honan Province particularly, where the peasants began to disarm individual Chinese soldiers one by one, and finally began to unite into roving bands looking for smaller bands of soldiers. An American observer in North China stated in November 1944 that mal-administration by officers and lack of discipline of troops, which Chinese freely admit contributed to the loss by the Central Government of much of Honan to the Japanese, also create conditions favorable to the growth of Communist influence in that province. According to several reports, Communist guerrillas are slowly filtering in from north of the Yellow River, subduing robber bands and organizing the peasantry.

As compared with the charges made against the Kuomintang, there are few accusations on record that the Communists have had "traitorous relations" with the Japanese or their Chinese puppets. Nevertheless, when the vast amount of propaganda is eliminated from reports of conditions in Communist-Japanese front sectors, the policy and behavior of the Chinese Communists toward the Japanese appear very similar to those of the Kuomintang—no more, but no less "traitorous." Communist troops have joined the puppet army, although probably in smaller numbers than Chungking troops. While the Chungking Government appeals for the friendship of the commanders of the puppet forces, the Communists make their appeals to the soldiers. Some puppet troops have deserted the Japanese to join the Communists. Others show a decided friendliness toward the Communists. This applies especially to the puppet Peace Preservation Corps, as distinct from the "regular" puppet army in which the Chungking Government has its strongest following. The soldiers in the Peace Preservation Corps are recruited chiefly from the local population and share the general sympathy of the people for the Communists. They are usually poorly armed and serve as a police force. In areas where friendly relations exist between the Communists and the puppets there is a virtual truce, just as in the case of some of the Chungking-Chinese puppet front sectors.

A private foreign observer in Communist areas on North China reported in 1943 that puppet troops "will seldom oppose the passage of fairly strong Chinese [Communist] forces," and that "it is fairly certain that as soon as the Japanese seemed likely to be defeated almost all the puppet forces would change sides" [joining the Communists]. This referred to Hopeh and Shansi Provinces especially. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Paoting, Japanese-occupied capital of Hopeh Province, stated that the puppet troops in the Peace Preservation Corps "seem to have an understanding of sort, or non-aggression pact, with the Eighth Route Army." Agents of Feng Yi-hsiang (the "Christian General") in the areas of Kiangsu Province north of the Yangtze River reported in 1943 that puppet troops and troops of the New Fourth Army in North

Kiangsu do not fight each other due to the fact that many of the men of the puppet forces belong to the New Fourth Army. These men were "ordered" by the New Fourth Army to join the puppets. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Japanese-occupied areas in Kiangsu Province, reported that though the New Fourth Army forces in the areas between Shanghai and Nanking were effective in keeping the whole area "upset" and unpeaceful and were "a thorn in the side of the Japanese," they sought no trouble with the puppet forces of the Nanking regime.

The foregoing are a few examples among many of the friendly relations, amounting to a virtual truce, that exists in some areas between Communist and puppet forces. This development of friendly relations began simultaneously with the similar development between Chungking Government and puppet forces, that is in the course of 1942, after the entry of the United States into the war.

In the course of 1943 insistent rumors began to circulate in Chungking-controlled China to the effect that there was a definite understanding of some sort between Nanking and Yen-an. An American observer in Shansi reported in January 1944 that a "highly placed provincial official who is reputed to be very well informed in regard to Communist affairs" had stated that the local authorities had "conclusive proof" to the effect that an agent of Wang Ching-wei's²⁸ puppet regime, said to be residing in T'ai-yüan, Shansi Province, went regularly to Yen-an to maintain contact with the Communist authorities. The same informant also asserted that the Communists had an agent representing them in Nanking. During March 1944, another American observer who had spent some time in Lanchow, reported that "there are, in this area, current rumors that the Communists have made an alliance, or have come to a working agreement, with Wang Ching-wei or elements associated with his regime." Chinese sources in Chungking stated that "news was current" that the Communists had come to terms with the "enemy and their puppets" not to attack one another in North China, and that in Central China the Japanese were said to have agreed to let the New Fourth Army remain where it was "for the time being," in return for a promise that the New Fourth Army would not hinder the movement of the Japanese Army, and would not assist the Chungking Government.

The American observer in Lanchow did not wholly discredit these rumors. He said that Wang Ching-wei and his associates were using, as a bargaining point to secure "forgiveness from Chungking, the threat of throwing in their lot with the Communists. He explained that his sources in Lanchow alleged that Wang was motivated both by fear of the treatment he might receive at the close of the war from a victorious Kuomintang Government, and by the leftist tendencies of which he had given evidence at various stages of his career."²⁹

The Communists, of course, denied the truth of these rumors, just as the Chungking Government has denied similar rumors in regard to its relations with the puppets. And there is no evidence that the Communists, any more than the Kuomintang, have ever considered coming to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. But this does not preclude the possibility that they have played politics with the puppets for whatever advantages they could gain thereby. In May 1943 an American agency in Chungking, commenting on these rumors of cooperation between Yen-an and Nanking, stated that "It would be surprising, therefore [in view of the anticipated efforts of the Kuomintang to seek the liquidation of the Communist Party and its army], if the Communist Party failed to utilize opportunities to undermine the Kuomintang, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese Communists would cooperate with the puppet elements in order to overthrow the Central Government."

There were elements in the Kuomintang-Communist situation in 1943 which favored the Japanese and mitigated the danger of large-scale Communist attacks against them. For in 1943 inter-party relations reached the greatest crisis

²⁸ The late head of the Nanking puppet government.

²⁹ In this connection it is of significance that it is not those reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, who are most strongly opposed to the Communists and who have been most commonly referred to as "appeasers," that have joined the Japanese to serve under them as puppets. On the contrary, it is so-called leftist leaders like Wang Ching-wei, and ex-Communists like Ch'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai, who have become the outstanding puppets. The Kuomintang officials who joined Wang Ching-wei in Nanking were for the most part his personal followers. Aside from them the majority of the puppet officials came from non-Kuomintang parties and groups.

since the New Fourth Army incident of 1941. In the spring of 1943 the Chungking Government began to increase its troop concentrations on the frontiers of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and the Communists in turn withdrew some of their troops from guerrilla areas in North China to the Shen-Kan-Ning area. Throughout the year there was the serious threat of an all-out Kuomintang offensive against the Communists. In 1942 and 1943, while a virtual truce existed on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors, the Communists had concentrated their attention on expanding their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. Clashes occurred in Shansi-Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh, and Chekiang, and the Communists scored several successes. The Kuomintang leaders became infuriated against the Communists for their "aggressive tactics against the Chungking forces," and their "intensified . . . activities, endangering the security of the State and sabotaging our [the Government's] war efforts."

It is against this background that the following Tokyo radio announcement made in March 1944, one month before the opening of the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government and American forces in China, assumes a particular significance. "The Sino-Reds recently adopted a '10-20-70 forward policy' under which they use 10 percent of their power to deal with Japan, 20 percent for the protection of their bases, and the remaining 70 percent for the expansion of their influence. In order to counter . . . the new strategy mapped out by the Chinese Reds, the Chungking regime is putting into practice the dual policy of political and military pressure, carrying on political negotiations with the Communists, and simultaneously carrying out an encirclement offensive."

The events of 1944 up to the present, April 1945, do not contradict this statement. A report by the Kuomintang Headquarters in Chungking in August 1944, evaluated C-3 by an American observer in Chungking, stated that "Puppet-Communist cooperation since last January is becoming clear." In substantiation of this, the report stated that "The puppets have demilitarized fortifications in Hopeh, the construction of which was primarily an anti-Communist measure." The demilitarization of some fortifications in Hopeh Province has been confirmed by the Chinese Communists, although they do not, of course, state that this is the result of any "understanding" or "cooperation" with the puppets. Since the Japanese consider their areas in North China as vital to their empire defense, they would hardly abandon some of their defenses in North China unless they felt reasonably assured that this move would not endanger their position vis-a-vis the Communists.

There is no indication that the Chinese Communist forces made any effort to support the Chungking Government and American forces in China during the Japanese offensive in 1944. But there is evidence showing that the same kind of "non-aggression pact," which American missionaries reported to exist between Communist and puppet troops in 1942 and 1943, continued in some front sectors in 1944. Throughout 1944 the Communists also continued their campaigns against Chungking Government forces.

An American Army officer who spent three months, from August to November 1944, with the New Fourth Army in Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces reported that the railroads in Japanese-controlled areas in Kiangsu "are not diked or walled in order to prevent attack upon them [by New Fourth Army troops]. There appears to be a tacit arrangement between the New Fourth Army and the Japanese by which, and in return for the Communists not attacking the trains and railroads, the Japanese will not construct walls and dikes along the [Tientsin-Pukow] railroad [in Kiangsu] as they have done elsewhere, and which would make crossing by the Communists next to impossible." New Fourth Army leaders told the American officer that they would not attack the Japanese railroad until "such an attack would have a strategic or tactical bearing as a part of a specific military operation." They claimed that a premature attack on this railroad would achieve little of military value, and "at the same time such would make their own operations and movements considerably more hazardous and difficult."

The American Army officer mentioned above reported on the tense situation at the Chungking Government-Communist front in Anhwei, northwest of Nanking. Several small clashes had occurred there during 1944. In January 1945 an American Army officer observer in China reported that Kuomintang troops had "attacked" the Communists in Anhwei. He did not explain whether the "attack" was necessitated as a means of self-defense. That this was the case, if the Kuomintang forces actually launched an attack, is indicated by other reports. In January 1945 Chungking Government sources, reporting on the fighting in Anhwei, stated that between 2,000 to 3,000 troops of the New Fourth Army had crossed to

the south bank of the Yangtze River with the aim of joining up with Communist elements in Chekiang to prepare to "greet" an American landing. Another report by an American Army observer in Anhwei (February 1945) stated that fighting between Chungking and Communist troops was taking place in Northern Chekiang and that 8,000 Communist troops had crossed to the south bank of the Yangtze River during the past few months. An American representative of the air ground aid service in Anhwei stated that progress was being made by the Communists, that they were winning over more recruits, were getting increased support from the people, and that the New Fourth Army troops could not be halted by the troops of the Chungking Government. He said that southern Chekiang and the Northern Fukien coast were reported to be the objectives of the Communists. The available information seems to show clearly that, in general, it is the Communists rather than the Kuomintang who have been on the offensive.

As the Japanese campaign progressed with the Chungking forces routed in various sections of China, clashes between Chungking and Communist forces were reported by Kuomintang, Chinese Communist, American, and Japanese sources to have taken place in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kwangtung, with the Communists extending their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. According to Japanese sources the Communists have successfully penetrated into Western Kwangtung. A Tokyo broadcast of 19 February 1945 states that "the Chungking troops [in the area southwest of Canton] are being gradually and steadily pressed by 5,000 Yen-an troops and the armed populace is alining with the Yen-an regime."

In October 1944 Mao-Tse-tung told an American observer in Yen-an that the Communists would "recover any territory lost by the Kuomintang," and that Communist forces had already moved into East Honan from both North and South. He intimated that the Communists would also go into Southeast China if Kuomintang control there "disintegrated." But he insisted, said the American observer, that "the Communists will not compete with the Kuomintang for territory which it still holds, and while they recognize the Japanese crushing of the Kuomintang may mean eventual advantage, the Communists realize that this will be outweighed by immediate disadvantages to the Allied war against Japan."

The foregoing outline of the Kuomintang-Communist fighting shows how little truth there was in this statement by Mao Tse-tung. In Honan the Communists have undoubtedly occupied some areas evacuated by the Chungking forces after their crushing defeat in 1944, but even here they have clashed with Chungking troops trying to maintain their remaining areas of control. In Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and Kwangtung the inter-party fighting during 1944 and thus far in 1945 did not take place in areas where the control of the Chungking Government had "disintegrated" in the sense Mao Tse-ung implied, for had this been the case there would obviously have been no fighting.

The foregoing examples have not been quoted in order to belittle the value of the contribution of the Chinese Communists to the war against Japan, nor to create the impression that the virtual truce which has existed on several Communist-Japanese front sectors indicates that the Communists have shown any willingness to surrender or to stop fighting the Japanese. As the succeeding section of this study will show, there was considerable fighting between Communist and Japanese forces all through 1944, although it was not in any respect comparable to the great battles between Chungking Government and Japanese forces. (Section 2. (4))

Nevertheless, all evidence leads to the conclusion that while the Communists have been on the defensive against the Japanese, they have been on the offensive against the Chungking Government. Their refusal to accept any demarcation of Chungking Government and Communist defense areas, and their policy of moving into Chungking Government defense areas whenever they feel that they are strong enough to drive out the Chungking forces, is largely responsible for diverting the Chungking Government's attention from the war against Japan and for the confusion created by the constant inter-party fighting.

Careful and dispassionate examination of the record shows that statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the behavior of the Kuomintang toward the Communists has been more moderate than that of the Communists toward the Kuomintang. Several times during the war the Kuomintang has considered invading Communist defense areas in the same way that the Communists have actually invaded several Kuomintang defense areas. Some observers have maintained that the Kuomintang could have defeated the Communists. In October 1943, during a serious inter-party crisis, the American Military Attaché in China reported: "In point of fact, the Communists could be crushed by force of arms.

They have not had any equipment from the Central Government for four years. They have not had any pay for three." Nevertheless, no general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas has been launched; each crisis has been resolved through the moderating influence of the Generalissimo and others affiliated with Chungking, who have maintained that a civil war must be avoided at least until the end of the war against Japan. That the Kuomintang has proved more sensitive than the Communists to this latter consideration does not necessarily prove greater virtue on the part of the Kuomintang, nor less on the part of the Communists. Certainly a powerful factor in the situation has been the attitude of the United States, which has been the chief source of vital supplies to China. Both the United States Government and the press have made it very clear to the Kuomintang that a military liquidation of the Communists, during the war with Japan, would be frowned upon by American opinion. It does not appear, on the other hand, that the Communists have had to fear similar disapproval of their activities in extending their areas at the expense of the Kuomintang.

The record indicates that neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang have expended their main efforts against the Japanese, except as both have been compelled to defend themselves. Both have done everything they could to prepare to maintain their own positions after the war. The evidence substantiates the statement made by Congressman Mansfield in his report to the Congress in January this year, after his return from his Mission to China: "On the basis of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past two years, than they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory."

(4) *The Chinese Communists' war against Japan*

In August 1943 General Hata, at that time C-in-C of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, said during a press interview in Nanking that in North China, "the Communist bandits . . . are the chief disturbing factors endangering peace and order. They are not only handicapping the administrative progress but also undermining the work of reconstruction of a New China. Furthermore, under the pretext of offering resistance, the Communists are actually bent upon expanding their influence for selfish purposes. In the pacification of North China, suppression of the Communists is a matter which should not be overlooked." In October 1943 a Tokyo broadcast to the home audience reported on fighting in Western Hopeh Province and the T'ai-heng Mountains of Southeastern Shansi Province. After repeating the usual claims of "destruction" of Communist bases, the Japanese announcer added the following unusual admission: "The work of detecting the fleeing enemy forces is not an easy matter even with the aid of the air units who report to us the positions of the enemy . . . Therefore, our forces are able to seek out only a small number at a time, and then pursue them. The hardships that our imperial forces are facing today may be well imagined."

To those who have followed the Japanese war communiques since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the frequent mention of battles with "bandits," "mopping up operations," and "pacification campaigns" in North China is strong testimony to the resistance offered by the Chinese Communists. This is confirmed by neutral observers, primarily by American and British missionaries, repatriated in 1943, who have lived in Japanese-occupied cities and towns and have had ample opportunities to witness the struggle between the Communist guerrilla forces³⁰ and the Japanese Imperial Army.

This does not mean that the resistance of the Communists has been strong in terms of military power, but rather in terms of political-economic subversive activities against the Japanese. The following statements are typical of the eyewitness accounts of the repatriated missionaries, which give a picture of the pattern of Communist guerrilla warfare. In regard to the border area between Shantung and Hopeh Provinces one Catholic priest stated: the Eighth Route Army forces "move from place to place constantly to elude Japanese watchfulness. Their influence is enough to cause constant worry to the Japanese, although their effectiveness remains small because they lack the necessary heavy arms . . .

³⁰ The Communists make a clear distinction between their regular army (Eighth Route and New Fourth armies), the guerrillas, and local militia. For convenience sake they are all referred to in this section as "guerrilla forces" since the methods of fighting of each group follow the pattern of guerrilla warfare.

Their hatred of the Japanese is real, and in equal combat they put up a good show. They specialize and excel in guerrilla fighting." Another Catholic priest from Shantung stated in regard to the Eighth Route Army forces in that province: "As soldiers they are not much, because their equipment is inferior to the Japanese. In one skirmish that I witnessed in November 1942, though the Communists outnumbered the Chinese puppet troops 4-1, the Communists fled without firing a shot. But their nuisance value is considerable, since the Japanese must constantly maintain garrisons in the region."

A Protestant missionary from Shantung reported: Formerly "I just thought of them [the Communists] only as a menace but their effectiveness [in Shantung] is now [1943] an established fact. They are fighting the Japanese and spreading their doctrine. I do not know about their numbers but they must be numerous because when the Japanese start one of their expeditions to 'mop up bandits,' they have to collect from 400 to 500 soldiers before they start out. The country people suffer most from these excursions because when the Japanese appear in force, the Communists simply melt away to reappear when the danger is past. Consequently the Japanese take it out on the village people. The 'Eighth Route' Army (Communists) are well disciplined and, where they have control, the common people enjoy a measure of security and of freedom from exorbitant taxes . . . Where the Japanese are in control the taxes are lowest but personal security and freedom are much less. Their [the Communists'] propaganda is strong and is definitely Communistic when not forced by circumstances to be anti-Japanese."

A Protestant missionary from Anhwei stated: "The Chinese 'New Fourth Army' is active very near Su-hsien [in North Anhwei on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad]. They carry on guerrilla activities and prey upon the Chinese people a great deal, taxation, etc. Every so often there are battles fought, but nothing is very effective. Near to the area strictly occupied by the Japanese (along Railroad, main motor roads, and principal cities) so many of the activities are just ordinary banditry and the well controlled groups are farther away." In regard to New Fourth Army activities in the Hankow area in Hupeh Province one Missionary from Han-yang, opposite Hankow, reported: "They [the Communists] are reported to have fought with the Japanese and even the regular 128th Chungking division in order to [obtain] local supremacy. [Their] spying system is very good. Sabotage—attacking Japanese shipping on the [Yangtze] River. This is not very helpful, for a shot will be fired and then they will run and the Japanese will take the particular village." A missionary physician from Ningpo reported: "A small group (1,000 perhaps) New Fourth Army Communists appeared in April [1943] in a sector of no-man's-land which lies between Shao hsing and Ningpo [in Chekiang Province] . . . They carried out the typical program of robbing the well-to-do and befriending the poor. They were to all reports not short of weapons or funds."

These statements which are confirmed by many other sources show that the policy of the Communists toward the Japanese is chiefly centered on winning the confidence of the people, "befriending the poor," and in this way extend their political-economic control in areas adjacent to Japanese-occupied zones. Through this policy, which was probably the only one possible in view of their poor arms and consequent inability to attack the Japanese and defeat them by military force, they have prevented the Japanese from deriving adequate economic benefits from their military conquests. Since both the Japanese-occupied zones and adjacent areas were originally under control of the National Government (Chungking), this policy of the Chinese Communists has inevitably involved alienation of the loyalty of the people from Chungking, as the initial step in establishing their anti-Japanese base areas. It led, as we have seen, to fighting between Chungking Government and Communist forces as well as between these forces and the Japanese. But whether the fighting represented the internal inter-party war in China or the Chinese war against Japan, the net result as far as the Japanese were concerned was that they never succeeded in consolidating their power.

It should be emphasized that the Communists were by no means the only ones who organized and maintained resistance in guerrilla areas. The Japanese have frequently, as late as 1944, mentioned Chungking guerrilla forces as fighting against them in Shantung, Shansi, and Hopeh, the three most important guerrilla areas of the Chinese Communists. And foreign missionaries repatriated in 1943, who reported on conditions in these three provinces during 1941, 1942, and part of 1943, were often unable to specify whether guerrilla operations in the areas in which they had lived were led by Chungking or Communist forces.

However, during the inter-party war that went on in guerrilla areas the Chungking forces in North China gradually lost out against the Communists. As from the end of 1943 the Communist forces were in unquestioned control of the Chinese resistance movement in North and Southeast Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and Kiangsu, although a few Chungking guerrilla forces were (and still are) operating in these provinces. In several other areas both Chungking and Communist troops are leading the resistance movement against the Japanese, each group within its own areas of political-military control.

The Communists' resistance has been strongest in North China since they possess their largest bases here. It has been comparatively weaker in the Central China areas controlled by the New Fourth Army, partly because the New Fourth is weaker than the Eighth Route Army, partly because it has had far more trouble than the Eighth Route Army in North China in establishing and consolidating its base areas. The Chungking armies are stronger in Central than in North China, and therefore have been able to put up a more determined resistance against the New Fourth Army's attempts to secure bases than could the provincial forces in North China against the Eighth Route Army.

During the first three years of the war the Japanese employed, against the Communists in North China, tactics somewhat similar to those which Chiang Kai-shek had used against them in Kiangsi during his first four "Extermination Campaigns," 1931-1933. They launched out from their bases along the railways in several directions, trying to occupy as many places as possible in the guerrilla base areas. From these they made strong local encirclements against the scattered Communist forces.

But the latter avoided pitched battles with the Japanese. They developed an excellent intelligence system through the local militia forces and the Village Mobilization Committees. They also developed a telephone system for rapid transmission of information about the movement of Japanese troops. The wires were stolen from Japanese lines. The telephones were taken during raids on small Japanese positions or bought in the large port cities and smuggled out to the guerrillas. Eight months after the outbreak of war the Communists claimed that they possessed a telephone system with 2660 miles of wires and over 600 offices in Hopeh, in addition to 10 radio stations. The rural areas became honeycombed with Communist spies and observation posts. Simple looking farmers working in the fields or bringing food to the Japanese-occupied towns watched the concentrations and movements of the Japanese forces and transmitted their information to the guerrilla headquarters from hidden telephone posts in the fields and in the villages.

Communist intelligence agents also infiltrated into the cities, many of them obtaining employment by the Japanese as puppet officials, soldiers, police agents, servants, and laborers. The Communist secret service organization was developed by Hsieh K'ang-chih (Chao Jung, Kang Sang), who is variously mentioned as chief of the Central Political Protection Bureau of the CCP, head of the Central Social Affairs Department of the CCP and concurrently director of the Intelligence Department. Available reports confirm that the Communist secret service organization is at present one of the best organized and efficient in China with secret centers in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, and in many of the cities and towns in rural areas of East China. Part of its work consists of gathering intelligence, and part of organizing subversive activities against the Japanese.

Through their well developed underground system, the Communists were able to avoid encounters with superior Japanese forces. They attacked their supply columns, severed their communication lines, and raided small isolated Japanese outposts. They attacked only when assured that they commanded superior strength. Like a blind colossus the Japanese army struck out in all directions fumbling for its opponent but seldom finding him. After the Chinese Government and provincial forces in North China were defeated in large-scale battles against fortified points and along front-lines, the war deteriorated, for the Japanese strategists and tacticians, into an undignified game of "hide and seek."

The realization that the Communists were turning the war into a people's war induced the Japanese to turn their armed might against the people. They adopted a policy of trying to make guerrilla areas uninhabitable. They burnt houses, carried off or destroyed the crops. Men, women, and children were killed in droves. Thousands were drafted as laborers and sent to Manchuria. By the end of 1939 the Japanese held most of the *hsien* cities in North China

and motor roads connecting them. But they still could not prevent the movement of the Chinese forces. The Communists had even managed to infiltrate into areas north of Peiping, whence they moved into the wild mountain region of Southern Jehol. There they began to establish their first base area in "Manchukuo."

Lt. General Tada was C-in-C of the Japanese North China Expeditionary Forces at this time. In 1940 he developed the so-called "cage policy," or "fortress tactics." Deep and wide ditches or moats were dug and high walls built along the sides of the railways and highways in Central and Southern Hopeh in order to protect them from attacks and, more important, to blockade and to break up the Communist base areas. At the same time hundreds of miles of new roads with protecting ditches were built with the object of cutting up the guerrilla bases into small pieces which would then be destroyed one by one. The number of blockhouses along the railways and roads, manned by Japanese soldiers, was greatly increased.

This policy was an adaptation of Chiang Kai-shek's successful "fortress-blockhouse policy" used against the Communists in Kiangsi in 1934; Chiang had renewed this policy in the summer of 1939, although this time as a means of defense against and segregation of the Communists, in the military blockade of the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. The Eighth Route Army clearly saw the danger of Tada's new tactics. On 20 August 1940 it launched the so-called "100-regiment offensive" in Hopeh and Shansi which lasted for three months. According to the Communists considerable damage was done to Japanese transportation and communication lines and to several coal mines near the railroads, including the important Ching-hsing coal mine on the Cheng-Tai Railroad in Shansi. The Communists claimed that over 20,000 Japanese were killed, over 5,000 puppet troops were killed and wounded, 281 Japanese officers and soldiers were captured, and some 18,000 puppet soldiers were captured. 2,993 Japanese forts and blockhouses were destroyed. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured.

This was probably the largest Communist campaign of the war. It was successful in that the Japanese had to go on the defensive temporarily. They were also forced to strengthen the defense of their transportation lines and to concentrate more troops in North China. But the offensive had been costly to the Communists both in ammunition and in casualties. They were unable to keep it up without supplies.

General Tada supplemented the "fortress tactics" with what the Communists called the "butcher knife tactics," which involved concentration of an overwhelming force in a sudden attack upon strongholds or important centers in Communist base areas. These attacks developed into virtual scorched earth campaigns when tens of thousands of the civilian population were killed and thousands of villages leveled to the ground. Foreign neutral travellers in the guerrilla areas in 1942 reported that it was rare to see a village in Hopeh and Shansi which had not been at least partially destroyed. Some areas in North-west Shansi had been completely depopulated. In the districts west of Peiping it was estimated that two-thirds of all the houses had been destroyed.

With their base areas on the plain of Central Hopeh chipped into small segments by the Japanese fortified roads, rapid escape from areas threatened by superior Japanese raiding columns became increasingly difficult for the Communist forces. They suffered several defeats. Tada was replaced by General Okamura in the summer of 1941. He strengthened the "fortress tactics" by digging more ditches, walls, and blockhouses, and by extending the network of fortified roads in Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung. At the end of 1942 the Eighth Route Army estimated that the Japanese had built 9,600 miles of walls and ditches throughout North China, 29,846 blockhouses, and 9,243 forts or strongholds. In the fall of 1941 General Okamura directed an army of more than 100,000 men, according to Communist statements, in an attack upon the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. In May 1942 he launched other offensives against the Communist guerrilla bases in the T'ai-heng Mountain region of Southeastern Shansi. During the latter part of 1942 similar campaigns were undertaken against Communist base areas in Southern Shantung. The Communists referred to these campaigns as General Okamura's "triple" or "three-all policy," that is kill all, burn all, and loot all. These campaigns achieved a measure of success. The Communists lost ground during 1941 and 1942 in both Hopeh and Shansi. But the Japanese campaigns were by no means conclusive. They aggravated the people's hatred of them and drove them into the arms of the Communists, who combined their efforts in fighting the Japanese with attempts to help the peasants in rehabilitating their devastated land.

The Communists had also been able to compensate for their losses of areas to the Japanese in Hopeh and Shansi by expansion into areas controlled by the Chungking Government. During the summer of 1941 they also began to expand into rural districts of Eastern Hopeh. There they laid the foundation for their political organization of the areas east of Peiping and Tientsin, preparatory to using this important area for guerrilla attacks against the Tientsin-Mukden Railway and for further penetration of Communist forces into "Manchukuo."

The Communists' answer to the Japanese "fortress policy" and their annihilation campaigns was the employment of land mines, which became one of their chief weapons. Every trail in the mountains was mined. Before the villagers fled into the fields or to the hills at the approach of Japanese raiding columns they mined the approaches to their village and placed "booby traps" in their homes, streets, wells, and courtyards. This caused a large number of casualties among the Japanese. In Central Hopeh they developed a new technique of underground fighting. The villagers built underground shelters where they could hide from the Japanese. Later these underground shelters were joined up by tunnels inside the village, and finally tunnels were built to connect several villages. These tunnels made it possible for the villagers and the guerrillas to escape from Japanese encirclements, and they enabled the guerrilla forces to cross underneath the fortified roads and railways and to attack the Japanese in villages which they believed to be deserted. The approaches to the tunnels were protected by land mines and "booby traps" which made the Japanese very unwilling to go near them. These tunnels played an important part in the Communist defense system during the campaigns in 1940 and 1941. Their usefulness became limited when the Japanese, according to Communist reports, started using poison gas. The anti-gas curtains which the villagers hung up at the entrances of the tunnels were not always effective.

Nevertheless, the Communists claim that their new technique placed the Japanese more and more on the defensive in the course of 1943. The Communists maintain that it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese to hold their widely-scattered *hsien* cities and to maintain the vast system of fortified roads. According to estimates published by the Eighth Route Army 10½ Japanese divisions were tied down in opposing the Communists in North China during 1942, in addition to 3 Japanese divisions engaged by the New Fourth Army in Central China. These made up 44 percent of the total of Japanese troops in China.

This explanation does not, however, seem wholly satisfactory. It fits part of the picture, but not all. It is questionable if the Communists actually "tied down" 13½ (and later more) Japanese divisions in China. Several observers have contended with a great deal of justification that the Japanese used China, and North China in particular (since they controlled larger areas in North China than elsewhere in China), as a proving ground for their troops. The numerous "annihilation campaigns" against both the Communists and Chungking Government forces were probably designed as much for the purpose of providing training for the Japanese troops as for defeating the Chinese. China, after all, was only a stepping stone for further Japanese conquests. The army that fought and conquered in China was designed for even greater conquests in other countries. The limited resistance offered by the Chinese provided an atmosphere of real war. The Japanese suffered casualties, but probably not so many as to render the annihilation campaigns truly costly to them. Because the Communist troops usually retreated before the Japanese few actual battles were fought during these campaigns. It was not the Communist armies that suffered so much as the people who were left a prey to Japanese vengeance. The Chungking armies when faced with these Japanese annihilation campaigns usually tried to defend their cities and areas. And as a result the Chungking armies also suffered far greater casualties than the Communist armies.

Many of the Japanese troops that have fought the Americans in the Pacific have had years of training in China. And as experienced Japanese troops have been shifted from China to the Pacific fronts, they have been replaced in great part with new Japanese recruits for training in China. Many foreign military observers came to view these Japanese annihilation campaigns in China as training campaigns without any other significance except possibly to loot and bring in grain for the Japanese Army. They were usually marked by a Japanese advance into the Chinese bases, destruction of these bases and the crops in rural areas, followed by a retreat to the original Japanese starting point. The pattern had been repeated so many times that some military observers failed for a long time to recognize the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government forces in 1944 as anything else than one of the "usual" training campaigns.

There were several indications that the Japanese defensive policy against the Communists which began in 1943 was induced by many other factors of greater importance than the one mentioned by the Communists, namely, the effectiveness of their new technique for fighting the Japanese. With the establishment of American air bases in China, Japanese military operations became increasingly centered on Chungking Government rather than Communist areas of control. Beginning with the Japanese spring offensive in 1942, following Lt. General (then Col.) J. H. Doolittle's raid on Tokyo, which had as one of its objects the destruction of Chinese-American air bases in Chekiang, the Japanese resumed, for the first time since 1939, offensive operations against Chungking with intent of conquering additional areas. In Communist areas the Japanese "training campaigns" continued through 1943 and 1944, although on a considerably smaller scale than before. But their campaigns in Chungking Government controlled areas assumed an increasingly serious nature far beyond the scope of mere "training" of troops.

Probably the most important factor in forcing the Japanese to reconsider their policy of large-scale annihilation campaigns into Communist areas was that the wholesale destruction of property and the mass slaughter of the people made it impossible for them to exploit the country adequately. They derived no more economic benefit than did the Communists from areas which had been laid waste. The Communists concentrated their efforts on fighting the Japanese in the guerrilla areas, the "no-man's land," between the Communist, Chung-king Government, and Japanese bases in which all three groups compete for control. It was therefore the guerrilla areas that suffered the greatest destruction. And since these were nearest the Japanese zones they were also the areas in which the Japanese were most interested, the pacification of which would have yielded them the greatest economic benefits.

There is no space here to go into the details of the economic problems that the destruction in the guerrilla areas caused to the Japanese. It reduced food production in North China considerably. The effect of this had not been felt so much by the Japanese and the people in their occupied areas so long as Australian and Canadian wheat could be imported. But from the end of 1942 when imported food supplies had been exhausted, the question of food control and production became one of the main problems of the Japanese and their puppet officials in China. The devastation in guerrilla areas also created a serious labor shortage for the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The question of filling the quota of labor for Manchuria, which before the war always came from North China, became increasingly difficult. During 1943 the labor emigration to Manchuria seems to have created such a manpower shortage in North China that it led to an actual clash between the puppet authorities in North China, trying to decrease the emigration, and the Japanese authorities trying to fill their Manchurian labor quota.

The North China Political Council announced during March 1943 that "in view of the increase in the number of laborers going to Manchuria, it would restrict the outflow . . . in order to insure . . . the agricultural production in North China." According to a Japanese statement, the emigration in 1942 from China to Manchuria was 1,086,000. This was 3 million below the number desired by the Japanese. In spite of strenuous efforts by Japanese labor recruitment agencies in North China and by the Japanese army the emigration during 1943 was considerably less than 1,000,000, probably less than 800,000. Even so many of the emigrants in 1942 and 1943 had been forcibly recruited from Central China. Central China had never before contributed to the Manchurian labor needs.

The emigration to Manchuria increased the acuteness of the labor shortage in Japanese-controlled areas of North China, where the demand for manpower became far above normal. There developed a shortage of farm labor because of the conscription of Chinese peasants for the puppet armies and for the construction of roads, defense walls, moats, fortifications, and other military works. Because of this there was also an industrial manpower shortage. In the end it became necessary to send laborers from Central China to North China and Inner Mongolia to fill the labor demands in those regions. And in order to relieve the food shortage in Japanese-occupied areas in North China food was imported from Central China.

Both the food and manpower shortages derived in great part from the comparative smallness of the Japanese-occupied areas. It is estimated that at the end of 1943 the total area of "Occupied" China proper, that is the areas behind the most advanced Japanese positions, was roughly 345,000 square miles. Out of this the Japanese controlled about 82,000 square miles. The guerrilla

areas ("no-man's-land") comprised about 67,000 square miles. The Communists controlled, roughly, 155,000 square miles (of which 110,000 square miles were in North China proper) comprising mostly thinly populated mountain regions. The balance, 41,000 square miles, represented Chungking-controlled areas. The Japanese-occupied and the guerrilla areas are the most fertile areas in China.

At the end of 1943 the total population of Occupied China was about 183,000,000 people. Of these about 70,000,000 lived in Japanese-occupied areas, and some 43,000,000 in guerrilla areas. About 54,000,000 lived in the Communist-controlled base areas, of which about 28,000,000 lived in North China. About 16,000,000 lived in Chungking-controlled areas.

These figures explain many of the difficulties with which the Japanese were (and still are) confronted in China. In 1943, with control over a population of only about 70,000,000 people in China proper, the Japanese had available as actual manpower only some 26,000,000 people. The difficulties the Japanese have had in supplying "Manchukuo" with one million immigrant laborers per year becomes apparent when it is realized that they have had to be recruited, chiefly, from Japanese-controlled areas. For example, the total population of Hopeh and Shantung, the two provinces from which most of the immigrants to "Manchukuo" have usually come, is about 70 million, of which, however, no more than about 27 million people have lived within Japanese-controlled areas. This represents a manpower capacity of barely 10 million employable people available to the Japanese in these two provinces.

The population and size of the different areas mentioned above varied constantly, of course, with the shifting fortunes of war. At all times the Japanese were able to supplement the resources of food, raw materials, and manpower in their occupied areas by drawing partially upon the food resources and manpower in the guerrilla areas, or no-man's-land.³¹ But since the Japanese, Communist, and Chungking Government forces were all competing with each other for control over no-man's-land, the Japanese could never derive adequate benefits from these areas.

The outbreak of war with the United States made Japan more dependent than before upon the resources of China, especially after 1942 when American sinkings of Japanese ships began to reduce Japan's ability to exploit the South-east Asia countries. In trying to find a solution for their problems in China the Japanese recognized that their annihilation campaigns had failed to crush the resistance of the Communists and the Chungking Government. Since the military campaigns had failed in their objectives, the Japanese decided to try diplomacy. The first announcement of the "New China Policy," or as it has also been called Japan's "appeasement policy" toward China, was made in November 1942 by Mamoru Shigemitsu, at that time Japanese Ambassador to the Chinese puppet government in Nanking. The chief objective of this policy was to establish better cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Japanese-occupied areas of China so as to maintain and possibly increase the production of food and industrial raw materials.

At the beginning of 1943 the Nanking puppet government was reorganized. Three new Ministries were created, those of Social Affairs, Food Supply, and Construction. In addition several economic control agencies for food, labor, commerce, and industry had been established during 1942. Many more were created during 1943. This emphasis on economic and social control showed not only where the Japanese and the puppets faced their greatest difficulties, but also, of course, in what fields of activity they intended to exert special efforts at rehabilitation. On 1 January 1943 the Nanking government inaugurated the "New Citizen Movement" (Hsin Kuo Min) which was to be coordinated with the "Rural Pacification Movement" which had been inaugurated in May 1942. The task of these two movements was to increase agricultural production, to exercise thought control, to promote the cooperative movement among the peasants and to organize student and youth organizations.

The government reorganization in Nanking at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 also involved a change of the military affairs structure in which the puppet military leaders obtained a considerably greater influence. At the end of January 1943 the Nanking government promulgated a decree by which the provincial puppet governors and district magistrates were designated to hold concurrent positions as commanders of the provincial and local Peace Preserva-

³¹ The Japanese also obtained considerable amounts of food and raw materials from the smuggling traffic with Free China.

tion Corps respectively. In the central government in Nanking the civilian puppet leaders continued to hold the dominant power, but in the provincial governments, the puppet military leaders obtained the dominant role. This change was of considerable significance. Since most of the puppet provincial governors were military men, the combining of both political and military authority in their hands added greatly to their prestige and power. It showed that the Japanese were placing increasing confidence in the puppet military leaders rather than, as before, in the civilian puppet leaders. The responsibility for garrisoning occupied areas was more and more shifted over from Japanese to puppet troops.

This was one of the outstanding military aspects of the New China policy which the Japanese adopted at the end of 1942. The second aspect was the shift in the use of Japanese and puppet troops. Instead of trying to hold as many fortified roads and towns as possible they concentrated on consolidating control in a few key agricultural areas. These areas were called "Model Peace Zones," and "Special Administrative Areas."

The first Model Peace Zone had been established in the summer of 1941 in the Soochow (Wu-hsien) area between Shanghai and Nanking. During the latter part of 1942 and 1943 Model Peace Zones were established along the entire railway line between Nanking and Shanghai, around Hangchow in Chekiang Province, in the Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow) area in Hupeh, in the Canton area in Kwangtung, in Northeastern Hunan, in the rich Huai Hai agricultural area in Northeastern Kiangsu, and around Kaifeng, capital of Honan Province. The Japanese stated in August 1944 that the combined area of these Model Peace Zones was slightly more than 24,600 square miles, with a population of 13,818,000 people. In North China, Special Administrative areas were established during 1943 south of Peiping and west of Tientsin, and, in 1944, in East Hopeh.

Within the Model Peace Zones the Japanese concentrated their military effort on clearing out the Communists and keeping them out. As areas were "pacified" in this manner, the administration and policing of them was turned over to the puppet military forces. As more Model Peace Zones were established the principle of the old strategy of breaking up Communist areas through the occupation of as many cities and towns as possible and the construction of fortified roads between these was gradually relaxed. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from hundreds of villages and abandoned many of their blockhouses and fortresses, which were taken over by the Communists.

In some areas the Chinese Communists tried to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their power and developing the agricultural production within the Model Peace Zones. Their principal method was to prevent the Japanese from maintaining their census system, which plays an important role in the enforcement of peace and order. In Japanese controlled areas each Chinese is required to carry a Certificate of Residence and each household must keep hanging beside the door a small wooden board listing the persons who dwell therein. Persons without a Certificate of Residence are subject to execution as spies or bandits. Any household that fails to give the Japanese police an adequate explanation for an increase or decrease in the household faces drastic punishment. On some occasions the Communists on arriving at a village confiscate and destroy all Residence Certificates and household census boards. Villages so treated by the Communists tend to be forced into opposition to the Japanese. The young men are then recruited by the Communist army. Food supplies are taken by the Communists to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese. The Communists thereafter afford these villages such protection as they are able to give.

There are, however, indications that the Communists have abstained from violence in many of the Model Peace Zones. One report from Kwangtung Province, in February 1944, emphasized that the Communists did not constitute much danger to the Japanese "since the policy of the Reds is undoubtedly to concentrate on strengthening their own position and avoid direct action . . . with Japanese." Another report from 1943 concerning Central China emphasizes that the Communist guerrillas were welcomed by the country people in so far as was "consistent with safety wherever they go. And in view of the fact that Japanese reprisals are usually collective, the guerrillas keep this in mind in their activities and keep as far away as possible from villages" in Japanese-controlled areas.

This statement and similar ones suggest strongly that the Communists had learned, from their experiences in the late 1920's, the danger of needlessly causing bloodshed. Their policy at that time of encouraging and organizing

strikes among the workers in the large cities under Kuomintang control had caused massacres of thousands of these workers by Kuomintang troops and police. The result was not only that the Communist labor movement in the cities was crushed, but that the city workers came to fear the Communists. The Japanese policy toward the villagers in areas under their control was similar to that of the Kuomintang in the 1920's and early '30's toward the workers. The Communists, therefore, avoided inciting the Japanese needlessly into reprisals against the population in their areas of control.

A factor which undoubtedly favored the Japanese, after 1943, in consolidating their power in the Model Peace Zones and Special Administrative Areas was the increased attention which the Communists devoted, particularly in the New Fourth Army areas, to fighting Chungking Government troops. As we have seen, it was also during this time that the Communists began to compete with the Chungking Government in winning the friendship of the puppet troops. A virtual truce existed between the Communists and the puppet forces in some of the front sectors, particularly in Kiangsu and Anhwei. This undoubtedly favored the Japanese, and in September 1943 they turned over most of their defense sectors in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang to the puppet forces.

The new strategy of the Japanese was partially successful. The size of their areas of control within the Communist defense zones in Central and North China decreased, but conditions within these areas, especially within the Model Peace Zones, in Central China, became more orderly than before. The added attention given to agrarian improvements within these Model Peace Zones also led to an increase of production. A German source stated that, in 1942, 24 million piculs (1,320,000 short tons) of rice and 600,000 piculs (33,000 short tons) of cotton were harvested in the Model Peace Zones, which meant an increase of no less than 30 percent over the previous year. The German source stated that "the increase of production strengthens the Model [Peace] Zones in their self-sufficiency with regard to food, and also facilitates the food supply for the larger cities, especially Nanking and Shanghai." In 1943 the harvest was especially good in China, and the food production in Japanese areas of China were estimated to be about 30 percent greater than in 1942. Since the Japanese no longer pursued their annihilation campaigns as vigorously as before, there seems also to have been a greater degree of order in the guerrilla areas between Communist and Japanese base regions, especially in Central China. And it is probable that this enabled the Japanese to derive somewhat greater profit from the agricultural production in the guerrilla areas.

On the other hand, these improvements were offset by several other factors beyond the control of the Japanese. The most important factor was the decreasing confidence in a Japanese victory of the Chinese population in Japanese-occupied areas. This made the people highly distrustful of the value of the currency of the puppet regimes which was backed chiefly by Japanese bayonets. And this in turn led people to prefer exchanging their currency holdings into commodities. Hoarding of food and other commodities became even more prevalent in Japanese occupied areas than in Chungking Government areas. From 1943 on the currency inflation in Japanese occupied areas began to rival that in Chungking areas. Hoarding and inflation became important factors in preventing a normal development of trade, and made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to finance their vast military and civilian undertakings in China. The inflation reached an acute stage during 1944; since that time it has been considerably worse than in Chungking areas.

Another important factor offsetting the advantages derived from increased agricultural production in the Model Peace Zones was the deterioration of the rolling stock on Japanese railways, which greatly hampered the movement of goods. Contributing factors were guerrilla activities against the railways, particularly in North China, and American bombings of Japanese railway bridges. American air attacks against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze and along the China coast further diminished the flow of Japanese inter-provincial traffic in China. As a result serious food shortages developed in the large cities in the occupied areas which are the centers of Japanese military and political control.

The withdrawal of Japanese forces from several fortified points led to a considerable increase of Communist areas in 1943 and especially in 1944. The Yenan radio announced in November 1944 that the Eighth Route Army had in 1944 "liberated" in Shantung eight county towns (*hsien* capitals), and an area of 11,100 square miles with a population of 5,000,000 people. Another announcement by the Yenan radio stated that nearly half of the population and territory of Shantung was still in Japanese hands, and that the Japanese were

holding the important communication lines and economic centers of the province. During 1944 the Eighth Route Army also began to use its growing strength in Shantung to attack the Japanese at several points. Its most notable victory was the occupation in November 1944 of Chü-hsien, an important city in Southeastern Shantung on the road from Tsingtao to Süchow. Throughout the past two years there has been considerable fighting in Shantung between Communist and Chinese puppet forces. On the basis of Japanese and Communist reports there has been more fighting in Shantung than in any other Communist-Japanese front sector.

Another area where the Eighth Route Army has been particularly active against the Japanese is in Shansi Province. The Yen-an radio announced in December 1944 that between January and October the Eighth Route Army had taken 3,060 square miles of territory with a population of 259,600. The Eighth Route Army was also active in Shansi during 1944 in fighting Chungking Government forces of General Yen Hsi-shan.

Except for Northeastern Hopeh and the coastal region between Hopeh and Shantung, no large-scale fighting took place between Japanese and Eighth Route Army forces in this province during 1943 and 1944. Communists sources state that in February 1944 Eighth Route Army forces occupied a "strong point" near Hsi-feng K'ou, one of the two important passes between Hopeh and Jehol. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the Eighth Route Army also became active in the area northeast of Peiping and along the Hopeh section of the Japanese-held Tientsin-Mukden Railroad. Eighth Route Army forces also extended their operations in Chahar and Jehol during 1944 and penetrated into Liaoning Province in Manchuria. Here, however, they met such strong resistance from the Japanese and Manchurian puppet troops that the Communists stated in December 1944 that "further expansion in Manchuria is not feasible at the present time." It was reported in March 1945 that the "most important fighting" between Japanese and Communist troops in China was in East Hopeh, South Jehol and South Liaoning, where the Japanese had started a large-scale mopping-up campaign in order to clear out the Communist positions. An American observer in Yen-an also reported that the Chinese Communists "seem to expect a strong Japanese effort to consolidate themselves in North China." The fighting in Eastern Hopeh, Chahar, and Liaoning "is apparently intended to establish a *cordon sanitaire* between China and Manchuria and is being conducted with unusual determination and ferocity. The Communists claim that the whole areas are being either depopulated or made into fortified areas in which the whole population is concentrated into garrisoned villages—as was done in parts of Manchuria [during the 1930's]. Large-scale Communist movement southward shows not only a growing determination [by the Communists] to control China proper, but may also be an effort to get out from under an expected Japanese attempt to crush Communist strength in North China."

In Central China there was sporadic fighting during 1943 and 1944 between New Fourth Army forces and the Japanese, but most of the fighting was between Chungking Government and New Fourth Army forces, and most of the expansion of New Fourth Army influence was into base areas of the Chungking Government forces in Central China.

The combined effects of Communist gains against both the Japanese and Chungking Government forces in the past two years have been to instill in the Communists a self-assurance and confidence about their future position in China greater than at any previous time. The great defeats suffered by the Chungking Government forces during the Japanese campaign in 1944 have opened up for the Communists an opportunity to attempt to drive out all Chungking forces from Eastern China. This is part of the reason why there has been more fighting during the recent months between Communist and Chungking forces than between Communist and Japanese forces. An American observer in Yen-an stated in February 1945 that Communist leaders point out "on numerous occasions" that Communist planning envisages the organization of Communist guerrilla units in all areas of Eastern China "evacuated by Kuomintang forces." He also stated that "Among the Communists there is no doubt as to their ability to repeat in other parts of China their North China feats of popular organization. In March 1945 General Ch'en I, Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, stated to an American observer in Yen-an that the New Fourth Army had reached a strength of 300,000 regulars, and can easily be expanded to 400,000. Other Communist leaders said: "Give us a year and we will have all of East China from the borders of Manchuria to Hainan [Island]. When that has been accomplished, the Communist forces will be at least as strong as those of the Central Government, and it will be the Kuomintang which will be blockaded."

The growing strength of the Chinese Communists is also reflected in their propaganda and in their official attitude toward the Chungking Government. They have begun to claim the role of representing the Chinese people as a whole rather than the Communist Party. At the end of April 1945, Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP at Yen-an, referred to the Government in Chungking as "the illegal so-called National Government without popular support." The following passage in his report clearly expresses the consciousness among the Chinese Communists of their emergence into a position of power rivalling and possibly surpassing that of the Kuomintang: "Chinese [Communist] liberated areas have become a democratic pattern for China, and the center of gravity for cooperation with our Allies to drive out the Japanese aggressors and to liberate the Chinese people. The troops in the liberated areas have expanded to 910,000³² and the people's volunteers to over 2,200,000. These troops have become the main force in the war of resistance. And as soon as they receive modern equipment they will become still more invincible and able finally to defeat the Japanese aggressors." It was also pointed out during this Congress, the first Communist Party Congress held since 1928, that "the power of the Chinese Communist Party, the unity and solidarity within the Party and the Party's prestige among the people of China, are higher than at any period in the past."

At the beginning of May 1945 the Japanese admitted the growing power of the Chinese Communists in the following broadcast report from Tokyo quoting an article in *Mainichi Shimbun*: "During the past two years . . . the Yen-an regime has stubbornly pushed a political offensive in Japanese occupied North China. But in reality no military offensive of a major scale has been undertaken. However, [Yenan's] . . . clever maneuver to win over the Chinese masses to its cause (is) by no means slighted. Along with the expansion of its political sphere of influence the Yen-an regime strove hard to cultivate its fighting strength through an aggressive military enlargement program, as well as a production increase movement . . . Yen-an's anti-Japanese general counter-offensive does not go beyond the scheme to strike the Japanese in the back in conjunction with the heralded American landing on the China coast."

(5) *International implications of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle*

(a) *Attitudes of the Kuomintang toward foreign powers.*—There are striking differences in the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the CCP toward foreign nations. The Kuomintang is a Nationalist party. The Communist Party is international. The Kuomintang argues that Communism is a foreign doctrine incompatible with Chinese tradition and temperament. The Communists charge that the Kuomintang represents and is supported by the capitalist class which exists at the expense of the masses, and therefore adheres to foreign capitalist nations and betrays the interests of China.

In regard to the Kuomintang, there are pro and anti American leaders in the Party, pro and anti British leaders, and pro and anti Soviet Russian leaders. But all of them are nationalists who, in their relations with foreign countries, place the interests of China first of all. They intensely resent foreign domination. Because Great Britain formerly represented imperialist domination in China they accepted Soviet Russian aid, in the 1920's to drive the British out of China. When Soviet Russia used her position in China to win a dominant position for herself, they turned against her and reestablished friendly relations with Great Britain. The CCP as developed by Soviet Russia had many of the features of a puppet organization, serving the interests of Soviet Russia. The Kuomintang turned against the Chinese Communists as well as against Soviet Russia. When Japan began to invade China, the Kuomintang was willing to accept the aid of Soviet Russia, America, and Great Britain.

The Kuomintang, of course, hailed America's entry into the war as China's salvation. It has welcomed American aid and has accepted American advisers to help the Government in Chungking to plan and organize Chinese resistance against Japan, just as it once accepted Soviet Russian advisers to organize Chinese resistance against Great Britain. But there can be little doubt that if the leaders of the Kuomintang were ever to feel that America was trying to dominate China, they would turn against us and would accept aid from any foreign power, even from Soviet Russia, to combat our influence.

China under the Kuomintang is willing to cooperate with any and all foreign powers that are willing to treat China as an equal, and willing to respect her sovereign rights.

³² In July 1944 the Communists claimed that their regular troops numbered 47,000.

This is why most of the Kuomintang leaders resent and fear Soviet Russia, for in their opinion Soviet Russia has not respected Chinese sovereign rights. She has established Soviet domination over Outer Mongolia. She exerted a dominant influence in Sinkiang, and even though she withdrew her military forces and economic interests from Sinkiang in 1943, she did not prevent Outer Mongolia from supporting the anti-Chinese Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, which began in 1943 and still continues. An American observer in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province in the Northwest, reported that in 1942 Chinese "continually spoke of Outer Mongolia as being just as much a part of China as Manchuria, and its recovery just as important . . . This determination to reestablish control over Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was, they had no hesitation in saying, the dominant reason for the great emphasis on the development of the Northwest, particularly the Kansu Corridor which is regarded because of its position as being of vital strategic importance."

The leaders of the Kuomintang have opposed any attempt to fetter China to the British imperialist world system. They have opposed China's inclusion in the Japanese imperialist system. Today they fear that it is Soviet Russia's intention to drag China into the Communist world system under Soviet Russian domination. And because the Chinese Communists have always been followers and supporters of Soviet Russia, most of the Kuomintang leaders think of the Chinese Communists as an instrument of Soviet Russian expansion into China.

The American Consul in Lanchow stated that Chinese with whom he had travelled through Kansu in 1942 commonly spoke of Great Britain as China's old enemy, Japan as her present enemy, and Soviet Russia as her future enemy. The C-of-S of the Eighth War Zone, including Kansu, Ningsia, and Sinkiang, said in 1943 that the Chinese in the Northwest are "faced on one side by Russia, and on the other side by the [Chinese] Communists." In August 1943, just before General Hsiung Shih-hui was appointed chief of the National Planning Board (mainly concerned with post-war plans), he told an American official that China's first problem after the war is over is "military security particularly in the north."

Many of the most influential Kuomintang leaders have been apprehensive about what might happen to China if Soviet Russia were to enter into the war against Japan. American observers in China reported in August 1943, during a crisis between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, that "reactionary Kuomintang circles" deeply distrusted Soviet intentions and good faith, arguing that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved immediately by the use of force. Otherwise, they feared, if Soviet Russia entered the war against Japan, the Chinese Communists would take over North China while the Russians were sweeping through Korea and Manchuria. The tense situation in 1943 between the Kuomintang and the Communists, arising from the heavy concentration of Kuomintang troops in areas facing the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region in Shensi, Kansu, and Ningsia, was explained by an American agency in China as follows: "Kuomintang provincial officials in the Northwest are strongly suspicious of Soviet Russia and fear the occupation by the Chinese Communists of parts of Kansu and Ningsia. The Chungking Government has concentrated its forces in the Northwest not in preparation for an attack against the Chinese Communists, but rather because of fear that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists possibly intend to establish land communications between their areas of control."

This fear of Soviet Russia increased during 1944 and 1945 with the successful Russian offensive into Germany and with Soviet Russia's denunciation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan on 5 April 1945. An official American source in Chungking reported on 15 April that "Although Chinese expressed approval of Soviet denunciation of the Japanese pact, there was also a question of when and how Russia will enter the war. Informed Chinese hope that the United States will be able to deal with Japan alone and are afraid that Russia will complicate Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations and the future status of Manchuria and North China."

Most Kuomintang leaders, foremost among them the Generalissimo, maintain their suspicious attitude toward Soviet Russia and lean heavily on American support of the Chungking Government to counteract the growing power of the Chinese Communists and possible future Soviet domination of China. But some Kuomintang leaders, among them Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan and one of the leading spokesmen for the Chinese liberals, began in the course of 1944 to press for closer cooperation between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia. They argued that it was futile to ignore the fact that after the

defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the greatest land-power of Asia, and that it would be essential to the security of China that the Chungking Government establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. These Kuomintang leaders also realize that the initial step toward winning Soviet Russia's good-will is the establishment of friendly relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

In April 1945 it was reported from Chungking that the "Sun Fo school of thought" is gaining in Chungking. "Chungking believes that unity with the [Chinese] Communists cannot be achieved unless Stalin gives the necessary orders to the Communists. If there is danger of U. S. agreeing to some deal with Russia on Manchuria in order to bring her into war against Japan, China would do better by bargaining direct with Stalin. Chang Kai-shek so far has refused to budge from his position."

(b) *Attitude of the Chinese Communists toward foreign powers.*—Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have consistently followed the Soviet Russian party line. In the course of the present war they have upheld every action of the Soviet Union, even though at times it has appeared difficult to reconcile these actions with the interests of China. But when the United States and Great Britain have taken somewhat similar action, the Chinese Communists have never failed to make their displeasure known. Thus they denounced the "capitalist nations" in 1938 for shipping "great quantities of munitions and war materials" to Japan. But they saw nothing wrong in Soviet Russia concluding a Neutrality Pact with Japan in 1941.

When the Soviet Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded in August 1939, Mao Tse-tung said that it "strengthens the confidence of the whole of mankind in the possibility of winning freedom." He said that the pact

"... has upset the plot of Chamberlain, Deladier and others who were engaged in transactions for the international reactionary bourgeoisie and who wished to provoke war between the U. S. S. R. and Germany. The Pact was a hard blow to Japan [since it exposed the "false character" of the Anti-Comintern bloc], helped China strengthen the position of the supporters of the war of emancipation and dealt a blow to Chinese capitulators ...

"As I have already said, Chamberlain and his policy will meet with the fate described in the proverb, 'He that mischief hatches, mischief catches.' ... In order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both belligerent sides [Germany and Great Britain who in the opinion of Mao Tse-tung would soon start a war against each other] will cynically declare that they are waging a just war, while others are waging an unjust war. But only a non-predatory war, a liberation war is a just war.

"In the capitalist world, in addition to the above-mentioned two big groups, there is still a third group, namely, the states of America, headed by the United States. This group, guided by its own interests, has as yet not entered into the conflict. It can still, together with the U. S. S. R., call for the preservation of peace.

"American imperialists intend afterwards to appear on the scene and win for themselves a dominant position in the capitalist world ...

"In the sphere of Japanese foreign policy a struggle is taking place between two groups. The fascist military clique continues to strive to seize the whole of China and the South Seas and to squeeze Britain, America, and France out of the East. The liberal bourgeoisie on the other hand insist that concessions be made to the British, Americans, and French in order [that] the Japanese may be able to concentrate their attention on the plundering of China. At present time, the danger of an Anglo-Japanese agreement has increased. The British reactionary bourgeoisie evidently want to partition China, jointly with Japan, to give Japan political and economic assistance on the condition that Japan becomes Britain's watchdog in the East to protect its interests, to suppress the Chinese movement of national emancipation, to launch an attack on the U. S. S. R., and to restrict America's influence. Hence Japan's chief aim as regards the enslavement of China will not change ... Britain's policy in the East is directed towards organizing a Far Eastern Munich ...

"As regards the U. S. S. R. we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship with it, in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure still greater support ... Relations with the United States should, generally speaking, be the same. The most reliable friends rendering us support in the Capitalist countries are the broad masses of the people ..."

The Chungking Government at this time saw little hope that America and Great Britain would come to the aid of China, and therefore hailed the Soviet-German pact as a distinct blow to Japan, and conversely an aid to China. The Kuomintang press agencies agreed with the Chinese Communists that the agreement automatically broke up the anti-Comintern pact and expressed the opinion that the Russo-German pact would allow Soviet Russia to center her attention on Japan and devote her resources more fully to the aid of China.

This proved to be a mistaken idea. Soviet Russia did not devote her resources "more fully to the aid of China." With the break up, in the course of 1939 and 1940, of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, Soviet Russia began greatly to reduce her shipments of supplies to the Chungking Government. On 13 April 1941 Soviet Russia concluded a Neutrality Pact with Japan.

Wang Ch'ung-hui, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, bitterly attacked the Soviet Union. The American M/A in China reported that Government circles in Chungking viewed the signing of the Soviet-Japanese pact with alarm. "The worst feature, as far as the Chinese are concerned, is the possibility that the Japanese will be able to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from Manchuria for use in settling the China incident . . . The possible effect of the pact on continuance of Russian aid to China has also caused some concern." Well informed Chinese quarters in Chungking were also apprehensive that what they called Russia's "appeasement policy" toward Japan might induce Great Britain and the United States to follow Russia's example.

The brighter side of the picture, as far as the Chinese in Chungking were concerned, was the possibility that the pact might tempt Japan, "now that the back door in Manchuria is at least partially freed from fear of attack from Russia," to move into American, British, French, and Dutch areas in Southeast Asia "without attempting a settlement of the China incident." The American M/A reported that "recent developments have led China to believe that a move south will bring on a war between the United States and Japan which, as far as China is concerned, is a consummation devoutly to be wished." By signing the Neutrality Pact with Japan, the Kuomintang leaders believed that Soviet Russia had acted against China, the United States and Great Britain.

The CCP, however, thoroughly subscribed to Soviet Russia's move. In a statement issued in Chungking on 23 April, the Chinese Communists announced:

"[The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact] is a great victory of the USSR's foreign policy. The significance of this agreement lies above all in the fact that it strengthens peace on the eastern frontiers of the USSR and guarantees the security of the development of socialist construction. This kind of peace and development of the USSR is in keeping with the interests of the working people and oppressed nations of the whole world . . .

"The Soviet-Japanese pact has not restrained the aid which the USSR renders to independent and just resistance. If only the Chinese government will not use the help of the USSR against compatriots in the country, as for instance was the case in January of this year when the New Fourth Army was destroyed in the southern part of Anhwei Province . . . we are deeply convinced that the USSR . . . will continue to help China . . .

"The hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR and by this treaty the USSR has not disappointed and never will disappoint China.

"As regards the statement of the USSR and Japan about mutual non-aggression on Manchuria and Mongolia, this measure was necessary since so-called Manchukuo already for some time past had been used by Japan as an instrument for attacks on the USSR and for creating disorders on the frontier of the USSR and Outer Mongolia . . .

"Following the USSR's statement that it will not attack Manchuria, these people [referring to Kuomintang "speculators"] began to maintain that the USSR has acted incorrectly. Such people are to say the least, craven tricksters . . ."

What these "craven tricksters" in the Kuomintang had objected against above everything else was Soviet Russia's pledge in a separate "Frontier Declaration" attached to the Neutrality Pact to "respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo."

After Germany's attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941 Chinese nationalist groups viewed the new war development with some optimism from China's standpoint as it tended to confirm their long-held belief that eventually all major powers would be drawn into the conflict, to the benefit of China. Many

expressed the opinion that Japan would have to "honor" her alliance with the Axis by attacking Siberia and Outer Mongolia.

The Chinese Communists adopted more or less the same attitude toward the new world situation as Communists all over the world. Their concern was for Soviet Russia's welfare, even to the point of making it clear that the Chinese Communists wished that the United States and Great Britain would employ "every means" to help "the countries fighting Germany," even if this meant leaving China to fight on as best she could. Mao Tse-tung's statement on 10 October 1941, the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, is typical of the attitude of the Communists:

"The war which will decide the fate of the human race is today being fought ferociously on the plains of Russia between the Red Army and the fascist hordes of Hitler. All those people who want freedom, and first and foremost the great Chinese people, are wholeheartedly behind the Soviet Union, behind the Soviet-British-American anti-fascist united front."

In November 1941 Mao Tse-tung stated:

"In our opinion Britain and the United States must employ every means to help the countries fighting Germany. It is absolutely clear that the aspirations of the majority of Americans and Britains coincide with our own. The British and American people must display more energy in overcoming difficulties and must strengthen the world anti-fascist front."

When those statements are compared with Mao Tse-tung's statement in 1939 after the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact it becomes clear that in the opinion of the Chinese Communists whoever sides with Soviet Russia sides with the cause of freedom.

After the entry of the United States into the war against Japan the Chinese Communists could naturally not continue to say that the "hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR." On 23 December 1941 the Central Committee of the CCP published a statement in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* in Chungking as follows:

"The war in the Pacific, started for the purpose of aggression, is an unjust, predatory war on the part of Japan. On the other hand from the point of view of resistance to Japan, the United States of America and Great Britain are waging a just war in defense of independence, freedom and democracy. This new act of Japanese reaction is similar to the Japanese aggression pursued in China for ten years, and fully coincides with the aggression of the German and Italian fascists in Europe and against the Soviet Union.

"The world is now divided into two fronts—the Fascist Front, waging war against aggression, and the Anti-Fascist Front, engaged in a liberation war [sic]. China, Britain, the U. S. A. and other anti-Japanese countries must conclude a military alliance to bring about full military cooperation. At the same time a united front of all anti-Japanese countries and peoples in the Pacific must be formed to continue the war against Japan to final victory.

"The Anti-Japanese National Front [in China] must be strengthened. The people must be afforded an opportunity to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle, as well as in the national reconstruction."

In the years that followed the Chinese Communists, like the Communists in all countries, came to stress more and more the "national" character of their revolutionary movements. When the Communist International was dissolved in May 1943, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the revolutionary organizational form of the Communist International had become unsuited to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. "What is needed for the present is to strengthen the Communist Parties in the various countries . . . The disbandment of the Comintern does not weaken the Communist Parties of the various countries but, on the other hand, strengthens them, making them more national and more suited to the necessities of the war against Fascism." Mao Tse-tung stated that since the Seventh Congress in 1935 the Communist International "has not once intervened in internal questions of the Chinese Party." The Central Committee of the CCP stated, however, that the Communist International had aided China up until it was dissolved. "What the Chinese people can never forget is that it helped the realization of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation with all its possibilities in 1924 when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was alive. Thence forward it helped the victory of the Northern Expedition. Moreover, when the Chinese Revolution was in most difficult situation between 1927 and 1937, it again aided the Chinese revolutionary people [the Chinese Communists]. Further on, during the six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it has called upon all its sections and working people in all countries to help the Chinese to oppose the aggression war of Japanese imperialism."

In the period following the dissolution of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists have tried to convince American observers of their friendly feelings toward America and the importance they attach to America's role both in the war against Japan and in the post-war rehabilitation work in China. This became the case especially after the establishment of an American Military Observer Section in Yen-an in July 1944, which was approved by the National Government in Chungking. In December 1944 General Yeh Chien-ying said to an American observer visiting Yen-an that "in the past, especially during the period of civil war after 1927, the Communists' attitude toward the United States had not been particularly favorable. However, this attitude had improved to a great extent since the outbreak of the Pacific War. General impressions of the United States were now very good."

In January 1945 Mao Tse-tung said: "We [Chinese Communists] hope for Allied aid but we cannot stake everything on this. We rely on our own efforts and the creative power of the [Communist] Army and the people."

During interviews on 13 March and 1 April 1945 with one of the American observers attached to the American Military Observer Section in Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung gave a detailed outline of the policy and attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States and the implications of American support of the Chungking Government. He stressed five things in particular: (1) China needs American aid both during and after the war; (2) the Chinese Communists will extend cooperation to the United States regardless of American action; (3) The Kuomintang cannot develop China into a stabilizing power in the Far East; (4) The Kuomintang is unable to maintain friendly relations with "Soviet Russia and other neighbors;" (5) the CCP represents the interests of the Chinese people wherefore it would be to the best interest of the United States to support the Chinese Communists; only under Communist leadership can democracy be established in China. The following extracts give the main points of Mao Tse-tung's statements:

"Between the *people* of China and the people of the United States there are strong ties of sympathy, understanding and mutual interests . . . China's greatest post-war need is economic development . . . America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America."

"[Chinese] Communist policy toward the United States is, and will remain, to seek friendly American support of democracy in China and co-operation in fighting Japan. But regardless of American action, whether or not they [the Communists] receive a single gun or bullet, the Communists will continue to offer and practice cooperation in any manner possible to them . . . The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and understanding because it will be needed by China in the post-war period of reconstruction."

"Whether or not America extends cooperation to the Communists is, of course, a matter for only America to decide. But the Communists see only advantages for the United States—in winning the war as rapidly as possible, in helping the cause of unity and democracy in China, in promoting healthy economic solution of the agrarian problem, and in winning the undying friendship of the overwhelming majority of China's people, the peasants and liberals."

"The peasants are China . . . The problems of the Chinese farmer are, therefore, basic to China's future . . . There must be land reform. And democracy . . ."

"The Kuomintang has no contact with the agrarian masses of the population . . . Afraid of real democracy, the Kuomintang is forced to be Fascistic . . . Unwilling to solve the agrarian problem it turns toward the principle of rigidly planned, State directed and controlled industrial development."

"Unable, therefore, to create a solid basis for power at home or for co-operative and amicable relations with Russia and other neighbors, it concentrates on 'national defense industry' and engages in the dangerous game of power politics. The expectation of future conflicts, internal and external, is implicit in these policies . . . Under these policies, . . . the Kuomintang cannot solve China's basic internal problems, cannot lead the country to full democracy, and cannot be a stabilizing power in the Far East."

"The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is *the* party of the Chinese peasant . . . The Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China . . ."

"It is to be expected that Chiang [Kai-shek] will do everything possible to avoid compromise in which he and the groups supporting him will have to yield power and give up their dictatorship. But the road he is taking now leads straight to civil war and the Kuomintang's eventual suicide . . ." "When attacked we [Communists] will fight back. We are not afraid of the outcome because the people are with us."

"We [Communists] are not worried about Chiang's American arms, because a conscript peasant army will not use them effectively against their brother conscripts fighting for their homes and economic and political democracy. What we are worried about is the cost to China in suffering and loss of life . . . China needs peace. But she needs democracy more, because it is fundamental to peace. And first she must drive out the Japanese. We think America, too, should be concerned, because her own interests are involved."

"America does not realize her influence in China and her ability to shape events there. Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on American help. If he had not had American support, he would have either collapsed before now or been forced to change his policies in order to unify the country and gain popular support."

"There is no such thing as America not intervening in China!"

"You are here, as China's greatest ally. The fact of your presence is tremendous. America's intentions have been good. We recognized that when Ambassador Hurley came to Yen-an [in November 1944] and endorsed our basic . . . points [for a settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist problem] . . . [But] we don't understand why America's policy seemed to waver after its good start. Surely Chiang's motives and devious maneuvers are clear. His [recent] suggestions of 'war cabinets' and 'inter-Party conferences' did not solve any basic issues because they had absolutely no power: they were far short of anything like a coalition government [which the Communists demand]. His proposals of 'reorganizing the Communist armies' and 'placing them under American command' were provocative attempts to create misunderstanding between us (the Communists) and Americans. We are glad to accept American command, as the British have in Europe. But it must be of all Chinese armies."

Mao Tse-tung's statement that the Chinese Communists will cooperate with America whether we support them or not may have been more diplomatic than realistic. A former American observer in China with close contacts with Chinese Communist leaders stated in November 1944 that the United States "is the greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese Communists," because they recognize that if they receive American aid, even if only on equal basis with Chiang Kai-shek, they can quickly establish control over most if not all of China. This observer concluded that "if we continue to reject them [the Communists] and support an unreconstructed Chiang [Kai-shek] they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be friends."

The conclusion from this observation is that the Chinese Communists, if given aid by the United States, will use this aid to oust the Kuomintang from power and unify China under their control.

The result of such a development as far as America is concerned depends much on the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Soviet Russia. A commonly held opinion on this subject was expressed by an American repatriated in 1943 from Occupied China: "Should the Communists get the upper hand in China as they nearly succeeded in doing in 1927 and are quite liable to do after this war again, seeing how widespread their armies are already in China, there will be a united front that will challenge the world, under orders from Moscow, as soon as the Red Armies have sufficiently recovered from their losses in the present war."

The strong attachment of the Chinese Communists to Soviet Russia is indicated in many ways besides their approval of Soviet Russia's policy no matter which way it swings. An American observer who visited Yen-an at the end of 1944 states that there is "no doubt" that a strong sentimental attachment holds for "Mother Russia," the home of the ideology of the Chinese Communists. "At a recent showing of newsreels in Yen-an, loud applause greeted Stalin's appearance; there was none for Roosevelt, Churchill, or Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin's speeches receive prominent space in the newspapers." The pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and

Marx are seen on the walls of most public buildings. Occasionally the picture of Sun Yat-sen is placed beside these Communist "saints." At times when American visitors have been received by the Communists, the pictures of Roosevelt and Churchill have been temporarily added to those of Stalin, Lenin, and Marx. The Soviet Russian training and background of the Chinese Communists is shown in such small details as the romanization used on their paper money. They employ the Soviet Russian romanization instead of the British-American romanization commonly used in China for Chinese characters; thus "bank" is written as "*inxang*" instead of "*yin-hang*."

A former American observer in China, who is convinced of the "nationalist" spirit of the Chinese Communists, stated in November 1944: "With all of their strong nationalist spirit, the Chinese Communists do not seem to fear Moscow's political dominance over them as a result of possible Russian entry into the Pacific war and invasion of Manchuria and North China. They maintain that the USSR has no expansionist intentions toward China. To the contrary, they expect Outer Mongolia to be absorbed with a Chinese federation. They do not see this or any other issue causing conflict between Russia and Chinese Communist foreign policy." This same observer wrote that "Possible future Soviet assistance to the [Chinese] Communists is a subject on which Yen'an leaders are uncommunicative. It seems obvious, however, that they would welcome such aid for what it would mean in exterminating the Japanese and giving impetus to Communist expansion in Central and South China."

The Chinese Communists have made great efforts to convince American observers that they have no relations with Soviet Russia. Mao Tse-tung said to the foreign correspondents visiting Yen'an in July 1944 that "There has been no connection between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the USSR, either in the past or now. There was a relationship with the Communist International, but this is no longer true. There has been no connection with the Communist Party of any other country." This rather naive statement probably did not convince anyone.

In an analysis of this subject an American observer in Yen'an contradicts Mao Tse-tung's statement just cited. "Although it will be denied, channels do exist and there is almost certainly some contact between the Chinese Communists and Moscow. This is probably through Chinese Communists in Moscow and radio at Yen'an . . . What contact does exist is between the two Parties, not Governments." This observer states that at present the Chinese Communists in Moscow include the former Chinese representatives to the Comintern, who have been in Russia since the beginning of the war. Among them are Li Li-san, at one time leader of the CCP, and a certain General Chao. "These men certainly are in contact with Russian Communist leaders. Another possible channel of contact is, of course, through the Communist representatives and the Soviet Embassy in Chungking. This contact, however, seems to be limited to avoid arousing Central Government suspicions." There is probably radio communication between Yen'an and Moscow, and the Communist newspaper in Yen'an receives its TASS news directly by monitoring Russian broadcasts. "Important Soviet editorials are often reprinted . . . These are enough to give at least the Party 'line.' The same can work in the reverse direction—from Yen'an to Moscow." He states that there is no evidence, however, that the Chinese Communists receive any supplies from Soviet Russia.

In regard to Soviet Russia Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yen'an that Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern war or in China's post-war reconstruction depends entirely on the "circumstances of the Soviet Union." He pointed out that Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. He said that the Chinese Communists do not expect Russian help. "Furthermore, the Kuomintang because of its anti-Communist phobia is anti-Russian. Therefore, Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us to seek it would only make the situation in China worse. China is dis-unified enough already! In any case, Soviet help is not likely even if the Kuomintang wanted it." He emphasized, however, that Soviet Russia will not oppose American interests in China if Americans are "constructive and democratic."

Mao Tse-tung did not explain what he meant by this. But it seems apparent from his remark that the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia are in agreement as to what should be a "constructive and democratic" American policy in China. It may be safely assumed that he meant that the United States should support the Chinese Communists.

This assumption is supported by Mao Tse-tung's indirect answer to the following statement by Maj. General Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador to

China. During a press conference in Washington on 2 April 1945 Ambassador Hurley said that the Chinese Communists had requested the United States to furnish them with arms. He explained that furnishing arms to an armed political party would be equivalent to recognizing it as a belligerent. And the United States, he noted, recognizes the Chungking national regime as the government of China. He emphasized that the U. S. policy in China was unity and that there would be no unity so long as there were "armed political parties and warlords strong enough to resist the Central Government."

In the subsequent weeks Mao Tse-tung warned the United States and Great Britain not to let their diplomacy go against the "will of the Chinese people." He added that "if any foreign government helps China's reactionary group [a reference to the Kuomintang] to oppose the democratic cause . . . a gross mistake will have been committed." At the same time he stated that the Chinese Communists believe that the Pacific question cannot be settled without the participation of Soviet Russia.

When Soviet Russia denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945, the Chinese Communists used the occasion to praise the Soviet policy in the Far East and to denounce the Kuomintang for having expressed its disapproval of the Neutrality Pact in 1941. The *Emancipation Daily* (*Chieh Fang Jih Pao*), Communist Party organ in Yenau, wrote in an editorial on 8 April: "If the Kuomintang authorities are sincere about correcting their mistakes, they must not continue their four-year hatred of the Soviet Union." The editorial pointed out how the Soviet Union had adroitly used the neutrality pact with Japan to mass her forces to knock out Nazi Germany first, and recalled the "vicious ravings of China's reactionary group against the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in the past . . . even . . . to the extent of talking about the so-called 'Tokyo-Moscow-Yenan axis.'"

At the end of April Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenau, gave an important outline of the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists. The Yenau radio reported his speech as follows:

Mao Tse-tung said, "Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, we [Chinese Communists] are of the opinion that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations.' On behalf of the Chinese people Mao Tse-tung expressed thanks for the help which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war of liberation and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech last November rebuking the Japanese aggressors and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.

"We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.

"The great efforts made by the Great Powers, America and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. We request the Governments of the United Nations, especially the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, to pay attention seriously to the voice of the widest masses of the Chinese people and not let their diplomatic policy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people.

"If any foreign Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'

"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by many foreign governments and the establishment of new treaties with China on the footing of equality, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people welcome such (measures of treating) the Chinese people on a footing of equality. 'But,' he pointed out, 'China definitely cannot rely simply on equality being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples.' A real and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong. China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force.'

"Mao Tse-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East:

"After the . . . unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors all democratic [groups] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese Fascism and militarism would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific. The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to attain liberation.

"America has already granted independence to the Philippines. We also hope that Great Britain [will] grant independence to India, because an independent, democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people, but is also needed for world peace.' Regarding Burma, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and Annam, Mao Tse-tung said: 'We hope that Great Britain, the United States, and France [will grant], after helping the local peoples to defeat the Japanese aggressor, the right to establish independent, democratic regimes to the local people in accordance with the stand of the Crimea Conference regarding liberated areas in Europe.

"With regard to Thailand she should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a fascist turncoat."

In regard to Japan, the Chinese Communists are reported to seek a democracy "like that which they plan in China." In effect this means that they envisage a democracy in Japan more akin to "Soviet democracy" than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. An American observer in Yenan has reported that the Chinese Communists hold it necessary to give Japan reasonable opportunities for economic recovery and stability. This will include freedom of participation in the economic development of China. This observer states that it is apparent that the views of the Chinese Communists are closely similar to the program of the Japanese Communist Party as set forth by Okano Susumu, leader of the Japanese Communist Party. Okano has been staying in Yenan since 1943. Mao Tse-tung has expressed the opinion that military occupation of Japan would be necessary with the aim of forming a democratic government in Japan.

In May 1944 the Chinese Communists established in Yenan the "Japanese People's Emancipation League." It advocates a united front of all Japanese parties with the "fundamental objective" of inducing the Japanese people to cease hostilities and overthrow the militarists.

The League maintains a school in Yenan, the "Japanese Workers' and Farmers' School." The League recruits its members chiefly from Japanese P/Ws. Out of several thousand Japanese P/Ws taken by the Chinese Communists during the past years, the Emancipation League has only between 400-500 members at present.

(c) *Soviet Russia's attitude toward China.*—In order to understand Soviet Russia's attitude toward China it is essential to bear in mind that the united front world movement was developed by Moscow. Its purpose, as we have seen, was to safeguard the Soviet Union against fascist aggression and strengthen the Communist parties in the capitalist, "bourgeois" democracies, as an instrument of Soviet policy.

In no country has the united front movement succeeded better than in China. It served its purpose during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war. It then centered the attention of all Chinese political parties and military groups on the problem of fighting Japan, at a time when Soviet Russia felt itself threatened by a war with Japan which it was anxious to avoid. It saved the Chinese Communist Army from extinction and gave the CCP a more powerful position in China than it had ever enjoyed. Had Chiang Kai-shek pursued his intention of starting a new "Extermination Campaign" in 1936 against the Communists in Shensi on the pattern of the Fifth Extermination Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934, it is likely that the Chinese Red Army would have been defeated. What saved it was Chiang's approval (stimulated, of course, by the Sian Kidnapping) of the united front idea.

Soviet Russia's policy in China during the first years of the war was basically the same as during the period in the 1920's of the Soviet-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*. Soviet support to China in terms of military supplies went exclusively to the Chungking Government as long as the Kuomintang supported the Chinese Communists. When the united front broke up, Soviet support of Chungking was gradually withdrawn. By that time, however, the Chinese Communists had gained a powerful position in China. As a result of the break up of the united front, Chinese resistance against Japan began to diminish. By that time, however, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact eliminated the immediate danger of a

Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union. America's entry into the Pacific War gave Soviet Russia an additional assurance that her Siberian frontiers were safe. On 12 December 1941 *Pravda*, in an editorial entitled "War in the Pacific," wrote that Japan's initial successes had decided nothing. The war undoubtedly will be "long and protracted," it believed, but "the Japanese aggressor has plunged into a very hazardous adventure which bodes him nothing but defeat. . . . In comparison with the United States, Japan is poor as regards resources of raw materials." *Pravda* pointed out that Japan faced the "united front" of the United States, Great Britain, and China.

While Soviet Russia ceased sending military supplies to China she continued her diplomatic relations with the Chungking Government. And her military advisers remained in China, although they were treated with increasing suspicion by the Chungking officials. During the first six years of the Sino-Japanese war Soviet Russia abstained from any action that would have substantiated Chinese suspicion that she was supporting or intended to support the Chinese Communists. Such action would not only have intensified the hatred of the Kuomintang for the Chinese Communists, which could have led to a large-scale civil war and the collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. It might conceivably have involved Soviet Russia in a war against Japan. Soviet officials maintained, outwardly, the attitude that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists and that they hoped for unity between all Chinese resistance parties. Until 1943 the Soviet press hardly mentioned the Chinese Communists.

Soviet Russia's experience in China has been that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists. In view of this it is only natural that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists have always supported unity in China, "democratic" unity.

That Soviet Russia was interested in the fate of the Chinese Communists was, however, explained by American observers in Chungking in a comment on the serious situation during 1943 between the Kuomintang and the CCP. "In the background of the situation is inevitably present a deep-seated Chinese [Kuomintang] fear and suspicion of Soviet Russia and its intentions with regard both to the Chinese Communists and the Northeastern Provinces [Manchuria] . . . That the Russians are not altogether disinterested in the Chinese Communist Party is evident from the call made in July [1943] at [several American observers by] representatives of the Soviet Embassy at Chungking who expressed Soviet concern over the possibility of civil war . . . This fear gives added reason for the Kuomintang to wish to dispose of the Communist question before the conclusion of the war in order that a post-war Kuomintang-Chinese Communist struggle for control in North China may not occur. Even should Soviet Russia remain outside the war against Japan, there would exist the possibility of Russian assistance, outright or under cover, to the Chinese Communists." The Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking stated to foreign observers in the Chinese Capital on 14 July 1943 that Chungking Government troops had fired on positions or outposts of the Chinese Communists in as many as ten different places "within the last few days." American observers commented that the Soviet Counselor's approach is "interesting" because so far as could be recalled, the Soviet Embassy had never before shown concern so unequivocally over what happened to the Chinese Communists. (367)

In August 1943 it was reported from Moscow that the Soviet press, for the first time since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, was emphasizing the role of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese war against Japan and was openly supporting their cause. At the same time the Soviet press was becoming more critical of Japan and was criticizing the Kuomintang for harboring pro-Japanese groups. The Soviet press alleged that these groups sought the destruction of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. While Chiang Kai-shek was not attacked, some of his supporters were called "traitors." This press campaign was started by the publication on 6 August 1943 in the semi-official Soviet Journal *War And The Working Class* of an article by Vladimir Rogoff, for many years a Soviet correspondent in China. He charged that the "Capitulators and defeatists holding high posts in the Kuomintang . . . weaken China . . . [and] had sent large forces to the area in which the [Chinese Communist] armies were operating . . . to disarm them and wipe out the Communist Party. If these adventures are crowned with any success, anti-democratic and anti-popular elements will gain the upper hand in Chungking." He warned against civil

war in China. It was not the content of the criticism in the Soviet press that was noteworthy. Similar criticism and charges against the Kuomintang had been made for years by American and British writers. It was the fact that Soviet Russia had departed from its previous press policy, which was to avoid mention of the Chinese Communists and not to make unfavorable remarks about the Kuomintang, that was significant.

It was also not without significance that in 1943 Soviet Russia withdrew her support of the Chinese regime in Sinkiang. The evacuation of Soviet military forces and advisers from Sinkiang began in May. During the rest of the year all Soviet citizens, except the consular staff, were withdrawn from Sinkiang. All Soviet technical equipment, the oil pumps and refinery equipment at the Tushan oil fields, tungsten mine equipment at Bole, and the aircraft assembly plant at T'ou-tung-ho were also withdrawn. Trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia came to a standstill.

Russia was fully within her rights, of course, in taking this action. It might even be argued that it was favorable to China, since the Chungking Government was anxious to gain control over Sinkiang. But the stoppage of trade and the total withdrawal of Soviet forces as well as technical advisers and material interests was significant, because its inevitable result was a rapid deterioration of the economic situation in Sinkiang which would reflect unfavorably upon the Chinese rulers. A Chungking Government official stated that while the action of Soviet Russia "means considerable political success for the Central Government, it will result in almost insolvable economic problems." And the Chungking Government's Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang who resides at Tihwa, Capital of Sinkiang, stated that the Chinese had attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to maintain their advisers in Sinkiang. In November 1943 he said that the Chinese wished to resume trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia but that the Soviet Consul General in Tihwa had stated that there is no possibility of such trade.

A statement by the Soviet Embassy representative in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, indicates that the Soviet Russians were aware that their withdrawal from Sinkiang would weaken the position of the Chungking Government in China's Northwest. He said in August 1943 that "Chinese policies [in Sinkiang], unless radically changed, will alienate rather than win the people. In any event, Sinkiang cannot avoid having closer economic ties with Russia than with China." He emphasized that the Tibetans, Mongols, and Moslems in the Northwest could not be won to China unless the Chinese would abandon their attitude toward "subject peoples," give up their present policy of "Sinification," and give up their efforts to govern minority groups by direct control or through support of the "feudalistic leaders" of these minority groups. He expressed the opinion that the Mohammedan question was more important than the Chinese realized and that the Chinese would be opposed by the Mohammedans until Mohammedan interests were recognized and given a more important share in local government matters.

This was, of course, a very correct evaluation of the Chinese. The intolerant attitude of the Chungking Government toward the non-Chinese groups in Sinkiang (which compose about 95 percent of the population) soon led to uprisings against the Chinese. At the end of 1943 the Kazak nomads, the second largest population group in the province, revolted in Northern Sinkiang. They received military support from Outer Mongolia. When the Chinese authorities in Tihwa protested in October 1943 to the Soviet Consul General, he denied that any disturbances had occurred. In March 1944 serious clashes developed in the Altai Mountains on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. The Chinese stated that Soviet planes bombed their provincial troops in the Altai region. Although the Chinese Military Attaché in Washington said that the Soviet Government had denied this, Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of the National Government in Chungking (who advocates rapprochement with Russia), stated that the Soviet Ambassador to China had admitted that Soviet planes were involved in these bombings.

On 2 April 1944 the Soviet *Tass* news agency announced that Chinese troops had violated the border of Outer Mongolia and that Chinese planes had bombed towns and villages in Outer Mongolia and strafed Kazaks fleeing from Sinkiang. This announcement referred to events during the latter part of 1943. According to Dr. Sun Fo, the Soviet Ambassador to China had informed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet Russia, because of its mutual assistance pact with Outer Mongolia, would have to aid Outer Mongolia if called upon, "owing to the fact that the Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier had been crossed by

Chinese planes and Kazaks had been machine gunned." An American observer in NW China reported in July 1944 that he had seen a Soviet map of 1940 on which the Mongolian-Sinkiang border was shown well west of the border line on maps printed in Moscow in 1927, slicing off some 83,000 sq. miles of territory from Sinkiang to the benefit of the "Mongolian People's Republic." It seems possible, therefore, that the Outer Mongolians considered the Chinese to have violated their border while the Chinese considered themselves in legitimate Chinese territory.

In November 1944 Kazaks, "White Russians," and Tartars revolted in Ining in Western Sinkiang. They organized a government at Ining by setting up a Local Maintenance Committee with An Te Hai, a Turki (the Turki, Moslems, are the largest population group in Sinkiang) as Chairman, with the reported aim of establishing an East Asia Turki Republic. The new government was reported to possess its own flag, a red banner with white star and crescent and, according to one report, a hammer and sickle as well. Latest reports (10 May 1945) from official sources at Tihwa stated that the Chinese have uncovered a widespread conspiracy in Tihwa itself for seizing the city and establishing a Turki Government. Americans have been informed that the conspirators are well supplied with machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades. Tihwa was reported to have been placed under martial law by the Chinese authorities. At the same time reports said that disturbances are spreading throughout the province. A portion of the Mongol garrison at Karashar, 120 miles southwest of Tihwa, who number about 1,500, are threatening the city from a northwestern direction. Men in plain clothes from Ining have marched south and are threatening Kashgar. "Serious trouble might develop at Kashgar. In the Ining Valley the rebels are forcing conscription."

In the light of these events it seems that Soviet Russia will in the long run benefit from her withdrawal from Sinkiang in 1943. Previous to that time she was committed to the support of Chinese rule in Sinkiang and in 1933, 1934, 1936, and 1937 she rendered military aid to the Chinese in suppressing rebellions by various Moslem groups in the province. During this time the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, had maintained a friendly policy toward Soviet Russia and had kept himself aloof from the Chungking Government. In 1942 he accepted a rapprochement with the Chungking Government and he and the Chungking authorities began an anti-Soviet policy in the province. The rebellions which followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Sinkiang has undermined Chinese rule in the province. There is at present a strong possibility that the Moslems in Sinkiang may renounce Chinese rule and establish one or several autonomous regimes of their own. All observers agree that if this were to happen these regimes would reestablish friendly relations between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia. By withdrawing her support of the Chinese in Sinkiang, Soviet Russia has not only indicated indirectly to the Moslems in the province her disapproval of the Chinese regime, but has also indicated that she is placing herself in a position to adopt a new policy in regard to Sinkiang.

In April 1944 the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa emphasized to an American that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to prevent the formation around Soviet Russia of a "cordon sanitaire" of border states. Soviet Russia was determined, he said, "that the foreign policies of border states should be friendly to the Soviet Union and free from unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." He said that where border peoples in the past had been oppressed against their will by the large powers, as Outer Mongolia had been by the Chinese, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into mutual assistance pacts, such as that existing with Outer Mongolia since 1936, to prevent a recurrence of oppressive acts. The remark is significant since it may be considered as giving a commonly held Soviet interpretation of Foreign Commissar Molotov's statement to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, in August 1944. Molotov said that the Russians had many grievances against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that they were interested primarily in having a good neighbor to the south.

If we accept the statements of Molotov and the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa as indicative of Soviet policy, it would mean that Sinkiang, and probably Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also Communist-controlled North China would go the way of Outer Mongolia which has been protected by the Soviet Union for twenty years from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." This trend of events is, of course, conditional upon whether or not the Chungking Government will readjust its relations with Soviet Russia on a basis of friendship and will accept a new united front arrangement with the Chinese Communists.

The appearance in 1943 of Soviet official and public concern for the Chinese Communists, the beginning of a press campaign highly critical of Chungking, and the Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang were all indications of the beginning of a more active Soviet interest in the Far East. A member of the French Special Mission to Moscow stated in May 1944 that in his opinion Soviet Russia is not going to tolerate for a very long time the continuance of a "reactionary regime" in China. He felt convinced, "definitely," that when the proper time arrives the Soviet Union will take active measures against Chiang Kai-shek and his group of supporters. He said that the Soviet Union will tend to intervene in Asia rather than in Europe in the post-war period.

His comment is similar to that of Mr. XX, a former member of the Communist International and a friend of Stalin, now ostracised as a "Trotskyite." He affirmed that the development of communism in China has always been uppermost in the mind of Stalin, because a Communist China, aligned with Soviet Russia, would create an indomitable Communist world power. Stalin has always been more interested in the Chinese Communist Party than in the German Communist Party. This created considerable jealousy among the German Communists who, before Hitler smashed their Party, always considered themselves as the most important Communist Party outside of Soviet Russia. This informer stated that Stalin had been criticized by members in the Comintern for his policy in China after the failure of the policy of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927. In developing the new united front policy during the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, Stalin paid especial attention to the application of this policy in China and repeatedly emphasized the coming role of China in the Communist world movement.

The Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang was followed in 1944 by a general withdrawal of all Soviet military advisers from the Chungking Government. The Soviet Military Attaché in Chungking stated to American observers in June 1944 that the Soviet disapproved of Chungking's policy of making relations with the U. S. S. R. worse, "and yet not cooperating with the British or Americans either." American observers, commenting on the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers, said that "the activities of Soviet military advisers in China have been so limited for such a long time that no particular significance is attached to the statement of the Russian Military attaché that these advisers are being removed from China as 'needed for the European fighting';" it might be an indication of Russian displeasure with the growing propaganda by Chinese officials along anti-Soviet lines, which has been particularly in evidence in various ways since the 12 April Sinkiang incident." (This "incident" was the fighting on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.)

Another indication of growing Soviet displeasure with the Chungking Government was the Soviet press criticism, which during the past year has become progressively more outspoken in its condemnation of Chungking and its approval of Yen-an. In July 1944 *War and the Working Class* sharply rapped the helplessness of the Chungking Army in its war against Japan and pointed out that the Chungking Army, numbering ten times the army of Tito in Yugoslavia, was waging a losing battle whereas the latter army had shown successes against Germany. The magazine charged that Chungking should score better results and stated that the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were feeling the brunt of the Japanese attacks. This was, of course, a misrepresentation of the facts, because the Japanese army did not launch any large-scale attacks against the Communist armies in 1944. Instead, it concentrated its attacks against the Chungking forces.

On 18 February 1945 the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* was reported to have given "unqualified endorsement" to the stand of the Chinese Communists for "liquidation of the Kuomintang dictatorship and formation of a coalition government and a united supreme command of the armed forces." *Izvestia* said approvingly that "other democratic parties as well as the Communist Party also suggested the liquidation of concentration camps and fascist organizations, strengthening of friendship with the USSR and increasing ties with Britain, the United States and the other Allies." The newspaper said, "The present situation imposes especially responsible tasks upon China which the National Government and the supreme army command, regardless of their reorganization, have been unable to fulfill . . . China's allies, especially the United States, warmly support the effort of Chinese democracy to achieve national unity."

At the beginning of March 1945 the Soviet trade union organ *Trud* published an article in which it urged the organizing committee of the World Trade Union Conference in London to issue invitations to trade union representatives from

Poland, Iran, and the "Special border areas of China" [Chinese Communist areas], to join the embryonic world trade union federation." American sources in Moscow commented that "The larger political phases of the keen interest of Moscow in international trade union movement are illuminated by the wish of the Russians to advance world standing of Communist China."

On 14 March 1945, the Soviet writer Viktor Avarin gave a lecture in Moscow entitled "The Struggle of the Chinese People for Their National Independence," in which he condemned the "reactionary elements" among the ruling circles in Chungking, discussed the weakness of the Chungking army and lauded the Chinese Communist armies. The speaker gave sympathetic treatment of the role of the United States in China. He stated that the recall of General Stilwell was instigated by "reactionary" Chinese elements. But he pointed out that it would be an error to assume that the Stilwell recall signified a departure from the American policy of attempting to promote Chinese national unity. Ambassador Hurley's visit to Yen-an and his "mediation" in the Chungking-Communist negotiations were referred to as evidence of continuing American interest in Chinese unity. In response to a question regarding the Soviet attitude toward China, Avarin remarked that the Soviet Government's policy was based on the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the equality of all peoples. He added that the Soviet people were warmly sympathetic to the Chinese people and their struggle for national liberation and desired to help them in their aspirations.

An American source in Moscow commented that it was significant that Avarin's criticism was directed at the "reactionary" elements in the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang and not against the Government or the Kuomintang as a whole. "This may indicate that if the Soviet Union has decided on an anti-Chungking and anti-Kuomintang policy, it is not prepared at this juncture to reveal it; or that the Kremlin reckons that the situation in China is still sufficiently fluid to warrant hope for the emergence in China of a 'reformed' regime (presumably including the Communists) congenial to the Soviet Union . . . If this interpretation is correct, the Kremlin certainly will have no desire, so long as it believes the situation in China remains fluid, to condemn wholesale either the Kuomintang or the present Chinese Government."

Only a month after this lecture, however, in the middle of April, *War and the Working Class* published an article by Viktor Avarin entitled "Whither Goes China," which was one of the most severe Soviet press attacks on the Kuomintang in many years. He emphasized that "Representatives of the broad masses of the [Chinese] people and the democratic press still suffer persecution. In districts where power is in the hands of the Kuomintang, anti-Japanese democratic fighters are jailed. Only one party is legal—the Kuomintang. Only the Kuomintang press can write what it wants and at present, when all humanity curses the German fascist butchers we come across such lines in the Chungking paper as 'we admire the German people and German soldiers for their valor on the battlefield.'" ³³ Mr. Avarin contended that the Chungking Government was cooperating with the Japanese and that it had constructed and "presented" to the Japanese the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway by not defending it. He also mentioned that inflationary prices in Chungking-controlled China had risen from an index number of 485 to 873 since last December. He then asked: "Is this not the beginning of a counter-offensive of large bankers and reactionaries against the people and their demands for the democratization of China? The democratic public received with great anxiety the news that the negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and Chungking had produced no results."

(d) *The American stake in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle.*—The problems of U. S. diplomacy in China are serious. Success or failure in solving these problems will affect the future situation not only in China but in the entire Far East; it is no exaggeration to state that it will decide the type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring the vast region beyond the Ussuri River (the present Russian Far Eastern Provinces), including the port of Vladivostok, from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China proper in the 1930's.

³³ There is no confirmation available that the Chungking press has published a statement to this effect.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States has always revolved around the ideas of equality of competitive commercial opportunity in China, and of respect for the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The need of this policy was stated as early as 1853 by the then American Minister to China, Humphrey Marshall. He affirmed that the weakness, or dissolution, of China was a matter of national concern to the United States and that the "true policy" of the American Government must be to strengthen and sustain the Chinese Government against "either internal disorder or foreign aggression. The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China."

Marshall arrived at this conclusion by observing a situation in China, in the 1850's which was in many respects similar to the present one. At the outbreak of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (comparable in its destructiveness to the Kuomintang Communist civil war of our time) he saw clearly that the success of the T'ai-p'ing rebels would have meant the separation of China into parts. The break-up of the empire could have resulted in the dismemberment of China by foreign powers. He therefore advocated American support of the Chinese Government as a means of promoting national unity in China and preventing, or at least limiting, encroachments on Chinese territory by the powers. At the turn of the century this policy was given fuller expression in the "open door" agreements which were sponsored by America. At present the prospect of a renewal of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war, on the scale of the years before 1937, threatens China again with separation into parts and possible dismemberment by foreign powers.

The importance to the United States of supporting China's independence has been demonstrated on several occasions. During the past eighty-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers of Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China was shown at the beginning of the present century when the United States assailed St. Petersburg with unavailing protests on the score of Russian violation of the "open door" in Manchuria. To strengthen her hand, the United States negotiated a commercial treaty with China in 1903, guaranteeing observance of the "open door" principle in all Chinese-American trade, and opening to such trade the Manchurian cities of Mukden and Antung. America's concern about Russian domination over Manchuria was shown again by the watchful attitude of this country during the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt told one of his friends that "As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France"³⁴ . . . that in the event of a combination against Japan . . . I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." After the Sino-Japanese war, in 1908, America proposed the internationalization of the Manchurian railroads as a means of preventing Russia and Japan from establishing a monopoly over their respective zones of influence in Manchuria.

The Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 aimed at restraining the foreign powers concerned, and Japan especially, in their policies of territorial aggrandizement in China and preventing any power from gaining control over China. The United States and Great Britain took the initiative in 1922 in inducing Japan to restore full sovereignty over the province of Shantung to China.

During the time of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's and the "anti-imperialist" movement at that time, Russia was successfully carrying through a policy of "freeing" China from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers" than Russia. After Chiang Kai-shek turned against Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, America strongly supported his nationalist movement for building up a strong, united and independent China. In 1928 the United States took the initiative in strengthening the prestige of the new National Government under Chiang by concluding a treaty with China recognizing the latter's complete autonomy in regard to the levying and collection of tariffs. This was the first important step in abolishing the system of unequal treaties by which the foreign powers had infringed China's sovereign rights.

Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to re-establish Chinese control over Manchuria, where Soviet Russia entertained ambitions similar to those of Czarist Russia

³⁴ There was at this time a Franco-Russian alliance, with Germany a silent partner.

brought him into conflict with Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1929 China and Soviet Russia fought pitched battles and came close to a formal declaration of war over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, tried in vain to settle the dispute through the instrumentality of the Kellogg Pact. After Soviet troops had invaded Manchuria, the Chinese Government was forced to accept peace terms from Russia which reimposed upon China essentially the same terms as those contained in the unequal treaties setting up Russia's privileges in Manchuria which China had attacked.

Soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 Secretary Stimson eloquently reaffirmed America's Far Eastern policy as follows:

"For several centuries Eastern Asia has owed its character mainly to the peaceful traditions of this great agricultural nation [China]. If the character of China should be revolutionized and through exploitation [by Japan] become militaristic and aggressive, not only Asia but the rest of the world must tremble. The United States has made a good start in the development of China's friendship. It would have been the most short-sighted folly to turn our backs upon her at the time of her most dire need."

As necessary as the defeat of Japan is to the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the years before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when Russia and the Western democracies stood facing each other in the Far East and when the period of power politics over China began between these powers. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time during the past eighty years.

To meet this situation the United States has affirmed its policy, aid to China. A recent statement prepared by the State Department reads as follows:

"The principal and immediate objectives of the U. S. Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the U. S. Government has undertaken the following measures: (a) direct military assistance to China and the Chinese armed forces; (b) promotion of effective Sino-American military cooperation; and (c) encouragement to the Chinese to contribute their maximum effort in the war.

"The American Government's long range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives: 1. Political: A strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people; 2. Economic: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries; and 3. Cultural: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress."

Our present policy was indicated already in 1844, after China had suffered her first major defeat by a Western power, Great Britain. After the first American Commissioner to China, Caleb Cushing, had signed our first treaty with China he offered to the Chinese delegate, Kiying, some models of guns and some books on military and naval tactics, and fortifications, delicately expressing the opinion that such information might be of value to China in the future. Kiying's behaviour was almost prophetic. He politely declined the gifts, stating: "If at a future day there be occasion to use them, then we ought to request your Honorable Nation to assist us with the strength of its arm."

Solutions for the present problems of U. S. diplomacy in China have been offered by many observers. In April 1944 after confirmation had been received of the Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, an American observer into Chungking commented on American policy in regard to China as it may affect Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists as follows:

"This incident [in Sinkiang] and the possibility of its repetition in other forms if the Chinese leaders continue in their present [anti-Soviet] course bring into prominence the question of Sino-Soviet relations and the position of the United States in relation to that problem. The United States in its dealings with China should; (1) avoid becoming involved in Sino-Soviet

relations; (2) limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan; (3) show a sympathetic interest in liberal groups in China and try to fit the Chinese Communists into the war against Japan; and (4) use our tremendous influence with the Kuomintang to promote internal unity on a foundation of progressive reform.

"To give, either in fact or in appearance, support to the present reactionary government in China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid solely for the prosecution of the war against Japan would encourage the Kuomintang in its present anti-Soviet policy. The result would be that the Chinese Communists, who probably hold the key to control of North China and possibly Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, would feel that their only hope for survival lay with Russia, and the Soviet Union would be convinced that American aims are opposed to hers and that she must protect herself by any means available, i. e. the extension of her direct power and influence."

Another American observer has stated the problem of U. S. policy in China in its relation to Soviet Russia as follows: He emphasizes that many people think that the situation in China is potentially one of revolution. The "opposition against the Chungking Government," that is, the Chinese Communists, want Russian-type reorganization of the country.

"If the Central Government starts organizing the peasants, there is always the possibility that the Communists might gain control of such an organization. Americans and Russians have tremendous influence in this situation. The Russians could quite easily sway the situation by sending in supplies—troops would not be necessary. The Russians could also lend diplomatic support for a Communist Manchuria. If, when a revolution starts, the Russians assist the Chinese Communists and the United States assists the Central Government, the Russians and Americans will be meeting head on. This possibility worries many people.

"Care must be exercised in sending help to the Chinese Government because . . . if we send in material with 'no strings attached,' we may just be building them up so a civil war can be more easily started."

That problems of China and of Soviet influence in China, either direct or through the Chinese Communists, affect not only China but also Southeast Asia, is indicated by the following observations by an American official observer:

"American cooperation with patriotic, subversive revolutionary groups of Southeastern Asia would . . . frustrate Chinese and Russian efforts through these groups to dominate their countries after the war . . . [These] groups prefer American help to help from other countries, such as China, Russia, or Great Britain whose motives they suspect . . . On the whole, China and Russia successfully influence the groups they touch. This influence is due less to genuine sympathy of these people for China and Russia than to their desperation that causes them to grasp at any aid extended to them. As long as the Chinese and Russian monopoly in these areas is not broken up, China and Russia will determine domestic and international political issues in these areas after the war, and Chinese and Russian domination of eastern and southeastern Asia will complicate economic adjustments in these areas and threaten legitimate American interests."³⁵

Among Western Allied observers in the Far East not only Americans, of course, are aware of the danger of Soviet domination in China. The British are keenly aware of it. In October 1943 a high British diplomat in London stated to a Chinese official in the presence of an American diplomat that Soviet Russia, "the most powerful or at least the most potentially powerful country in the world, is the great enigma, a part of which is whether Russia will collaborate with the rest of the world." "The latter aspect," he emphasized, "is one which Chinese should study and watch."

The problems evolving out of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle and its implications for Soviet Russian and American policies merge into the general

³⁵ Among the most active subversive groups in Southeast Asia are the Communists. They caused the French considerable trouble in the years before the Japanese sent military forces to Indo China in 1940. The Chinese Communists are comparatively strong in Malaya. After the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941 they pledged their allegiance to Great Britain. (So also did the Communist Party of India.) The British released the Chinese Communist prisoners in Malaya and allowed them 10 seats out of 60 in the Chinese Mobilization Committee in Singapore. This gives an indication of their strength.

question of how the Chinese shall be able to establish a government acceptable to both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a government which can deal on a basis of friendship with both America and Soviet Russia. The other question is how America shall apply its influence in China in the interest of Chinese unity.

It is obvious that the Chungking Government, as now constituted, endangers Soviet-Chinese friendship. Its strong suspicion that the Soviet Union intends to dominate China through the Chinese Communists may or may not be justified. Personal opinions on this subject are divided, although the past records of Soviet Russian-Chinese relations give little support to the contention of those who maintain that Soviet Russia has no intention to dominate China. There is, however, no question that if the Chungking Government fails to effect a compromise with the Chinese Communists whereby the National Government of China becomes representative of the Chinese Communist Party as well as other parties, Soviet Russia may in time denounce the Chungking Government and support a Communist-sponsored government in China. This would be in line with present Soviet policy in Poland and other eastern European countries. There is also a fairly general agreement among observers that failure to effect a Kuomintang-Communist compromise might lead to a large-scale civil war in China after Japan's defeat, possibly before. America's interest in such a compromise is obvious.

In view of this, unity between the Chinese political parties is the key to a solution of China's problems. At the instance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang and Communist delegates met in May 1944 in an effort to find a solution of their inter-party problems. On 11 May they agreed tentatively to a set of 20 proposals which included a stipulation that the Communist armies should obey the orders of the National Military Council and that the Government should agree to a reorganization of the Communist forces into three armies consisting of 12 divisions, as proposed originally by the Communist general Lin Piao during his negotiations in Chungking in November 1943. It was also tentatively agreed that the Kuomintang should recognize the legal status of the Communist Party and should lift the military blockade of Communist areas.

On 5 June 1944 the Government issued a reply in which it approved of the organization of the Communist armies into "four armies consisting of ten divisions." In other respects the Government expressed its willingness to accept the proposals mentioned above provided the Communists also agreed to them. On the preceding day, however (4 June), Lin Tsu-han, the Communist delegate in Chungking submitted a new set of 12 proposals by the Chinese Communists which went far beyond the proposals agreed upon in May. Among other things, the Communists now requested the Government "to organize the Chinese Communist Party troops into 16 armies consisting of 47 divisions with 10,000 troops per division. As a compromise, the Government is requested to grant designations to at least five armies of 16 divisions." The Communists also requested that "during the period of war . . . the status quo be maintained in areas garrisoned by the Communist troops," and they asked the Government to recognize the legal status not only of the CCP but of all Communist Border Regions and base areas in China. The Government was, furthermore, requested to "give full material aid to the [Communist armies]," and to give the Communist armies "a share due them" of the weapons, munitions, and medicines furnished China by the Allied countries. The Government was advised to "realize democracy." At the Plenary Session of the People's Political Council, which was held in Chungking in September 1944, Lin Tsu-han added a new request of the Communists, the establishment of a Kuomintang-Communist "coalition government."

These demands were refused by the Government. In regard to the Communist demands for democracy and "guarantee of freedom" the Government pointed out that these were "empty phrases . . . because the 'Democracy' in which the Kuomintang believes and the 'Democracy' in which the Communists believed in the past or believe at the present are not necessarily the same."

The negotiations became deadlocked. To the Chungking Government leaders it became obvious that if the Government agreed to the new demands of the Communists to accord legal status to all Communist areas it would in effect give its consent to a permanent division of China into two independent parts.

In a speech before the People's Political Council session in September 1944 Chiang Kai-shek said: "If only the Chinese Communists obeyed military and political orders, the Government would make the greatest concessions to their demands . . . No nation can hope to attain an appropriate position in the family of nations if its internal administration is not unified . . . The Central

Government has repeatedly made it clear that what it insists upon is a unified military command and political unity. While it means to accord equal treatment to the Eighteenth Group Army, it demands equal observance of law and discipline."

A new attempt to break the deadlock which followed the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in June 1944 was made in November of the same year. The American Government had by this time shown its concern for bringing about unity in China. The Soviet Russian press criticism of the Kuomintang was growing increasingly antagonistic. The situation in Sinkiang was going from bad to worse as a result of the Kazak rebellion. In the summer of 1944 Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Siberia, Sinkiang, and China proper. The *National Herald* in Chungking, which is believed to express the opinions of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Wallace's visit said that the Chinese hoped he would be able to help in bridging the gap separating China and Soviet Russia.

On 3 July an American observer in Chungking, in a conversation with Dr. Sun Fo (one of the leaders of the liberal faction within the Kuomintang), advanced a suggestion that it might be helpful if the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek would call together 11 independent parties and groups, including the Communists and the Kuomintang, into a High Command or Military Council and make an appeal to them to accept, along with the Generalissimo, joint responsibility for effective military operations, "to save what remains of China." This became the basis for the ensuing negotiations for an inter-party settlement. With the Japanese advance in Hunan and Kwangtung toward Kwangsi, the military situation was becoming almost desperate. Kweilin was threatened, and many felt that both Kunming and Chungking were threatened.

In August President Roosevelt appointed Donald M. Nelson, chief of the War Production Board, and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, to undertake a mission to China to discuss military and economic problems with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On 21 October 1944 General Joseph Stilwell was removed from his China-Burma-India command and was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. On 31 October Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned his post in China and was succeeded at the end of November by General Hurley.

On 7 November General Hurley, accompanied by the Communist delegate Lin Tsu-han, flew to Yen-an for a two day conference with Chinese Communist leaders. He had been granted permission by the Generalissimo to present an offer to legalize all parties and allow the Communists to participate in the Supreme National Defense Council and in the Government. Mao Tse-tung accepted the offer "in principle" as comprising a portion of the desires of the Communists. He and Hurley drew up and signed a document which not only included Chiang's offer but also embodied the Communists' desires, among which were a coalition government and a bill of rights. On 10 November General Hurley flew back to Chungking accompanied by Chou En-lai. Ambassador Hurley took part in the ensuing negotiations between Chou En-lai and representatives of the Chungking Government.

Tentative agreements were reached providing for legalization of the CCP, giving the Communists representation in the Government and on the Supreme National Defense Council, and a fair method of distribution of military supplies to the Communist armies. But negotiations broke down on the question of command of the Chinese Communist armies. The Communists were willing to accept an American commander to coordinate their army with the Central Government army. But they refused serving under an American commander who would act under Chiang Kai-shek, the C-in-C of the China war theater. General Chu Te stated to an American observer in Yen-an that the only really practical solution is "an American C-in-C of all forces in China, strongly supported by the American government. This commander would have to be able and willing to use the whiphand over the Kuomintang through control of American supplies . . . Even under these circumstances it would be necessary not to mix the Kuomintang and Communist forces. Each should have its own task and sphere of operations." This remark indicates that, as long as the Kuomintang maintains its power, the Communists do not seek any unification of China, but a division of China into two independent parts. They aspire to American support of this plan.

The Communists' proposal for a coalition government was rejected by the Generalissimo. On 7 December 1944 Chou En-lai flew back to Yen-an.

On 16 December Mao Tse-tung, in a speech before the People's Congress of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coali-

tion government. He said that there was little prospect of accomplishing the desired unity in China by negotiation.

On 1 January 1945 Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's speech announced his intention of calling a People's National Congress (or Assembly) in 1945. The Congress would "adopt a Constitution, which would enable the Kuomintang to transfer the power of the government to the people." On the same day, Mao Tse-tung reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coalition government. On 24 January Chou En-lai returned to Chungking. "My present trip to Chungking," he stated, "is to propose to the National Government, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Democratic League³⁶ that . . . a conference of all parties and groups should be held. This will be a preparatory conference to the National Affairs Conference so as formally to discuss the organization and steps leading to the realization of a National Affairs Conference and a coalition government. We [Communists] consider that apart from this there is no other way to . . . overcome the present crisis . . . It is hoped that the Government will quickly accept these proposals."

The American Government again reaffirmed its desire for an inter-party settlement. During a press conference on 23 January Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew reminded both the Chungking Government and the Chinese Communists that the United States stands ready to use its "friendly good offices" in bringing them together. During a press interview in Chungking on 14 February Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, and one of the delegates in the negotiations with Chou En-lai, announced that the Government had made the following concessions to the Communists: (1) A "readiness" to recognize the CCP as a lawful political party; (2) Inclusion of a high Communist official in the National Military Council; (3) Inclusion of Communist representatives and representatives of other political parties in the Executive Yuan with a view to forming a "sort of wartime cabinet"; (4) Establishment of a committee of three to consider reorganization of the Communist Army and the question of that Army's supplies, "with possibly an American Army officer presiding."

Dr. Wang said, however, that the Communists had considered these proposals unacceptable, and had brought forth a proposal to convene a conference of all political parties. "It is," he said, "in compliance with the general idea of this request [by the Communists] that the Government has . . . consented to convening a conference of the Kuomintang, the CCP, and other parties as well as some non-partisan independent leaders to consider interim measures of military and political unification pending a convocation of a National Congress." He expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his "disinterested but friendly efforts" during the past negotiations with Chou En-lai in "keeping the two sides together and in helping create a better atmosphere for the negotiations."

Chou En-lai left for Yanan on 15 February with new Government proposals. But he told newsmen that he doubted that the Communist Party would accept the new proposals "any more readily than those rejected." These proposals included one for the establishment of a "Committee of Political Affairs" comprising members from all parties. It would consider problems of reform transition from Kuomintang rule to constitutional all-party rule, and a unified political program for the unification of all armed forces. Chou En-lai stated during a press conference in Chungking that the Government's "concessions" to the Communists, as announced by Wang Shih-chieh, were unacceptable because "there were conditions attached." These conditions, he said, were (1) The Communist troops should be placed under the National Military Council, which the Communists regarded as tantamount to handing them over to the Kuomintang; (2) The Kuomintang "obstinately insisted" that one-party dictatorship would not be terminated. "Concretely speaking," he said, "the Government's conditions mean that there would be no legal status for the Chinese Communist Party unless Communist troops were given over to the Kuomintang Government. The proposed so-called War Cabinet under the Party-ruled Executive Yuan would have no power for final decisions of policy. One-party rule would not be abolished. The proposed Committee of three [including one American] to reorganize Communist troops could only mean giving them to the Kuomintang. On the basis of achievements, the Kuomintang troops, and not the Communist force, require reorganization." Chou En-lai, like Wang Shih-chieh, expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his help in the negotiations.

Here the matter rests. No further negotiations have been held since Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking in February. The issue now is between the

³⁶ The league comprises several smaller political parties and non-Kuomintang military groups.

Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang-sponsored plan for a National Assembly. Ambassador Hurley recently stated that "the objectives of both plans appear to be generally the same; the chief differences between public statements of both parties concern procedure." The Communists insist that the coalition government should not derive its authority from the Kuomintang. Therefore they maintain that the National Government in Chungking should "discard, immediately, the one-party dictatorship," recognize the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, and recognize the legal status of the Communist Border Regions and base areas. The coalition government would then derive its authority from the "preparatory conference," of all parties as suggested by Chou En-lai in January this year.

The Kuomintang rejects this plan. On 1 March Chiang Kai-shek announced in an address before the Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitutional Government that he would propose to the Kuomintang Congress, due in May, the convocation of a National Assembly on 12 November this year. "The position of the Government," he said, "is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communists as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the government, without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly . . . If the Government . . . surrenders its power of ultimate decision to a combination of political parties the result would be unending friction and tears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such a contingency, unlike in other countries [where parliaments or congresses exist] there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people for a government to appeal to. I repeat, whether by accident or design the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile it will be ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of parties [a reference to the Communist-sponsored plan for a "preparatory conference"]. Such a surrender would not mean returning power to the people. We must emerge from the war with a United Army. The Communists should not keep a separate army . . ."

The last sentence gives a clue to the main and important difference between the Communist plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang plan for a National Assembly, for the Communists insist on maintaining their army independent of the Central Army. It now becomes apparent that what the Communists mean by a coalition government is not the establishment of a national government with sovereign rights over all of China, but rather some sort of loose federation between independent parts of China divided between the Kuomintang, the Communists, and other parties and groups, including Mongolians, Tibetans, and the Moslems of Northwest China. The parties would decide on policies of common interest in the councils of the coalition government, these policies to be executed separately by the CCP, the Kuomintang and other independent parties within their respective areas of control.

This type of a federation might be feasible if China were to be divided between the Kuomintang and the CCP with a clearly defined border demarcation between the two parts. This study has, however, shown that whereas the Chungking Government has throughout the war tried to persuade the Communists to accept a demarcation of defense areas between Kuomintang and Communist troops, the Communists have persistently rejected these suggestions. An American Embassy observer in Yenan stated in October 1944 that a statement by Chou-En-lai indicates that the Communists "are now not merely seeking recognition of their present forces and Communist-controlled governments, but of all future ones which may be set up."

A federative coalition government established under such conditions would obviously not lead to unity. There is no indication that the Communists would not continue to insist, as they have throughout the war, that the Kuomintang forces evacuate any area into which Communist forces penetrate. If they refuse, they are accused by the Communists of being "uncooperative," "traitors," "experts in dissension." Under such conditions the plan for a coalition government could never lead to the establishment of a strong central government in China. It would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord a legal status to present Kuomintang areas.

Little if anything could be gained under these circumstances by extending American aid to the Chinese Communists. The Kuomintang would no doubt resent American aid to the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless the "reactionary" Kuomintang has never stipulated to the United States that if we were to extend aid to both the Kuomintang and the CCP our military commander in China "must," to reverse the statement of General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Communist army, be "willing to use the whiphand over the Chinese Communists." But it is clear that were we to aid the "democratic" Chinese Communists they would expect us to use our "whiphand" against the Kuomintang. This being the case, it is obvious that if the United States started arming both the Kuomintang and Communist armies, we would run the risk of encouraging civil war in China rather than restraining it. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed by several foreign nations, who desired to keep China weak, during the first two decades of the Chinese Revolution. They sold and gave arms to all Chinese warlords, knowing that this would lead to civil war.

It is in this light that General Wedemeyer's recent press statement of the American Army's policy in China must be understood. It was given on the day of Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking, 15 February. "My policy," he said, "is this, that we will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity, to any organization within the Chinese theater [except to the Central Government] . . . Obviously we get requests from time to time for assistance from various sources but I am ordered to support the Central Government and I am going to do that to the best of my ability." This policy was confirmed by Ambassador Hurley during a press interview in Washington on 2 April.

There is, obviously, no other recourse for the moment. But an all-out support of the Chungking Government with "no strings attached" will not solve the problem. We are facing a situation, it must be candidly admitted, where we are backing a government in China which, though it may be militarily stronger than any other independent Chinese regime, has lost much of its popular following. It is still the same widely hated political "machine" which the aforementioned American observer described in 1935, and the same men who were in power then are in power today. The difference is that the Chinese Communists of today constitute a greater challenge to the Kuomintang's rule than it has ever faced since the days in 1928 when it established itself as the National Government of China.

Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yen-an, when commenting on the probability of the Kuomintang leaders planning a civil war against the Communists: "Chiang [Kai-shek] could not whip us during the civil war when we were a hundred times weaker. What chance has he now?" He was undoubtedly right. In recent references to armed clashes between Kuomintang and Communist troops, it has been repeatedly stated that the Kuomintang troops are losing because "the populace join the Communists."

It is not only the populace which shows a tendency to join the Communists. Within the past year, several of the military and political leaders in Chungking China who, though not members of the Government except in a purely nominal way, are affiliated with it in the war against Japan, have shown a tendency to cooperate with the Communists rather than the Kuomintang. The corruption of the Government administration and its almost total disregard for any constructive reforms, together with the unwillingness of Kuomintang leaders in the Government to share power with any but well-trusted party members, have alienated practically all the political parties and groups who offered their support to the Government in 1937 at the outbreak of the war. There are also many progressive and liberal leaders within the Kuomintang who strongly object to the policy of the present ruling clique.

In April 1944 Dr. Sun Fo, who is the chief spokesman for the discontented groups within the Kuomintang, said during a speech at the Central Training Institute of the Kuomintang: "There must be a fundamental readjustment of methods within the Kuomintang itself . . . If we had realized the principle of democracy during the past twenty years, the democratic spirit of the party would now be an inspiration to the rest of the country. Unfortunately we have failed to do so . . . The Kuomintang has no right to monopoly of political activity. We have now developed from a system of party dictatorship to one of personal dictatorship [a reference to Chiang Kai-shek] and while claiming to be a democratic country we have no democracy even inside the Party . . . Suggestions have been made that I make complaints against the Government and the Party directly and privately. I have done this many times without effect. People accuse me of being a talkative idealist, but if I do not say these things

no one else will and I say them for China's sake. Unless I say these things now and unless China goes democratic now it will be too late."

All observers agree that the greatest cause of the exceedingly poor showing made by the Chungking forces last year during their defense against the Japanese was the hostility of the people toward their own army and the hopeless disunity between the regular Kuomintang or Central Army and the Provincial armies. Marshal Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi Military Group, one of the outstanding liberal leaders in China, and a strong advocate of a democratic government said in July 1944: "[The] drift toward dictatorship and departure from democratic principles has brought about the inevitable result; the seizure of power by a small clique, and taxation, which is levied on the people as a whole, is used arbitrarily to maintain the clique in power to the detriment of the people, thus weakening the power of national resistance . . . Because of misappropriation of government funds, the treatment of the soldiers is disgraceful to the extent that they have now neither the strength nor the will to fight . . . The masses of the people are now ready and willing to assist the enemy. There is a slogan quite popular among the people of Honan: 'We should prefer to be slaughtered by the Japanese than to endure the tyranny of [the Kuomintang] General T'ang En-po.' A similar situation exists in the Ninth War Zone [including Honan and parts of neighboring provinces] . . ."

Among various discontented groups in West China in the provinces controlled by the Chungking Government, there is today a strong tendency to form a new united front. But unlike the movement of 1937, this new united front is developing against the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. It includes several leading scholars, the powerful Szechwan warlords and several other military groups, seven small political parties united in the Democratic League, and a number of non-partisan leaders. The movement has considerable popular support from small shopkeepers, small manufacturers and "petite bourgeoisie," who are angry about inflation, corruption and increasing monopoly of business by the Kuomintang. It is also supported by some enlightened landlords.

None of these groups are pro-Communist. They would be far more willing to unite with the Kuomintang than with the Communists, were the Kuomintang to liberalize its rule and share power with other groups. They have made persistent bids for American friendship and support, but in deference to the Chinese Communists, they have received neither publicity in the American press nor official American recognition in any form. They are not powerful enough to change the political situation through their own efforts. But they can, as they have shown on several occasions, combine with the Communists by supporting their demands for "democracy" and thereby strengthen their position against the Government. The Democratic League is as doubtful as the Communists about the sincerity of Chiang Kai-shek's announcement that the Kuomintang will relinquish one-party dictatorship. Just as the Communists, it has boycotted the National Assembly to be convened in November this year and has subscribed to the Communist plan for a coalition government.

The Chinese Communists on their part are offering strong support to the Democratic League. One leader of the League asserted in August 1944 that the new united front movement against the Chungking Government had been "assured" of the support of the Soviet Russian Government.

It must be emphasized that if the Chinese Communists gain control of this movement, it is not because the followers of this movement desire to combine with the Communists but rather because they find it impossible to obtain any cooperation from the Kuomintang. Under Communist direction the movement can be turned into a powerful weapon against the Government. This movement includes one of the most genuinely pro-American elements in China as well as many of the best educated, most intelligent men and women in China. The literary editor of the *Ta Kung Pao*, the "*Manchester Guardian of China*," wrote in July 1944 to an American observer in Chungking: "Sino-American friendship is based upon the genuine love of Americans on the part of our people, not on the thanksgiving attitude of the present Government. The people with no exception hate their government, and recognize it as no stabilizing force but a serious trouble maker here. If you (Americans) go on to strengthen it with your support you will find gradually our people taking you as hypocrites, visionless traders. . . Even if the war is won in spite of all the above you (America) will be regarded the world wide as Lords Simon and Hoare during the Spanish war. And the world's hope for a leadership towards a new peace will easily turn away somewhere else."

There are still good prospects that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can reverse the trend, bringing these dissident groups back into the Government's fold. One of the chief complaints of military leaders who belong to these groups is that they have been denied a share of American military supplies, even though their troops are fighting in the Government's army. In March of this year it was reported that General Ho Ying-ch'ing, C-of-C of the Chinese Army, was sincerely endeavoring to weld the troops of General Lung Yün, the Governor of Yunnan, and one of the leaders of the opposition movement in Free China, with Central Government forces stationed in Yunnan. It was also reported that he has been advocating measures which would make available to General Lung a substantial portion of the U. S. arms and equipment.

This is, of course, a correct procedure. If American supplies are distributed to various non-Kuomintang groups by the Chungking Government rather than directly by the American Government representatives in China, the dissident groups will undoubtedly rally behind the Government. There has of late been no report of Lung Yün sponsoring the movement against the Government. If the Government effects an equitable distribution of these supplies to other dissident military groups, it is likely that unity will be established between these groups and the Chungking Government, and that these will give up their support of the Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and will decide to join the National Assembly. Similarly, if the Chungking Government, rather than the United States on its own initiative, were to distribute to the Chinese Communists a part of the American supplies sent to China, it is conceivable that they would be more favorably disposed to accept Chiang Kai-shek's plan for a National Assembly and constitutional government as the basis for establishing unity in China.

The Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang, which was held from 5 to 21 May 1945, resolved that a law should be enacted giving legal status to political parties and groups other than the Kuomintang. This is apparently a concession to one of the chief conditions stated by the Chinese Communists and the Democratic League as prerequisite to their participation in the National Assembly. Another important resolution was the abolition within three months of all existing Kuomintang headquarters in the Army. This is a move toward the development of the Chinese Army into a true national army rather than a party army of the Kuomintang.

The Kuomintang Congress confirmed Chiang Kai-shek's promise to convene a National Assembly on 12 November to enforce constitutional government. The coming five months will, therefore, be decisive, for unity in China depends greatly on the final decision of the Communists as to whether they shall join in the National Assembly. And this decision will be largely determined by their willingness to join their armed forces with those of the Central Government. At the beginning of May Ambassador Hurley conferred with the Generalissimo on this question of unifying the Chinese armed forces opposed to the Japanese. The Generalissimo said that "some progress" was being made with the Communists although things were "not moving as fast as he would like." He promised, however, that the situation would be solved satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, the prospects for a settlement of this all-important question are not promising. The tendency during the past months has not been toward unity, but away from it. The Communists have freely admitted to an official American observer in Yenan the truth of Kuomintang charges that they keep increasing the scope of the concessions which they demand for a two-party settlement. This supports a conclusion by Congressman Walter H. Judd, who has spent many years in China, and who re-visited China during the latter part of 1945:

"They [the Chinese Communists] do not want unity. What they want is all the advantages of appearing to want unity so they can get arms and sympathy and support from abroad, while at the same time having all the advantages of complete independence."

Congressman Judd continues:

"If they [the Chinese Communists] can stall along thus until the war in Europe ends, then they can hope for powerful support from Russia. They can try an 'October Revolution' in the hope of getting control of all of China. If that fails, they can at least rebel and try to split off North China, including Manchuria—of course, in the name of freedom—and then the new 'independent democracy' can invite Russia in to protect it as she is protecting Eastern Europe. The new 'North China' can even voluntarily in-

sist, if it desires, on being taken in as one of the United Socialist Soviet Republics."

This observation should be viewed in the light of a statement by Mao Tse-tung during the recently concluded Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yen-an. While in 1941 he approved of Soviet Russia's Neutrality Pact with Japan as in the interests of China and "the oppressed nations of the whole world," he now expressed thanks to Stalin for Soviet Russia's denunciation of the same pact. As long as Soviet Russia was fighting Germany, he never urged Soviet help of China, although he stressed that China's hope was with Soviet Russia. However, with a Soviet victory in Europe assured, Mao Tse-tung declared: "We [Chinese Communists] believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question." In the next sentence he expressed thanks to the United States and Great Britain, especially the former for their efforts "in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors." But he warned them not to let "their diplomacy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people." "If any foreign Government," he added, "helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed."

The "democratic cause" here referred to is, of course, the Chinese Communists' version of "Soviet democracy" which they have introduced in their areas of control. This "democracy" is, as we have seen in this study, as rigidly controlled by the CCP as is the so-called "dictatorial" system of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang. The American Military Attache to China, in a study of the Kuomintang-Communist problem, stated in October 1943: "Political intolerance is nothing new in Chinese history. If the [Chinese] Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be sternly truer of the Communists if they ever attain power."

Soviet Russia's attitude toward China will undoubtedly play an important part in the decision of the Chinese Communists as to whether or not to join the National Assembly, proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, is expected to visit Moscow on his way home from the San Francisco conference. The diplomatic correspondent of the Kuomintang party organ, the *Chungking Central Daily News*, who is now in San Francisco, has stated that T. V. Soong was invited by Molotov to go to Moscow, "presumably" to discuss a mutual aid agreement between China and Soviet Russia. This has not been confirmed. However, any agreement or understanding between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia would undoubtedly strengthen the cause of unity in China, and lessen the danger of Soviet Russia and the United States becoming involved in the inter-party struggle in China between the Kuomintang and the CCP.

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENTS IN COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED AREAS

A. CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

In May 1945 the Yen-an radio announced that the CCP comprised 1,200,000 members. In comparison, the Kuomintang has 2,000,000 members. In August 1943 Chou En-lai stated that the CCP had about 800,000 members. A member of the Communist Party Headquarters in Chungking stated in July 1944 that no new members had been admitted into the Party in China since 1939. If these various statements are true, then the great increase of Party members has taken place in the past ten months, concurrent with the Communist expansion of areas of control in Central and South China.

The procedure for admission into the CCP is reported by a Communist Party member to be as follows. In a school or factory or particular locality in which there is a "cell" (*hsiao tsu*, literally "a small organization"), a person who is sympathetic to the ideas and ideals of Communism will begin to associate with and become known to others of the same general trend of thought. When such a person has come to have a firm acquaintance with several members of a cell, and they are sure of his sincerity, he will be informed of the cell's existence and, if he wishes to join, he will be supplied with an application blank on which he will enter his name, his status in society, the condition of himself and his family, etc. His application is then presented to a meeting of the cell, and a resolution is

proposed and passed (or rejected) to the effect that he is to be admitted to membership in the Party.

A worker elected in this way will thenceforward be a full member, but a student or peasant will be required to go through a probationary period of several months or more before being admitted. In the case of a member of the "capitalist class" or of the Kuomintang, the cell itself will not be authorized to grant membership; after the applicant's name has been voted on favorably, it will have to be submitted to the next highest organ of the Party for approval.

The Communist informant stated that the Party is organized on an "industrial basis," vertically rather than horizontally, that is, "steel workers in one plant who are members of the Party have no necessary connection with steel workers in another plant who are also Communists;" every Communist worker in that one plant, whatever his task, is a member of the cell or cells in that plant. A cell usually consists of about 20 people. If it becomes too large it is split to form two or more cells, so that in a large factory with a considerable Communist membership there may be several cells. Each cell represents a cross-section of the work of the factory; there is not one cell for one kind of work and another for another kind of work. Each cell has a "Secretary," a "Director of Propaganda," and a "Director of Organization." These officers, who form the Cell Committee, are not elected, but appointed by the next highest Committee in the Party, usually the *Hsien* (County) Committee. All cells are self-supporting, being financed by contributions from the members. Every member must pay into the Party treasury a percentage of his earnings. If the earnings are low the percentage is low, being somewhere between four and seven percent; if the earnings are high, the percentage is sometimes as high as 40 percent.

Liaison between the cells is accomplished through officers appointed by the *Hsien* (county) or City Committee of the Party, according to the district or city in which the cell is located. The *Hsien* Committee is in turn appointed by the Provincial Committees, which are appointed by the Central Committee in Yenan.

The Communist informant emphasized that this control from above was essential under present conditions in China because of the danger that the Party would be inter-penetrated by Kuomintang and other counter-espionage agents. The greatest secrecy is maintained: the whole organization in Chungking-controlled China is "underground," although its objectives there are no different from those of the Chinese Communists as a whole. According to the informant these objectives are the establishment of "democracy, with free elections and freedom of speech, etc., throughout China, coupled with agrarian and other reforms." "To this end," he said, "they [the Communists] cooperate at the higher levels with members of the Democratic League and other liberal and leftist groups in China, but members of the latter are never directly or indirectly associated with one of the cells, and on the lower or 'operation' levels there is practically no contact."

Election of a new Central Committee was one of the items on the agenda of the Seventh National Congress held in Yenan during the latter part of April 1945. The preceding Central Committee was elected by the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in 1938. The total membership of the Central Committee is about twenty. The Communist informant stated, however, that their names and the number of them are both secret. He said, however, that among the members were Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, Lin Tsu-han, and Chu Te. The list of members of the Central Committee which appears in Section 4 of this study has been compiled from non-Communist sources.

Because of this secrecy the average member of the Party knows little or nothing about the organization as a whole. The greater part of the membership of the Party is in the Communist-controlled areas. When the Chinese Communist Army reaches a new *hsien*, it contacts the local cell, which it expands, or if there is no cell in existence it organizes one. The cell may be permitted to hold its own election, but usually the Cell Committee is appointed, as is the case in Chungking-controlled China.

The Communist informant stated that no knowledge of the theories of Karl Marx is required of an applicant for membership in the Party. It is only necessary that he sympathize with what he understands to be the general aims of the party, and that he be willing to obey the Party leadership. He is not even required to be literate, the informant said, describing the Party's attitude

as being that the neophyte can be schooled after he enters.³⁷ The heads of the Propaganda "Department" of the Cell, *Hsien* and Provincial Committees are responsible for the education of the members. In some places classes are held, and higher education is available in Yen-an. The local cells only conduct classes in two subjects, "political work" and "common sense." The American Embassy officer who obtained this information stated that he understood that the first of these subjects was largely an elementary education in how to keep out of the hands of the police, while the second course evidently covers the teaching of a basic number of Chinese characters, together with the rudiments of geography, history, etc.

For the Party Statutes (1928) of the CCP, see Appendix I, page 267, Vol. I.

B. BASE AREAS

Communist-controlled areas behind Japanese lines are generally referred to by the Communists as anti-Japanese bases. They have been set up by the 8th Route and New 4th Armies. These anti-Japanese bases are officially called "Military Regions" (*Chün Ch'u*) in Communist military communiques. Administratively, they are called either "Border Region (*Pien Ch'u*) Governments" where full-fledged Governments are established, with elected village, *hsien* (county) and Border Region Congresses, or "Administrative Committees" (*Hsing-chang Wei yuan hui*), where representative governments have not yet been established. In nearly all instances the military and administrative regions are identical in extent, although there are three military regions which have no border region governments or administrative committees. The Communist, for brevity's sake, use the literary one-character names of the provinces; for example, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsi Border Region is called the Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Ch'u, and the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region is called the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'u. All the main base areas are divided into sub-regions, and are called either military sub-regions (or sub-districts), or just districts (when used administratively).

At the end of 1944 there were sixteen anti-Japanese bases, of which only five had full-fledged Border Region Governments, eight had Administrative Committees, and three were Military Regions where no anti-Japanese government organizations had yet been set up. They are as follows (see map):

(1) Border Region Governments

Under 18th Group Army:

Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia: Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Ch'u.

Shansi-Suiyuan: Chin-Sui Pien Ch'u.

Shansi-Hopeh-Honan: Chin-Chi-Yü Pien Ch'u.

Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar: Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'u.

Hopeh-Shantung-Honan: Chi-Lu Yü Pien Ch'u.

(2) Administrative Committees

Under 18th Group Army:

Shantung: Shantung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

Under New 4th Army:

North Kiangsu: Su-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

Central Kiangsu: Su-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

South Kiangsu: Su-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

North Huai: Huai-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

South Huai: Huai-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

Central Anhwei: Wan-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

Hopeh-Honan-Anhwei: Yü-Wan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

³⁷ There is some evidence that the Chinese Communists do not encourage educated people to join the Party. Even Chinese liberals and non-party intellectuals who offer their services to the Communists have found it difficult to cooperate with them. For example, the daughter-in-law of Tai Chi-t'ao, President of the Examination Yuan of the National Government in Chungking, a well educated woman, fled from Japanese-occupied Peiping to Yen-an en route to Chungking. She was treated with the greatest suspicion by the Communists. It took her a year and a half to obtain a release from the Communists to proceed to Chungking, which led her to remark that it is easier to get out of Japanese-occupied areas than out of Communist areas. Meanwhile, she offered her services to the Communists while staying in Yen-an, but found them extremely uncooperative. Mr. Michael Lindsey, a British subject who has been working for the Chinese Communists during the past three years, recently told an American Army officer visiting Yen-an that "for some unknown reason" the Communists find it extremely difficult to obtain cooperation from Chinese "technical people". Because of this one of their greatest shortcomings is lack of capable technicians, teachers, and administrators. "They [the 'technical' Chinese] all run away at the first opportune moment," he said. But he added as possible explanation for this that it is difficult for any educated person who does not follow the "Party line" to work for the Communists.

(3) *Base Areas with no anti-Japanese governments*

Under 18th Group Army:

Hainan Island: Hainan or Ch'ung-yai Base.

East River: Tung Chiang Base.

Under New 4th Army:

East Chekiang: Che-tung Base.

As originally planned, the Border Region governments were to be under the National Government in Chungking. Of the thirteen Border Region Governments and Administrative Committees which existed at the end of 1944, only two were officially recognized by the National Government—the Shensi-Kansu-Ning-sia and Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Governments.³⁸ The eleven other anti-Japanese governments have, therefore, no legal status. Whether legalized or not, however, the real leadership of these anti-Japanese bases is centered in the Communist Party Headquarters at Yen-an.

Within, or alongside, a Communist-controlled area there may be found "island" areas where a Kuomintang Government is still in existence. Such areas, however, are much smaller than Communist base areas, and are found only in Central China and the coastal Provinces.

Along the outer edges of the Communist-controlled base areas, near the Japanese lines, the Communists mention the existence of so-called "revolutionary double side" and "reactionary double side" (local) governments. The "revolutionary double side" governments are made up of landlords, merchants and wealthy people in the Japanese-occupied area, who are appointed by the Japanese, but are not enemies of the Communist forces. The "reactionary double side" governments, on the other hand, are made up of wealthy individuals who have played both the Japanese and Communist sides alternately for individual gain, but are at present with the Japanese because their fortunes are dependent on Japanese control.

C. GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER REGIONS

The administration in the base areas is carried on by Border Region, *Hsien*, (county) *Chu* (township) and village government organs. Chart No. 1 (see last page, Vol. 1.) shows the general structure of the Border Region Government. Paralleling this structure is the organization of the "People's Committee for anti-Japanese Armed Resistance", which aids the 18th Group Army in the defense of the Border Region and is the link between the Border Region Government and the 18th Group Army.

(1) *Border Region, Hsien and Village Governments*

The highest organ of government in the base area is the Border Region Council (see Chart No. 1, last page, Vol. I.) When the Border Region Council is not in session, government is carried on by the Border Region Government Committee whose members are chosen by the Council. A standing committee is also chosen by the Council to supervise the Government in its carrying out of resolutions passed by the Council. There are also the *Hsien* Council and the Village Citizens' General Assembly whose functions within the *hsien* and village respectively are the counterpart of those of the Border Region Council.

(2) *Supervisor's and Chü Offices*

The Supervisor's Office represents the Border Region Government in supervising the affairs of several *hsien*. The *Chü* (township) Office is the counterpart of the Supervisor's Office in supervising the affairs of several villages. These two offices are purely supervisory and not administrative organs, and are generally called the "nominal offices," while the organs of the Border Region, *hsien* and village governments are the "real offices." Personnel for the Supervisor's and *Chü* Offices are chosen by the Border Region and *hsien* governments respectively, except in areas behind enemy lines where communications are poor and where the personnel of the *Chü* Office are selected by the *Chü* People's Delegates Assembly rather than by the *hsien* government.

(3) *Village Government organs*

The Village Citizens' General Assembly (which includes all village inhabitants of voting age) chooses delegates to form the Village Delegates Assembly, as well

³⁸ The Chungking Government recognized the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government in 1938. This recognition may have been rescinded later when an attempt was made by the Kuomintang to set up a conflicting government under Lu Chung-Lin in Hopeh. At any rate, its present status of legality vis-à-vis the Central Government is obscure.

as the Mayor and the Assistant Mayor who are respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman of both the General Assembly and the Delegates Assembly. Each delegate chosen by the Citizens General Assembly represents several persons; and if the people whom he represents are not satisfied with the way he performs his duties, they may change him at any time without waiting for the next election date. The heads of the various village committees are chosen by the Delegates Assembly from among their ranks. The Mayor and his Assistant and the heads of the village committees together form the Village Government Committee which directs the Village Office's work.

A Village Government as described above may actually govern a combination of several small villages or settlements, or a single large village. If several small villages comprise an administrative village, each small village elects a "chief delegate" to act as intermediary with the Village Officer, taking care of the interests of the particular village. If the Village Government represents only a single village, no "chief delegate" is selected.

(4) *Congresses*

The Congresses of the various levels of government (Border Region People's Congress of the Border Region Government; Administrative Congress of the Supervisor's Office; and the Hsien People's Congress) are convened by the heads of the various government organs to stimulate democracy and realize collective leadership, according to Communist statements.

(5) *Elections*

Elections are held every year for village delegates, every two years for the Hsien Affairs Conference, and every three years for the Border Region Council. It appears that in the more sparsely populated regions, in the village (or group of villages) one representative is elected for every 60 persons, in the hsien one for every 600 to 800 persons, and in the Border Region Congress one representative for every 8,000 persons. In the more densely populated region of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, however, one representative for 30,000 people was elected to the Border Region Congress of Jan. 1, 1943.

As early as 1940 the Communist Party decided to limit the number of Communist members in any elective Government body to one-third, leaving one-third for upper class members (landlords and merchants) and one-third for Kuomintang members and non-party people.

This self-imposed restriction has not, however, prevented the Communist Party from taking the leading role. As has been shown in the historical section of this study, in the Communist areas the Kuomintang members have no party machine to back them, and the upper-class non-party group is made up of representatives of the unorganized landlord-merchant class. The liberal intellectual members of the Government are strong supporters of the Communists, and so are the peasants and representatives of mass organizations.

The Communist Party makes a point of sponsoring most progressive plans. An individual landlord, for instance, may suggest a regulation to bring about a certain improvement in administration or in production or distribution. If it is considered worthwhile, the Communist Party endorses such a regulation, publicizing it as a Communist-sponsored measure. It is soon forgotten that the landlord originally introduced the measure, and the Communist Party receives the credit for having sponsored the regulation. For all of these reasons, there is no strong opposition party to the Communist Party, which remains undisputedly the dominant political factor.

D. PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES FOR ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED RESISTANCE

The organization of the Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance is strictly a militia ("People's Militia") organization and works closely with the 18th Group Army. The Committees have no civil administrative functions, although they originally formed the core of the Mobilization or Administrative Committees which were the rudimentary governments later replaced by elected governments. The organization of these People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance parallels the administrative set-up of the Border Region Government. Members of the Village Committee are elected by the citizens of the village. The Village Committees elect the Chü Committee. The several Chü Committees within a *hsien* elect the Hsien Committee and so on. Although the Committees have a large measure of independence, they are subject to both government and military control.

The Committees are headed by the Village, *Chü* or *Hsien* Command Headquarters. In the village the Mayor is the head of the Command Headquarters, while the head of the village guerrilla detachment is the executive officer, and the Chairman of the Committee is next in authority. If a Communist army unit is stationed in the area, an army representative is also included in the Village Command Headquarters. The head of the *Chü* government is also head of the *Chü* Command Headquarters, and the *Hsien* Magistrate is head of the *Hsien* Command Headquarters; the organization of these headquarters is similar to that of the Village Command Headquarters.

The functions of the various groups within these committees are more fully discussed in the military section of this report under "The People's Militia."

4. DIRECTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND BORDER REGION GOVERNMENTS

A. CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Since the names and number of members of various Communist Party organs are secret, no personnel list has been obtainable from Communist sources. The list below is supplied by various non-Communist sources and should be evaluated as C-3.

(1) *The Central Committee*

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

CHANG Hao	LIN Piao
CHANG Wen-t'ien	LIN Tsu-han
CH'EN Ch'ang-hao	LIU Shao-ch'i
CH'EN Keng	LIU Shao-wen
CH'EN Shao-yü	LO Mai
CHI Ming-hui	LU Ting-i
CH'IN Pang-hsien	MAO Tse-tung
CHOU En-lai	P'ENG Te-huai
CHOU Hsing	TENG Fa
CHU Te	TENG Ying-ch'ao (Miss)
FENG Wen-pin	TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)
FU Chung	TS'AI Shu-fan
HÖ K'o-ch'üan	TUNG Pi-wu
HO Lung	WU Li-p'ing
HSÜ Hai-tung	WU Yü-chang
KAN Ssu-ch'i	YANG Ching-yü
KAÖ Tzu-li	YANG Shang-k'un

(2) *The Political Bureau.*

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

CHANG Wen-t'ien	LO Mai
CH'EN Shao-yü	MAO Tse-tung
CH'IN Pang-hsien	TENG Fa
CHOU En-lai	TSENG Shan
HSIEN K'ang-chih	TUNG Pi-wu
K'ANG Sheng	WANG Chia-se
KAO Kang	WU Yü-chang
LIN Tsu-han	YANG Ching-yü
LIU Shao-ch'i	YANG Shang-k'un

(3) *The Secretariat*

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

Committee Members:

CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Shao-yü
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
LIU Shao-ch'i
MAO Tse-tung
WANG Chia-se

Chief of Organization:

CH'EN Yün

Chief of United Front:

SSU Ko-ching (Acting)

Chief of Publicity:

HO K'o-ch'üan (Acting)

Chief of Intelligence:

HSIEH K'ang-chih

Chief of Social Affairs:

HSIEH K'ang-chih

Chief of Military Affairs:

CHOU En-lai

Chief of Industrial Workers:

CH'IN Pang-hsien

Chief of Agricultural Workers:

K'ANG Sheng

Chief of Women:

TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)

Chief of Young People:

FENG Wen-pin

Chief of Minorities:

TSENG Shan

Chief of Overseas Members:

LIAO Ch'eng-chih (in 1940)

Director, National Labor Union Headquarters:

LIU Shao-ch'i

Director, Southeast Political Branch Bureau:

LIU Shao-ch'i

Director, North China Political Branch Bureau:

NIEH Jung-chen

Director, Southern Political Branch Bureau:

CHOU En-lai

Director, Northwest Political Branch Bureau:

KAO Kang

Director, Statistics Research Bur:

MAO Tse-tung

Director, Central Research Inst:

FAN Wen-lan (Acting)

Director, Medical Service for the Masses:

FU Lien-chiang

Director, *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* ("Emancipation Daily"):

CH'IN Pang-hsien

Director, *Chieh-fang Press* ("Emancipation Press"):

CH'IN Pang-hsien

Director, *Hsin-hua* News Service:

CH'IN Pang-hsien

Principal, Party School in Yen-an:

MAO Tse-tung

(4) *Central Revolutionary Military Council*

Chairman:

MAO Tse-tung

Vice-Chairmen:

CHOU En-lai
CHU Te

(5) *18th Group Army*

Commander:

CHU Te

Deputy Commander:

P'ENG Te-huai

Chief of Staff:

YEH Chien-ying

Chairman General, Political Dept:

WANG Chia-hsiang

Secretary General:

YANG Shang-k'un

Director, Yen-an Office:

WANG Shih-ying

Secretary, Yen-an Office:

HUANG Hua

(6) *New 4th Army*

Commander (Acting):

CH'EN I

Vice Commander:

CHANG Yün-i

Chief of Staff:

LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu

Political Commissar:

YAO Shu-shih (Acting)

(7) *United Defense Headquarters at Yen-an of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Regions*

Commander:

HO Lung

Vice Commander:

HSIAO Ching-Kuang

Chief of Staff:

CHANG Ching-wu

Political Commissars:

HSIAO Ching-kuang
HSU Hsiang-ch'ien
KUAN Hsiang-ying

(8) *Party Office in Chungking*

Resident Representative:

TUNG Pi-wu

Secretary:

LI Pong

Publisher, *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*:

P'AN Tzu-nien

B. BORDER REGION GOVERNMENTS

(1) Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region government

Membership lists have been included here for only the three most important Border Region governments. Personnel information on other governments of Border Regions and Base Areas is too incomplete to be of value in this directory.

Chairman:	LIN Tsu-han
Vice Chairman:	LI Ting-ming
Chairman's Committee:	
AI Ssu-ch'i	KAO Su-hsien
CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu	LEI Ching-t'ien
CH'EN K'ang-pai	LIU Ching-jen
CHOU Yang	MA Ming-fang
HSIAO Ching-kuang	PAI Chen-pang
JAO Chang-hu	T'AN Cheng
K'ANG Sheng	T'ENG Tai-yüan
KAO Ch'ung-shan	TS'AO I-ou
KAO Kang	TS'AO Lan-ju
KAO Lang-t'ing	YEH Chi-chuang
Secretary General:	LO Mai
Commissioner of Civil Affairs:	LIU Ching-fan
Commissioner of Construction:	HO Tzu-lo
Commissioner of Education:	LIU Shih
Commissioner of Finance:	NAN Han-chen
President, Supreme Court:	KAO Tzu-li
President, High Court:	LEI Ching-t'ien
Director of Trade:	YEH Chi-chuang
Chairman, Cultural Association:	MAO Tse-tung
Director, Cultural Association:	WU Yü-chang
President, Yen-an University:	CHOU Yang
President, Bethune Medical College:	CHANG I-chen
Director, Bethune Hospital:	LU Chih-chün
Commander, Peace Preservation Corps:	KAO Kang
Mayor of Yen-an:	KAO Lang-t'ing
Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council:	KAO Kang
Vice Chairman, 2nd PPC:	HSIEH Chüeh-tsai

(2) Shansi-Chahar-Hopoh Border Region government

Chairman:	SUNG Shao-wen
Vice Chairman:	HU Jen-k'uei
Political Committee:	
CHANG Su	NIEH Jung-chen
HU Jen-k'uei	SUN Chih-yüan
LIU Tien-chi	SUNG Shao-wen
President, Associated University:	CH'ENG Fang-wu
Chairman, People's Political Council:	CH'ENG Fang-wu

(3) Shansi-Hopoh-Shantung-Honan Border Region government

Chairman:	YANG Hsiu-feng
Vice Chairman:	JUNG Wu-sheng

5. EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED BASE AREAS

Education in the Communist base areas is designed to further the war of resistance and train the people to improve agricultural and industrial production. There are two kinds of schools, those directly under the Communist Party for the training of Party officials and Communist Army personnel, and those under the educational departments of the various Border Region Governments. Despite this distinction, however, there is Communist influence in the schools not directly under the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's "new Democracy," for instance, and Communist newspapers are used extensively in the University of Yen-an (which is under the Educational Department of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government), and primary school textbooks in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, examined by the group of visiting correspondents in the summer of 1944, were found to contain Communist propaganda.

(1) Communist Party Schools

The Communist Party School at Yen-an is under Mao Tse-tung's direction. All Party leaders and functionaries from all over China are required to attend the school periodically for purposes of indoctrination. There is also the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in southeast Shensi, with a branch at Sniteh, Shensi, to train officers for the Communist Armies.

(2) University of Yen-an

This University is under the Educational Bureau of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. It was established in 1941 by the amalgamation of the North Shensi Public School, the Chinese Women's College, and the Tze-tung Youth Cadre School. The Institute of Public Administration was incorporated early in 1944. The University of Yen-an now comprises the following:

- (a) College of Administration, with departments of public administration, public finance, economics and jurisprudence;
- (b) Lu Hsiin Art College, with departments of fine arts, drama, music, and literature;
- (c) College of Natural Science, with departments of medicine, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, and agriculture.

In July 1944 there were 1,302 students enrolled in the University of Yen-an, according to Liu Shih, the Commissioner of Education of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. They are said to spend 80% of their time in classes and study, and 20% in agricultural and industrial production. Great stress is laid upon "practical" education. According to Liu Shih, "National education cannot be isolated from life, and college and secondary education cannot be isolated from society. It will not do to depend upon textbooks alone." The Yen-an newspaper CHIEH FANG JIH PAO (Emancipation Daily), organ of the OCP, and other documentary materials are used in addition to textbooks.

(3) Primary and secondary schools

Owing to the deficiency of equipment and materials, the schools in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are not considered adequate by normal standards. Mimeographed textbooks and hand-drawn maps are used, as well as the Communist-controlled newspaper MASS JOURNAL (which is published by the so-called Cultural Association of the Border Area). Primary schools are under the village and hsien governments, and secondary schools are under the Border Region Governments. There are also classes for adults who wish to learn to read and write, and in the Army, factories, and arsenals, illiterates are urged to learn a few characters each week.

Primary school courses in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are five years long, according to Commissioner of Education Liu Shih, and classes are held mainly in the winter so as not to interfere with production. Students are required to learn 500 characters the first year and an additional 500 the second year; these enable the student to read the Mass Journal.

During the winter, schools are in session all day with alternate periods of study, song, recreation, and spinning and weaving. Enrollment in the winter classes in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region is said to be over 40,000, and government officials expect to wipe out illiteracy within five years. Mass education is also carried on by means of blackboard newspapers, dramas and so-called "Transplantation Songs," which are songs and dramatizations telling the population how to improve production and keep up the anti-Japanese resistance.

APPENDIX

PARTY STATUTES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY [1928]

CHAPTER 1. TERMS

[Article] 1. *Definitions*.—The Chinese Communist Party is a part of the Communist International. It shall be called: Chinese Communist Party, Branch Headquarters² of the Communist International.

² Before a prospective Party member has been approved as a Party member, [one character possibly missing] the appropriate Party Headquarters may entrust said prospective Party member with a certain type of Party work in order to observe his ability and his attitude toward the Party.

CHAPTER 2. PARTY MEMBERS

[Article] 2. *Qualifications for entering the Party.*—Whoever accepts the Party regulations and Party Statutes of the Communist International and of the Party, joins one of the Party's organizations and does active work, therein obeys the decisions of the Communist International and the Party, and regularly pays his Party dues, may be a member of the Party.

[Article] 3. *Procedure for entering the Party.* When a new Party member enters the Party he shall be passed by a Branch Headquarters of the Party. His entry must also be approved by a District Committee of a Municipal or *Hsien* (county) Committee or of an organization equivalent to a *Hsien* Committee.

Conditions for entering the Party are as follows:

A. Factory workers must be introduced by one Party member and passed by a Production Branch Headquarters.

B. Peasants, workers in handicraft industries, intellectuals, and low-ranking employees of various agencies must be introduced by one Party member.

C. High-ranking employees of various agencies must be introduced by two Party members.

D. Those who leave other political parties (such as the Kuomintang) to join the Party must be introduced by three Party members with a membership of one year or more in the Party. If [such person] was formerly an ordinary member of the other political party, he shall be approved by a Provincial Committee; if he was formerly an officer of the other political party, he must be approved by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 3. When members of the Young Communist League enter the Party, they shall be introduced by the Young Communist Committee. They must also undergo whichever of the above procedures may be appropriate, be passed by a Plenary Meeting of the Party members of a Branch Headquarters or be approved by a higher-ranking Party Headquarters.

Under certain special circumstances Party committees of all ranks have the power directly to recruit and pass on new Party members.

[Article] 4. *Changes in Organization.*—When portions of other political organizations or whole political groups, including entire party organizations, enter or come over to the Communist Party, [their entry into the Party] must be decided on by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 5. *Transfers of Party members.*—When a Party member transfers from one [Party] organization into the sphere of activity of (that is into the district of) another [Party] organization, he must enter the organization in the place to which he moves and become a member of that organization. All procedures by which Party members transfer from one organization to another or from China to another country must be in accordance with the regulations promulgated by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 6. *The question of expulsion.*—Expulsion of a Party member must be passed by a Plenary meeting of the Party members of his Branch Headquarters and must be approved by a higher-ranking Party committee before becoming effective. Also, [during the period] before an expulsion decision has been approved by the higher agency, all activities in the Party of the expelled member must cease immediately. Anyone not submitting to an expulsion decision may appeal to the supreme organ of the Party. In cases where a Party member engages in anti-Party activities, Party committees of all ranks have the power to expel [the offender] directly. But the lower-ranking Party Headquarters organization which the expelled person had joined must be notified of such an expulsion decision.

CHAPTER 3. PARTY ORGANIZATION

[Article] 7. *Principles of organization.*—Like other Branch Headquarters of the Communist International, the principle of organization of the Chinese Communist Party is the concentrated democracy system. The fundamental principles of the concentrated democracy system are as follows:

(1) Low-ranking and high-ranking Party Headquarters are elected by Plenary meetings of Party members, by congresses, and by national congresses.

(2) Party Headquarters of each rank must make periodic reports to the body of Party members which elects it.

(3) Lower-ranking party Headquarters must unflinchingly recognize the decisions of higher-ranking Party Headquarters, must strictly observe Party discipline, and must execute speedily and exactly the decisions of the Communist International Executive Committee and the directing agencies of the Party. [One character possibly missing] Organizations having control over a certain district are superior in rank to the organizations in the various parts of that district. Party members can carry on debate concerning any question within the Party only before the passing of a decision on that question by the appropriate agency. Any decision passed by the Congress of the Communist International, by the Congress of the Party, or by a directing agency within the Party must be executed unconditionally. Even if a certain group of Party members or certain local organizations do not agree with such a decision, it must still be executed unconditionally.

[Article] 8. *The appointment of directing agencies.*—When made necessary for reasons of secrecy, lower-ranking agencies of the Party may be appointed by higher-ranking agencies and may, with the approval of the higher-ranking agency, appoint new members to its Party Headquarters Committee.

[Article] 9. *Regional districts of the Party.*—The Party is divided into units on the regional principle. An organization controlling a region is a higher-ranking agency than the organizations of the various parts of that region. All Party members, without regard for race or nationality, must enter the organization of a local Party Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and become members of the Chinese Communist Party.

[Article] 10. *Executive authority of agencies of various ranks.*—Party organizations have the right of free decision with respect to local problems, within the limits of the decisions of the Communist International and of the Party.

(Notes). ¹The introducer must be responsible for the person introduced. If his letter of introduction should be found incorrect, he must be subjected to disciplinary action, which may include expulsion from the Party.

[Article] 11. *The supreme organ of Party Headquarters of each rank.*—The supreme organ of Party Headquarters of each rank shall be the Plenary Meetings of Party members, the Congresses, or the National Congress.

[Article] 12. *The various ranks of committee.*—The Plenary Meetings of Party members, the Congresses, or the National Congress shall elect Executive Committees of the Party Headquarters of corresponding rank. This Executive Committee is the directing agency in the interval between Plenary Meetings and directs all ordinary activities of the organizations appropriate to it.

[Article] 13. *Question of approval.*—All newly established Party organizations (Branch Headquarters, *Hsien* Committees, and so forth) must be approved by the higher-ranking agency to which they are attached.

[Article] 14. The system of organization of the Party is as follows:

(1) In each factory, workshop, commercial shop, street, village, small town, military unit and so forth: firstly, Plenary Meeting of Party members of Branch Headquarters; and secondly, Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee.

(2) In urban or rural districts: firstly, Plenary Meeting of Municipal District Party members or Municipal District Congress; and secondly, District Committee.

(3) Within a *Hsien* or municipality: firstly, *Hsien* or Municipal Congress; and secondly, *Hsien* or Municipal Committee.

(4) Special districts (include several *Hsien*, part of a province): firstly, Special District Congress; and secondly, Special District Committee. Special district organizations may be set up when necessary by a decision of a Provincial Committee.

(5) Province: firstly, Provincial Congress; and secondly, Provincial Committee.

(6) The nation: firstly, National Congress; and secondly, Central Committee.

(7) For the sake of convenience in directing the activities of each Party Headquarters, the Central Committee may, in accordance with the needs of the situation, establish Central Administrative Bureaus or Central Special Commissioners with jurisdiction over several provinces. The Central Administrative Bureaus and Central Special Commissioners shall be appointed by the Central Committee and shall be responsible to the Central Committee only.

[Article] 15. *Agencies of Party Headquarters.*—In order to carry out various special Party functions, various departments or committees, such as an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, Labor Movement and Women's Movement Committees, and so on, may be set up under the Party Committees of each rank. Each such department or committee shall be attached to the Party Headquarters Committee, shall carry on its activities under its direction, and shall put into effect its own decisions upon their being passed by the Party Committee. The organization of the various departments under the Party Committee shall be determined by Central [Headquarters].

(Supplementary note): For the purpose of using national languages among the labor and peasant elements of other nationalities and thus facilitating work, a Minority Nationalities Activities Department shall be set up under local Party Committees. This Minority Nationalities Activities Department must carry on its activities under the leadership and supervision of local party Headquarters.

CHAPTER 4. BRANCH HEADQUARTERS

[Article] 16. *Basic organization.*—The basic organization of the Party is the Branch Headquarters (the factory, the mine, the workshop, the commercial shop, the street, the village, the military unit, and so forth). All Party members [carrying on] activities in a place must without exception join a Branch Headquarters. Any place where there are three or more Party members may set up a new party Branch Headquarters organization, but it must be approved by a District Committee of a *Hsien* Committee or of an organization equivalent to a *Hsien* Committee.

[Article] 17. *Special organizations of Branch Headquarters.*—In any business enterprise where there are one or two Party members [carrying on] activities, these Party members may be amalgamated with the Production Branch Headquarters nearest to said business enterprise, or they may organize a Branch Headquarters jointly with Party members in a neighboring business enterprise.

Party members not in any business enterprise, such as persons engaged in a handicraft industry, independent workmen, domestic servants, intellectuals, and so forth, [may] organize a Street Branch Headquarters in accordance with their place of residence.

If in a Village Branch Headquarters there should be workmen in village economic enterprises, such as small mines or a certain kind of agricultural pursuit, they may organize a Production Branch Headquarters on the basis of what they produce.

[Article] 18. *Functions of Branch Headquarters.*—Branch Headquarters is an organization created for the purposes of linking the Party with labor and agriculture. The functions of a Branch Headquarters are: (1) To carry out the Party's slogans and decisions among the non-Party laboring and agricultural masses and cause labor and agriculture to stand on the side of the Party by means of planned Communist agitation and propaganda; (2) To participate actively with the strength of the Party organization in all the political and economic struggles of labor and agriculture; to argue their demands from the standpoint of the revolutionary class struggle; to organize revolutionary movements among the masses; to struggle for the leadership of all revolutionary movements among workers and peasants; to strive to draw workers and peasants into participation in the general revolutionary struggle of the Chinese and international proletariat; (3) To recruit and train new Party members; to disseminate Party literature; and to carry on cultural and political education activities among Party members and among non-Party workers and peasants.

[Article] 19. *Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee.*—Branch Headquarters shall elect three or five persons, according to the number of Party members, to constitute an Administrative Committee to conduct ordinary Party affairs. This Administrative Committee shall conduct the activities of Branch Headquarters and shall assign the work of Party members in Branch Headquarters such as propaganda, dissemination of printed material, carrying on Party group activities in labor unions and peasant organizations, women's activities, establishing liaison with Young Communist Branch Headquarters, and so forth. The Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee shall elect one person to be Branch Headquarters Secretary to execute the decisions of the Plenary Meeting of Party members or of Branch Headquarters meeting and the directives of higher Party Headquarters.

CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATION OF URBAN AND RURAL DISTRICTS

[Article] 20. *The District Congress.*—Within the urban or rural sub-district the highest ranking Party organ is the Plenary Meeting of Party members or the Congress of Delegates from every Branch Headquarters of the urban or rural district in question. The Urban or rural district Plenary Meeting of Party members or Congress of Delegates receives and passes on the reports of the District Committee, and it elects the District Committee and the delegates to the *Hsien* or Municipal Committee or to the Special District and Provincial Congresses.

[Article] 21. *The District Committee.*—The urban or rural District Committee directs all Party affairs within the jurisdiction of the district during the interval between Plenary Meetings of Party members or between Congresses. Ordinary meetings of the urban or rural District Committee must be convened regularly, within the limits imposed by conditions of secrecy, at least once every half-month. During the interval between meetings of the Municipal District Committee activities shall be directed by the Standing Committee of the Municipal District Committee. The Standing Committee shall be chosen from among the members of the District Committee itself.

CHAPTER 6. HSIEN OR MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION

[Article] 22. *The Hsien Congress.*—The highest Party organ within the *Hsien* is the *Hsien* Congress. The *Hsien* Congress shall convene once every three days. A temporary *Hsien* Congress shall be called by the *Hsien* Committee on the demand of over half the organizations in the *Hsien* or on the decision of the Provincial Committee (or Special District Committee). The *Hsien* Congress shall receive the reports of the *Hsien* Committee and the *Hsien* Investigation Committee. It also shall elect delegates to the Special District Congress or Provincial Congress.

[Article] 23. *The Hsien Committee.*—The *Hsien* Committee is elected by the *Hsien* Congress, and is the highest Party organ in the *Hsien* in the interval between *Hsien* Congresses. In addition to representatives of the *Hsien* capital, representatives from the Party Headquarters of the rural districts or from each important village in the *Hsien* must also participate in the *Hsien* Committee.

The time [for holding] Plenary Sessions of the *Hsien* Committee may be determined by the *Hsien* Committee itself, but it must hold meetings at least once each month. The *Hsien* Committee shall elect one person as Secretary of the *Hsien* Committee to administer daily business. The Secretary of the *Hsien* Committee must be approved by higher Party Headquarters.

[Article] 24. *Agencies of the Hsien Committee.*—The *Hsien* Committee must execute the decisions of the *Hsien* Congress, the Provincial Committee, and the Central Committee; and it must, so far as possible, set up various departments or committees (such as, Organization, Propaganda, Agitation, Women's Movements, Peasants' Movements, and so forth) to conduct each type of activity. The heads of the various departments and committees must as a rule be members of the *Hsien* Committee and must conduct their activities under the direction of the *Hsien* Committee. If a *Hsien* Party paper is published, the *Hsien* Committee shall name its editors. The *Hsien* Committee administers Party affairs within the jurisdiction of the *Hsien* and in the interval between *Hsien* Congresses is responsible to higher Party Headquarters. It must also make regular reports concerning its own activities to said higher Headquarters.

[Article] 25. In cities where a *Hsien* Committee is located a Municipal Committee shall not be set up. Activities [in such cities] shall be under the direct guidance of the *Hsien* Committee. City organizations may be divided into city districts. The city District Committee shall be the organization in charge of the activities of a city district.

[Article] 26. The organization of the Municipal Committee shall be [the same as] the *Hsien* Committee, and, in addition to the rural and Municipal Districts under it, it may control the suburban rural districts or the Branch Headquarters directly attached to its suburbs. A Municipal Committee will not be set up in cities where there is a Provincial Committee or a Special District Committee. Activities [in such cities] shall be under the direct charge of the Provincial or Special District Committee.

[Article] 27. In places where a Special District organization has already been established, the Special District shall conduct its activities in accordance with the regulations for all *Hsien*. Where there is no Provincial Committee, the Special District shall establish direct relations with Central [Headquarters] and shall carry on its activities in accordance with the regulations for all provincial organizations.

CHAPTER 7. PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

[Article] 28. The Provincial Congress is the supreme organ within the jurisdiction of a province. Ordinary sessions of the Provincial Congress shall be convened once each half-year. Temporary Provincial Congresses shall be called by the Provincial Committee on the demand of over half of the organizations of the province or in accordance with a motion of Central [Headquarters]. The Provincial Congress shall listen to the reports of the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Investigation Committee, shall debate questions of Party affairs and social activities in the province, and shall elect the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Investigation Committee, and delegates to the National Congress.

[Article] 29. The Provincial Committee shall be elected by the Provincial Congress. In the interval between Provincial Congresses it shall be the supreme Party organ within the jurisdiction of the province. Representatives of the Central (provincial capital) organization of the province and representatives from Party Headquarters in other important places in the province must all participate in the Provincial Committee.

The Provincial Committee shall determine the time for its own meetings; but it shall hold at least one meeting every month and a half. In the interval between meetings of the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Committee may, for the sake of convenience in its work, elect a Standing Committee from among the members of the Provincial Committee and it may elect a Secretary for the purpose of administering daily business.

[Article] 30. The Provincial Committee shall execute the decisions of the Provincial Congress and the Central Committee. The Provincial Committee shall organize the various Party agencies within the jurisdiction of the province; shall name the editors

of the party papers in the province; shall manage party resources and expenditures within the jurisdiction of the province; and shall control the Accounting Office of Party Headquarters. The Provincial Committee shall have charge of Party group activities in non-Party organizations within the province. The Provincial Committee shall make regular reports on its activities to Central [Headquarters] and shall regularly apprise lower-ranking Party Headquarters of its activities. For doing research into each important problem, the Provincial Committee shall set up various departments or committees, such as, an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, a Labor Movement Committee, and so forth. As a general rule, the head of each department shall be appointed from among the regular or reserve members of the Provincial Committee and shall carry on its activities under the direct guidance of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Committee.

[Article] 31. The Provincial Committee shall conduct activities in the city where it is located by means of Municipal District Committees. For this reason, if a *Hsien* Committee be established where a Provincial Committee is located, such *Hsien* Committee may carry on activities only in the rural districts of the *Hsien*.

CHAPTER 8. THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PARTY

[Article] 32. As a rule, the National Convention of the Party shall meet twice a year. The composition of the National Convention and its rate of representation (i. e., how many persons shall elect one delegate) shall be determined by the Central Committee.

[Article] 33. Resolutions of the Party National Convention shall take effect only after authorization by the Central Committee.

[Article] 34. If the time for holding a Party National Convention should fall just prior to a World Congress of the Communist International, [the National Convention] may, with the consent of the Communist International Executive Committee, elect delegates to such Communist International World Congress.

CHAPTER 9. THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

[Article] 35. The National Congress of the Party is the Supreme organ of the Party. As a general rule, it shall meet once a year, being convened by the Central Committee upon obtaining the consent of the Communist International.³ Temporary meetings of the National Congress of the Party shall be called by the Central Committee on the independent decision of the Central Committee or on the motion of the Executive Committee of the Communist International or on the demand of delegates to the last previous Congress representing organizations [comprising] a majority of the membership of the Party. But the calling of temporary meetings of the National Congress of the Party must be approved by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. [Information] concerning the convening of the Party National Congress, matters to come up for discussion in the Congress, its daily agenda, and so forth must be made known to the membership of the Party one month before it meets at the latest. The Party National Congress may pass resolutions only when the delegates present are able to represent a majority of the membership of the Party.

The rate of representation in the National Congress of the Party shall be determined by the Executive Committee of the Communist International or by the Central Committee or by the Party Convention held prior to the Party National Congress.

[Article] 36. The National Congress of the Party shall

- (1) receive and examine the reports of the Central Committee and the Central Investigation Committee,
- (2) decide questions concerning Party regulations,
- (3) make decisions on all such matters as political questions and questions of policy or organization,
- (4) elect the Central Committee, the Central Investigation Committee, and so forth.

[Article] 37. Delegates to the National Congress of the Party should be elected by the Party Provincial Congresses, but when made necessary by secret activities, delegates may be appointed by a Provincial Committee on obtaining the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. A temporary National Convention of the Party may be substituted for a Party National Congress on obtaining the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

CHAPTER 10. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[Article] 38. The number of members of the Central Committee shall be determined by the National Congress.

[Article] 39. The Central Committee is the supreme organ of the Party in the interval between National Congresses of the Party. *It represents [the Party] when relations are opened with other political parties,*⁴ establishes the various kinds of Party agencies, directs all political and organizational activities of the Party, names the editors of the central official organs of the Party, which are under its guidance supervision, sends Central Commissioners to Party organizations in any province and establishes Central Administrative Bureaus as conditions may require, administers publishing offices and other enterprises of importance to the Party as a whole, administers Party finances and resources, manages the Central Accounting Office, and so forth.

The Central Committee shall periodically convene Plenary Sessions of its members—at least once every three months.

[Article] 40. The Central Committee shall elect a Political Bureau from among its own membership to direct the political activities of the Party in the interval between Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee, and it shall elect a Standing Committee to conduct ordinary business.

[Article] 41. In accordance with the various types of activity, the Central Committee shall set up various departments and committees, such as: an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, a Labor Committee, a Woman's Movements Committee, and so forth. The duty of the various departments or committees is to conduct

³ The 6th National Congress was held in Moscow in 1928. The 7th National Congress was held in Yenan in April 1945.

⁴ Origin of italics uncertain.

various activities within their particular sphere of work in accordance with the directives of Central [Headquarters]. The Central Committee shall appoint the heads of the various departments and committees. These heads should so far as possible be chosen from among the members of the Central Committee.

[Article] 42. On the basis of political and economic conditions, the Central Committee shall determine the scope of the activities of each Party Headquarters organization in each place, and it shall delineate the various territorial units in accordance with the administrative districts throughout the country.

CHAPTER 11. THE CENTRAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE

[Article] 43. The Party National, Provincial, *Hsien*, and Municipal Congresses shall elect Central, Provincial, *Hsien*, and Municipal Investigating Committees for the purpose of inspecting the finances and accounting of Party Headquarters of various ranks and the activities of the various agencies.

CHAPTER 12. PARTY DISCIPLINE

[Article] 44. Strictly to observe party discipline is the highest obligation of all Party members and of Party Headquarters of all ranks.

The decisions of the Communist International, of the Chinese Communist Party National Congress, of the Central Committee and of the other high-ranking agencies must all be speedily and exactly executed. However, all controversial questions within the Party may be debated freely before a decision is made.

[Article] 45. [Those who] do not execute a decision of higher Party Headquarters and [those who] are guilty of other faults recognized within the Party as errors must be given disciplinary punishment by the appropriate Party Headquarters. The methods by which a Party Headquarters administers punishment against an organization are: rebuke, naming a temporary committee, and dissolution of the organization and re-enrollment of its Party members. Against individual party members they are: various kinds of formal rebuke, warning, public rebuke, cessation of important Party activities, and dismissal from the Party or subjection to observation for an appropriate period.

Questions relating to breaches of discipline shall be investigated by Plenary Meetings of Party members or Party Headquarters of the various ranks. Committees of the various ranks may set up special committees to conduct a preliminary investigation of questions relating to a breach of Party discipline. The decisions of such committees shall take effect after being approved by Party Headquarters of that rank. Questions of dismissal from the Party shall be settled in accordance with the procedure established in Article 6 of these Statutes.

CHAPTER 13. PARTY FINANCE

[Article] 46. Expenditures of a Party Headquarters shall be paid from Party dues, special contributions, subventions from Party printing establishments and from higher Party Headquarters, and other such sources.

[Article] 47. The amount of Party entry fees and Party dues shall be determined by the Central Committee. Unemployed and extremely indigent Party members may be exempted from payment of dues.

One who for three months successively fails without adequate cause to pay his dues shall [make] a statement of his voluntary separation from the Party and shall announce it to the meeting of Party members.

CHAPTER 14. PARTY GROUPS

[Article] 48. Whenever there are three or more Party members at the congresses or conventions of, or in the agencies of, a non-Party organization (such as a labor union, peasant association, social group cultural organization, and so forth) they shall form a Party Group the duty of which shall be to strengthen the influence of the Party within such non-Party organization, to carry out the Party's policies, and to supervise the activities of Party members in such non-Party organization. A Party Group may elect an Administrative Committee and a Secretary to conduct ordinary business.

A Party Group shall have the right of independence in settling internal questions and in its ordinary business. When disagreements arise between the committee of a Party Headquarters and a Party Group, the Party Committee should re-examine the question with the help of a representative of the Party Group and make a decision. The Party Group must execute such a decision at once. If the Party Group should dissent from it and make an appeal, the question shall be settled by the nearest higher-ranking Party Headquarters, but it must still carry out the decision of the Party Committee during the period of the appeal.

[Article] 49. When a Party Committee debates a question which concerns a Party Group, it must have a representative of that Party Group in attendance at the appropriate meetings of the Party Headquarters Committee, and [such representative] shall have the right to speak.

[Article] 50. When a Party Group elects an Administrative Committee, such Administrative Committee must be approved by the Party Headquarters to which [the Party Group] is attached. The Administrative Committee of a Party Group must be responsible to a Party Headquarters of that rank for the work of the Party Group. A Party Headquarters may send one of its own committee members as a representative to join the organization of the Party Group Administrative Committee; it shall also have the power to recall any committee member, but it shall at the same time inform the Party Group of the reasons for the recall.

[Article] 51. In any organization in which a Party Group is active, name lists of personnel for each position shall be proposed by the Party Group on obtaining the consent of local Party Headquarters. Questions relating to the transfer of Party members from one Party Group to another shall be settled in the same way.

[Article] 52. Every question requiring decision in an organization where there is a Party Group ought first to be debated in a meeting of the Party Group or in the Party Group Administrative Committee.

At meetings of an organization [where there is a Party Group], Party members who have joined that Party Group must uniformly support and vote for the decisions of the Party Group on all questions. All Party members who break this rule must be given disciplinary punishment by Party Headquarters in accordance with the Statutes of the Party.

CHAPTER 15. RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS [YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE]

[Article] 53. Representatives having the right to speak and vote must be exchanged between directing agencies of all ranks (from Branch Headquarters to Central [Headquarters]) of the Party and of the Youth Corps. Likewise, the Youth Corps may elect and send [a number of] representatives proportionate to the number of members in the Corps to all Congresses of the Party.

VOLUME II

6. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHINESE COMMUNIST AREAS

A. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, AREA AND POPULATION

(1) General

The Communist-controlled areas of North China embrace the northeastern parts of Shensi and Kansu in Free China and parts of the provinces of Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Suiyuan and Chahar behind the Japanese lines. In Central China the Communist areas are all behind the Japanese lines and include substantial portions of the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and small areas in Chekiang and Hunan. In South China the Communists control small areas in and around the Canton delta and on Hainan island. In the occupied region the Japanese control the railways and main highways, the important navigable rivers, the large cities, the chief district cities, and the adjoining countryside. The Japanese-controlled territories separate the Communist areas one from the other and make free and easy communication between them impossible. A unified economic life within the Communist region is therefore impossible.

(2) Economic characteristics

In North China the central core of each Communist base is located in a rough, mountainous or out-of-the-way region. The periphery generally extends out into the plains and more fertile agricultural areas. Between the consolidated Communist area and the Japanese-controlled area there is a region not effectively controlled by either. Millet and wheat are staple food crops. In Central and South China the Communist bases are located in more fertile territory, but are generally outside the main lines of communications and in regions cut by many waterways and divided by swamps and lakes. Rice and wheat are the staple food crops. In general the areas occupied by the Communists were the most backward and least fertile and productive regions prior to the war. Although important mineral-producing areas are within the Communist Border Regions, the important mines are controlled and operated by the Japanese. Agriculture and decaying handicraft industries were characteristic of these areas before the war. Although the Communists have made extensive efforts to reclaim land, revitalize agriculture and revive handicraft industries, the productive capacity of the areas is still low, and there are no modern large-scale industries. Small scale farming and handicraft industries provide the economic foundation of the areas.

(3) Area and population

No even approximately accurate figures on the area and population controlled by the Communists are possible, because a census has not been taken and because the dividing line between Japanese and Communist controlled areas is constantly changing. Communist broadcasts have claimed as much as 520,000 square miles of "liberated" territory behind the Japanese lines, but other Communist sources lay claim to little more than 150,000 square miles. Similarly some recent Communist sources claim that they control as many as 100,000,000 people, but reports of 1943 claimed only about 52,000,000.

As careful an estimate as possible of the area and population controlled by the Communists was made in MIS in the spring of 1944. This estimate was as follows:

	Area, square miles	Population
North China	155, 000	35, 718, 000
Central China	48, 500	23, 700, 000
South China	8, 300	3, 000, 000
Total	212, 000	62, 418, 000

After making due allowance for recent Communist advances it seems probable that the area largely under their control is somewhere between 200,000 and 225,000 square miles and that the population largely under their control is between 70,000,000 and 85,000,000. Further details as compiled from various sources are given in the accompanying table.

Area and population of the Communist regions

Region	Claims of 1943-44		Claims of 1944-45	
	Area, square miles	Population	Area, square miles	Population
North China (Eighth Route Army Area):				
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia.....	(?)	2,000,000	35,000	1,580,000
Shansi-Suiyuan.....	9,000	1,750,000	-----	3,600,000
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh.....	30,000	8,600,000	-----	¹ 18,000,000
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan.....	33,000	13,470,000	14,000	¹ 4,200,000
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan.....				¹ 10,800,000
Shantung.....	26,000	10,707,000	-----	¹ 14,000,000
Total for North China.....	98,000+	36,520,000	-----	51,580,000
Central China (New 4th Army Area):				
Northern Kiangsu.....				3,700,000
Central Kiangsu.....				7,608,075
South Kiangsu.....				1,908,843
North Huai River.....				3,021,318
Southern Huai River.....				2,083,600
Central Anhwei.....				1,660,000
Eastern Chekiang.....				(?)
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei.....				9,200,000
Total in Central China.....	(?)	15,480,000	-----	² 30,481,836
South China:				
East River Base.....	(?)	(?)	7,000	1,000,000
Hainan Island Base.....	(?)	(?)	-----	(?)
Grand Total.....	-----	52,000,000+	-----	83,061,836+

¹ The figures for the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shantung areas seem too large.

² Sic.

B. ECONOMIC POLICY, PROGRAM AND ACHIEVEMENTS

(1) *Economic theory*

Although the Communist leaders are admittedly Marxists and look forward to the time when a Communist society will prevail in China, they have for the present abandoned their earlier policies of land confiscation and immediate collectivism in favor of a more moderate policy designed to gain the support of the mass of the people and more suited to the situation in China. In general the theory being followed for the present is that it is impossible for China to move immediately from an agrarian society to a Communist collectivistic society. The Communists argue that China must go through a stage of democratic industrialism based fundamentally upon private property before the time is ripe for true Communism. During this transitory period they expect to avoid the major evils that have appeared in Western capitalistic society.

The ideas of the Communist leaders are set forth in the following reported statements of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Mao states that:

"Our old program of land confiscation—modified, inasmuch as the landlord got a share—was not bad at the time. The basic demand of the masses was concentrated on their desire for land. Sun Yat-sen advocated it. But it is not suitable to war time because the landlords wish to be anti-Japanese, but a policy of confiscation may drive them into the other camp. The peasants see the simple truth that rent reduction makes it possible for the landlords to remain, and helps to isolate the Japanese. After a few experiences of land confiscation in some areas early in the war, the peasants saw that this policy ultimately harmed them. A policy of rent concessions by the landlord and guarantee of payment of rent by the tenant results in successful and genuine cooperation. This policy is not merely opportunistic: it is the only possible one. Three forms of industrialization will coexist.

These are mentioned in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress. (State, large scale private, and handicraft) Use of cooperatives depends on locality. Here in the Northwest there will be need for handicrafts. In the large cities conditions will be different. We can work according to Sun Yat-sen. Nation-wide enterprises capable of influence on the national economy, such as railways, should be State-owned. The rest will be private. In rural and distant areas, we will need cooperatives."

Chou En-lai looks forward to an ultimate socialist collectivism but believes that will not come for a considerable length of time.

"China's development will not proceed along the same lines as Soviet Russia's. There will be stages. For example, on the basis of individual production we have adopted the mutual help or labor-exchange method, rather than an immediate and drastic establishing of collectivism."⁸⁹ Second, from the principle of private ownership we hope to move to the nationalization of big enterprises—communication systems, banks, war industries. Third, we shall progress from the reduction of rents and interest to the stage of land owned by the tillers, and eventually to state ownership or nationalization of the land. Fourth, on the basis of equal suffrage for all social classes, we shall enable the majority—the laboring classes—to obtain the privilege of suffrage. The intention is to make rule by a minority less likely. . . . Fifth, under conditions of equality we shall strive for international peace and cooperation. These five points summarize what we call our New Democracy. They are also incorporated in the program of the revolutionary *San Min Chu I* as interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924."

(2) Present economic policies

Present policies include among others the following main points:

(a) The abandonment of land confiscation. As a result of the formation of the united front, the program of confiscation of the land of the landlords was abandoned in September 1937. Confiscations prior to that time have remained in force, but according to the Communist none have been made since then.

(b) The reduction and guarantee of rents. Although land confiscation has been abandoned, landlords have had to accept smaller rents, but in return a policy of guaranteeing the payment of these rents has been adopted. This policy has had the three-fold purpose of gaining the support of the landlords, protecting the peasants, and, by reducing the rents on land, forcing the landlords to invest their surplus capital in industry.

(c) The encouragement of cooperatives as a means of developing industry, increasing capital, promoting self-sufficiency and raising the living standard.

(d) The encouragement of private capital in order to obtain sufficient funds to make possible the economic development of the Communist areas. The investment of private capital in industry and business has been encouraged. Profits are limited, and hoarding and profiteering are regulated, but loans are made to all types of private enterprise, especially cooperative. Recent observers indicate that small business enterprises are encouraged and that private trade flourishes in the market towns. In 1944 there were 2,579 private shops in the Yen-an area, and the number is said to be increasing every year.

(e) A program of increased production aimed at self-sufficiency, the raising of the standard of living and the equalization of wealth. This program is popularized in the One-One Program of Mao Tse-tung, so named because of its eleven points. The pertinent economic elements of the program are as follows:

Each family is to keep one year's food supply in storage.

Each village is to have a spinning and weaving machine and a blacksmith shop.

Each village (hsiang) is to have a large storehouse.

Each town is to have a general merchandise store.

Each family is to have a pig and a cow.

Each family is to plant 100 trees.

Each village is to have a well and a water supply station.

⁸⁹ It should be noted that collectivism was not introduced immediately in the Soviet Union. It was not before 1928 when Stalin felt that Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated to permit such a drastic economic reform that collectivism was introduced in Soviet Russia. There are many similarities between the economic program of the Chinese Communists and the "New Economic Policy" of Soviet Russia as introduced in 1921.

(f) After the war they look forward to free trade and hope to have foreign help in the development of industry.

The following economic principles, outlined in the People's Political Council in Yen-an in 1941, set forth certain of the basic essentials of the present policy:

The Communists will urge the strict enforcement of the principle of clean and honest government and severe punishment of any functionary guilty of graft or embezzlement. They will oppose jobbery. If a Communist violates the laws, the Party is of the opinion that he should be subjected to a severe penalty. At the same time, we believe that the salary system should be based on the principle of economy and frugality. The necessary material needs of all functionaries and their dependents should be satisfied, and an adequate cultural and recreative life must be guaranteed them.

Communist representatives will urge measures intended to develop agricultural production and to mobilize the masses for their spring sowing and autumn harvesting, and help poor peasants to overcome difficulties in securing plowing animals, farm implements, fertilizers and seeds. They will propose that a further 600,000 *mou* [six *mou* equal one English acre] of untilled land be cultivated in the present year in order to increase the supply of food crops by 400,000 piculs [one picul equals 133 pounds]. Migration of people to the Border Region will be encouraged.

The Communists declare their belief that in the districts where land has been distributed, the right of private ownership of land should be guaranteed to all peasants who have acquired land. In other districts where land has not been distributed (such as Suiteh, Fuhsien and Chinyang), the right of ownership of land should be guaranteed to creditors. The Party declares that the rates of rent and interest must be reduced. Tenants should pay a certain amount of rent to the landlords, and debtors should pay a certain amount of interest to creditors. The Government should regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and between creditors and debtors.

The Communist representatives will propose measures designed to develop industrial production and trade, encourage private enterprise, and protect private property. They believe the Border Region should welcome investments from outside and abroad, foster free trade, and oppose monopoly and manipulations. At the same time it should develop the cooperatives and promote the development of handicraft industry.

The People's Political Council should regulate the relationship between employers and employees, put into practice a ten-hour working day, raise labor productivity, foster labor discipline, and adequately improve the livelihood of the workers.

The People's Political Council should devise a rational system of taxation, with the exception of the poorest section of the people, who should be exempted from taxation, a progressive tax system—in which the rate of taxation varies in accordance with the amount of property or income of the taxpayer—should be enforced, so that the costs of the anti-Japanese War are equitably borne, and by the great majority of the population. At the same time the organization of financial institutions should be improved, financial relations regulated, national currency protected. Notes issued by the Border Region Bank should be consolidated so as to facilitate the development of a healthy economy and finance.

The People's Political Council should provide vagrants with opportunity to work on the farm, secure jobs, and receive education. It should seek to correct the bad habits of functionaries and others in discriminating against vagrants. It should pursue a policy of winning over, uniting and educating Hweimin [organizations with superstitions and semifeudal practices and purposes].

(3) *The program for increased production and self-sufficiency*

Because of the relative poverty of the Communist areas and the difficulty of getting supplies from the outside, a drive to increase production and make the areas self-sufficient was begun in the late thirties. After the imposition of the blockade against the Communist areas by the Chungking Government in 1940 this program was intensified. The main methods used to increase production were as follows:

(a) Every person was to be a producer. Women were encouraged to work and to form spinning and weaving cooperatives. Townspeople, officials, students

and soldiers were ordered to cultivate gardens, to work part time in industry and in general to become self-sufficient. In pursuit of this policy, most of the army units began the reclamation of land, the cultivation of gardens, and the production of clothing and other items needed by themselves. As a result many of the army units are now practically self-sufficient. Army, government and party members are said to be producing about 64 percent of their food and clothing in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

(b) "Labor Heroes" were introduced as a means of encouraging people to increase their productive efforts. Persons who had made signal contributions were singled out for honors, and their achievements were propagandized. Idlers were encouraged to go to work and every possible device used to get them to work. In 1935 there were supposed to have been 70,000 idlers in the Yen-an area, which number was reportedly reduced to 3,967 by the beginning of 1944.

(c) Labor unions and agricultural labor brigades were also organized to increase the efficiency of labor. The organization of labor unions was begun in 1937, in the Yen-an area. The Border Regional General Labor Union was formed in 1940. It includes industrial workers, office workers and agricultural laborers. It is considered a mass organization and aims to mobilize the population in the war. Its functions are to adjust relations between employers and workers, to carry out the government production program and to improve the general cultural condition of the workers. In general it aims to support the labor policy of the government which includes the following points:

The improvement of livelihood, increased production and strengthening the cause of workers.

A 10-hour day for the present period with an 8-hour day as the ideal.

Respect on the part of labor for contracts and the maintenance of labor discipline.

Strengthen the organization and improve workers' education.

Increase the number of laborers.

Peasant societies have been organized to improve the condition of agricultural workers and to bargain with employers. Wages in general are paid in kind, and in many industrial establishments, meals, clothing and other items are provided.

(d) Immigrants were encouraged from other areas, particularly from the famine-stricken regions of Honan. Some 70,000 have reportedly been absorbed recently in the Yen-an areas alone.

(e) An extensive program of land reclamation and agricultural improvement was put into effect. (This will be discussed in more detail below).

(f) The organization of cooperatives was actively promoted. They are of four types: industrial or producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, transportation cooperatives, and credit cooperatives, of which the first two are the most important. They have been organized extensively throughout all the Border Regions and have added materially to the productive power of the area. Industrial cooperatives were started in 1939 with the aid of organizers of the movement from the Chungking area. However, support from Chungking was soon cut off, and the movement had to go on with little support or aid from the outside. No over-all statistics on the number of cooperatives in the Communist areas are available, but in the Yen-an area they are said to have increased from 142 in 1937 to 624 in February 1944.

(4) Achievements of the production program: living standards

In general the program of increased production seems to have been successful. Recent travelers in the various Communist regions almost universally agree that economic conditions have greatly improved over what they were in 1941. At present all of the areas are relatively self-sufficient. Food production has been increased and is fairly equitably distributed. Beggars have practically disappeared, and there are few signs of desperate poverty. Handicrafts have been revised to such a state that the most pressing needs of the civilian population and fighting forces are being met. Clothing is simple but generally adequate. The Yen-an area, one of the poorest of the Communist areas and the one which has been most severely affected by the Chungking blockade, is now said to be producing at least two-thirds of its cotton cloth requirement and to be self-sufficient in most consumer goods such as matches, soap, paper, etc. Wheat is of increasing importance in the diet, although millet is still the staple food.

Most observers seem to agree that the general living standard is equal to and in many cases superior to that in Kuomintang China. Troops in general are better fed and certainly in better physical condition than in Kuomintang China.

One observer indicates the change in the standard of living of troops in the Yen-an area as shown in the following table. December 1939 equals 100.

1939-----	100
1940-----	88
1941-----	84.2
1942-----	96.3
1943-----	125.5

Although living conditions may have improved, judged by Western standards they are still pitifully low, as can be seen from the accompanying table which gives the monthly ration allowance per person established by the government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Area.

[Pounds]

	Basic minimum ration	Factory workers	Soldiers
Millet-----	48	¹ 60	60
Meat-----	2.7-5.3	4	4.6
Vegetables-----	40	36+	48
Vegetable oils-----	1.3-2.2		
Salt-----	1.3		
Coal-----	60		

¹ Includes 20 pounds of wheat.

In addition clothing, shoes, bedclothes, soap, paper, lodgings, medical care and some other items are provided.

C. AGRICULTURE AND TRADE

(1) Agriculture

As has been pointed out, agriculture forms the basis of economic life in the Communist area. In North China the important food crops are millet, wheat, sweet potatoes, *kaoliang*, soybeans, broad beans, corn, Irish potatoes and oats, while the most important commercial crops are cotton, soybeans and vegetable oil seeds. Considerable wool is also produced, and pigs, sheep and poultry are the important food-producing animals. Oxen, donkeys, mules and horses are the chief draft animals. In Central China rice becomes an important food crop, replacing millet and *kaoliang* to a considerable extent, and in South China rice is the all-important food crop. The water buffalo is the most important draft animal in Central and South China.

Since much of the area controlled by the Communists is relatively unproductive, since agricultural methods are very backward, and since the area depended upon the importation of many agricultural tools and implements, the Communists have often had serious difficulties in meeting their food requirements. Consequently they have endeavored to increase agricultural production by the following means:

(a) Land reclamation which includes the clearing and cultivation of land which have been allowed to go to waste, the reclamation of other areas through irrigation and the construction of irrigation canals or drainage ditches. The army has taken a prominent part in this reclamation program. Although no over-all figures on land reclamation are available it seems certain that considerable areas have been restored to cultivation and that areas damaged by Japanese raiding expeditions have been restored.

(b) Agricultural education and the introduction of new methods and new crops. Each of the Border Regions maintains an agricultural experiment station which studies improved varieties of seeds and carries on education among the peasantry directed toward the improvement of agricultural methods.

(c) The increase and improvement of agricultural implements.

(d) The encouragement of livestock breeding.

(e) The improvement of the condition of the tenant farmer through reduction of rents, loans and exemptions from taxation.

(f) The formation of labor exchange groups among the farmers so as to increase village productivity and to use more economically the limited supply of agricultural implements.

(g) Keeping agricultural production out of the hands of the enemy by encouraging handicraft industries and discouraging the production of crops which have no food value or could not be marketed within the Communist area.

As a result of these measures agricultural production has increased, and at the present the Communist areas are generally self-sufficient so far as food production is concerned.

Agriculture is discussed more extensively under the various Communist areas.

(2) *Trade*

The Communists carry on a limited amount of trade with Chungking China and with Occupied China. The trade with Chungking is mainly from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area, while the trade with the Japanese occupied regions is carried on from the areas behind the Japanese lines. Since the Communist areas were deficient in cloth and most types of manufactured articles, they have attempted to acquire these through trade either with the rest of Free China or with the occupied areas. They adopted a policy in the regions behind the Japanese lines of restricting the export of food, cotton and other raw materials which would be useful to the Japanese, but did permit sufficient trade so that they could obtain cloth and finished products such as munitions, radio parts, medicines, kerosene, etc. During the early years of Japanese occupation it was relatively easy to acquire goods from the Japanese controlled areas, but as time has gone on the availability of manufactured products has decreased and the Japanese have imposed a more rigid blockade, with the result that the flow of essential commodities has decreased. Between 1937 and 1940 relatively free exchange of goods between the Yen'an area and the rest of Free China took place, but since that time the Central Government has imposed a partial blockade against the Communist areas. As a result, exports from the Yen'an area have been confined largely to salt and petroleum products which were needed by the rest of Free China in return for cloth, dyestuffs, etc. There was very little movement of goods from one Communist area to another because of the difficulties of transportation.

D. INDUSTRY AND ARMS PRODUCTION

(1) *Industry*

Before the war there was no modern industry in any of the Communist-controlled areas, and because most of the people depended upon imported cloth and manufactured items the home handicraft industries had deteriorated or gone out of existence entirely. Under Communist leadership a great effort has been made to develop handicraft industries in order to make the areas self-sufficient both as to military supplies and essential civilian needs. Numerous obstacles have been encountered, including: (1) lack of equipment, (2) difficulties in obtaining raw materials, (3) lack of skilled artisans, and (4) shortage of power, practically no electrical power being available. Nevertheless considerable progress has been made through the development of cooperatives and the establishment of government factories or government subsidized industries. At present numerous handicraft industries exist throughout the Communist region. They produce cotton, woolen and linen cloth, blankets, stockings, towels, cigarettes, matches, soap, paper, dyes, chinaware, chemicals, machine tools, etc. Although the Communist areas are still not entirely self-sufficient in the production of light consumer goods, their position has greatly improved. They are, however, still woefully weak so far as the production of machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment and all heavy industry goods are concerned. Most steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese-controlled railways.

(2) *Arsenals*

Although there are a number of small arsenals scattered throughout the Communist areas, they are incapable of effectively meeting the needs of the Communist troops, who still must depend to a considerable extent for arms and munitions upon materials captured from the enemy. No rifles, bullets or other military supplies have been received from the Central Government since 1940-41, when the sending of such supplies was stopped. The largest and best equipped arsenals are in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh area. Generally speaking the arsenals behind the Japanese lines are of a mobile type so that they can be dismantled and moved about readily in case of raids. No complete list of arsenals is available, although there appear to be three in the Shenai-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region one or two small ones in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region, two in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region, two in the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region and a number in each of the other base areas. American fliers forced down in the New 4th Route Army region in

Kiangsu province reported that each division had three small arsenals attached to it.

The arsenals specialize in the repair of small arms and the loading of cartridges, the manufacture of mortars and mortar ammunitions, hand grenades and land mines, and the production of powder. A few of the arsenals are able to make rifles and light machine guns and repair light field guns. Among the difficulties which interfere with arms and munitions production are: (1) lack of steel, copper, brass and other necessary raw materials; (2) poor explosives (generally speaking the powder available is a locally made black powder of poor quality, although in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region a good quality powder is manufactured); (3) lack of proper equipment and machinery; and (4) lack of adequately trained technical personnel. Numerous observers agree that the armament production facilities of the area are so limited that no large scale offensive would be possible.

Industry and arms production are discussed in more detail under the various Communist areas.

E. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

(1) General

Transportation and communication facilities throughout the Communist areas are very poor. There are no railroads and, except in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which is outside the Japanese occupied area, there are no motor roads. In fact, behind the Japanese lines the Communists have deliberately destroyed roads and trails leading into their base areas as a means of defense against the Japanese. Within the base areas trails provide the chief connecting arteries.

(2) Roads and trails

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there are said to be about 800 miles of road which could be used by trucks or motor cars. These include the main highway from Fu-hsien north through Yen-an to Mi-chih. From Fu-hsien this road runs southward through Kuomintang-controlled territory to Sian and affords the only motor connection between the Communist area and Free China. Other motor roads include one running northwestward from Yen-an via Ching-pien to the salt-producing area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. Another runs from Ting-pien southeast to Ch'ing-yang. A fourth road reportedly runs from Ch'ing-chien on the Yen-an-Mi-chih road to Ching-pien on the Yen-an to Ting-pien road. These roads supplemented by trails constitute the main transportation routes in this area. During 1942 about 45,000 laborers are said to have been mobilized to work on road construction.

The main route leading from Yen-an to the base areas behind the Japanese lines runs northward from Yen-an to Mi-chih. From there a trail runs north-eastward to Chia-hsien on the Yellow River and thence for some distance north along the west bank of the river to a ferry crossing which connects with trails leading to the headquarters of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. From there various routes lead to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region. Communication between the base areas behind the Japanese lines is difficult because the Japanese-controlled railroads can be crossed only by armed forces or by means of tunnels.

(3) Equipment and methods

The few hundred miles of motorable highway are of little use to motor transport because of the almost complete absence of trucks or automobiles. One source states that there are only about 20-odd dilapidated trucks in the Yen-an area. In general, mules, donkeys and human carriers are the main means of transportation, while horses are used to transport persons. Travel is slow and difficult, throughout the Communist areas, and one member of the U. S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an indicates that during an extended field trip which he took by horseback they were rarely able to cover more than 25 miles a day. In the area behind the Japanese lines travel is even slower because of the long delays caused in crossing the Japanese controlled railways and highways, and in many cases it takes week or even months to travel a distance which would normally take only a few hours or days. In Hopeh extensive tunnel systems lead under the railways.

The government has encouraged the formation of transportation cooperatives and salt transport groups to facilitate the movement of goods in the Yen-an area. These organized groups are said to be much more efficient in transporta-

tion than private transport efforts. Salt is perhaps the most important item transported. In 1942 over 1,550 animals were reportedly employed in the transportation of salt, of which 246 belonged to cooperatives and the balance was privately owned. By 1943, 3,706 animals were employed by cooperatives and 21,337 by private owners.

(4) *Interference with Japanese transportation*

North of the Lung-Hai railway the Communists have attacked the Japanese-controlled railroads and roads so often that the Japanese have been forced to defend them with blockhouses and ditches and defense works running along the communication lines. Despite these elaborate precautions the Communists are still able to wreck trains, attack convoys and cause considerable damage to Japanese transportation. South of the Lung-Hai railway in the new 4th Army area, the Communists have been less active in attacking communication lines. Consequently they are not protected by dykes and walls, and it is much easier for the Communists to move back and forth across them. They claim to be in a position to destroy large sections of the transportation routes in this area whenever it seems especially profitable to do so. Apart from this type of interference with communications, the Communists hold certain areas which deny to the Japanese the ready use of several potentially important highways. Among these are the through highway in eastern Shantung from Chiao-hsien via Lin-i to Tung-shan (Suchow), the through highway from Tung-hai (Haichow) to Nan-t'ung in Eastern Kiangsu, the highway from Hui-yin to Pukow via T'ien-ch'ang in Western Kiangsu, the main highway from Ch'ing-yüan (Paoting) to Tientsin and various other routes of lesser importance.

(5) *Radio*

Radio communications, although they exist between most of the Communist base areas, are very slow and inadequate. Several days are usually required to transmit or receive messages from the coastal areas to Yen-an. Except in Yen-an all of the sets are powered by hand generators and the messages have to be relayed from one area to another in order to cover any extensive distance. In exceptional circumstances Yen-an can communicate with the Shantung peninsula in seven or eight hours, but this is the exception rather than the rule. The chief difficulty is lack of adequate equipment. Most of the existing equipment is old or has been patched up from materials captured from the Japanese. Efforts are being made through the U. S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an to provide short-wave radio sets so that weather data and information about American fliers forced down behind the Japanese lines can be more rapidly communicated to Yen-an.

The Yen-an radio broadcasting station XNCR exists only for the purpose of broadcasting to outside areas. There are no private receiving sets in Yen-an, and the broadcasts are devised primarily for foreign consumption or consumption of people outside the Communist areas.

(6) *Telegraph*

There are some telegraph lines in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and there are limited telegraphic connections between the area and the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. So far as is known telegraphic communications are not used in other areas. A study of the whole communications situation in the Communist area is being carried on by officials attached to U. S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an.

(7) *Air transport*

Air transport between Yen-an and Free China is possible and the U. S. Army Observer Section there has bi-weekly connection with the outside by transport plane.

(8) *Post Office*

The Communists have their own postal system which is managed by the General Communications Administration. They have their own post offices, stamps and system of postal deliveries. The Nationalist Government insists that the Communist postal authorities interfere with the functioning of the regular postal system of China.

F. CURRENCY AND FINANCE

(1) *Currency*

Each of the Communist areas issues its own currency which circulates freely throughout the issuing region. This currency is backed in some cases by reserves

of gold, silver and Chinese national currency but in general it seems to have no great backing other than popular confidence in it. It is issued by the various Border Region banks, and in general the circulation of Chinese National Currency or of Japanese puppet currency is prohibited. However, in the areas behind the Japanese lines puppet currency is stolen or otherwise acquired to use in commercial transactions with the areas controlled by the Japanese. An original function of the Border Region currency was to serve as a shield between Chinese National Currency and the puppet currency and so prevent the former from falling into Japanese hands.

The Border Region currency has a fair degree of stability within the issuing region. Since there is little trade between the various Border Regions, it is impossible to determine any accurate standard of value as between the various currencies. In general, however, it seems that currency of the Yen-an area is less valuable than that of some of the other areas. As a matter of fact, in all of the Border Regions money is of relatively minor importance, because wages and salaries are paid in millet or other commodities and taxes are collected in kind. Millet is in reality the standard of value in the northern areas and rice is probably the standard in the New 4th Army areas. According to National Government sources approximately \$350,000,000 worth of this Communist currency had been issued by the end of 1943. All such currency is illegal in the eyes of the Chungking Government.

Such exchange rates between the Border Region currencies as are available are given in the accompanying table.

Some exchange rates of Communist currencies

Date	Silver \$	CN \$	SKN \$	SS \$	SCH \$	Shan \$	New 4th \$	FRB \$	CRB \$
1937.....		1	1.21						
February 1941.....		1	1.50						
1941.....		4			1½-2	5		1	
1943.....		1	2.20						
July 1943.....		1	10						
Late 1943.....	1		1,500	150	30				
May 1944.....	1		1,000						
Spring 1944.....					2			1	
Spring 1944.....				4	1				
Spring 1944.....			8	1					
July 1944.....		1	10						
Fall 1944.....		1	8.50						
1944.....		1	18						
1944.....		1	4-6						
Fall 1944.....			6	1					
February 1945.....						1		4	

NOTE.—

- Silver \$ = Chinese silver dollars.
- CN \$ = Chinese National Currency.
- SKN \$ = Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia.
- SS \$ = Shansi-Suiyuan.
- SCH \$ = Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh.
- Shan \$ = In 1941 Shansi-Hopeh-Honan, but in 1945 Shantung.
- New 4th \$ = New Fourth Army Area currency in Kiangsu.
- FRB \$ = Japanese Puppet Federal Reserve Bank currency (North China).
- CRB \$ = Japanese Puppet Central Reserve Bank currency (Nanking Gov't).

1 Official.
2 Unofficial.

(2) Prices and inflation

Prices have gone up considerably in all of the Communist areas and there is unquestionably currency inflation everywhere. Inflation seems to be the worst in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region but most observers agree that inflation is not as serious as in the Chungking area because salaries and wages are paid in kind to a very large extent and hence currency inflation matters very little.

(3) Banking and finance

A number of banks function in the various Communist areas. According to a Kuomintang source the following banks have been set up in the various Border Regions:

Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank

Kwang Hwa Shang Tien (shop) in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region

Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Frontier Bank
 Northwest Agricultural Bank in Shansi
 Shang Tang Bank in Southeast Shansi
 South Hopeh Bank
 Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Frontier Bank
 Pei Hai Bank in Northeast Shantung
 Tai Shan Bank in Shantung
 North Kiangsu Bank
 Huai Nan Bank
 National Salvation Cooperative Society in Shansi
 Agricultural Cooperative Society in South Shantung

Besides issuing currency these banks make loans to the Border Region governments, to cooperatives, and to private enterprises. They also have floated the following loans or bond issues, according to Chungking sources:

- (a) The \$12,000,000 Ten Year "Reconstruction Loan" issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
- (b) The \$500,000 Fifteen Year "Relief Loan" by the office of the Administrative Commissioner for South Hopeh.
- (c) The \$4,000,000 Fifteen Year "National Salvation Loan" by the Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Region Government.
- (d) The \$6,000,000 Ten Year "National Reconstruction Loan" by the Hopeh-Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.
- (e) The \$3,000,000 "Trade Loan" by the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.
- (f) The lottery savings bonds issued by the Frontier Bank, each issue of which is \$1,000,000. (1) (24) (25) (46)

(4) *Interest and loans*

Generally speaking, the Communists have abolished usury and greatly reduced the interest rates throughout their territory. The various governments make loans in the form of grain, agricultural implements and machinery, equipment, etc., to farmers or industrial enterprises at very low rates of interest as a means of encouraging production. The Communists claim to have reduced interest rates in S99 hsien under their influence.

(5) *Taxation*

Taxation seems to have been reduced, particularly upon the poorer classes, throughout the Communist areas. Most observers agree that there are only a few types of taxes and that the maximum rate is generally not over 37½ percent upon the total income. Taxes at this rate are levied only upon the richer peasants who hire others to do their work. The rate progressively lowers until the poorest people pay no taxes at all. Since 1937 a general effort has been made to introduce a progressive tax system based upon ability to pay and to be levied upon income or property. However, no uniform system seems to have been adopted throughout the whole region. Taxes are generally paid in kind. There are also rather light taxes upon business, a courvee or work tax, levies for the support of troops and various other devices aimed at collecting revenue and equalizing income.

The Communists claim that in the New 4th Army area in Kiangsu and Anhwei taxes have been reduced by about \$200,000,000. In the Tai-hang mountain area of Southern Shansi taxes in 1944 are said to be only about half of those levied in 1941, and in most other liberated areas they also claim that taxes have been reduced. In contradiction to the above claims and to the general opinion of observers in the Communist areas, the Chungking Government contends that the Communists have introduced a multitude of new taxes and lists some 27 different types of levies to back up its contention. These include among others: anti-Japanese contributions, levies on rich families, inheritance taxes, stamp, tobacco, opium and wine taxes, enemy goods entrance tax and marriage registration tax.

(6) *Government income*

The income of the Border Region governments in general seems to be derived from the following sources: (1) taxation, (2) income from government enterprises and the production of the armed forces, and (3) note issue.

G. THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION

(1) *Agriculture—General*

This is one of the poorest of all the Communist areas, although it served as the original base for the whole movement. The region consists of loess-clad hills and barren mountains with valley regions where agriculture can be pursued. Rainfall is very scanty and most of it comes in July and August with some in June. Crop failure caused by lack of rainfall occurs every few years. The hillsides are rather barren or covered with short grass because of lack of rainfall. The most important food crop is millet followed by wheat and *kaoliang*. Irish and sweet potatoes are also important food crops and corn, soybeans, barley, flax and rye are produced. Vegetables include carrots, onions, tomatoes, cabbage and string beans, while melons, apricots and peaches are also produced. Among the commercial crops opium, cotton and tobacco should be noted.

(a) *Agricultural education*.—In an effort to improve agriculture the government has sent instructors among the peasants to introduce crop rotation, diversified planting and better methods of fertilization. Seeds have been supplied to the peasants by the government and loans have been made to enable them to acquire necessary equipment. Classes on agriculture and animal husbandry have been set up in rural villages and spinning and weaving have been taught to women in the villages. As a result of these efforts the cultivation of rice has been introduced into this area and the production of wheat considerably increased. More beans, corn soybeans and cotton have also been produced. (1)

(b) *Land reclamation*.—According to Communist figures, some 3,300,000 *mou* (one *mou* probably equals $\frac{1}{3}$ of an acre) of land were reclaimed between 1939 and 1943. The area reclaimed amounted to about 699,000 *mou* in 1940, 381,000 in 1942, 976,000 in 1943, and the objective in 1944 was 1,000,000 *mou*. In 1943, of the 976,000 *mou* reclaimed, 207,000 were reclaimed by the 8th Route Army. (9 p. 1)

(c) *Food production*.—According to Communist figures, total cultivated land and food production (principally millet) in recent years was as follows:

Date	Food production	Cultivated land
	<i>Piculs</i> ¹	<i>Mou</i>
1940.....		11,742,000
1942.....	1,680,000	
1943.....	1,840,000	13,387,000

¹ The picul probably equals 133 pounds but it may be the *shih* picul of 110 pounds.

In 1943 food production was roughly divided as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>		<i>Percent</i>
millet.....	24.5	flax.....	5.1
wheat.....	21.5	corn.....	3.7
yellow millet.....	1.4	potatoes.....	3.2
beans.....	11.2	cotton.....	1.4
buckwheat.....	7.1	vegetables, misc.....	2.2
<i>kaoliang</i>	6.4		

The food requirements of the area are given by one Communist source as 1,620,000 piculs and by another as between 1,500,000 and 1,600,000 piculs of millet plus 230,000 piculs of other food. Production in 1943, therefore, exceeded requirements.

(d) *Cotton*.—The production of cotton has been particularly encouraged, apparently with good results, as can be judged from the accompanying table.

	Area cultivated	Production of cotton	Production of cotton seed
	(<i>Mou</i>)	(<i>Piculs</i>)	(<i>Piculs</i>)
1940.....	15,117		
1942.....	94,000	14,000	28,000
1943.....	150,288	17,300	
1944.....	¹ 300,000		

¹ Planned.

The planned production for 1944 would have reached requirements, but frost damaged the crop and consequently complete self-sufficiency was not attained. The main cotton producing districts are around Yen-ch'ang, Yen-ch'uan and Ku-lin. The first two of three districts had about 80 per cent of the total cotton acreage in 1942. In order to encourage the production of cotton, the fields have been exempted from taxation and also loans at low rates of interests have been given to cotton producers.

(c) *Salt*.—Important salt fields are located in the northwestern part of the area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. These fields are worked especially during the season when people are not engaged in agriculture. Salt provides the largest percentage of exports from the area, and, according to one source, about \$40,000,000 worth of revenue was obtained from salt in 1942. Salt transport cooperatives have been organized to work the fields and transport the salt. Communist figures indicate that 310,000 piculs were produced in 1942 and that in 1943 between 800,000 and 900,000 piculs were produced. During this latter year some 3,706 animals belonging to transport cooperatives were involved in transporting the salt and over 21,000 belonging to private individuals.

(f) *Livestock*.—The Border Region Government has also encouraged the production of cattle, donkeys, mules and sheep. According to Communist figures, the following increases in livestock took place between 1940 and 1943:

Year	Cattle	Donkeys	Sheep
1940.....	193, 283	125, 054	1, 725, 037
1943.....	220, 781	167, 671	20, 332, 371

Sheep products in 1943 are given as follows: white wool 6,710 piculs; black wool 3,337 piculs; large sheepskins 71,512, and small sheepskins 45,756.

(g) *Opium*.—During the last few years it appears that opium has been produced in the area, primarily for export to the Chungking area as a means of obtaining necessary currency for the purchase of cloth and other items. The Chungking Government claims that throughout the Communist areas, 158,000 *mau* were planted to opium in 1942. The controversy over opium has been one factor of discord between Chungking and the Communists.

(2) *Industry—General*

The government at Yen-an has established a number of industrial plants; it has also encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives and has promoted private handicraft production. Military units, government officials, students and other people are also encouraged to produce items needed for their own use. Early in 1944, according to a Communist pamphlet, there were 108 government establishments in the Yen-an area as follows:

weaving.....	23	implements.....	13
coal enterprises.....	18	blankets and cloth.....	15
grain grinding mills.....	12	printing presses.....	5
chemical plants.....	13	miscellaneous.....	9

In 1939 there were 800 workers in industrial establishments, and by early 1944 there were some 12,000 workers in 70 of the government and private factories.

(a) *Cooperatives*.—Cooperatives have developed rapidly, reportedly increasing, according to one Communist source, from 142 in 1937 with a membership of 57,807 and a capital of \$55,225 (Border currency) to 634 in February 1944 with a membership of 182,878 and a capital of \$733,998,403. These cooperatives in 1944 were classified as follows: consumer 281, producer 114, transportation 223, credit 6. Another Communist source gives more detailed but very different figures on the cooperatives as follows (values are presumably in Border currency):

Year	Number	Members	Shares of Capital	Business Income	Production	Transportation (head of cattle)
1937.....	142	57, 847	\$55, 229	\$261, 689	-----	-----
1938.....	107	66, 707	75, 629	391, 282	-----	-----
1939.....	115	82, 885	125, 848	552, 249	\$600, 000	-----
1940.....	132	123, 279	332, 843	1, 156, 435	4, 131, 500	-----
1941.....	155	140, 218	1, 362, 384	6, 493, 399	14, 189, 000	206
1942.....	207	143, 721	9, 346, 876	34, 932, 109	23, 252, 600	265
1943.....	260	150, 000	170, 000, 000	600, 000, 000	494, 000, 000	3, 706

(b) *Textiles*.—No satisfactory over-all figures on the textile industry are available. In 1941 1,085 persons were reportedly employed by government and army units and operated 388 looms and 32 carpet machines, and 30 spinning and weaving cooperatives employed 385 persons, operating 176 looms and 12 carpet machines. In addition 34,500 weaving workers and 75,000 spinning workers operated 12,000 locally-made looms while 68,000 hand looms were operated in various households. Total production in this year was reported as 100,000 *pi* of cloth (1 *pi* equals 32.33 meters or about 100 feet). This production was said to equal 40 per cent of the requirement. At about the same time Mao Toe-tung indicated that the total demand for cloth in the Yen-an area was 360,000 *pi* and that cloth production amounted to one-third of demand. Since that time considerable efforts have been made to increase the production of raw cotton, and some reports state that the area is now approximately self-sufficient in cloth. Woolen and linen cloth production has also been encouraged. Production in government weaving factories, which amounted to only 3,000 *pi* in 1940, increased to 15,840 by 1943.

(c) *Iron and steel*.—Shensi iron, generally speaking, is of a poor quality and all mining and refining is done by very primitive methods. The first iron foundry was established in May 1943, and it is operated by people who know very little about iron production. It has two small and three somewhat larger furnaces and employs about 200 workers. Several thousand workers are employed in digging iron ore from mines about 10 miles distant. Some steel is produced by a very primitive puddling process. Iron and steel production is inadequate, and the area has to depend very largely upon captured rails for the steel used in its arsenals. Iron is reportedly produced near Yen-an, Kan-ch'uan and other places in Shensi. Mao says that the iron requirements of the area are 47,000 piculs a year.

(d) *Coal*.—In 1942 the 15 coal mines in operation are said to have produced 3,400,000 lbs. during the month of September. This, however, barely met the requirements of Yen-an. Good anthracite is produced in some areas, but lack of mechanical facilities and adequate transportation seriously limit production and distribution of coal. It has to be carried by mule and donkey to points where it is used.

(e) *Printing and paper*.—A local type of grass is used in the production of a rough but rather good quality paper. Several primitive paper factories are operated in the Yen-an area, and although production has increased it still does not meet adequately the needs of the area. One of the larger factories which was visited in the spring of 1944 by representatives of the press made ten reams a day. Its motive power was provided by a waterfall and horses.

(f) *Petroleum*.—Several oil wells are operated in the vicinity of Yen-ch'ang. The equipment is old and very unsatisfactory and the operating personnel are unacquainted with the technical aspects of oil production. Wells Nos. 1 and 2 are practically dry. Only Well No. 3 is at present functioning, and drilling on Nos. 4 and 5 has just been started. Daily output is said to be from 70 to 80 lbs. The plant produces gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils and candles. Most of the gasoline produced is kept to operate the few trucks in the Yen-an area. Kerosene and other byproducts are largely exported to the Chung-king area.

(g) *Miscellaneous industries*.—Other important industries include matches, soap, chemicals and pharmaceutical supplies. There is a fairly efficient establishment for the production of the latter materials in connection with the hospital at Yen-an. It produces sodium chloride, sodium sulphate, magnesium carbonate, sulphur, medical carmon and bandages, etc.

(h) *Arsenals*.—Two arsenals are reported in the vicinity of Yen-an. One is located about 12 miles northwest of Yen-an at a place variously called Wen-chia-kou or Wu-ch'i-chen. The location of the other is unknown. This was visited by Colonel Barrett and various others who have described it in detail. Its power is provided by two truck motors, and it contains a heterogeneous assortment of lathes, presses, punches and machines. The steel and smokeless powder used in it is produced in other nearby plants. Forgings are hammered out by hand on anvils and a great degree of skill is shown by the blacksmiths. Most of the steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese railways. Its principal product is grenade dischargers (knee mortars). It formerly produced about 100 of these per month, but because of shortage of steel it now only produces about 50. It also reloads rifle ammunition and produces bullets and primers but is largely dependent upon captured cartridge castings. It is now preparing to manufacture cartridges and hopes ultimately to be able to produce about 1,000 rounds

per month. It also repairs rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, knee mortars and mountain artillery.

Another arsenal is located in Northern Shensi at the village of Pan-nu-kou, which is somewhat south of Chia-hsien and about 13 miles west of the Yellow River. It serves the Shansi-Suiyuan area primarily. This is said to be the largest and best equipped arsenal in the Communist area. It is located in a very out of the way place and is equipped with machinery which formerly belonged to the arsenal at Taiyuan. It has a large steam generator. It is said to produce from 250 to 300 knee mortar projectiles and 10 knee mortars a week. It also reloads rifle cartridges and manufactures a few light machine guns. The reloading of cartridges is irregular because this depended largely upon the number of casings retrieved from battle. It also makes land mines and repairs weapons. Four hundred men are employed, and it operates two 10-hour shifts daily. One hundred of the men had been former employees in the Taiyuan arsenal.

(3) Trade

Because of the deficiencies of this area in manufactured products, particularly cloth and munitions, it desires to obtain these products from the Chungking area. From the formation of the united front agreement in 1937 until 1940 some products did reach the Yen-an area and helped to meet its difficulties. However, in 1940 Chungking limited trade to such items as would benefit Chungking and prohibited entirely the movement of arms or munitions into the Communist region. About the only products which Chungking wanted from the Yen-an area were salt and petroleum products. Consequently, the balance of trade turned strongly against Yen-an, with the result that in 1943 it had an unfavorable balance of trade amounting to CN 150,000,000. In an effort to redress this unfavorable balance and obtain sufficient currency to acquire the imports desired, the cultivation of opium was carried on and some if it is smuggled into Chungking territory. The Yen-an government has also imposed restrictions upon all imports except cloth, iron and similar items of vital necessity, and has prohibited the importation of luxuries and nonessentials and the export of foodstuffs. The export of salt and other items is under strict government control.

(4) Finance

(a) *Currency*.—The currency of this area is issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank at Yen-an. The existing currency dates from 18 February 1941, according to Communist sources. It is illegal in the eyes of Chungking, but it is the only currency allowed to circulate in the area. According to Chungking these Border Region notes were issued much earlier than 1941, and Edgar Snow indicates that when he visited the Yen-an area in 1936 Communist notes were in circulation. The exchange rate was then CN\$1 equaled Yen-an \$1.21. It may be that after the formation of the united front the issuance of the Border Region currency was temporarily suspended and that the Yen-an government resumed issue in 1941 after the imposition of the blockade by Chungking. The Border Region currency is backed by gold, silver and Chinese national currency, and it seems probable that the silver was brought by the Communists to Shensi at the time of their long march from Kiangsi. One source indicates that much of the currency is in small denominations, which, because of the inflation, makes its use as an ordinary medium of exchange troublesome. Another source indicates that currency is now printed in \$200 denominations.

(b) *Inflation and prices*.—Observers disagree as to the degree of inflation in the Yen-an area, but all agree that it is considerable. Prices of cloth, metals and such objects which are relatively scarce are possibly higher than in Kuomintang China, but in general prices are probably less inflated than in the rest of Free China. Regardless of the degree of inflation, most people do not suffer from it seriously because of the relative unimportance of money in the whole economy. The situation is summarized by one observer as follows:

"Prices in Yen-an are as high as elsewhere in Free China but the inflation has little effect on the economic well-being of the population. Those groups which suffer most severely in Nationalist China—government employees, soldiers, teachers, students—are paid in kind in Yen-an and are under no hardship. Housing, clothing, food and a variety of other necessities are provided. Cash salary or wages have little significance except for the purchase of luxuries, and of these there are practically none. Farmers, shopkeepers, artisans and small industrialists sell their product or labor at inflated prices and accordingly are able to purchase their requirements."

(c) *Interest and loans.*—As soon as the Communists came into Shensi they undertook the abolition of usury and the reduction of the interest rate. As of 1936 Edgar Snow noted that the maximum rate permitted was 10 per cent and that most government loans were made at a rate of about 5 per cent. More recently the government has followed a policy of making extensive loans in the form of money, seed, agricultural implements, machinery, etc., to poor farmers, small merchants and private individuals who will enter productive enterprise. The government has also guaranteed payment of the lower rates of interest allowed, which has tended to satisfy money-lenders.

(d) *Taxation.*—Soon after the Communists came into Shensi they abolished the existing tax structure, canceled most taxes on the small land owners and tenant farmers and levied rather heavy taxes upon the wealthy landlords and usurers. In 1937 Mao Tse-tung proposed the introduction of a progressive tax system which would be based upon ability to pay, and some such scheme has gradually been introduced. The present tax system seems to embrace the following main features:

A tax levied on land and agricultural gains. This in general is a certain percentage of the produce of the land levied in kind plus taxes on income from rents, animal hire, etc. The maximum is 37½ per cent on the largest incomes and progressively decreases until the poorer people pay little or no taxes at all. The families of soldiers, immigrants of less than three years' standing, and people with too low an income to maintain a decent standard of living are exempted from taxation. Those exempted are said to amount to less than 20 per cent of the population.

A commercial tax. This is said to have started in 1940 and is collected twice a year by the tax office of the local government and the local chamber of commerce. In 1943 it is said to have amounted to 13 per cent of the net profits of commercial activities.

A public service or labor tax. This consists of labor service to the government and includes the transportation of foodstuffs and salt or aid to troops such as carrying wounded soldiers, building roads, underground houses, etc.

Various forms of assistance to the army such as loans of seed, tools, food, clothing, animals, etc.

Most observers agree that taxation for the mass of the people is considerably less than in pre-Communist days.

(e) *Government revenue.*—In 1936 government expenditure was said to amount to about \$320,000 per month (presumably Border Region currency). At that time 40 to 50 per cent of government revenue was obtained through confiscations, another 15 to 20 per cent through voluntary contributions and the remainder through taxation, trade, government industries and bond issue.

In 1943 according to Communist sources total government expenditure was \$6,000,000 Border Region currency plus taxes collected in kind, which perhaps amounted to 170,000 piculs of millet. Of this income 64 per cent came from government enterprises and army production. The remainder came from taxation and note issue. The deficit was said to be 18 per cent, which was met by borrowing from the Border Region bank, i. e., by the issue of notes. The main factor in the unbalanced budget was the drain of currency to pay for imports from the rest of Free China. In 1944 70 per cent of the government revenue was said to be derived from government and army production, and the deficit was said to be considerably less than in 1943. Income from the land tax is given as follows:

1938— 10,000 piculs of millet

1939— 50,000 piculs of millet

1940—180,000 piculs of millet

1944—160,000 piculs of millet plus 180,000 piculs of fodder.

II. THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN BORDER REGION

(1) *General*

In general the physical characteristics of this area are similar to the Shensi-Kausu-Ningsia Border Region. It is probably the poorest of all the Communist areas and has made the least progress. Achievements here cannot be compared with those in any of the other Border Regions. It is a rather desolate region with a very impoverished peasantry who have not responded as rapidly to Communist leadership as has been the case elsewhere. Most of the people speak a dialect which is not very widely known and this has complicated matters. However, some developments have taken place, and even as early as 1943 some 125,000 people had been organized into the Farmers' Mass Organization and 55,000 workers into the Workers' Mass Organization. It is very important as a

connecting link between the Yen-an region and the more prosperous Border Regions to the east.

(2) *Arsenals*

A small arsenal is reported to be located near Hsing-hsien and another in the mountains south of Taiyuan and north of Fen-yang. Both of those are apparently small plants which specialize in the repair of small arms and the manufacture of land mines and grenades. One of them is said to manufacture black powder and the one north of Fen-yang reportedly makes a thousand land mines and two thousand grenades a month.

I. SHANSI-CHAHAR-HOPEH BORDER REGION

(1) *General economic features*

The central core of this area is made up of the mountainous regions forming the border between Shansi, Chahar and Hopeh, but the base area also extends into the fertile North China plain. It is one of the most progressive and richest of the Communist areas. The economy of the mountainous regions is similar to that of the Yen-an area, but the plains include very fertile agricultural lands. The rainfall is greater than in the loess highlands and crop failures are less frequent. Wheat and millet are the most important food crops. Wheat is generally planted in October and harvested in the late spring and early summer. Important spring and summer crops are millet, *kaoliang*, corn, soybeans, sweet potatoes, peanuts and sesame. Cotton, hemp and tobacco are important commercial crops, and some wool is also produced. Vegetables include cabbage, beans, carrots and Irish potatoes, while the important fruits are pears, persimmons and melons. The alluvial plains support a large population, and it is in these regions that the intense struggle between the Communists and Japanese for control goes on. The people have suffered severely from Japanese raiding expeditions which destroy property, deplete the food supply, reduce the domestic animals and commandeer workers. As a consequence the area has suffered from a shortage of cattle, seeds and manpower.

(2) *Government economic program*

The government, which includes a large number of non-Communists, has followed a very progressive policy along the following lines:

(a) Land reclamation has been pushed forward. In this regard there has been a close cooperation between the civilian population and the army, which aids in carrying out repair of damage done by the Japanese to drainage canals and irrigation ditches. A considerable amount of land has been reclaimed.

(b) To compensate for the shortage of manpower and to facilitate the general agricultural program, cultivation teams have been formed, consisting of several workers who jointly use the same implements and draft animals and who move from place to place plowing and doing agricultural work.

(c) Mass organizations have been promoted, and by 1943 about 858,000 persons were organized into farmers' groups and some 235,000 in workers' groups.

(d) Loans of seed and animals have been made to farmers, and food has been supplied to famine and devastated areas. The government maintains some food storehouses, but in general government tax grain is left stored in the local villages and is issued to troops or other persons when needed against vouchers which the taxpayer can present to the government as tax receipts.

(e) Household industries have been encouraged to supplement normal farm production and improve the self-sufficiency of the area.

(f) A policy of preventing cotton and other important industrial production from reaching the Japanese has also been enforced. Some opium is produced in the area, but its use is restricted to trade with the Japanese in exchange for necessary commodities.

(g) Finally, a very active program of agricultural research and education aimed toward the improvement of grain seeds and agricultural production has been carried on. This program is well summarized by an observer who was in the area in 1943.

"A lot of agricultural research work is being done in developing new kinds of seed, methods of pest control, the introduction of new kinds of animals and so on. There are a number of experimental farms which have done some valuable work. Twenty-three irrigation schemes have been carried on with 58 miles of canal increasing the irrigated area by over 15,000 acres. Agricultural credit is given by branches of the government bank and there are

also credit cooperatives. Some work has been done on afforestation but the people have not yet been educated to the dangers of soil erosion, which is actually one of the most serious problems in North China, and progress has been very slight. A lot of trees have been planted by the rivers where people can see that the timber will be useful in the future but they do not see the point of planting on the hills.

"At the end of 1941 an organization for controlling grain prices was started. The farmers usually sell their grain soon after the harvest so that there has been a very big fluctuation in grain prices which rise very high before the harvest and fall very low after. The grain control board has a capital of \$5,000,000, half from the government and half from private capital. The private capital was largely subscribed in the form of grain. The board, therefore, started with a considerable influence on prices. It has been of considerable assistance to the farmers and small merchants by being ready to buy in local markets when the price fell too low. Communications in the areas are so bad that slight excess of supply might cause a very big fall in the local market price and the farmer or small merchant might spend a long time transporting his grain by mule between markets several days' journey apart before he could obtain a reasonable price."

(3) *Industry and arsenals*

The industries in this region are in general similar to those found in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and the same methods of production are used. One of the most notable industrial establishments of this region is an excellent chemical plant near Fou-p'ing (Fuping) which enables the area to produce the best explosives in the Communist region. It is operated by competent chemists from Peiping. Observers from the area say that the plant is to be divided into four sections which are to be located at different places throughout the base area. The area also has a small blast furnace which makes iron for military use. Two arsenals are also reported, one of which is located near Fou-p'ing. This arsenal is described as being rather similar in character to the one at Wen-chia-kou near Yen-an. Vegetable oils are also cracked to produce fuel for lamps. There is a research bureau which encourages new industrial developments.

(4) *Currency and taxation*

The currency in this area seems to have been especially well managed and apparently its value is holding up better than that in most other areas of North China. It is issued by the Northwest Farmers' Bank and originally had a backing of 60 percent national currency notes. As national currency depreciated most of this reserve was spent in buying gold and silver, which now backs the existing currency. Some reports claim that the currency has a higher value than that of Chinese currency at present.

A progressive tax system has been introduced into certain parts of this area, very similar in nature to that described under the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The main features are taxes on land and income. Reportedly the rates range from about 7 per cent of the income of the lowest taxpaying group to 65 per cent for the highest income group. There is also a tax on imports and exports. This is levied primarily to regulate trade rather than as a means of revenue. Taxes in general are payable in kind and are collected and stored locally. The policy of reducing rents and interest rates and of public loans at low interest rates is also maintained in this area.

J. THE SHANSI-HOPEI-HONAN BORDER REGION

(1) *General*

Much of this area is mountainous and unproductive and its population is relatively small. In general the economy resembles in most respects that of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Tobacco is one of the most important commercial crops produced. There are important minerals in the mountains, but these have never been greatly developed, and the few that have been are under Japanese control. Despite its comparative poverty, the region is relatively self-sufficient.

(2) *Agriculture*

During 1942 and 1943 the fertile agricultural regions of this area suffered from a severe famine brought on by drought and later by a plague of locusts. The government aided in meeting the famine and rehabilitating the area through a policy of rent and tax reductions and the granting of loans and the supplying

of seed grains to the devastated area. Good crops in the fall of 1943 and 1944 improved the condition of the area considerably. A very active program of improving types of grains and reclamation is carried on. The agricultural experiment station has introduced a new type of corn which has greatly increased the yield. It also maintains an agricultural school which attracts students from throughout the area. During 1944 the government of the area claims that 50,000 acres of wasteland were reclaimed and that agricultural production was greatly increased. In 1943 in this area and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region some 2,670,000 peasants were organized in mass farmers' organizations and 23,625 workers into workers' organizations.

(3) Industry and arsenals

This region is particularly notable for its production of cigarettes from locally produced tobacco. The cigarettes are traded to the Japanese-controlled areas in return for sugar and cotton cloth. It also makes paper, farm tools, cotton cloth, etc. Fliers forced down in this region report that there are two small arsenals which can make mortars and mortar shells, reload cartridges, repair rifles and produce land mines and grenades. Powder in the area is said to be poor.

K. THE HOPEI-SHANTUNG-HONAN BORDER REGION

This area lies entirely in the alluvial plains of North China and it resembles in every respect the plains area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region. It is a comparatively rich agricultural region, but suffered very severely during 1942 and 1943 from a prolonged drought followed by a plague of locusts. During the drought nearly a million and a half acres reportedly lay uncultivated, and crops of millet, *kaoliang*, wheat, corn and cotton were not over 50 per cent of normal. Many people died or left the area. However, during the fall and winter of 1943-44 there was adequate rain; the government supplied grain seeds, and the resulting winter crop was fairly good. The area was plundered again during the spring and summer of 1944 by the Japanese. Despite these difficulties over 2,500,000 acres were reportedly sown to wheat during the winter of 1944.

L. THE SHANTUNG BASE AREA

The Communist-controlled region in Shantung is broken up into a number of separate areas, although there has been a tendency for consolidation during the past year. The most important base is in the mountainous areas of central Shantung south of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway, with other centers in the mountainous parts of the Shantung Peninsula and in the relatively swampy areas around the estuary of the old Yellow River. In general, however, the economy resembles that of the plains and mountainous areas of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region. Some silk is produced in the mountainous areas of Shantung.

A picture of conditions in the area is given by the Austrian, Dr. Rosenthal, who is serving with the medical department of the Shantung Liberated Area.

"In Shantung, private property is untouched and landlords have reduced rents by 25%. Formerly landlords got 60-70% of the produce, but now they are getting 37½%. Through seven years of armed resistance, peasants in the 8th Route and the New 4th Army bases are living in greater prosperity compared with the past. It is very obvious that the peasants are willing and actively prepared to fight for their own democratic government and against Japanese mopping-up drives. Landlords are also happy. Income from 37½% of the harvest is handsome, while there are troops fighting against Japanese pillage. Thus the majority of landlords are also backing up and supporting the democracy government.

"There is dire lack of armament, but the food ration of the army is good and the fighting morale is high. There is excellent unity between the army and the democratic government. . . .

"Peasants plow their land with buffaloes, cows, oxen, donkeys and mules. Staple food is millet, *kaoliang* and sweet potatoes which have low nutritious value. The output of wheat and rice is comparatively [small], but in many places there are extremely sweet pears, peaches, apples, grapes, watermelons, chestnuts and walnuts. . . . Tobacco is planted and excellent cigarettes are manufactured."

Little information is available on currency or tax policy in this area. Reduction of rents and interest rates are put into effect in newly liberated regions. Relief grains and loans at low interest are also distributed by the government. Prices are reported to be less inflated than in occupied China or in Chungking

controlled areas, and one broadcast claims that the Communist currency in the area is at a premium over the puppet Federal Reserve Bank notes.

M. THE NEW FOURTH ARMY AREA IN KIANGSU, ANHWEI, AND CHEKIANG

This includes seven base areas in east central China. In Northern Kiangsu and Anhwei a good deal of wheat is grown, and in some respects the economy is similar to that of the North China plain, but as one proceeds south precipitation increases and rice increases in importance as a basic food crop. Because of the extensive rainfall the area is cut by numerous canals and streams, and the existence of these waterways has facilitated the development of the guerrilla bases. In general, two crops a year are produced in these areas. The winter crop consists of wheat, beans, barley, rape seed and similar commodities. Rice is the most important summer crop and is probably the main element in the diet of the people. It is planted in the spring and harvested in October and November. Silk and cotton are also produced. It is perhaps the richest of all the Communist areas, and observers who have been in the region generally agree that it is well administered and that there is close cooperation between the troops and the local population. If crops are short the ration allowance of troops is reduced. The property of landlords seems not to have been disturbed, and troops are careful to pay for supplies. The general economic well-being of the area is testified to by the fact that no rationing is imposed upon the civilian population. Along the coast peasants are encouraged to produce salt and fishermen are also encouraged.

Local Communist currency, Chinese National Currency and puppet currency are said to be used in these areas. The latter is used primarily in trade with the Japanese, of which there seems to be considerable. A policy of rent and interest reductions has been carried out, although the Communists have moved rather carefully in this regard because of a desire to avoid alienation of the powerful landed interests. Taxation is levied on a progressive basis with the poorer 20 per cent of the farmers exempted from taxation. The highest rates, which generally do not exceed 35 per cent of income, are levied on rich landlords. Revenue is said to be derived from taxes on agricultural production and on industrial and commercial activities. The tax money is reportedly divided so that seven-tenths is used for military affairs and three-tenths for civil affairs.

N. THE HUPEH-HONAN-ANHWEI BASE OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

This is in general the area around Hankow, and in recent times seems to have been extended to include parts of Hunan and Kiangsi. Its general economic characteristics are similar to the New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu and Anhwei. A recent broadcast from Yen-an summarizes the achievements in the area during 1944.

"The total area of the Honan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi-Anhwei border region is now approximately 33,000 square miles, of which 5,500 square miles were added in 1944. The total population is 9,200,000, of which 1,500,000 were liberated last year.

"There are five prefectures controlling 44 counties. The first provisional Border Region People's Congress attended by 177 delegates was held in June of last year. There are now 16 counties with a County People's Council.

"Vast irrigation projects and productive measures passed by these County People's Councils have led to bumper crops never seen in the past 15 years. Fifteen million dollars in local currency were spent by the government last year for famine relief work, while 293,120 *tan*, 67,844 dollars, 78,785 labor days and 168,664 cattle days were used to aid the dependents of the army men.

"The government has launched a large scale production movement which is also joined by government organs, public bodies and the army. At present the army and institutions are already self-sufficient in vegetables, firewood and coal for three months. They have altogether reclaimed 3,928 acres of wasteland and planted 1,158 acres of vegetables. There are now six cooperatives with a capital of 5,000,000 one with a capital above 5,000,000 and one with a capital of 50,000,000 in local currency.

"Economic reconstruction has been mainly devoted to building and repairing of irrigation works: 1,392,963 work days spent on building of dykes, dams and irrigation canals have reclaimed 88,392 acres of land in 12 counties. In another 13 counties, 1,731,273 work days were spent on irrigation works which can irrigate 141,250 acres of land."

O. BASES IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

There are two Communist base areas in Kwangtung province one being located in the Canton delta region and the other on Hainan Island. Little is known about economic developments under the Communists in either of these base areas. The East River base in the Canton delta is located in a rich rice-producing area. Rice farming and vegetable production supplemented by local handicrafts undoubtedly provide the basis of economic life in the area. The area of consolidated Communist control in Hainan Island seems to be in the rice-producing lowlands of northeastern Hainan, and rice production undoubtedly forms the basis of economic life.

P. CONCLUSION

The Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in North and Central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of North and Central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are nonexistent, roads and motor transport are practically nonexistent, communication facilities—radio, telegraph, telephone—are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

7. CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY

A. STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) *General*

The forces of the Chinese Communists may be classified into three general categories: the Field Forces, the Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia. The Field Forces are often moved about from one area to another as the military situation demands, and they generally wear uniform. The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army, usually confine their operations to particular areas, and wear plain clothes. Other than this, there is little difference under the present organization of the Communist forces between the Field Forces and the Local Forces. These two forces make up the so-called regular troops of the Communist Army. Equipment and training of the former is usually slightly better than that of the latter, but both receive their orders through regular channels of command and both are supplied by regular supply organs. It is believed that both of these forces comprise the two large units of the Chinese Communists, the 18th Group Army, and the New 4th Army. The People's Militia is composed of men and women throughout Communist-controlled areas, selected on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance, and initiative. Unlike the two groups of regular forces above, they engage regularly in production, and perform their military duties as the occasion demands.

Fuller discussion of these three groups is contained in section 6 of this report.

The average age of general officers is approximately 40 years; of field officers, approximately 37 years; and of company officers, approximately 30 years. In general education the average of both field and company officers is about that of a middle school graduate. (The Chinese middle school corresponds to the Western

High School.) Almost all officers come from the ranks, but of these about 70 percent have received training in the Communist "Anti-Japanese Military Academy" in Suiteh, Shensi.

The average age of enlisted men is approximately 28 years. Taking into consideration their general education before entering the Army and the education they received in the Army, their average level of education is approximately that of a student in lower middle school. (The Chinese lower middle school corresponds to the Western Junior High School.) Their average length of service is about eight years.

(2) *Overall Strengths*

In October 1944 it was reliably reported that the total strength of the regular Communist forces was 475,000. Of these, 318,000 are reported as under the 18th Group Army Command, 149,000 under the New 4th Army, and 8,000 in South China. Recent reports indicate that these forces may have been increased to as many as 910,000 troops. There is a marked difference between the actual strength of Communist forces and that authorized by the Central Government. Officially, only three Communist divisions and a so-called "Garrison Force" are recognized with a total authorized strength of about 50,000 officers and men. Expansion has been effected by increasing the number of regiments in each division, and by creating new regiments in the various military regions. The New 4th Army was officially disbanded in 1941 and is now unrecognized by the Central Government; nevertheless, its strength is steadily increasing.

(3) *18th Group Army Strength and Distribution*

General Chu Te has official status under the National Military Council of the Central Government as Commanding General of the 18th Group Army. The Deputy Commanding General is P'eng Te-huai. General Yeh Chien-ying is Chief of Staff. The 18th Group Army operates in general north of the Lung Hai railroad and East of Sian, Shenai. The six military Regions under the 18th Group Army follow:

(a) *Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Military Region*.—This region contains a relatively large concentration of troops, reported as 50,000 in the Field Forces. These are all first-line troops held in this home base area to guard against possible Kuomintang or Japanese attack.

(b) *Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region*.—In this region there are 26,000 in the Field Forces, 5,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 31,000 regulars. There are 50,000 Militiamen in the area. The area is relatively small, and has a sparse population. The 120th Division of the 18th Group Army is in this Region, commanded by General Ho Lung.

(c) *Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region*.—This region contains 35,000 in the Field Forces, 29,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 64,000 regular troops. There are 630,000 in the Militia. The forces of this area are large, but are probably relatively weak in the extensive plain regions (Central and East Hopeh) and in the mountainous and sparsely populated North (along the North of the Great Wall). This is a well-known area because it was the first established behind Japanese lines and has been more often visited by foreigners.

(d) *Shantung Military Region*.—This region contains 42,000 in the Field Forces, 28,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 70,000 regulars. 500,000 Militiamen are reported in the Region. The 115th Division is stationed in the Region, with General Ch'en Kuang as its commander. The Communist Forces have expanded rapidly in Shantung in the past few years, and are well organized in the whole area.

(e) *Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region*.—In this region there are 50,000 in the Field Forces, 25,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 75,000 regulars. 320,000 Militiamen are reported. This area includes South Shensi and the T'ai-hang Mountains, where the Communists have apparently become well entrenched. The 129th Division is stationed in this Region, Commanded by Liu Po Ch'eng.

(f) *Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region*.—This area contains 17,000 in the Field Forces, 11,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 28,000 regulars. There are 80,000 Militiamen in the Region.

(4) *New 4th Army Strength and Distribution*

The New 4th Army is also under General Chu Te's command. General Yeh T'ing is still carried on the roll by the Communists as Commanding General of the New 4th Army, but since his arrest by the Chungking Government dur-

ing the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, command is exercised by General Ch'en I, whose title is "Acting Army Commander." The Army operates South of the Lung-Hai Railroad, with headquarters in the Hung-tze Lake area. No break-down for Local Forces in the New 4th Army is available but the total has been reported at 31,000. In regions where no figure is given for the Militia, information is not available. The eight Military Regions under New 4th Army Command follow:

(a) *Central Kiangsu Military Region.*—This region contains 19,000 in the Field Forces and 130,000 in the Militia. It is the area of the 1st Division, and is bounded on the South by the Yangtze River from Ch'ung-Ming Island (North of Shanghai) West to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal to Huai-an, and on the North by the She-yang River.

(b) *South Huai Military Region.*—This region contains the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army, with 21,000 in the Field Forces. (See North Huai Military Region below for boundaries.)

(c) *North Kiangsu Military Region.*—The 3rd Division is stationed in this Region, with 23,000 in the Field Forces. 85,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region is bounded on the North by a line running generally west from Lien-yünkang (Lao-yao) to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal as far south as Huai-an, and on the South by the She-yang River east to the coast.

(d) *North Huai Military Region.*—The two Huai Military Regions (North and South) cover an area bounded generally by a line running from Sūchow, N. Kiangsu, east to the Grand Canal, then south along the Grand Canal to the Yangtze, along it to Nanking, from Nanking southwest to Ho-fei, northwest generally along the Huai-Nan Railroad to near Tien-chia-an, thence northeast to Pengpu (Pung-fou) and north along the Tsinpu Railroad back to Sūchow. The Huai River is the dividing line between the two regions, with Hung-tze Lake generally in the center. The 4th Division is stationed in the area, with 18,000 troops in the Field Forces reported.

(e) *Hupei-Honan-Anhui Military Region.*—This Region contains the 5th Division with 22,000 in the Field Forces. Although this division is almost completely surrounded by the Japanese forces, the Ta-pieh Mountains (on the junction of Hupei-Honan-Anhui borders) on the East and the Ta-hung (Tung-pei) Mountains (about 120 miles NW of Hankow) on the west provide terrain favorable for the Communist troops. Parts of these mountain areas are old (pre 1934) Red districts and the people therein are experienced in guerrilla warfare. The Region extends north of Hankow on both sides of the Ping-Han Railway to the vicinity of Hsin-yang, Honan, and south of Hankow along the Canton-Hankow Railway to Yochow, (Yüeh-yang) in Huan. On the east the Region extends to the vicinity of Huang-mei in eastern Hupei, and on the west to Shasi and Ichang.

(f) *South Kiangsu Military Region.*—The 6th Division is stationed in this Region with 6,000 in the Field Forces. 25,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region is bounded on the north and west by the Yangtze River and on the south by a line running generally from Wu-hu east to the coast. In the center of the Region is Tai Lake (between Nanking and Shanghai). The Region contains some of the largest cities in China.

(g) *Central Anhwei Military Region.*—The 7th Division, with 5,000 in the Field Forces, occupies this area, which is along both banks of the Yangtze from Nanking westward to Su-sung. In the northern and widest part of the Region, part of the 2nd Division is operating in the area between the Tsin-Pu and Hwai-Nan Railroads. 25,000 Militiamen are reported in the area.

(h) *East Chekiang Military Region.*—The forces operating in this area, about 4,000 in the Field Forces, are known as the "East Chekiang Column." They were originally the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division, 18th Group Army, which were sent to Chekiang in the fall of 1942. 10,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region extends generally on both sides of the Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad to Ningpo, and south as far as Feng-hua.

(5) *East River Military Region*

In this area there are 3,000 in the Field Forces. Very little is known of the troops in this area and on Hainan Island. Communist Headquarters in Yenan appears to maintain very slight contact with them.

(6) *Hainan Island Military Region*

This Region contains 5,000 in the Field Forces.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) General

The organization of the Chinese Communist Army is closely linked with the political organization of the Communist Party and the political organization of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists. (See p. 2335.) The organization and administration of the People's Militia is based on the civil organization of the Military Regions, Military Districts, and Military Sub-districts. Every unit headquarters of company size and larger has a political section which is headed by a commissar. The commissar usually has received military training and in the higher units often serves as deputy commander.

(2) The High Command

Supreme command of the Chinese Communist Army is vested in the Communist Military Council (Military Affairs Commission). This body consists of a Chairman, who in this case is the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (Mao Tse-tung); a vice-Chairman, who is the Commander in Chief of the Communist Army (Gen. Chu Teh); a second vice-Chairman; a Chief of Staff; the Chiefs of departments of the General Staff; the Inspector General; and two deputies of the Inspector General.

(3) Territorial Organization

(a) *General*.—The territory controlled by the Chinese Communist Army consists of a large area in North China under the jurisdiction of the 18th Group Army, a somewhat smaller area in Central China under the New Fourth Army, and two very small areas in South China and Hainan.

(b) *Area controlled by the 18th Group Army*.—The area controlled by the 18th Group Army is divided into six regions, as follows:

1. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Military Region

This region west of the Yellow River is the Main Communist Base, in which Yenan is located.

2. The Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region

This region is divided into the Ta-ch'ing Mountain Military District (in Suiyuan) and the Chin-hsi-pei (northwest Shansi) Military District.

3. The Shansi-Hopch-Chabar Military Region

This region is sub-divided into four Military Districts, and 13 Military Sub-districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, (area east of Peiping and Tientsin) Ping-Pei (area north of Peiping), Central Hopei (area SW of Tientsin), and North Yüeh, (area W and SW of Peiping).

4. The Hopch-Shantung-Honan Military Region

This region is sub-divided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-Districts. The two Military Districts are the following: South Hopie, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan.

5. The Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region

This region is sub-divided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-Districts. The two Military Districts are the following: in the east, T'ai-heng and in the west, T'ai-yueh (Sw Shansi, excluding Gen. Yen Hsi-shan's area in SE Shansi).

6. The Shantung Military Region

This Region is sub-divided into four Military Districts and 17 Military Sub-districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Po Hai (gulf) in the northwest, Chiao-tung in the Northeast, (Shantung Promontory), Central Shantung, and Pin Hai in the southeast (coastal region S of Tsingtao).

(c) *Area Controlled by the New Fourth Army*.—The area which is controlled by the New Fourth Army is divided into eight Military Regions. Further sub-division of this area into Military Districts and Military Sub-districts is not known. The eight Military Regions are the following:

1. North Kiangsu Military Region.
2. Central Kiangsu Military Region.
3. South Kiangsu Military Region.
4. North Huai River Military Region.
5. South Huai River Military Region.
6. Central Anhwei Military Region.

7. East Chekiang Military Region.

8. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region.

(d) *South China*.—In South China there are two small Military Regions under command of the 18th Group Army. They are: East River Military Region (Canton Area), Ch'ung-yai Military Region (interior of Hainan Island).

(4) *Organization of the Army*

(a) *Field Forces*.—

1. *General*

The Field Forces and Local Forces of the regular Army are organized into the two main units of the Communist Forces, the 18th Group Army, and the New 4th Army. The former has 3 oversized divisions in its formal organization, plus jurisdiction over the other minor units. The latter has 7 divisions and the "East Chekiang Column" under its command.

2. *Divisions*

The three divisions of the 18th Group Army as originally authorized by the Central Government consisted of three brigades of two regiments each. The strength was about 14,000 officers and men per division. The exact extent to which these divisions have expanded in numbers of regiments and troops is not known. A recent report states that the divisions of both the 18th Group Army and New Fourth Army are now each organized into three brigades of three regiments. The strength of the New Fourth Army divisions appear to vary greatly and is believed to approximate the strength listed for the field forces in each of the military regions in which the divisions operate.

3. *Brigades*

A recent report states that there are three regiments to a brigade. The highly decentralized nature of operations would appear to make the brigade an important link in the chain of Command. It probably exercises a relatively high degree of independence in both command and administrative functions.

4. *Regiments*

The tactical units of the Chinese Communist Army are organized into three types of regiments: type A, type B, and type C.

a. *Type A regiments*

The 59 type A regiments are organized as follows: a headquarters company, three rifle battalions, and a political section. The headquarters company comprises an administrative section, a signal platoon, an artillery or mortar platoon, a supply platoon, a medical platoon, and a service company. The regiment has a strength of 1763 officers and men and the following equipment: 693 rifles, 124 carbines, 82 pistols, 81 light machine guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 482 mm mortars, 27 light mortars and 33 horses.

b. *Type B regiments*

There are 105 type B regiments. Type B regiments are similar to type A regiments, but they have only two rifle battalions, and they have no artillery or mortar platoon in the headquarters company. The strength of the type B. regiment is 1,163 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 468 rifles, 24 carbines, 76 pistols, 36 light machineguns, 6 heavy machine-guns, 18 light mortars, and 13 horses.

c. *Type C regiments*

There are 133 type C rifle regiments. These regiments are designed to operate in flat terrain where unobserved movement of large bodies of men is difficult. Type C regiments comprise the following: a headquarters company, a political section, and from four to five rifle companies. The headquarters company consist of an administrative section, and supply, signal, medical, and service platoons. The strength of a type C regiment is 866 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 425 rifles, 20 carbines, 62 pistols, 15 light machine-guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 5 light mortars, and 9 horses.

2. *Battalions*

The rifle battalion consists of a headquarters, a political section, a headquarters and service company, a machine-gun platoon, and three rifle companies.

6. Companies

The rifle company consists of a headquarters, a political section, a service platoon, and three rifle platoons. Each rifle platoon has three 13- to 16-man squads. The strength of a rifle company varies from 118 to 136 officers and enlisted men. The equipment allotted to a company consists of 83 rifles, 3 light machine-guns, 3 light mortars, 380 hand grenades, 81 picks, and 81 shovels.

(b) *The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army.*—The personnel of the guerrillas is drawn from the local inhabitants. These men receive the same military and political training as do the members of the field force. They do not regularly engage in productive work. The guerrilla forces are controlled by the commander of a Region. The commanders of separate guerrilla detachments besides being responsible to the Region commander are also accountable to the local People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. It is believed that the organization of the Local Forces is patterned after that of the Field Force, but that they are not as well equipped.

(c) *The People's Militia.*—Every able bodied Chinese Communist of either sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who is not a member of the regular army field forces or local forces (guerrilla) is a member of the People's Militia. (Most of the members of the People's Militia are, however, non-Communist volunteers). At each level of administration (region, district, sub-district, county, township, and village) there is a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolitions Section, Training Section, and Operations Section, is subordinate to the Communist military commander and the Political Commissar of the Communist Army in the region, district, etc. The People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance trains and directs the operations of the following four groups which comprise the People's Militia:

1. The Youth Vanguard

The Youth Vanguard is a group comprising inhabitants between 16 and 23 years old. Their training consists of military drill, use of weapons and first aid, as well as political indoctrination and intelligence work.

2. The Model Detachments

Male graduates of the Youth Vanguard are organized into Model Detachments. This group supplies replacements to both the regular army field forces and local forces. The "local guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from those who desire particularly active service, should not be confused with the local forces above, which are composed of full-time guerrillas. Members of the People's Militia engage in production in addition to their military duties.

3. Self Defense Detachments

This group consists of able bodied men who are not members of any of the other groups. They are organized into small groups whose function is to protect the homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties, and sabotage in the event of Japanese occupation.

4. Women's Detachments

Able bodied women who do not belong to the Youth Vanguard are members of this group. Their organization and functions are similar to those of the Self Defense Detachments.

(5) Air Force

The Communists do not have any aircraft.

(6) Navy

There is no navy as such. The Communists operate a number of armed junks off some sections of the coasts of Kiangsu and Shantung Provinces which they sometimes refer to as their "Navy."

(7) Organization of the Services

(a) *Signal Communications.*—Signal communications in Communist China are limited by shortage of equipment and trained personnel. However, both radio and wire communications are used by the Army. The radio communications network within the army is as follows:

The 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yen-an communicates with the various Military Region headquarters at least once a day.

The Region Headquarters communicate with each other and with the Military Districts under them.

The Military District headquarters communicate with local regimental headquarters, intelligence stations, and other units equipped with radio.

(b) *Medical Service*.—See Section 7, h, page 2445.

NOTE.—For chart of territorial organization, see chart No. 1, opposite page 2448.

C. TRAINING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) *General*

The training policies of the Chinese Communist army have been influenced by many factors. Training has been carried out under unusual conditions, since the Communists must be on the constant alert against possible attack by the Japanese as well as by the Kuomintang. The time devoted to training is limited, due to the fact that the troops in many areas must produce part or all of their own food and clothing in order to exist. Training equipment is of the most primitive type. Training in the combined arms is practically non-existent. Many of the units have been forced to combine the problem of subsistence with the problem of training. One brigade was sent to an area for the purpose of making it self sufficient. The troops would plant crops in the springtime and tend the fields until harvest. During the period there was practically no training. After harvest time an intensive program would be carried out until the following spring when the cycle would be repeated.

The training objectives of the Chinese Communists have been set forth by General Lin Piao, President of the Anti-Japanese Military Academy in Sui-te, Shensi. He points out that it is necessary for the troops to conduct training and operations simultaneously, and since the troops are scattered it becomes quite difficult to engage in the unit training of regiments or brigades. Due to the high rate of attrition in officer personnel and to the rapid expansion of the military forces, enlisted personnel have been advanced to the officer grade after a comparatively short period of service in the ranks.

The training policy is to give infantry instruction to all personnel regardless of branch of service. Little instructional effort is devoted to subjects like close order drill or company administration. The emphasis is on field training, with the tactics of close combat and guerrilla warfare being stressed. The shortage of ammunition necessitates reliance on the hand grenade and bayonet. Stealth, night fighting and ambush are accepted doctrine.

Training periods vary from two and one-half months in the forward areas to about four and one-half months in the rear areas. Troop training is the responsibility of all officers. Higher commanders indicate the general policy and the details are left to the commanders of the smaller units. Officers are instructed first, and then are expected to pass on their knowledge to the men, who use the coach and pupil method of instruction. Routine tasks of the day are utilized for training whenever practicable. For instance, troops on a routine march would be trained in the tactics of the advance guard, approach march and meeting engagement.

The competitive spirit is fostered by the publication of standings in the progress made during any training period. Formal or informal contests are held and prizes are awarded.

The Communist Forces have emphasized decentralization in training. This does not make for efficiency in methods, but it seems to have been unavoidable by reason of the conditions under which the Communist forces have been forced to operate.

(2) *Training in Weapons*

(a) *The Rifle*.—The extreme shortages of ammunition have curtailed formal target practice as we know it. In many instances the trainee is allowed but three rounds of rifle ammunition for training purposes. Field manuals on rifle marksmanship are in use by Chinese Communist forces and the conventional subject matter is included in them. The only report available of an observed target practice indicates that no attempt was made to coach the pupil, and that training methods were most primitive.

(b) *Machine Guns*.—In an observed target practice, the machine gun was emplaced and aimed, and the pupil had but to step up and pull the trigger. He then would make whatever adjustment he considered necessary.

In their official training manual on the use of machine guns the Communists emphasize vigorous training under field conditions. They teach the doctrine of fire and movement, emphasizing the value of the machine gun as a close support weapon. The weapon is utilized in night training exercises. A knowledge

and use of the terrain in the proper selection of positions is considered essential. Stress is placed on the proper methods of cover and concealment.

(c) *Hand Grenades*.—The hand grenade has been considered the most important weapon at the disposal of the Communist forces, and appears to have been effectively employed. Termed "Artillery for the Soldier" the hand grenade has proved a decisive factor in many instances. As a result, training in the use of this weapon has received much emphasis. In an observed training exercise, the troops performed in a most creditable manner.

(d) *Bayonet Training*.—Training methods in the use of the bayonet follow the conventional pattern. The use of the weapon in hand to hand fighting is stressed, since the absence of artillery makes victory difficult for the Communists except that which is gained by close combat.

(3) *Unit Training*

(a) *Squads, Sections, and Companies*.—Extended order drill, for units up to the size of the company, receive careful attention in the theoretical and practical training of the Communist Military Forces. Methods of movement under fire, of deployment, close support and reliance on stealth and ambush are taught. The preponderance of unit training is given under this category by reason of the fact that it is difficult to assemble larger units exclusively for training purposes.

(b) *Regiments and Brigades*.—It is in the training of the larger units that the Chinese Communist forces have been most deficient. A U. S. military observer reported on an exercise consisting of an approach march and a meeting engagement conducted by a brigade of two regiments. Among the deficiencies noticed were these: There was not sufficient time given for a reconnaissance, for the designation of assembly points, for the issuance and receipt of orders or of making estimates of the situation. No use was made of concealment or of cover. Machine guns were employed without any definite fire plan in mind. Trench mortars were fired from the crest of hills without taking advantage of the cover afforded by the reverse slope of the hill. Communications were almost non-existent. Communist Military leaders admit their deficiencies and acknowledge the need for further training for officers of the grade of regimental commander and above. Training in the combined arms and in Staff procedure are among the more important items which must be studied before the military potential of these forces is realized to the fullest extent.

D. TACTICS OF THE CHINESE FORCES

(1) *General*

The tactics of the Chinese Communist Army have been influenced by their low economic potential, and their operations have been aimed chiefly against Japanese military and economic consolidation and exploitation of the occupied areas.

(2) *The Offensive*

(a) *Large Scale Operations*.—Despite existing deficiencies in weapons and materiel the Communist forces have occasionally engaged in operation of a fairly large scale. Well organized attacks have been made against puppet troops in Shantung province recently. These attacks against the Chinese puppets appear to have been intensified in the past few months, with the probable objectives of capturing their arms and causing defection in their ranks.

(b) *Attacks against Fortified Areas*.—The Chinese Communists have engaged in offensive operations such as raids, attacks on forts, strong points, and forays into large cities.

(c) *Attacks against Enemy Troop Concentrations*.—The Communists attempt to strike at the critical time when the Japanese are preparing for mopping up operations. This causes the enemy to detach portions of his striving force and thus weaken the proposed offensive. The favorite tactics are to strike the Japanese on the flanks and rear and then disappear before the enemy can effect a concentration of forces. The Communists have managed to capture an increasing number of prisoners in this manner.

(d) *Small Scale Operations*.—It is in the small scale operations that the Chinese Communist Army has dealt the most damage to the Japanese. These operations constitute the larger portion of engaged military activity. The struggle for supplies has been a motivating factor in many cases. Captured enemy materiel and supplies are needed to remedy the deficiencies confronting the Communists. In these engagements the fighting unit is seldom larger than a company, and the operations are generally of short duration. The attacks are leveled at small Japanese detachments on independent missions, isolated Garri-

sons and villages. The tactics used are those of conventional guerrilla warfare. Strategems, night attacks and ambush are employed in order to overcome the inferiority of numbers and weapons.

(e) *Demolitions*.—Demolitions on a small scale are included in the program of employed strategy. Bridges, roads, military installations and railroads are destroyed with regularity. However, the homemade black powder used in these operations often prevents the accomplishment of results commensurate with the effort and danger involved.

(f) *Use of Propaganda*.—The Communists claim that the increasing number of prisoners captured in the past year is due as much to the effectiveness of their propaganda measures as to their increased military strength. While the peasants in the People's Militia frequently mistreat or kill Japanese prisoners, the regular army forces use the prisoners for propaganda purposes to cause defection in enemy ranks. They are given money, new clothes and good food. They are usually allowed to return if they so desire. Those who do return dispel the belief of their associates that they would be maltreated if captured; hence, according to the Communists, they surrender more easily when hard-pressed. Those who remain receive political indoctrination and usually espionage training, after which they are either returned to Japanese troops for espionage work or used to shout propaganda to the Japanese troops in blockhouses or other enemy concentrations.

(3) *The Defensive*

In defending against Japanese attacks, the Communists avoid frontal clashes wherever possible. Avenues of approach are mined and booby-trapped, and the Japanese flanks, rear, and line of communications are harassed and attacked in an attempt to prevent the Japanese advance from penetrating too deeply into the base areas. Where they fail to halt a deep Japanese incursion, the food supplies and the small quantities of manufacturing machinery are either removed from the area or hidden to prevent their capture or destruction by the Japanese. Attacks are then made against the extended enemy line of communications to force a Japanese withdrawal, after which the bases are reestablished.

(4) *Summary of Communist Tactics*

Shortage of ammunition has had noticeable effect on the tactics of the Chinese Communists. By necessity they are forced to fight small engagements of short duration. They are precluded the use of long-range fire. In fact, some units have adopted the following rule of thumb for purposes of conservation: Rifle fire is not to be used beyond 200 yards, although more expert riflemen are allowed to fire up to 400 yards. Light machine guns may be fired 300 to 400 yards and heavy machine guns 400 to 500 yards.

Extensive use of land mines has been made recently, and hand grenades are used as much as possible.

The necessary emphasis on small scale operations has had its effect on Staff Procedure as employed in larger Chinese Communist units. Communist forces have had little experience in logistics. Nevertheless, certain characteristics have been developed in their operations. They have attained a high degree of efficiency in independent actions. Their leaders have courage, initiative and self-reliance. Their troops are highly mobile. They know the terrain intimately and use it to the best advantage. They have also learned to improvise with their limited resources.

(5) *The People's Militia*

(a) *General*.—While not actually a part of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces, the People's Militia has an important part in the continuing operations against the Japanese. The function of the Militia is to maintain peace and order in the rear areas. They are primarily concerned with the task of production, but they are capable of spontaneous guerrilla warfare. The People's Militia is a natural outgrowth of the desire of the more aggressive elements of the population to participate in active defensive operations.

(b) *Tactical Doctrine*.—An excellent knowledge of the surrounding terrain coupled with an efficient intelligence system combine to make the Militia a formidable bulwark of defense. Their tactical doctrine can be summarized by the following Militia Dictum:

"Appear where the enemy does not expect you; attack where he is not prepared. When the enemy attacks, avoid him; when he encamps, harass him; when he retreats, pursue him."

(c) *Training Methods*.—Training is considered secondary to production and as a result it is given during the free time of the Militiamen, generally two hours during the evening. Training methods are extremely simple, but the course is varied. The following subjects are covered; fundamentals of drill, rifle marksmanship, grenade throwing, ambushing, tunnel warfare, surprise attack, harassing lines of communication and methods of reconnaissance.

(d) *Tactical Employment*.—The People's Militia is used for the most part in active support of the regular forces. It renders valuable service in the protection of supply lines in the evacuation of the wounded.

(e) *Tunnel Warfare*.—With customary ingenuity, village inhabitants of areas under the control of the Chinese Communist Military Forces have built underground defense works. Many villages have elaborate caves and tunnels. They are built as a means of escape from Japanese raiding parties. They have an additional function in the safeguarding of supplies and matériel. The tunnels have numerous narrow twists and turns both in the horizontal and vertical planes, making defense a fairly easy matter. Gas proof chambers, secret passages, and air vents are a part of the detailed construction plan.

(f) *Mine Warfare*.—The People's Militia has used mine warfare effectively. In many areas the Japanese are reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garrisons, since roads and paths are mined nightly. Mine casings are received from local, primitive ordnance factories. The village inhabitants fill them with homemade black powder, attaching a simple detonating apparatus.

(g) *Harassing Warfare*.—The Militia is deployed to tear down and destroy blockade walls, and to fill ditches and moats surrounding Japanese garrisoned villages. They have been instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of Japanese. They have planted spies and intelligence agents in Japanese occupied villages, and in many Japanese units.

(6) *Communist Army Intelligence Measures*

The Chinese Communist Armies have developed a unique intelligence system which has apparently been highly successful for their immediate purposes.

The People's Militia, in addition to other duties, maintains a constant vigilance in order to detect spies and traitors. It performs a valuable counterintelligence function by constantly checking the passes of individuals found within their particular locality. In general, the Communist armies could not carry on operations in their present area without the help of the People's Militia.

The Communists have planted spies in towns and villages under Japanese control. Information of impending Japanese attacks has usually been received in sufficient time to allow the proper employment of defensive measures. Many Communist agents are working in Japanese organizations. The lack of portable radio equipment, however, often prevents agents operating in the cities from getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.

E. MILITARY WEAPONS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

(1) *General*

The Chinese Communist forces are poorly armed. Their manufacturing facilities are extremely limited, and they are forced to depend almost entirely on captured weapons and equipment. The Communists have a few old and badly worn artillery pieces but no artillery ammunition. Trucks and other mechanized equipment are destroyed when captured because the lack of fuel and the lack of trained personnel precludes their use. No protective equipment is available against chemical attack, and signal and medical supplies are insufficient. The troops, all of whom are trained primarily in guerrilla tactics, depend completely on small arms and individual close-combat weapons.

(a) *Rifles and bayonets*.—Approximately 80% of their rifles have been captured from the Japanese and Chinese puppet forces. Most of these are probably the Model 38 (1905) 6.5 mm. The remainder have been obtained from the National Government forces and are for the most part 7.92 mm Mausers M 88 and M 98. Bayonets are mostly Japanese Model 30 (1897). A few that are manufactured by the Communists are of inferior quality.

(b) *Light machine guns*.—Most of the light machine guns are probably Japanese Model 11 (1922) 6.5 mm, although a few are Chinese 7.92 mm. Z.B. 26 "Praga" type and Belgian 6.5 mm Brownings. Heavy machine guns are Japanese Model 3 (1914) 6.5 mm and Model 92 (1932) 7.7 mm.

(c) *Grenade discharges and hand grenades*.—Great faith is placed in grenade discharges and hand grenades for close combat. About 50 percent of the grenade discharges are Japanese M 10 (1921) 50 mm and Model 89 (1929) 50 mm. The

rest are made, mostly by hand, by the Communists in their own small arsenals.

Hand grenades are used in relatively large quantities. These are made by the Communist arsenals and appear to be effective. They are the "potato masher" type consisting of a cast iron head filled with black powder and wooden handle and pull-type friction igniter with a time delay of 4 to 6 seconds.

(d) *Land mines*.—In recent operations extensive use has been made of crude land mines. These mines consist of spherical cast iron bodies 5.9 inches in diameter containing a high explosive filling. They are detonated by means of pull-type igniter.

(e) *Mortars and antitank guns*.—The Communists have a few old Japanese mortars, possibly the Model 11 (1922) 70 mm, as well as some Chinese 82 mm mortars of the Stokes-Brandt type. In 1938 they received 6 anti-tank guns and 120 light machine guns from the Chinese National Government, but since then have had to capture equipment from the Chinese Nationals or use weapons that have been discarded by the Nationals for salvage.

(f) *Ammunition*.—Ammunition supply is the most serious disadvantage to the Communists. All types of ammunition are exceedingly scarce, and the many different small arms calibers complicate the problem. Much rifle and machine gun ammunition has been reloaded in Communist arsenals but is of inferior quality. Ammunition is so scarce that practically none can be allotted for either rifle or MG training.

(g) *Individual Equipment*.—Theoretically, the equipment of an infantry soldier consists of a rifle and bayonet, 50 rounds of ammunition, 4 hand grenades, and an entrenching tool. Actually, there is an average of one rifle per two infantrymen and a proportionate amount of other individual equipment.

F. UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) *Uniform*

In winter the Communist soldier wears the horizon blue quilted uniform, made of cotton. This uniform is light in weight but affords great protection from the cold, and is not too bulky for efficiency. The items making up the uniform are a vest, a long coat (double breasted, high collar model), knee-length breeches and a short jacket. Some or all of these items may be worn by one soldier. Blue denim wrap puttees and the usual Chinese cloth shoe with closely stitched sole of cloth complete the outfit.

A lighter weight uniform is worn in warm weather. A typical blouse has the following characteristics: high neckline, buttons up to the neckline, turned down collar on which insignia could be attached, and a buttoned-flap patch pocket.

(2) *Insignia*

Equality is the basis of the relationship in the Chinese Communist Army. There is no difference in the uniforms of "Leaders" and "Fighters" and Leaders wear no rank insignia. Their contact with the Fighters is supposed to be so intimate that their position of authority is known to all. The cap device is usually a red cloth star, although the Chinese national emblem has been officially designated for use.

G. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) *General*

Before 1940 the Chinese Central Government furnished the Chinese Communist Forces with some explosives, rifles, ammunition, and grain. This flow of supplies was curtailed in 1940, and halted in 1941. The Communists, therefore, in recent years have had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their own efforts. They have fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity of arms, ammunition, medical supplies and other important manufactured and imported supplies has been meager.

(2) *Procurement of supplies*

(a) *General*.—The territorial organization forms the basis of the productive, maintenance, and repair activities of Communist China. Farmers retain sufficient produce for their needs, moving the balance to numerous widely distributed collection points.

(b) *Food*.—Wheat, millet, rice, other grains, vegetables, and small quantities of meat are raised wherever possible. Some of the troops aid in planting and collecting the harvests while others provide protection for these activities.

(c) *Clothing*.—Some clothing and uniforms are manufactured in a number of small factories.

(d) *Arms and ammunition*.—The Communists obtain most of their weapons and ammunition by capturing them from the Japanese, Chinese Puppet, and to a lesser degree from the Central Government forces. A few arsenals are known to exist but these manufacture only small quantities of rifles, small arms ammunition, hand grenades, and land mines. Because most operations are manual, precision is low, and models antiquated. These arsenals as well as other installations provide limited repair facilities.

(e) *Other Supplies*.—Some material such as medical supplies and storage batteries are purchased in either open or "black" markets of Japanese held cities, notably Shanghai.

(3) *Distribution and transportation of supplies*

The dispersed supply collecting points (see 2a) become distributing agencies from which troops in the area may draw when necessary. In the event of Japanese incursions, these stockpiles may be moved or hidden and thus saved from destruction or capture. Troops in movement may requisition supplies directly from farmers, offering "ration cards" which are redeemable by the Communist-sponsored government.

Communist forces are particularly deficient in transport. In some rear areas there is a small amount of transport by pack animals and two-wheeled carts (usually drawn by three mules) but in active areas all that troops take with them on the march is carried on their backs or slung on poles over their shoulders. Field officers are often provided with horses or mules. Motor transport is practically non-existent.

(4) *Maintenance requirements*

A Yenian press dispatch states that the standard allowance of the army is now four pounds of meat, one and three quarters pounds of oil and lard, forty-seven pounds of vegetables and sixty pounds of grain per man per month. This averages about three and one half pounds per man per day. Observers report that the average soldier appears healthy and well fed.

H. MEDICAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) *General*

In evaluating the medical accomplishments and problems of the Chinese Communist forces the following four points and their effect upon medical care in the area have been considered:

(a) The Chinese Communist Army is primarily a guerrilla army, and its tactics and organization are based on extreme mobility. The effectiveness of the Communist forces has been due in great part to their ability to strike and run, to infiltrate through enemy lines and harass their rear, to sabotage enemy personnel, supplies and lines of communications. Such extreme mobility directly effects medical organization.

(b) Areas under Communist control correspond rather closely with a topography of rugged hill and mountain sections, while enemy-held territory consists of plains lands and lines of communication running in the valleys between guerrilla areas. This factor is at the same time advantageous and disadvantageous medically speaking. The terrain precludes evacuation of the wounded by any method save hand-borne stretchers or, in the case of the less severely wounded, by horse. At the same time the numerous more or less inaccessible hide-aways in the hills afford excellent sites for dispersal of hospital units.

(c) The Communist Army has on the whole succeeded exceedingly well in their determined effort to win over the peasant class. This cordial relationship between the soldiers and the local peasantry plays an important part in the army's evacuation and care of its sick and wounded.

(d) Since 1939, except for a few more or less luxury items, the Central Government has thrown a rigid blockade around the Border Regions of the Communist area. This blockade has excluded medical supplies and literature from the Communists and has resulted in improvisations, the manufacture of a few modern drugs from locally procureable products, and the utilization of Chinese drugs of questionable efficacy. Only rarely are some urgently needed items smuggled through the blockade.

(2) *Line of Evacuation of the Sick and Wounded*

(a) *Company First Aid Man.*—The smallest unit having attached medical personnel is the company, and save for exceptional circumstances this is an enlisted man who has had no more than a basic first aid course or some nursing instruction. The exception occurs in the case where a company is going on a long and arduous journey as a single unit at which time a medical officer (surgeon) may be attached. The medical corps first aid man is equipped with a small cloth bag containing bandages, gauze, iodine and a pair of dressing forceps. Due to the shortage in medical supplies he carries no drugs such as morphine or sulfonamides. After an engagement the medical corps man gives first aid and supervises the evacuation of the wounded to the Battalion Medical Station or a nearby sheltered spot, utilizing the soldiers of his company as stretcher bearers. At this point the responsibility of the company ceases. In the event that a company is out on an isolated mission cut off from rear lines of communications the disposal of the wounded is accomplished by one of two methods: firstly, if the wounded are few in number and the company anticipates further engagements, their uniforms are changed to civilian clothes and they are placed in the homes of the local populace who nurse them back to health and then aid them in filtering back to their units; secondly, if the percentage of wounded is rather high and further engagements are not anticipated, the medical corps man remains behind with the wounded who are dispersed through the local homes, supervises their nursing and after convalescence leads them back to Communist army units. These men though wounded retain their arms, and in their return trip may fight guerrilla warfare for months before rejoining their army. The medical attention given the wounded under such conditions is of necessity limited and those whose lives are dependent on major surgery are lost. Food, bed rest and bandaging constitute the sum total of medical care. At times even bandages are not available.

(b) *Battalion Medical Station.*—This medical station lying about a mile behind the lines, staffed by one doctor and two nurses, constitutes the first point in the chain of evacuation where the wounded soldier comes under the supervision of a surgeon. No major surgery is attempted here and the main duties of the surgeon are those of redressing, giving priority of evacuation and supervising the stretcher bearers. Those lightly wounded and able to ride horses or walk are moved on to the rear in this fashion. The mode of medical care in case the battalion is cut off from further evacuation corresponds to that of the company.

(c) *Regimental Medical Station.*—The next in line of evacuation is the Regimental Medical Station staffed by two surgeons and four nurses whose duties are to: 1) prepare dressings and bandages for forward stations; 2) debride minor wound and ligature hemorrhaging vessels; 3) temporarily splint fractures; 4) register the wounded. (This is the first point along the line where the wounded are registered). There are no beds in this medical unit, but those lightly wounded may remain here for a few days before returning to join their combat forces. Those requiring further medical attention are evacuated down the line by stretcher or horse to the next unit which is usually set up in some of the buildings of a village about five miles behind the lines.

(d) *Brigade Field Hospital.*—This hospital, staffed by five surgeons and a dozen or so nurses, is the first point along the line of evacuation where major surgery, such as amputations, debridement of major wounds and removal of foreign bodies, is performed. No abdominal surgery is undertaken. Here, too, are found the first hospital beds which are put up in buildings temporarily appropriated for this purpose. The time lapse from injury to hospitalization in the Brigade Field Hospital runs from three to eight hours.

(e) *Divisional Field Hospital.*—Up to this point all medical units have been mobile, but in this hospital the first stationary organization is found. Each sub-military district normally contains two such hospitals, which are set up in villages and have an average bed capacity of one hundred and fifty. Actually the emergency expansion of such a unit is limited only by the size of the village. Usually the operating and the dressing rooms are the only permanent fixtures of the installation, the patients being distributed through the village homes as the occasion demands. The basic staff consists of five officers distributed as follows: three surgeons, one assistant to the surgeons and one pharmacist. The size of the nursing staff depends on the number of patients and the number of nurses available. In such fixed hospitals all types of surgery are performed, the extent limited only by the amount of medical supplies on hand. In the event of a Japanese push even the "fixed" hospital is sometimes forced to move, and the pa-

tients are dispersed into isolated mountain regions where they are cared for in caves. The surgeons and nurses accompany the patients and the local peasants volunteer their services as stretcher bearers to aid in the mass evacuation.

(3) *Base Medical Service*

Each military Region of which there are fourteen reported in Communist China, has as the head of its medical organization a Base Medical Service under whose jurisdiction come larger fixed hospitals (three to four), medical schools (only one of which gives training at all comparable to accepted medical institutions of the west), medical factories and nursing schools. The several Base Medical Services are theoretically under the control of the 8th Route Army Medical Department; however, the various medical organizations are very decentralized and to a great extent on their own initiative. This decentralization is readily explained on the basis of two factors: firstly, the Base Medical Services are to a great extent isolated from one another with poor lines of communication; secondly, the 8th Route Army Medical Department, because of the stringent Kuomintang blockade, has practically nothing in the way of medical supplies to distribute to the various Base Medical Services. As a result, the two organizations are not interdependent. The larger fixed hospitals care for both the local civilian population and the more chronic military patients who, because of the necessity for prolonged hospitalization, have been evacuated to the rear from Divisional Fixed Hospitals. In certain cases where these larger hospitals are in fairly close areas, one will cater to the civilians and the other to the military.

(a) *Hospitals*.—On November 23, 1939, Dr. Norman Bethune, who had been sent to China under the auspices of The American Canadian League for Peace and Democracy some two years before, died of a septicemia resulting from a wound sustained while operating on the wounded in Wutai. Yen-an held a vast memorial meeting attended by all representatives of the Communist Party, Army, Government and people, and passed a resolution to enlarge the 8th Route Army Military Hospital and to change its name to the "Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital." This hospital has been moved several times and has split off into further subdivisions. At present there is the head hospital and three sections, all in the vicinity of Yen-an. The different sections are located in different areas to facilitate management, supply (growing of food, etc.) and the reception of different kinds of patients. They are all able to solve their own technical problems, but whenever medical difficulties are encountered the head hospital usually convenes consultations of all section chiefs. General consultations are held on all rare and difficult diseases with members of each section attending. Medical reports on the activities of each section are received monthly, and an interchange of professional experiences is a regular item in this relationship. All problems of medicines, medical equipment and other hospital supplies are decided on in meetings organized by the head hospital. Education work, for example, is handled by the head hospital and all three sections, some providing actual teachers for lectures in the medical school and others taking in the graduates for their internships.

(b) *Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital*.—In the Spring of 1943 the hospital moved to its present location at Liu Wan Chia Kou, about four miles northeast of the old walled city of Yen-an. The hospital, nestled in a small valley off the Yen River, is a community in itself with all the staff living on the premises. Every family has a small vegetable garden (including the patients who are able to work). The Communist Party has put on a great agricultural drive during the past few years in an effort to make the country self-sufficient. The professors and their families take great pride in showing off their gardens to visitors. The wards and homes of the faculty of the hospital are caves dug out of the soft loose soil of the hill sides.

The hospital has six services with separate wards for each: surgical, medical, infectious diseases, obstetrical-gynecological, pediatrics and the out-patient services. Each individual ward room contains around six beds, except for the pediatrics ward where, due to the shortage of nursing personnel, the preponderance of breast feeding and the local customs, beds are furnished the mothers of the patients so they may sleep beside the cribs. The pharmacy and the laboratory are also housed in caves, but the operating rooms are in a stone building built on a level area below the wards. Each service has one chief doctor and two assistants (out-patient department is staffed by members of the other services

rotating daily); there are two pharmacists, one laboratory technician and one assistant, one superintendent of nurses, and 38 nurses.

Though civilians are accepted, the head hospital is primarily a military institution and caters to soldiers and their families. There are approximately two hundred beds of which fifty are for surgical cases.

Each hospital has a political commissar whose duties seem to be those of a sort of morale builder, catechizer and political instructor. In many ways he would compare with a chaplain attached to our military hospitals. The staff members are from varying walks of life and educated in various parts of the world, some in China, others in America, Germany, France, or Switzerland.

The common surgical diseases encountered are: wounds, burns, fractures, acute appendicitis, inguinal herniae, and minor rectal conditions such as hemorrhoids, rectal fissures and fistulae in ano.

The operating rooms are two in number. In the same building are preparation rooms, dressing rooms where gauze is prepared for sterilization and a small room with the instrument cabinets.

Local and spinal anaesthesia are used almost exclusively, primarily because other types are not available. It is possible to smuggle novocaine and local anaesthetics from Japanese controlled sections of China.

In the medical service the following diseases are prevalent: tuberculosis, influenza, gastro-intestinal diseases, malaria, relapsing fever, and some cases of kalaazar. In pediatrics one encounters whooping cough, pneumonia, and gastro-intestinal diseases. Typhoid, typhus and bacillary dysentery are the more common diseases encountered in the infectious disease wards. One can readily appreciate the difficulty of treating the above diseases when such items as the sulfonamides, neostibosan, arsenicals for intra-venous use and typhoid and typhus vaccines are not available.

Daily ward rounds are held throughout the hospital with weekly staff conferences. Charts are kept in orthodox fashion with history sheets, nursing charts, temperature charts, drug order sheets and laboratory sheets, all of which are printed locally on paper made in this region.

The running fund and expenses of the hospital, except for a small part coming from the China Defense League and the China Aid Council, comes from the Border Region Government. Another small part is supplied from the self-production work accomplished by the hospital.

(4) Conclusion

The medical personnel seem very much alive to the needs of the Army and civilians in Communist China. Considering the difficulties encountered, U. S. observers have been favorably impressed by the accomplishments of the medical profession. The medical staffs of the local hospitals, medical school and military establishments of forward echelons are all very cognizant of their limitations in personnel and matériel. Major improvement in the medical service can only be effected by the importation of medical supplies, at present prevented by the Central Government embargo. The peasants as well as the army would likely benefit from any medical improvement in this section. This would in turn be a factor in improving the fighting qualities of the soldier, for the civilian besides being his family is also his rear echelon, growing the food and making the supplies essential to the army.

I. CONCLUSIONS

The consensus of opinion of U. S. observers is that the Chinese Communist Regular Army is a young, well fed, well clothed, battle-hardened volunteer force in excellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelligence, and very high morale. Training of these troops may be rated as fair for their present capabilities even though it is woefully inadequate judged by American standards. Military intelligence, for their purposes, is good. The most serious lack of the Communist forces is in equipment.

The outstanding weaknesses of the Communist forces include lack of sufficient small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical personnel, lack of signal equipment in general and especially of radio communication below regiment level, complicated and irregular organization, and heavy casualties among officers with consequent weakness in junior leadership.

The most pressing needs of the Chinese Communist forces are for rifle and machine gun ammunition and for an easily portable weapon capable of knocking out Japanese forts, which sometimes have brick walls. The bazooka might prove useful for this latter purpose, and could also be used against the numerous

Japanese blockhouses of less formidable construction than the forts. The same weapon might be employed against Japanese rail traffic, since the Communists are often able to operate very close to important Japanese-held railroads. Rifle and machine gun ammunition required is caliber 7.92, about half Chinese and half Japanese. An urgent need is for more modern signal equipment, so designed as to be light and easily portable. Photographic equipment of the Communists is very meager. Medical supplies and hospital equipment of all kinds are urgently needed. A few supplies, such as chemical balance scales and various machine tools, would materially increase the productive capacity of Communist manufacturing plants. Many factories waste time making inferior tools which soon wear out because they are made from railway rails. The bayonets manufactured by the Communists are of soft steel and the quality is poor. This is a serious handicap because the shortage of ammunition compels Communist troops to rely heavily on bayonet charges and fighting in close quarters. The Communists have no anti-gas equipment. General Yeh Chien-ying C-of-S of the 18th Group Army, states that the Japanese have taken advantage of this fact to inflict over 14,000 casualties, including a number of brigade and division commanders. There is need for a definite program of tactical training and for training in combined arms. Training in weapons is deficient, partly due to lack of sufficient ammunition and partly due to faulty methods employed.

These shortcomings of the Communists are, however, offset in part by certain organizational advantages. The small units of the Communist forces, carrying the lightest possible equipment, have high mobility and are well adapted to guerrilla warfare. These units are equipped and trained to operate independently. They exist off the country, apparently having full support of the populace in the areas. This facilitates quick dispersal and mobility. The organization of the forces enables coordination of the operations of these individual units, within the limits of existing communication facilities, through a centralized command. This command takes in not only the regular forces of the area, but also the local detachments and other units within the People's Militia, and the whole population enlisted in the People's Self-Defense Corps. The Communists claim that the political work throughout the Army guarantees high morale, excellent discipline, and the whole-hearted support and cooperation of the people.

The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Army may be viewed in the light of the following two factors. Firstly, the Communists are capable of continuing indefinitely the present program of harassment against the Japanese while slowly increasing their strength and supplies. Secondly, they are not capable of independent, decisive operations to dislodge the Japanese from north or east China unless the Japanese situation has deteriorated seriously or is on the verge of collapse.

This deterioration of the Japanese situation depends largely upon the success of the Chungking Government army in an advance against the Japanese and on a landing of Allied forces on the China coast. At present the Japanese forces are so disposed in China that a major operation against them would entail the movement of substantial troops and supplies to the threatened areas. Allied domination of the seas would confine the movement to the lines of communication available to them within China. The reinforcements which the Japanese could obtain to bolster their defense against the Allies would be drawn largely from units engaged in garrison duties along the railways. The Communists are so disposed over all of North China and a large part of Central China that they are capable of (a) widespread attacks against Japanese garrisons and concentrations to hamper their mobilization for movement and (b) attacks upon and destruction of sections of the railroads to interfere with the movements of Japanese troops and supplies. This interference will slow down Japanese movements considerably, though they will probably not stop all movements.


In tactical situations the Communists are capable of providing a local Allied force with the following forms of resistance:

- To serve as advance, rear, and flank guards;
- To pursue a defeated or withdrawing enemy;
- To strike at or turn an enemy flank;
- To plant mine fields and engage in demolitions;
- To engage in ambush, surprise attacks, and night operations;
- To infiltrate enemy lines, attack rear installations, and harass lines of communications;
- To provide intelligence to Allied forces on local Japanese strengths, concentrations and movements.

CHART No. 2.—*Strength distribution of Chinese Communist Army*

	Field forces	Local forces	Total regulars	Rifles, field forces	Rifles, local forces	Total rifles	Militia	Regiments			
								A	B	C	Total
Shen-Kan-Ning.....	50,000		50,000	30,000				14	28	10	52
Shansi-Suiyuan.....	26,000	5,000	31,000	15,000							
Shansi-Chahar-Hopel.....	35,000	24,000	64,000	21,000					16	40	56
Shantung.....	42,000	28,000	70,000	25,000				13	11	13	37
Shansi-Hopel-Honan.....	50,000	25,000	75,000	29,000					4	6	17
Hopel-Shantung-Honan.....	17,000	11,000	28,000	11,000				3	13	11	27
Total, 8th Route Army.....	220,000	98,000	318,000	131,000	50,000	184,000	1,580,000	34	74	91	199
Central Kiangsu.....	19,000			11,000			130,000				
South Hwai.....	21,000			13,000			(?)				
North Kiangsu.....	23,000			14,000			85,000				
North Huai.....	18,000			11,000			(?)				
Hopel-Honan-Anhui.....	22,000			14,000			(?)				
South Kiangsu.....	4,000			3,000			25,000				
Central Anhwei.....	5,000			3,000			25,000				
East Chekiang.....	4,000			2,000			10,000				
Total, New 4th Army.....	118,000	31,000	149,000	71,000	10,000	93,000	550,000	25	31	42	98
East River.....	3,000		3,000	2,000		2,000					
Hainan Island.....	5,000		5,000	3,000		3,000					
Grand total.....	346,000	129,000	475,000	207,000	66,000	282,000	2,130,000	50	105	133	297

CHAPT. I



C H A I T I


Note: This chart has been constructed from information supplied by Communist officials.

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DATE 10/10/00 BY 60322 UCBAW

Communist Party organizations
are indicated in solid BLACK

Chart No. 3

ORGANIZATION OF CLASS A REGIMENT



Note: Class B regiments lack the artillery platoon of the Hq. Co., and one rifle Battalion. (12)

ORGANIZATION OF CIRCUS C REGIMENT

Chart 10. 4

STRENGTH & EQUIPMENTOFFICERS & ENLISTED MEN

196 - Officers & enlisted men

420 - rifles

20 - carbines


62 - pistols

15 - light MGs

2 - heavy MGs

5 - light mortars

9 - horses



WHO'S WHO IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Note: Asterisks indicates names for which no Chinese characters are available.

- AI Ssu-ch'i—Leading Chinese Marxian-Leninist philosopher. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when reported in 1943. One time member of the Party Central Research Institute.
- *AN Wen-hsiang—Identified in 1944 as President of the Sui-te (in Shensi) People's Political Council.
- ANDREOFF—One of the Russian Communist advisers with Borodin in China until 1927. Reported in 1944 in Chungking on the staff of the Russian Military Attache. Speaks Chinese fluently, said to be "very clever."
- ASANUMA—Head of the Japanese Emancipation League formed in West Suiyüan Province by a group of Japanese captives.
- BERG, Michael—See BORODIN, Michael
- BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch (Ga-lin, Galen)—Marshal. Chief Russian Military Adviser to CHIANG Kai-shek and Instructor in Whampoa Military Academy 1924-27. Born 1889. Metal worker. Served in Czarist Army in World War I until seriously wounded, 1915. Formally joined the Bolshevik Party, 1916. Rose to fame as a military leader in the Russian Civil War. Drove the White Russians out of Crimea, 1920, out of Outer Mongolia, 1921. Appeared in China in 1924 under the name of Ga-lin or Galen. Reorganized and trained Chinese troops. Devised plan of attack for the Northern Punitive Expedition, 1926. Departed from China early 1927. C-in-C of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, 1929-38. Served on the military court which tried TUKACHEVSKI and other Soviet officers in 1937. Reported in October 1944 to be in an NKVD political concentration camp in good health but blind from work in the mines.
- BO Gu—see CH'IN Pang-hsien
- BORODIN, Jacob—see BORODIN, Michael
- BORODIN, Michael (BORODIN, Jacob; GRUSENBERG, Michael; BERG, Michael)—Chief Russian Communist Adviser to Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), 1923-27. Exile from Czarist Russia, studied in the U. S. where he was known as Michael Grusenbergs or Berg, 1910-17. Returned to Russia to take part in the 1917 Revolution. Communist propagandist in Spain, Mexico, the U. S., and Great Britain. Illegally in England, he was arrested and deported to Russia in 1922. He arrived in Canton, China, September 1923 as an agent of the Communist International. Became adviser to SUN Yat-sen. Played an important part in the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 and of the Nationalist Government in CANTON, 1925, which was moved to Hankow in 1926. He became, by invitation, High Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist Government and was instrumental in revolutionizing Chinese diplomatic methods. In 1927 the Chinese opposed his idea of a Chinese alliance with Japan and a belligerent attitude toward the British. With the rise of strife between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang and Kuomintang aversion to the Communist International, his position became impossible. He offered his resignation which was accepted in July 1927. However he departed for Soviet Russia in 1927 with full honors and expressions of appreciation from the Nationalist Government in Hankow. Later he became Editor of the Moscow Daily News.
- *CHANG Ai-ping—Apparently succeeded P'ENG Hsueh-feng as Commander, 4th Division, New 4th Army in September 1944.
- CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
- CHANG Ching-wu—Chief of Staff of United Defense Headquarters at Yenai under IIO Lung.
- CHANG Go-tao—see CHANG Kuo-tao.
- *CHANG Han-fu—Editor of the Communist newspaper, Hain-hua Jihpao in Chungking. Attended the San Francisco Conference, 1945, as secretary to the Chinese Communist delegate TUNG Pi-wu. He speaks English.
- CHANG Hiao (LIN Yü-ying)—Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Around 1917 member of the Social Welfare Society of Hupeh, a great many of whose members became Communists.
- CHANG I-chen—Identified in 1943 as President of the Bethune Medical College founded in 1940 in honor of the late Dr. Norman Bethune. Former associate of Dr. Bethune.

CHANG Kuo-tao (CHANG T'e-li; CHANG Go-tao)—Expelled from the CCP March 1938.

Once much respected in Chinese Communist circles as a hero of the "Long March", and as a real field general. Well read and able to converse on many subjects besides the strictly military. Jovial, approachable, stocky, muscular. Member of the upper classes. Was a radical student in Peking. A returned student from Moscow. Participated in the "Literary Revolution" 1917. Helped found the CCP in Shanghai, 1921. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he was appointed Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee with HSIANG Ying as the other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-tung as Chairman. Member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International elected by the 7th World Congress July-August 1935 in Moscow. As Chairman of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet he helped 4th Front Army Commander HSU Hsiang-ch'ien lead the army into north Szechwan where they joined the Red forces from Kiangsi in the "Long March". Later he became Chairman of the Soviet at Yen-an with precedence over MAO Tse-tung himself. He was expelled from the CCP in 1938 apparently because he urged a genuine United Front on the basis of a sincere acceptance of the *San-min Chu-i*. Became a member of the Third People's Political Council in Chungking.

CHANG Lo-fu—see CHANG Wen-t'ien

CHANG Su—Identified in 1943 as member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

CH'ANG Te-i—Identified in 1942 as the Communist magistrate of Yen-ch'ush Hsien, Shensi.

CHANG T'e-li—see CHANG Kuo-tao

CHANG Ting-ch'eng—Commanding General of the 7th Division, New 4th Army, Central Anhwei Military Region in 1943, but his activities have not been reported since then. TAN Hsi-ling was Acting Commander of the 7th Division in 1944. CHANG established one of the early Soviets in western Fukien Province, 1928. Appointed Commander of the 7th Division February 1941. CHANG Wen-ping—Apparently still under arrest as of May 1944. The release of CHANG and other Chinese Communists allegedly arrested in connection with the "New 4th Incident" was requested by LIN Tzu-han in a signed proposal, 1944.

CHANG Wen-t'ien (CHANG Lo-fu)—Member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: Member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat, and Minister of Propaganda of the CCP; Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the People's Council. In 1940 at Yen-an he was Member of the Central Committee of the CCP, Member of the Political Bureau, and Secretary-General of the Secretariat of the CCP, also President of the Marx-Lenin Institute.

CHANG Yün-i—Deputy Commander of the New 4th Army since at least 1943. Graduate of Paoting Military Academy. Once a leader in the 7th Red Army. Chief of Staff of New 4th Army in 1940. Appointed Commander of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army, February 1941.

CHAO Jung—see HSIEH K'ang-chih

CHAO Yung—see HSIEH K'ang-chih

CH'EN Ch'ang-hao—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CH'EN Chen-hsia—Identified in 1944 as Director of the Yen-ch'ang Petroleum Refinery, Shensi Province, operated by the Chinese Communists.

CH'EN Chia-k'ang—Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions for the press party to Yen-an summer 1944.

CH'EN Chung-fu—see CH'EN Tu-hsiu

CH'EN I (CH'EN Yi)—Acting Commander of the New 4th Army and Political Commissar of Shantung Military District.

Graduate of Whampoa Military Academy 1926. Joined the Communists in Nan-ch'ang after the split with the Kuomintang. In 1931 when Communist control of Kiangsi was almost absolute, he was appointed Military Governor and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Provincial Government of Kiangsi. When the "Long March" started in 1934, CH'EN remained behind in command of guerrilla forces on the Kwangtung-Fukien Kiangsi border. Commanded the 1st Guerrilla Division of the New 4th Army in operations between Shanghai and Nanking, 1938. Escaped with his division after the

"New Fourth Army Incident" 1941, and assumed acting command of the New 4th Army upon capture of Commander YEH T'ing.

CH'EN K'ang-pai—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

CH'EN Keng—General in southeast Shansi in 1944. Listed as member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.

He allegedly once saved CHIANG Kai-shek's life by carrying him from a field of defeat in one of his early wars, 1925. He was promoted to a brigadier general in the nationalist army, but was subsequently jailed under suspicion of being a Communist. He escaped and as Commander of the 1st Division of the 1st Red Army Corps he participated in the "Long March." He was described as one of the important officers of the First Front Army which held a reunion in Kansu with leaders of the 2nd and 4th Front Armies in October 1936. He commanded a brigade of the 129th Division, 18th Group Army in the "100 Regiment Offensive" against the Japanese operating in southeast Shansi, 1941.

CH'EN Kuang—Vice Commander, Shantung Base, 18th Group Army. Reported Deputy for LIN Piao in both 1938 and 1943.

CHEN Pai-ta—see CH'EN Po-ta.

CH'EN Po-ta (CHEN Pai-ta)—Identified in 1943 as secretary to MAO Tse-tung.

He is reportedly a well-known Communist theoretician. Author of several books on socialism and of numerous Communist pamphlets in English as well as Chinese. Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1940. He is reported to have sent CHIANG Kai-shek a criticism of the latter's book "China's Destiny". While in Chungking in 1942 he served as editor of the *Shang-huo Shu-chu* (Life Book Company) and as editor of the Communist newspaper *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*. He was closely associated with CHOU En-lai during this Chungking period. He is reported to be a native of Hunan province and long-time member of the CCP.

CH'EN Shao-yü (WANG Ming)—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee, Member of the Political Bureau, and of the Secretariat of the CCP. Is reported very ill in Yenan, probably with ulcers. He is now in his late thirties. Has a pleasing, disarming manner. He is exceptionally articulate, but is essentially a theoretician. His very short stature is the butt of many Kuomintang jokes. Born the son of a prosperous Anhwei family, he went in 1925 to Moscow at his own expense to attend the Chungshan University. There he specialized in subjects pertaining to revolutionary methods and problems of the unpropertied class. Wrote many pamphlets. He allegedly became the sworn confederate of CH'IN Pang-hsien whom he met at the University. During the 1930's he became the leading Chinese in the Moscow apparatus of the Communist International. In 1934 he was appointed to the following posts at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Member, Secretarial Bureau; member, Political Bureau; Chairman of the Chinese Communist delegation to Moscow. At the 7th World Congress held July-August 1935 he was elected to the following positions in the Communist International: Member of the Executive Committee; Member of the Presidium; Alternate Member of the Secretariat. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee, member, Political Bureau, and member, the Secretariat of the CCP, also President of the China Women's College, and member of the People's Political Council at Chungking. Although Kuomintang sources have long reported him as being at odds with MAO Tse-tung, there is no evidence of any serious rift. According to a reliable American source, his alleged ouster by MAO from the post of Director of the United Front Department in March 1940 was probably a resignation due to real ill health.

CH'EN Tai—Identified in 1944 as Deputy Commander of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army at the Shantung Base in absence of Gen. LIN Piao.

CH'EN Tu-hsiu (CH'ENG Chung-fu)—Deceased. One of the founders and the first leader of the CCP. Noted scholar and literary figure. He was born in Anhwei 1879. He received advanced education in France and Japan. Returning to China he became professor and later Dean of Literature of the Peking National University. He was in the forefront of the "Literary Revolution" in China which signified an attempt to bring the written language into closer correspondence with the colloquial language. In 1919 he established contact with the Communist International. Together with Li Ta-chao and Lenin's secretary Marin he organized the foundation meeting of the CCP in Shanghai, May 1921. As a result of the Soviet Russian Kuo-

mintang *Entente Cordiale* he was admitted into the Kuomintang in 1924 and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1925. Concurrently a member of the CCP he was elected by the Chinese Communists as one of their delegates to the Communist International at Moscow in 1925.

CH'EN Tu-hsiu led the CCP until the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, 1 August 1927. Shortly thereafter he incurred the disfavor of the Comintern because of his opposition to the Moscow-inspired policy of class war. He was deposed as Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CCP and was dismissed from the Communist Party. Later he affiliated himself with the Chinese Trotskyite sympathizers. In 1932 he was arrested in Shanghai by the Kuomintang, tried and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He was released, however, a few years later. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he went with the Nationalist armies to west China and lived in Szechwan. He died in May 1942.

CH'EN Yi—see CH'EN I

CH'EN Yün—Identified in March 1944 as director of the Department of Organization of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he was chosen member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee.

CH'ENG Fang-wu—Identified in 1944 as Chairman of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region People's Political Council, and President of the Associated University of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. He is a noted Communist writer.

Born in 1894 in Hunan Province. He was a friend of the writer KUO Mo-jo during the latter's student days in Japan, and together with KUO he joined the Creative Society (*Ch'uang-tsao She*) and collaborated with him in certain literary efforts. He was formerly professor at Canton University. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP and also President of the North Shensi Public School. In 1943 he was listed in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government as a member of the Chairman's Committee and as Education Commissioner.

CHI Ming-hui—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CHIANG Ping-chih—see TING Ling.

CHIH Sheng-ping—Identified in 1944 as magistrate of Yen-ch'ang, Shensi, where the petroleum wells are located. Born a peasant.

CH'IN Pang-hsien (CH'IN Po-ku, Po-ku, Bogu)—He is editor of the Yenan *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Emancipation Daily); Director, *Chieh-fang* Press; Director, Hsin-hua News Service. He is tall, broad-shouldered, pale and handsome to the point of incurring such Kuomintang epithets as "pretty-faced Bolshevik." He speaks Russian and some English. He was educated in Russia where he met CH'EN Shao-yü, who allegedly became his sworn confederate. He returned to China in 1930 and was appointed member of the Central Committee of the CCP and concurrently Chief of the Kiangsu Bureau of Organization. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed member of the Secretariat Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP. He was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress July-August 1935. He was reported to have played a big part with CHOU En-lai and YEH Chien-ying in the negotiations with CHIANG Kai-shek during the Sian Incident, December 1936. In 1938 he was Chief of the Hankow Office of the 18th Group Army. In 1939 he was Director of the Northwest Office of the CCP and Resident Member of the Central Government's 1st People's Political Council. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member of both the Chairman's Committee and the Secretariat of the Political Bureau of the CCP. These posts he still held in 1943, when he was also Chief of the Industrial Workers' Department of the Secretariat.

Although he may still hold all or some of these posts, his chief activity is now in propaganda. He has built the circulation of the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* to a total of 7,855 and is constantly increasing the output of the *Chieh-fang* Press. As Director of the *Hsin-hua* News Service, he is entrusted not only with the job of keeping Chinese Communist leaders informed of world happenings, but must disseminate such news to the public.

CH'IN Pang-hsien, Mrs.—see LIU Ch'ün-hsien.

CH'IN Po-ku—see CH'IN Pang-hsien.

CHOU En-lai—Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council, and concurrently Chief of Military Affairs, and Director of the Southern (China) Political Branch Bureau of the CCP. He is also

member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He has lately visited Chungking twice to negotiate with the Central Government, 13 November to 7 December 1944, and 25 January to 15 February 1945. He is at present considered second only to MAO Tse-tung. Since he has great influence in shaping the policy of the CCP toward the foreign powers as well as the Kuomintang and other Chinese parties, he is often referred to as the "foreign minister" of the Chinese Communists. He has been a leading political figure in the political section of the CCP and has also been considered one of the most able and forceful military men in China. Intelligent, he has a modest but composed manner, a friendly smile and a good sense of humor. CHOU is a practical rather than theoretical Communist. He is the one leading Chinese Communist said to enjoy the respect and confidence of CHIANG Kai-shek. He has been reported largely responsible for saving CHIANG's life during the Sian Incident, December 1936.

He was born in 1898 in Kiangsu Province of an old mandarin family. At the age of 13 he moved to Manchuria. He graduated from the Nankai Middle School in Tientsin 1917 and became a student leader, much interested in revolutionary movements. He attended universities in Japan for a year and a half after which he returned to Nankai University where he edited a student newspaper. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1919 for leading a student demonstration, and met his future wife, TENG Ying-ch'ao, in jail. When released he joined a radical society called "Awaken", to which she also belonged. In October 1920 he went to France for two years. There he helped found the French Branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Subsequently he went to Germany for a year and is also reported to have traveled in England. He joined the Kuomintang at Canton in 1924 as Secretary of the Provincial Committee. During 1925-26 he was Chief of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy under CHIANG Kai-shek. He participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition 1926. In command of three divisions under General Ho Ying-ch'in at the time of CHIANG Kai-shek's first anti-Communist coup in Canton, March 1926 CHOU was arrested in Swatow, but CHIANG released him and retained him as "advisor" because of his great influence with the Whampoa cadets. He was appointed head of party work in the Kuomintang armies. Meanwhile he also studied military tactics and strategy under General Galen and other Soviet teachers at Whampoa.

In 1927 he went to Shanghai and led three workers' uprisings, the object being to help CHIANG Kai-shek seize Shanghai. A few months later when the Kuomintang turned against the Communists, PAI Ch'ung-hsi ordered CHOU'S arrest and execution, but a division commander freed him. He fled to Hankow and worked on the Military Committee of the leftist Kuomintang Government in Hankow. He joined the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, August 1927, and became Secretary of the CCP Front Committee. He went with the 1st Red Army to Swatow, led a division in the Kwangtung East River fighting and was defeated. Thereafter he became an undercover worker in Shanghai. He was a delegate to Moscow to the 6th Congress of the Comintern, 1928, and was appointed a member of the Communist International. In 1930 he was Chinese Red Army delegate to Moscow. In the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931, he became Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. Six months later he became Political Commissar under CHU Te. In January 1934 he was appointed a member of the Secretariat of the CCP and concurrently Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and Minister of Military Affairs of the Chinese Soviet Government at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Then in February 1934 he received the following posts from the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee: member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission, with CHU Te as Chairman.

He participated in the "Long March" starting in October 1934. He was elected member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress, July-August 1935.

With the advent of the United China Front in 1937 he became the representative of the Chinese Communists to the Central Government and was readmitted into the Kuomintang in 1938. In 1940 he was reported member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking. He held the post of Vice Minister of Political Training of the National Military Council

1938-40. In 1940 he was relieved of this post and appointed Vice Director of the War Areas (Kuomintang) Affairs Board, a position which actually meant little. His chief task remained that of liaison officer between the Kuomintang and the CCP. In 1941 he was also head of eight Communist representatives to the Peoples Political Council in Chungking. In 1942 he was asked whether he were ambassador or hostage in Chungking and his answer implied the latter. In the same year he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council, but did not return to Yen-an until the summer of 1943. After the reshuffle in the CCP in March 1944 he received his present posts.

CHOU is known to speak adequate English and to have studied it in recent years. He said that he had forgotten French and German.

CHOU En-lai, Mrs.—see TENG Ying-ch'ao

CHOU Ho-sheng (CHOU Ho-sin)—Author. Elected member of the Control Commission of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress July-August 1935.

CHOU Ho-sin—see CHOU Ho-sheng.

CHOU Hsing—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CHOU Shih-ti—see CHOU Tzu-t'i.

CHOU Tzu-t'i (CHOU Shih-ti ??)—Identified in 1940 as Chief of Staff of the 120th Division, 18th Group Army. Reported in 1944 as Chief of Staff and Vice Political Commissar of the Shensi-Suiyuan Base of the 18th Group Army.

CHOU Yang—As of 1944 President of Yen-an University. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1943 he was Secretary General of the Border Government.

CH'U Ch'iu-pai—see CH'U Ch'iu-po.

CH'U Ch'iu-po (CH'U Ch'iu-pai. TSUI Chiu-pai) DECEASED. One of the founders of the Moscow Branch of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; People's Commissar for Education. Apparently killed sometime prior to 1937.

CHU Min-liang—Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions for the press party to Yen-an, summer 1944.

CHU Te (CHU Teh)—C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, Commander of the 18th Group Army and Deputy Commander of the 2nd War Zone since August 1937. Vice Chairman of the Central Revolution Military Council and member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He is the best trained military leader among the Chinese Communists. Tenacious when convinced, scrupulously honest, exceedingly selfless in thought and action. He possesses the personal magnetism of inspiring leadership, he is considerate to subordinates, devoted to his men. He lives and dresses like the rank and file, is a wide reader, and sports lover. He is characterized as taciturn, kindly, mild, slow temperament, courteous but not polished. He is stockily built, and has rough features, of peasant type. In January 1944 he was reported as serving more in a General Staff capacity, with P'ENG Te-huai directing operations in the field.

Born 1886 in Szechwan Province. One story says he comes of a poor tenant farmer family, went to local schools, then to the Yunnan Military School 1909-1911. Other sources describe him as a son of the landed gentry, who entered the Yunnan Military Academy through his family's prestige. He joined the *T'ung Meng Hui* in 1909 and later the Kuomintang. In the 1911 Revolution he was a company commander in TS'AI Ao's Yunnan army. He was Brigade Commander in the Yunnan Army during 1913-16, and later aide to the Governor of Yunnan. It is said that at this time he became sunk in vice, opium; he had a harem, and other amenities of a war-lord's existence. In 1921 when his patron was ousted as Governor, CHU went with him. He began to read books on Communism and the Russian Revolution and came into contact with Chinese Communists in Shanghai and Canton. He became affiliated with the Communist party, gave up his vices, and divided his property among his wives. He was allegedly sent to Germany in 1922 to study military science at the expense of the Communist International. He was one of the founders of the CCP in Germany. He was twice arrested by the German Police for revolutionary activity and finally driven out of the country. He traveled through Europe and the USSR.

On his return to China in 1926 he became Chairman of the Political Department of the Kuomintang 20th Army in Szechwan province. Later he was appointed Principal of the Military Training School in Nan-ch'ang and concurrently chief of the Nan-ch'ang police. He helped organize the Nan-ch'ang Uprising of 1 August 1927. Driven out of Nan-ch'ang, he retreated to Kwangtung, reequipped his men, and organized the South Hunan Uprising. In May 1928 he combined forces with MAO Tse-tung, thereby becoming Commander of the 4th Red Army. They began a campaign through southern Kiangsi in January 1929 and reorganized the 3rd, 4th and 12th Red Armies into the First Red Army Corps with CHU as Commander. In 1930 he became Commander in Chief of the First Front Army which included the First and Third Army Corps. MAO Tse-tung was always Political Commissar.

At the 1st All-Soviet Congress at Jui-chin, Kiangsi in 1931, CHU was elected C-in-C of the Chinese "Red Army" which repeatedly defeated the Central Government troops sent against the Red Army in Kiangsi. In January 1934 he was appointed member of the Political Bureau of the CCP. In February 1934 he was appointed member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; People's Commissar for Military Affairs; and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee.

In October 1934 he was forced to start the "Long March" and arrived in the Northwest at the end of 1936.

In August 1937 CHIANG Kai-shek appointed him Commander of the Eighth Route Army (the new name given to the Red Army after the conclusion of the Kuomintang-Communist united front) and Vice Commander of the 2nd War Zone. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP, also member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking.

CHU Te, Mrs.—see K'ANG K'o-ch'ing.

CHU Teh—see CHU Te.

CHUNG Ch'i-hsien—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army, Central Kiangsu Base.

FAN Chin—Known to be the author of at least one Chinese Communist pamphlet, no date.

FAN Tzu-chia—Last known information dated October 1940. He was a brigade commander, 129th Division, 18th Group Army. Wounded in south Shansi.

FAN Wen-lan—Acting Director of the Central Research Institute of the CCP as of 15 March 1944.

FANG Chih-min—Last known information dated 1939 when he was reported under arrest by the Chungking Government. He was chosen Member of the Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at Jui-chin, Kiangsi 1934. Later he became member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

FANG Pu-chou—Last known information dated 1939 when he was identified as Commander of the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Region Guerrilla 5th Column, New 4th Army.

FENG Wen-pin—Reported in 1940 and 1943 as Chief of "Young People" and member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

FU Ch iu-tou—Identified June 1944 as a garrison commander of the New 4th Army.

FU Chung—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

FU Lien-chiang—Ph. D. Reported to be a Christian. He is a graduate of Fukien Christian University. Joined the Chinese Communist forces from the start. In 1944 he was in charge of the medical service for the masses.

FUNG Pak-yu—Reported in March 1943 as leader of about 1,000 armed Communists on Hainan Island.

GALEN—see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch.

GA-LIN—see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch.

GOGOV—Russian Communist Doctor connected with Bethune Memorial Hospital. He has contributed his medical services to the Chinese Communist forces for several years.

GRUSENBERG, Michael—see BORODIN, Michael.

HAN Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

HO Ch'ang-chiang (HO Ch'ang-kung?)—Identified in 1942 as a commander in the 3rd Column, 18th Group Army. He is possibly the HO Ch'ang-kung reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HO Ch'ang-kung—see HO Ch'ang-chiang.

HO Ch'ang-li—Identified in 1942 as an "important Communist."

HO K'o-ch'uan (KAI Feng)—Acting Director of Publicity of the CCP. In 1940 was member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and listed again as such in 1943.

HO Lien-ch'eng—Identified in January 1944 as Vice Commissioner of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

HO Lung—General. Commander, United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling-pu*) at Yen-an of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Regions. Concurrently commander of the two large units which compose the UDH: the 120th Division of the 18th Group Army and the Yen-an Garrison Army (*Liu-shou Ping-t'uan*). Listed as member in 1943 of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He is known as "China's Chappiev". About 50 years old. Allegedly still illiterate at time of the "Long March", he has since been improving his education. An able leader with a sharp wit, shrewd judgment, and a swash-buckling manner which appeals to his men. He is said to possess a fiery temper. Handsome. Allegedly the most admired of all 18th Group Army generals, and most feared by Kuomintang commanders. He is reported to be closely connected with Chinese secret societies.

HO Lung is a native of Hunan. He was a cowherd. At 20 he became leader of a kind of Robin Hood gang. He commanded the 2nd Division of the *Chien-kuo* Army in Szechwan in 1925, and subsequently joined the Nationalist Revolutionary Forces. There he commanded the 3rd Division under T'ANG Cheng-chih. When the Party split in 1927 HO remained with the leftist Kuomintang group. In August 1927 he and YEH T'ing organized the Nan-ch'ang Uprising. Defeated, they fled to Kwangtung where they joined CHU Te and tried to occupy Swatow. After the failure of their venture HO escaped to Hong Kong and thence via Shanghai back to Hunan. There he joined the CCP and, beginning in 1928, built up the 2nd Front Red Army and established a Soviet in the Hupeh-Hunan border area. He participated in the "Long March". In 1940 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HO Tzu-lo—Construction Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

HO Wei—Reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Identified in 1939 as any army commander in the Chinese Communist forces.

HO Wei-te—Vice Commissioner of Construction of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in January 1944.

HONG Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

HSIA Hsi—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Communist 3rd Army.

HSIANG Ying (HAN Ying, HONG Ying, HSIANG Te-lung, SHANG Ying)—**DECEASED**. One report states he was killed in the "New 4th Incident" January 1941. He was an experienced military leader who reportedly provided most of the military leadership of the New 4th Army under YEH T'ing. He was very active in Kiangsu in 1927. In January 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed to the following posts by the 5th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CCP: member Secretarial Bureau of the CCP; member, Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP; Head of the Labor Department of the Chinese Soviet government. In February 1934 he was appointed to the following posts by the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; Vice Chairman of the Presidium, with CHANG Kuo-tao as the other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-tung as Chairman; and People's Commissar for Inspection of Labor and Agriculture. This last post he still held in 1939, but meanwhile had been appointed Vice Commander of the New 4th Army under YEH T'ing. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HSIANG Te-lung—see HSIANG Ying

HSIAO Ching-hsien—see HSIAO Ching-kuang

HSIAO Ching-kuang (HSIAO Ching-hsien)—Member of the Government Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region since at least 1943, concurrently Vice Commander and Political Commissar of the United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling pu*) at Yen-an under HO Lung. He studied at CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoo Military Academy at Canton, 1924-27. He was one of the first Chinese cadets to be trained at the Moscow Military Academy where he spent the next four years. He participated as a leader in the "Long March." In 1936 his task was to break through the hostile Moslems to the Russian controlled areas in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.

He was defeated by Kansu warlords in October 1936. In January 1937 he held the posts of Chairman of the Military Department of the Kansu Soviet and Commander of the 29th Red Army. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was reported as Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Garrison Commander.

He is possibly the HSIAO Ching-hsien (*kuang* and *hsien* are two characters frequently mistaken for each other) referred to as a member of the CH'EN Shao-yü clique among Chinese Communists.

HSIAO Chün—Identified in 1944 as a literary figure in Yen-an.

HSIAO Hua—Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces in south Hopeh.

HSIAO Keh—see HSIAO K'o.

HSIAO K'o (HSIAO Keh, HSIAO K'o-ch'eng)—Vice Commander under NIEH Jung-chen of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Military Region, 18th Group Army. He is about 43 years old, of small stature. He was formerly an independent warlord, famed as a guerrilla leader. He received military training in CHIANG Kai-shek's army. In 1928 he helped lead a peasant revolt, then raised his own Independent Partisan Army in central China to fight against the Central Government. He joined forces with HO Lung in 1934. Both joined the main Communist forces in the "Long March." He was Vice Commander of HO Lung's 120th Division in 1939, and patrolled districts west of Peking in 1941.

HSIAO K'o-ch'eng—see HSIAO K'o.

HSIAO Wang-tung—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department, 4th Division, New 4th Army. He was Political Commissar of the same division in 1943 but was apparently succeeded by *TENG Chih-hui in 1944.

HSIEH Chieh-tsai—Vice Chairman of the 2nd Peoples Political Council of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in Yen-an; Chief of the 1st Department of the Chinese Communist Military Council. Sexagenarian. He was interviewed by Chinese members of the Chungking Press Party to Yen-an in the summer of 1944.

HSIEH Fu-chih (HSIEH Kung-chih)—Identified in 1940 as a member of the Political Department of a brigade of Chinese Communist forces in North China.

HSIEH Hao-ju—Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander of Chinese Communist forces.

HSIEH K'ang-chih (CHAO Jung, KANG Sang, CHAO Yung)—Chief of the Social Affairs Department and of the Intelligence Department of the CCP. He is a native of Shantung Province, about 41 years old. He attended the University of Shanghai. He is reported to be a follower of CH'EN Shao-yü and to have become a member of the CCP upon the latter's recommendation. He once held the post of Secretary of Organization of the CCP in Kiangsu. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Paper Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He was reported in 1943 as Chief of the Central Protection Bureau, in charge of all Communist secret service work. He was also listed in 1943 in the concurrent posts of Chief of Organization in the Central Secretariat and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP.

HSIEH Kung-chih—see HSIEH Fu-chih

HSING Jen-fu—Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces in south Hopeh.

HSIUNG P'o-ch'en—Identified in 1940 as a Chinese Communist army officers.

HSÜ Cho-jan—Identified in 1939 as a Chinese Communist military leader.

*HSÜ Fan-t'ing—C-in-C of the Shansi "new Army," and Vice Commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. The Shansi "New Army" is composed of troops formerly under YEN Hsi-shan. Under the influence of HSÜ, who served under YEN Hsi-shan, these troops mutinied and went over to the Communists in 1940 after YEN allegedly attempted to disband them. The "New Army" now shares garrison areas with the 18th Group Army and operates under the General Staff of the 18th Group Army. It is referred to as the "Dare to Die Detachments" under its original commander HSÜ.

HSÜ was formerly member of the *T'ung Meng Hui*. In 1935 he attempted harakiri before SUN Yat-sen's mausoleum to show his loyalty to the *San Min Chu I* and protest against the non-resistance policy against Japan. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he became a high staff officer to YEN Hsi-shan, then Commander of YEN's "New Army" in the 2nd War Zone,

West Shansi. This army consisted largely of liberal volunteers with susceptibility to the influence of Communists with whom they were in close proximity in Shansi. HSU wrote an article, "Words Unspoken for Three Years," in the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, Communist Party organ in Yen-an, on 16 August 1944, protesting against YEN Hsi-shan's alleged slander of the Communists.

HSÜ Hai-tung—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943. Born 1900 in Hupeh province, youngest son of a potter. He went to school while learning his father's trade. In 1922 he joined the 4th Kuomintang Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei. When the Chinese Communists were driven under ground in 1927, HSU returned to Hupeh and organized a "workers' and peasants' army". This group later grew into the 4th Front Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, with HSU Hsiang-ch'ien as army commander and CHANG Kuo-tao as chairman of the Soviet. HSU later became commander of the 15th Red Army Corps. In 1937 he was assigned to help NIEN Jung-chen in anti-Japanese action in Shantung. In 1939 he was reported to be in command of a unit of the 18th Group Army in Shensi. In 1940 he was reported as Vice Commander of the Chiang-pei Headquarters of the New 4th Army.

HSÜ Hsiang-ch'ien—Vice Commander and a Political Commissar of 120th Division of 18th Group Army under Ho Lung, also Political Commissar of the United Defense Headquarters. He has been a leading Communist figure for a long time. He was a member of the first class graduated from CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy and served as an officer in the Kuomintang forces. He participated in the Nan-Ch'ang Uprising in 1927 and subsequently in the Swatow and Canton uprisings. In 1932 he commanded the 4th Red Army Corps on the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei borders. This unit, later known as the 4th Front Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, advanced into north Szechwan under HSÜ and the Chinese Chairman of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, CHANG Kuo-tao, and merged in Szechwan with Kiangsi Communists in the "Long March". In 1940 HSÜ was reported in command of a unit in Shantung and Kiangsu. He was also member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling-pu*) at Yen-an of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu Ningxia Border Regions under HO Lung.

***HSÜ Hung**—Member of the Political Committee of the Independent Communist Division of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi.

***HSÜ Te-lieh**—Known as "Elder HSÜ," or Lao HSÜ, the educator. Born 1876 in Hunan of a poor peasant family. He received six years of classical schooling and became a school teacher. When 29 years of age he entered the Changsha College and upon graduation became an instructor of mathematics. MAO Tse-tung was one of his poorer mathematics pupils. He is said to have been one of SUN Yat-sen's collaborators. During the Revolution in 1911 he was active in the Honan provincial Kuomintang and afterwards became a member of the provincial council. After World War I he accompanied the Hunanese delegation of "workers-Students" to France and studied for three years in the Paris University. He returned to Hunan in 1923, established two modern normal schools in Changsha, and prospered for four years.

He did not join the CCP until 1927, but had sympathized with the Communists before that and had preached Marxism to his pupils. "I wanted to be a Communist" he allegedly stated "but nobody asked me to join. I was already fifty and I concluded that the Communists considered me too old." He joined when a Communist sought him out, and the Party subsequently sent him to Moscow to study for two years. On his return he ran the blockade to Kiangsi, where he became Assistant Commissioner, then Commissioner of Education upon the death of CHÜ Ch'iu-pai. He survived the "Long March" and became Commissioner of Education in the northwest.

HSÜ Yen-kang—Identified in 1930 as commander of a group army of the Chinese Communist forces.

HU Fu—see LIU Shao-ch'i.

HU Jen-k'uei—Identified in 1944 as Deputy Director of the Administrative Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government. In 1943 he was listed as Vice Chairman and member of the Political Committee of the Provisional Executive Committee of the same Border Region Government. He was formerly a Magistrate of Yu-hsien, Shansi.

- HUANG Chen-t'ang—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Communist 5th Regiment under CHU Te.
- HUANG Hsin-lüeh—Identified in 1935 as an important Chinese Communist leader.
- HUANG Hua—Identified in 1944 as Secretary in the 18th Group Army Office, Yen-an.
- HUANG K'o-ch'eng—Identified in 1944 as Commanding General and Political Commissar of 3rd Division of New 4th Army, North Kiangsu Base.
- HUANG Ya-kuang—Identified in 1944 as Manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Bank.
- HUANG Yung-sheng—In 1943 he was reported Commander of the Chinese Communist 3rd Divisional War Zone. He was under command of NIEN Jung-chen in 1940.
- JAO Cheng-hu—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
- JEN Chih-pin—Identified in 1943 as Political Commissar of the 5th Division, New 4th Army.
- JEN Pi-shih (ZENG Pi-shu—When last reported in May 1943 he was to attend a meeting of the Chinese Communists to discuss the disbandment of the Communist International. He was Political Commissar of the 8th Route Army in 1938. In 1940 he was member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. He speaks perfect Russian.
- JOFFE, Adolph Abramowicz—Deceased. Special Soviet Envoy to China and Japan 1922-24. Outstanding diplomat. Friend of Trotsky and other oppositionists. He was born in Crimea 1883 of wealthy parents. He joined the Socialists in 1900. An exile from Russia, he studied medicine and law in Berlin, Zurich and Vienna, 1903-08. Together with Trotsky he founded *Pravda* in Vienna. On one of frequent secret trips back to Russia he was arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1912. After release, 1917, he became a leader in the Soviet councils. He negotiated with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, and was Ambassador to Germany, 1918. He was ousted from Germany in the same year when it was discovered that he was helping to prepare a revolution in Germany. Thereafter he became Commissar of Foreign Affairs and of Social Insurance of the Soviet Government, then Commissar of Soviet Inspection in the Ukraine. He formulated the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian treaty, and attended the Genoa conference in April 1922. Arriving in Shanghai, December 1922, his talks with SUN Yat-sen led to the SUN-JOFFE Manifesto issued in January 1923 inaugurating the Kuomintang-Soviet *Entente Cordiale*. He left the Far East in 1923 and went to England where he negotiated with the MACDONALD Government in February 1924. He won Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union. He committed suicide, November 1927, out of agony caused by a disease he had contracted in the Far East.
- JUNG Wu-sheng—Identified in November 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shensi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.
- *KAI Feng—see HO K'o-ch'uan.
- KAN Ssu-ch'i—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
- K'ANG K'o-ch'ing (Mrs. CHU Te)—In her twenties. Buxom. Apparently fond of the Yen-an Saturday night dances. Not reported as holding any official post.
- KANG Sang—see HSIEH K'ang-chih.
- K'ANG Sheng (KANG Sin?)—Chief of Agricultural Workers and members of the Political Bureau of the CCP when last reported in 1943. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. He is probably the KANG Sin who was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee and an alternate member of the Presidium of the Communist International in 1935 by the 7th World Congress.
- KANG Sin—see K'ANG Sheng
- KAO Ch'ung-shan (KAO Tsung-shan)—Member of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in September 1944.
- KAO Kang—General. Director, Northwest Bureau, and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP. Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region; concurrently Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps. He is about 40 years old, of a peasant family in Shensi. The

alleged inspiration of his revolutionary activity was the death of his father at the hands of authorities for tax defaults. He is locally influential, which is why he is kept in nominal authority, but he has probably run his course in the revolution due to lack of education. He was illiterate in 1935, but has since learned to write. He has had no training abroad. He is inclined to exaggeration. He has an assistant with better education. KAO began his career by stirring up mutinies among soldiery while a young recruit during famines of 1928-29. Subsequently he organized peasant uprisings. He finally established soviet self-government in considerable areas of north Shensi. He organized the Workers' and Farmers' Anti-Japanese Army (Kung-nung K'ang-jih Chun) and had the region already operating as an anti-Japanese base when MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te arrived in Shensi from the south. He is reported to have been Chief of the Supreme Court of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1940. In 1943 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

KAO Lang-t'ing—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

KAO Su-hsien—Member of the Chairmen's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

KAO Tsung-shan—see KAO Ch'ung-shan.

KAO Tzu-li—Identified in 1943 as Vice Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government and Concurrently President of the Supreme Court of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940 and 1943 he was also identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

KARAKHAN, Leo Mikhailovich—Soviet emissary, then Ambassador, to the Peking Government 1923-26. Armenian, born 1889. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1904. In 1918 he was Secretary to the Russian Brest-Litovsk Peace Delegation. In 1921 he was Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and became Ambassador to Poland in November 1921. Between 1922 and 1924 he was Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. He went to China in September 1923 to negotiate with the Peking Government, and concluded agreements in May 1924 for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and USSR and for the provisional management by the Soviet Union of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He was appointed Ambassador to China in 1925, and as such became the first Ambassador to China appointed by any foreign power. He was Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs 1928-34. In 1933 he was reported to have been replaced in the conduct of Far Eastern matters and to have fallen into complete disfavor. Nevertheless, he was Ambassador to Turkey 1934-37. No information on him after 1937.

***KUAN Hsiang-ying**—Political Commissar of United Defense Headquarters at Yen'an under HO Lung.

KUAN Wen-wei—Identified in 1940 and 1942 as a commander in the New 4th Army.

KUO Shu-chung—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army.

LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu—Chief of Staff of the New 4th Army. In 1940 he was Chief of Staff of the Chiang-pei Headquarters of the New 4th Army.

LAN P'ing (Mrs. MAO Tse-tung)—She married MAO Tse-tung in the spring of 1939. Comely, fairly young, and said to be very intelligent. She was formerly a well-known movie actress in Shanghai. Member of the Chinese Communist Party since 1933. She left her movie career in 1937 to attend the LU Hsun Fine Arts College in Yen'an where MAO's interest in drama apparently drew them together.

LEI Ching-t'ien—Identified in 1944 as President of the High Court and Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

LI Chieh-yung—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

LI Fu-ch'un—Vice Director of the Department of Organization of the CCP at least since March 1944. In 1940 was member of the Central Committee and Director of Organization of the Party.

LI Hsien-nien—Commanding General. Hupeh-Honan-Anhui Base, and member of the Political Committee of the 5th Division of the New 4th Army. He was appointed to the latter post by the Communist Military Council in February 1941. In 1939 he was reported as Commander of the Honan-Hupeh Flying

Column of the New 4th Army. His troops were said to have fought Central Government troops in central Hupeh in 1941, and in Anhwei and Hupeh in 1943.

LI Kuang—Identified as a Communist writer in 1935.

*LI Pong—Identified in July 1944 as Secretary in the Office of the Chinese Communist Resident Representative in Chungking.

LI Ting-ming—Vice Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. He is allegedly not a member of the CCP or of any other party. In 1941 he originated the principle of the "Picked Army, Simplified Government" (*Ching-ping Chien-cheng*) which has since become one of the ten most important policies of the Chinese Communists. He is about 64 years, a native of Mi-chih, Shensi, and comes from the prosperous gentry class. A typical scholar of the old school, he has been noted as a *chu-jen* (2nd Degree Graduate) in north Shensi. He was onetime private secretary in the former Imperial Office of the Governor of the Yü-lin District, Shensi. Upon formation of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1937 he was elected member of the People's Political Council.

LIAO Ch'eng-chih (S. C. LIAO)—As of May 1944 he was still under arrest by Chungking Government authorities and he probably is still under arrest. He is the son of the late Kuomintang leader LIAO Chung-k'ui. After studying in Germany he returned to China in 1932 and was arrested the following year on charges of Communistic activities. He was subsequently released by CHIANG Kai-shek. At the time of Pearl Harbor he was in Hong Kong as representative of the New Fourth Army. He escaped, but allegedly was arrested by Kuomintang authorities in 1943. LIAO was reported to have left his chief assistant LOO Sun as head of an underground Chinese Communist organization in Hongkong. In 1940 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee and Director of Overseas Members of the CCP.

LIAO, S. C.—see LIAO Ch'eng-chih.

LIN Chu-han—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Chün—Identified in 1940 as Commander of the Chiang-nan Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army of the New 4th Army.

LIN Mai-k'o—see LINDSAY, Michael.

LIN Pai-hsu—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Pei-chuh—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Pei-yü—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Piao—General. Commander, 115th Division, 18th Group Army, with CH'EN Tai as Deputy Commander. President, Anti-Japanese Military Academy (*K'ang-jih Chün-cheng Ta-hsüeh*) since at least 1940. Listed in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He is at present in charge of recruitment and training of 18th Group Army troops. LIN Piao is rather diminutive, but wiry and in excellent health. He has proved an able military leader, and is famous for his tactics, strategy and remarkable memory. His articles on military subjects have won recognition not only in Chinese Communist circles but also in Kuomintang China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. He knows no language but Chinese. He has, perhaps, visited Moscow briefly, but most reports state he has never been abroad. LIN Piao, the son of a factory owner who was ruined by taxation, was born in 1908 near Hankow, Hupeh. He joined Socialist Youth and Kuomintang in 1924, and the CCP in 1925. He graduated from CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 with a brilliant record. Subsequently he commanded a unit in the Kuomintang Fourth Army or "Iron-sides" of CHANG Fa-k'uei. In 1927 he joined HO Lung and YEH Ting in the Nan-ch'ang Uprising. He was made Field Commander of the Chinese Red Army in 1929, and Commander of the First Red Army Corps in 1932. This unit immediately began to defeat or outmaneuver every government force sent against it. After participating in the "Long March", LIN was placed in charge of training cadets at the "Communist Anti-Japanese Military Academy". In 1937 he was given command of the 115th Division with which he defeated the Japanese ITAGAKI Division at Ping-hsing-kuan (Pinghsing Pass), Shansi, in September of that year. He was identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1942 he was invited to Chungking for discussions, but returned to Yenai in 1943 after six months of fruitless negotiations.

LIN Po-ch'ü—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Tsu-han—(LIN Chu-han, LIN Po-ch'ü, LIN Pai-hsu, LIN Pei-chuh, LIN Pei-yü)—Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

Member, Third People's Political Council, Chungking. Member, Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. About sixty years old. Handsome, white haired, scholarly looking. Alert, energetic, enthusiastic. He is characterized as an inspiring organizer and leader with ability to draw the best out of junior officers, a man who knows how to pull teams together. He is widely venerated for his learning even in non-Communist China. For a long time LIN was a co-worker of the late SUN Yat-sen, allegedly having done underground work with him prior to the 1911 Revolution. He is reported to have been driven to the study of Marxism by the failure of the 1911 Revolution. In 1925 when SUN Yat-sen died, LIN was appointed Chief of the Department of Peasantry (Nung-min Pu) of the Kwangtung Government. In 1926 he participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition as Kuomintang representative in CH'ENG, Ch'ien's 6th Army. In the same year he was appointed Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and in 1926 he was appointed Secretary General of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee at Hankow. He went to Russia after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 and founded a Chinese Workers' School at Khabarovsk. Returning to China in 1931, he became in the following year Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chinese Soviet Government in Kiangsi. He participated in the "Long March" to Yen-an. Since its formation in 1937, LIN Tsu-han has been chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940 he was reported as being a member of Chungking's Supreme National Defense Council and member of the People's Political Council. In 1943 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, also member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. He represented his party in the Kuomintang-Communist discussions of May-October 1944, and also acted as a party spokesman before the session of the People's Political Council at Chungking in September 1944.

LIN Yü-ying—see CHANG Hao.

LINDSAY, Michael (LIN Mai-k'o)—Radio advisor and technical assistant to the Chinese Communists in Yen-an. An Englishman, son of the Master of Balliol, about 40 years old. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War he was professor of economics at Yenching University, Peking, where he also carried on extensive experimentations in radio. After Pearl Harbor he escaped from Peking with his Chinese wife to the headquarters of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base of the Chinese Communists. He trained radio technicians for the Communists, rebuilt their wireless sets, and worked on improvement of telephone communication for the Border Government. In March 1944, he spent three weeks in Northwest Shansi rebuilding their apparatus and teaching their technicians and eventually arrived in Yen-an on 17 May 1944. He now translates material for broadcasts in English and advises on choice of material, taken largely from Chinese Communist newspapers. He is described as fair and honest in opinion but politically naive and naturally influenced by long association with the Chinese Communists. He wears a rough military uniform and is full of enthusiasms for the Border Governments and guerilla warfare.

LIU Ching-fan—Identified in 1944 as Civil Affairs Commissioner of Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

LIU Ching-jen—Member of the Chairmans Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

LIU Ch'ün-hsien (Mrs. CH'IN Pang-hsien)—In her late thirties. Formerly a mill worker in Shanghai. Returned student from Moscow Chung-shan University. She was reported in 1937 as Director of the Women's Department of the Chinese Communist Trade Unions.

LIU I—Identified in 1939 as a Chinese Communist army commander.

LIU Pai-cheng—see LIU Po-ch'eng.

LIU Po-ch'eng (LIU Pai-cheng)—Commander of 129th Division of the 18th Group Army since August 1937. Acting Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-Honan Military Region. Serious-minded, rated as one of the best tacticians and students of military history in the Chinese army. He formerly belonged to the old Szechwan military clique and has been through hundreds of bloody encounters. His right eye was shot out during the civil war. According to a Kuomintang source he belongs to the "CHU Te clique". He is about 46 years old. In 1927 he directed and led an uprising against CHIANG Kai-shek which failed. Subsequently he studied at the Moscow Military College. Upon his return to China he was appointed a staff officer

of the Headquarters of the (Communist) Central Revolutionary Army. In the vanguard of the First Red Army Corps during the "Long March," he obtained a safe passage for the Communists through the territory of the Lolo tribes in Sikang and Szechwan. He won the friendship of these tribes because he understood their tribal feuds and knew a few words of their language. He even succeeded in enlisting hundreds of Lolos in the Red Army. LIU Po-ch'eng was identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. As Commander of the 129th Division he occupied towards the end of 1943 the T'si-bang Shan area following evacuation by Central Government forces. In April of 1944 he was reported operating in northern Honan.

LIU Shao-ch'i (HU Fu)—In 1943 he was identified as member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the CCP, also Director of National Labor Union Headquarters and Director of the Southeast Political Branch Bureau. He probably still holds these, or at least some of these posts. He is reported to belong to the "MAO Tse-tung clique" within the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was member of the Secretariat Bureau and of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, and also member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee.

LIU Shao-wen—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943.

LIU Shih—Identified in 1944 as Commissioner of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Government.

LIU Tien-chi—Identified in 1943 as a Kuomintang member who was also a member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

LIU Tse-ju—Identified in July 1944 as head of the CCP in Honan, a student in the Party School and a writer.

LIU Tzu-tan—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the 26th Chinese Communist Army.

LIU Yen—Last known information dated 1943 when he was reported Political Commissar for the 1st Division of the New 4th Army, a post now held by SU Yü. He was appointed a member of the Political Committee of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region.

LO Jui-ch'ing—Director of the Political Department, Field Headquarters of the 18th Group Army. Vice Chairman of the Anti-Japanese University in Yenian in 1938. Identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

LO Jung-heng—Political Commissar and Acting Commander of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army in the Shantung Military Region. He has held the position of Political Commissar of the 115th Division under LIN Piao at least since 1939.

LO Mai—Secretary General of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government as of March 1944. In February 1934 he was chosen member of the Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at the meeting in Jui-chin, Kiangsi. In 1943 he was reported as member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP.

LO Ping-hui—Commanding General of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army in the South Huai Military Region. Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940. Appointed Vice Commander of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army February 1941.

LOMINADZE—DECEASED. Replaced BORODIN as chief Comintern adviser to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Chief instigator of the Communist coup in Canton, December 1927. It failed and he returned to Russia where he became a youth leader. Referred to among friends as the "darling of Stalin." After 1933 he began to disagree with Stalin's policy and fell into disfavor. Committed suicide, 1935.

*LOO Sun—Reported in 1942 as head of a Chinese Communist organization in Hong Kong with the underground address of 181 Sai Yeung Choy Street, 3rd Floor, Samshui-po. He was chief assistant to LIAO Ch'eng-chih former New 4th Army Representative in Hong Kong.

LOU Ning-hsien—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.

LÜ Cheng-ts'ao—General in the United Garrison Army commanding in the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. He serves under HO Lung, C-in-C of the United Garrison Army of the 18th Group Army. He is said to have been a

leader of a Red cell in WAN Fu-lin's 53rd Army and a former guerrilla fighter in Jehol. He was the commander of the Central Hopeh Military Region from 1938 probably until it was reported abolished in September 1943 and incorporated in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region under the direct command of NIEH Jung-chen. As of 1938 he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government. Early in 1943 he was reported in command of Communist forces in western Hopeh.

LU Chih-chun—Director of the Bethune International Peace Hospital in Yen-an.

LU Ting-i—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.

LUNG Ling—Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander in the Chinese Communist forces.

MA Hai-te—American doctor on the Staff of the Bethune International Peace Hospital and medical advisor to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Base Medical Service. He is responsible for student health and epidemic prevention. He is a Catholic from North Carolina. Received his medical education in Switzerland. He has been with the Chinese Communist Medical Service since 1936, but apparently is not a Communist himself. He is a man in his thirties or early forties, not tall, muscular, and bent slightly forward. He has an energetic, handsome tanned face, deep set kindly blue eyes under fierce black shaggy brows. He speaks English like an American, French like a Frenchman, Chinese like a native, and some Near Eastern languages. He said he was a Syrian American.

Ma Hsi-wu—Special Administrative Commissioner in East Shensi, concurrently Chief of Branch Court. Originator of the "MA Hsi-wu court method." The procedure is to go among the populace in search of evidence and then combine trial and settlement in court.

Ma Ming-fang—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

*Ma Pun-chi—Identified in 1943 as Commander of a Mohammedan column of the 18th Group Army.

MAHLIN (MARTIN, MARLIN)—Comintern representative, LENIN's secretary, sent to China in 1921. He met Chinese Communists in Shanghai and organized the CCP together with CH'EN Ti-hsiu and others. He also visited Marshal WU P'ei-fu and SUN Yat-sen and recommended, on his return to Moscow, that the Comintern enter relations with both.

MAO Tse-tung (MAO Tze-tung, MAO Tzu-tung). Chairman of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council; Principal of the Chinese Communist Party School in Yen-an, Director of the Statistics Research Bureau. MAO is an able political, military, and intellectual leader. He has the confidence of the Chinese Communists. He is well read on current affairs at home and abroad. An expert dialectician, he is skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist International and is keenly critical within limits of his Marxian orthodoxy. He is a prolific contributor to the Yen-an press, and is the Author of "New Democracy" ("Principles of New Democracy" published in 1940), an outline of the basic aims and policies of the CCP. He has impressed interviewers with his sincerity. Born in Hunan Province in 1893, he is a son of poor peasants. His father, however, became fairly prosperous, and was able to pay his son's tuition at various schools. MAO read and studied considerably on his own, becoming acquainted with Western literature as well as Chinese. He enlisted in the Revolutionary Army of 1911, but resigned when SUN Yat-sen came to terms with YUAN Shih-k'ai. He became a student leader. He graduated from the Hunan Provincial First Normal School, and obtained a job as assistant librarian at the Peking National University, where he also attended classes.

Always a rebel and a liberal, his political ideas did not become consolidated until 1920 when he read Marx and books on the Russian Revolution. He began organizing workers politically for the first time in the winter of 1920. In May 1921 he went to Shanghai to attend the foundation meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. In October he became a member of the first provincial branch of the Party in Hunan and Secretary of this group in May 1922. By this time he had organized more than twenty trade unions. In 1923 he went to Shanghai to work in the Central Committee of the Party. He attended the third CCP Congress in Canton when it was decided to cooperate with the Kuomintang. He was then elected Member of the Central

Committee of the CCP and concurrently Member of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Shanghai.

In 1925 he began organizing the peasants, thereby arousing the wrath of the landlords who demanded his arrest. He fled to Canton. For a while he was editor of the Kuomintang paper "Political Weekly" and headed the Kuomintang propaganda department. In 1926 he went to Hankow and directed the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. From there he was sent to Hunan as inspector of the peasant movement. The following year he was elected the first President of the All-China Peasants' Union. After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 he took part in the decision to depose CH'EN Tu-hsiu as Secretary of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, 7 August 1927. He was then sent by the Communist Party to Changsha, Hunan, where he organized the First Division of the First Peasants' and Workers' Army and the Autumn Crop Uprising. The Uprising was not approved by the Central Committee so MAO was dismissed from the Political Bureau and the Party Front Committee. However, he held his army together, based at Ching-kan Shan (Mt.).

In May 1928 he combined forces with CHU Te and created the 4th Red Army with CHU as Commander and himself as Political Commissar. They began a campaign through southern Kiangsi in January 1929. MAO and CHU assumed the same positions in the First Red Army Corps when it was organized in 1929 to include the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Red Armies. In 1930 when CHU became C-in-C of the First Front Army combining the First and Third Army Corps, MAO was again Political Commissar. He also became Chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee.

In 1930 MAO's wife, YANG T'ai-hui, and his younger sister were executed by the Kuomintang authorities. He later married HO Tzu-chien, school teacher and Marxist. His present wife is LAN P'ing, former Shanghai movie actress.

In 1931 he was elected Chairman of the Central Soviet Government in Kiangsi. He was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress, July-August 1935. In 1938 after the Kuomintang-Communist United Front against the Japanese had been formed he was readmitted into the Kuomintang. In 1940 he was reported member of the Supreme National Defense Council and of the 1st People's Political Council in Chungking.

MAO was described in the summer of 1944 as slightly stouter, a chain-smoker inhaling every time, a man with a hearty laugh when amused. Other observers describe him as rather effeminate, somewhat slow-witted, with a tired kindly smile, and fine sense of humor. He seldom appears in public in Yen-an and is said to be always well-guarded for fear of assault by Kuomintang secret service agents from Sian.

MAO Tze-tung—MAO Tse-tung

MAO Tzu-tung—MAO Tse-tung

MARLIN—see MAHLIN

"MENG Fu-tang—Identified in October 1944 as Chairman of the South Hopeh Administrative Office of the CCP. He is noted educator in Hopeh Province.

MIYAMOTO, Tetsuji—Formerly a labor foreman who was taken prisoner. Chief of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch of Japanese Anti-War League in China. After the formation of the Anti-War League's North China Association he became secretary of its Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch.

Note: Japanese Anti-War League was organized by Wataru KAJI, residing in Chungking, who is not a Communist; but location of its branch referred to above makes it possible that Japanese People's Emancipation League, organized by Susuri OKANO in Yen-an, is meant.

MUELLER, Hans—Anti-Nazi German doctor with the Chinese Communist Medical Service in Yen-an in 1944.

NAN Han-chen—Finance Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

NEUMANN, Heinz—DECEASED. German. Comintern representative with LOMINADZE to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. One of the chief instigators of the Communist coup in Canton, December 1927. Following its failure, he returned to Europe where he became a leader of the German Communist Party. After the rise of Hitler, NEUMANN opposed the policy of the Comintern to infiltrate into the NAZI Party. He fled to Switzerland, 1935, and thence to Russia. He was murdered during the purge in 1936.

NIEH Jung-chen (NIEH Yung-chen)—Commanding General and concurrently a Political Commissar of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region under the 18th Group Army; Member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government. Psychologically he is westernized to a certain degree, and is described as more like a college president than a military man. Energetic looking. Approximately 37 years old. Speaks good French. He worked in the Schneider-Crenson Arms factory, Renault Motor Works and the Thomson Electric Company in France. He was educated in the Belgian Labour College and received political training in Moscow. About November 1937, as Political Commissar of the Communist First Army Corps he was sent to Wu-t'ai in Shansi to develop partisan organizations and prevent Japanese occupation of the area. In January 1938 he was Vice-Commander and Political Commissar of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army in command of Fou-p'ing area in Hopeh. He was the founder and builder of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar War Base and has been a member of the Executive Committee of its Border Government, Military Commander, and Political Commissar in this region since 1938. In 1940 he commanded the 18th Group Army forces in the northeast of Shansi Province, and was also member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In September 1943 the Central Hopeh Military region was reported abolished and incorporated under NIEH's direct command in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region.

NIEH Yung-chen—see **NIEH Jung-chen**.

NOULENS—Comintern agent arrested in Shanghai 1932, and convicted in Nan-king. He was reported to be at that time the chief Far East agent of the Comintern.

OKAMOTO—Instituted North Kiangsu branch of Japanese People's Emancipation League after dissolution of Auhwei, South Kiangsu, and North Kiangsu branches of Japanese Anti-War Association [League?] for amalgamation into new organization.

OKANO, Susumu.—The best known member of the Japanese Communist Party is **OKANO Susumu** who makes his headquarters at Yen-an, China, in association with the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. His real name is said to be **SAKAMO Tetsu**.

OKANO was born in 1892 and was left an orphan when quite young. An older brother put him through a commercial school and then Keia University. His interest in the labor movement dates from 1913 when he was active in the Yu Ai Kai, one of the earliest of Japanese trade unions. His interest in the Russian revolution took him to Russia. Later he went to England where, reportedly, he aided in founding the British Communist Party. His inflammatory speeches then caused Scotland Yard to suggest his departure from the country. After spending some time in France, Germany and Switzerland he returned to Japan and assisted in the inauguration of the Japanese Communist Party under **KATAYAMA Sen** in 1922. Shortly afterward he was arrested and spent most of his time in jail until 1931. In 1932 he went to Soviet Russia as a delegate of the Japanese Communist Party to the Third Internationale. After **KATAYAMA'S** death in 1933 **OKANO** became spokesman for the party in Moscow and in 1935 was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International. One source stated in 1944 that **OKANO** had not been in Japan for 12 years but had occasional underground contact with Communist groups there. Another source stated in 1944 that he smuggled himself quietly into North China in 1937 and worked underground against the Japanese Army until he transferred his activities to Yen-an sometime during 1943.

Since his arrival in Yen-an **OKANO** has organized the Japanese People's Emancipation League which has absorbed the less effectual Japanese Anti-War League in numerous places. He also has provided the dynamic leadership which the zealous but inexperienced membership required. He insists that the League is not Communist. In addition, he has established the Japanese Communist League and the Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School which trains Japanese ex-prisoners of war as well as a few Chinese for propaganda work at the front.

Members of the United States Army Observer Section who interviewed **OKANO** at Yen-an last September reported his program for Japan's emancipation as one of moderation and gradual development toward socialism through "democratic" processes. A Yen-an broadcast in December 1944 stated that **OKANO** attended the second session of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region People's Congress, a privilege which the 8th Route

Army allows to one or two Japanese honorary members of this and other border region assemblies. The National Herald, Chungking, reported his return last June from a visit to Soviet Russia. OKANO is reported to be soft-spoken, physically healthy and energetic, and intellectually alert and keen.

ORLOV, Andrew—Very competent Soviet Russian surgeon in the Bethune International Peace Hospital in Yen-an. Arriving in Yen-an via Lanchow with permission of the Kuomintang he has been in the Chinese Communist area for almost three years.

PAI Ch'en-pang—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

P'AN Tzu-nien—Publisher of the *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*, Chinese Communist newspaper in Chungking since at least 1943. Identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

P'ENG Te-huai—Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army since August 1937.

Dynamic, loathes procrastination, gruff, forthright in manner and speech, a great wit. Of excellent health and endurance. Walked most of the 6,000 miles of the "Long March" frequently giving his horse to a tired or wounded comrade. Non-smoker and teetotaler, late to retire and early to rise. Author of many treatises on military strategy and tactics. Directs field operations, while Commander CHU Te serves more in a general staff capacity. He was born of prosperous peasants in Hunan Province in 1900. Hated by his stepmother. Attended an old fashioned Chinese school where he was often beaten. At the age of nine he was denounced by his family as unfilial and sent out into the world. He worked as a cowherd, coal-miner, shoe-maker's apprentice, and dyke-builder until 16 when he returned home and was taken in by a rich uncle. During a rice famine in Hunan, he stirred up 200 peasants to attack the house of a merchant known to have large stores of rice. He joined the Army at 18, eventually received a commission and was sent to the Hunan Military School, graduating a battalion commander. There he discovered Marx and other Communist literature. Among his troops he began Marxist course in political training and organized soldiers' committees. In 1926 he married a girl who belonged to the Socialist Youth but they became separated during the Revolution and he has not seen her since 1928.

P'ENG joined the CCP in 1927, revolted from the Kuomintang Army in July 1928 and joined the "Red Army" with his troops. The 5th Red Army was organized under his command. In April 1930 he was put in command of the 3rd Army Corps which joined forces with CHU Te's 1st Army Corps to become the First Front Army under CHU. Arriving in the Northwest in 1935 after the "Long March" he was put in direct command of the 1st Front Red Army and made C-in-C of all Northwest Red Armies until the arrival of CHU Te in late 1936.

When the United China Front was formed, CHIANG Kai-shek appointed P'ENG Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army in Shansi. In 1940 he was member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking. In 1942 he was reported Chief of the General Staff of the Communist Military Council, also Vice Chairman of the same Council. In 1943 he was reported in the field commanding forces in southeast Shansi, also member of the Central Committee.

Po-ku—see CH'IN Pang-hsien.

ROSENTHAL, Dr.—Austrian or German Jewish surgeon who has been working for the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army in Shantung Province since 1943. Before that he was with the New 4th Army for two years having escaped to the region from Shanghai.

ROY, M. N.—Indian. Communist agent attached to the Kuomintang Government in Hankow in 1927. His alleged indiscretion in revealing to WANG Ching-wei the Comintern's instructions to the Chinese Communists is reported to have been a factor causing the Kuomintang-Communist break. BORODIN was said to have asked for Roy's withdrawal.

SHANG Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

SHU Fan-t'ing—Identified in 1943 as head of the Chinese Communist administration in Northwest Shansi. Said to be a former member of the T'ung-meng Hui.

SU Yü—Commanding General and Political Commissar of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region. In February 1941 he was appointed Commander of the 1st Division and has been Political Commissar of this division since 1943.

- *SSU Ko-ching—Appointed Acting Director of the United Front Department of the Chinese Communist Party to replace CH'EN Shao-yü, March 1944.
- SUN Chih-yüan—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.
- SUNG Jen-ch'ung—Commanding General of the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region. In 1940 he was reported Commander of the Communist Southern Hopeh Military Area.
- SUNG Shao-wen—Chairman of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government when last reported in 1943. He is not a member of the CCP.
- T'AN Chen-lin—Commander of the 6th Division of the New 4th Army when last reported in 1943. In 1941 he was also temporary Political Commissar of his division.
- T'AN Cheng—Vice Director of Political Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, and Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Author of "Report on Political Work in the Army".
- T'ANG T'ien—Identified in 1942 as a commander in the 18th Group Army.
- *TENG Chih-hui—Reported in 1944 as Political Commissar of the 4th Division of the New 4th Army.
- TENG Fa—Member of the Central Committee and member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party when last reported in 1943. He is an outdoors man of action, full of enthusiasm and mischief. Native of Canton, of a working-class family. He was once a foreign-style cook on a Canton-Hong Kong steamer. A leader in the great Hong Kong shipping strike in 1924. He became a Communist, entered Whampoa Military Academy, and participated in the Nationalist Revolution. He joined the Chinese Communist Army in Kiangsi after 1927. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. He was chief of the Chinese Communist Secret Police in 1937 when his head was worth \$50,000 to the Kuomintang.
- T'ENG Tai-yüan—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
- TENG Ying-ch'ao (Mrs. CHOU En-lai)—Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. She is said to have met CHOU En-lai about 1919 in a Tientsin jail where they and other radical students had been imprisoned for participation in student demonstrations. She was then attending a normal school in Tientsin, and was member of the radical society "Awaken" which CHOU also joined upon release from prison. She was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940 and at the same time a member of the 1st People's Political Council, Chungking 1940. In 1943 she was a member of the 3rd People's Political Council in Chungking.
- TING Ling (CHIANG Ping-chih)—Well-known woman writer engaged in organizing cultural activities in the Northwest. She was born in Hunan Province in 1905. She studied at the Ping Ming Girls' School founded by CH'EN Tu-hsiu. She entered Shanghai University's Department of Literature in 1924. Her first novel "*Hsiao Shuo*", published in 1927, immediately attracted attention in the literary world. Since then she has written a great many novels and short stories. In 1931 she edited a magazine "*Pei Tou*" ("The Great Dipper") organ of the Left Writers' Union in China. At first she tended to be an anarchist, then after 1927 swung more to the left, especially after the death of her husband, the well-known novelist HU Yeh-p'ing in February 1931. She was arrested as a Leftist writer in May 1933, and imprisoned for two years, then released under surveillance in Nanking. In November 1936, she left Nanking for Sian, where she arranged to join the Chinese Communists in Shensi.
- TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)—"Chief of Women" and member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943. She has held the former post since at least 1940.
- TS'AI Shu-fan—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943.
- TS'AO I-ou—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
- TS'AO Lan-ju—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
- TSENG Hsi-sheng—Political Commissar, Central Anhwei Base of the New 4th Army. In 1941 he was a member of the Political Committee of the 7th Division of the New 4th Army.

- TSENG Shan**—Member of the political Bureau of the CCP and Chief of Minorities Department of the Secretariat of the CCP when last reported in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen People's Commissar for Internal Affairs by the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee and Chief of Minorities of the Chinese Communist Party.
- TSENG Sheng**—Commander of Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. About 34 years old. He was active in the 1935 Student Anti-Japanese Movement. Attended Canton Chung-shan University. Commander of the former 3rd Detachment, which became a part of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps in 1940. He was sent by the New 4th Army in 1939-40 to the Canton-Hong Kong area to organize guerrilla resistance. His present Vice Commander, WANG Tso-yao, joined him with the former 5th Detachment late in 1940. In spite of Kuomintang extermination campaigns against them, TSENG's corps helped many Kuomintang officials escape to Free China after the fall of Hong Kong.
- TSO Ch'i**—Member of the Political Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Former Political Commissar of a regiment of the 18th Group Army. He lost his right arm in anti-Japanese action.
- TSUI Chiu-pai**—see CH'U Ch'iu-po.
- TUAN Chi-nien**—Identified in 1943 by a Kuomintang source as a Chinese Communist and member of the CH'EN Shao-yü clique.
- TUNG Pi-wu**—Chinese Communist Resident Representative in Chungking. Member of the Chinese Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. He was one of the founding members of the Hupeh Branch of the CCP in 1921. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen Chairman of the Provisional Supreme Court by the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. He was Chairman of the CCP School at Pao-an, Shensi, in 1937. In 1940 he was reported as a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; member of the 2nd People's Political Council in Chungking; also member of the Council's Resident Committee. Member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party 1943. Standing member, Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government, Chungking, October 1943. Member, 3rd People's Political Council, Chungking, and member of the Council's Resident Committee 1944. In October 1944 there was much talk of TUNG's accompanying the People's Political Council's five-man investigation party to Yen-an, but so far as is known, the trip never did take place. He was one of the Chinese delegates to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.
- * **WA Bok-san**—Reported in 1944 to be a Chinese Communist leader on Hainan Island.
- WANG Chen**, Maj. Gen. Commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the 18th Group Army, Presiding Member of the Brigade Cooperative Management Committee, Commanding officer of the Yen-an Garrison, Commanding officer of the Yen-an Branch Military Area. He is a hot-tempered warrior from Hunan Province. In the beginning of 1938 he entered northern Shensi from northern Shansi, but a part of his brigade was called back from the front to Nan-ni-wan to do reclamation work in 1939. From 1940 to 1942 the whole brigade was called back by batches to engage in farming. WANG's brigade spends 70% of its time in military training and 30% in political and cultural training. He has said that his troops are educated with "Marxian materialistic dialectics" and "historical materialism." His men seem healthy and well-fed and have received the first prize for production in the army. WANG was chosen to escort the Chungking Press Party from Sian to Yen-an in the summer of 1944.
- WANG Chia-hsiang**—Chairman of the Political Department of the 18th Group Army. In 1940 he was Director of the Political Department of the 18th Group Army, also member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1942 he was member of the Central Committee of the Party and Executive Staff Officer on the Central Revolutionary Military Council.
- WANG Chia-se**—Member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CCP when last reported in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: member, Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vice Chairman, Chinese Soviet

- Military Affairs Commission. In 1943 he was Chief of Publicity of the Chinese Communist Party.
- WANG Chien-an—Identified in 1943 as Commander of the Chinese Communist Central Shantung Area.
- WANG Chu—Reported as Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1938. No information has been received about him since.
- WANG Chu-ch'ing (WANG Tso-yao?)—Guerrilla leader in Tung-kuan area in Kwangtung. Possibly same as WANG Tso-yao as he seems to be doing the same thing in the same area. Reported in 1943 by Kuomintang sources as having had secret dealings with Communist leader TSENG Sheng.
- WANG Ming—see CH'EN Shao-yü.
- WANG Po—Reported made Political Commissar of the New 4th Army at time of reorganization. No information since.
- *WANG Shan—Identified in October 1944 as a member of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area Administrative Committee. Allegedly a Kuomintang member who escaped to the Chinese Communist areas from Japanese occupied Shansi.
- WANG Shih-ying—In 1944 he was reported as director of the 18th Group Army Office in Yen-an.
- WANG Tsai-hsing—In 1944 he was reported as section chief of the 18th Group Army Office in Yen-an.
- WANG Tso-yao—Guerrilla leader who joined forces with TSENG Sheng late in 1940. Vice Commander under TSENG. Commands the former 5th Detachment which since 1940 has been part of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. He is about 30 years old, former student at Central Officers' School, Canton Branch. He participated in the 1935 Student Anti-Japanese Movement. Ex-teacher. After the fall of Canton, in 1938 he organized the 4th Guerrilla Area in the Pso-an-Tung-kuan district. He was recognized as an official guerrilla leader by Kuomintang General HSIANG Han-p'ing, but in the spring of 1940 and later HSIANG sent troops to suppress WANG.
- WU Han-chieh—Identified in 1940 as Director of the Political Department of the 129th Division, 18th Group Army.
- *WU Hsin-yu—Identified in December 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shansi-Suiyuan Administrative District.
- WU Li-p'ing—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
- WU Liang-p'ing—According to last known information, dated 1940, he was member of the Central Committee and Chief of Information of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he held the following posts: member, Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP; Director of Work in "White Areas" (non-Communist areas); People's Commissar for Economics.
- WU Man-yu—Representative "labor hero" of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. A peasant aged 51. He has been honored as a production leader.
- WU Po-hsiao—Identified in 1944 as a Communist writer.
- WU Yü-chang—Director of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Cultural Association. Identified in 1943 as member of both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was reported in 1942 as Chief of the Inspector-General's Department of the Chinese Communist Military Affairs Commission. Member of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd People's Political Councils at Chungking, 1938-1944.
- At present his chief activities in Yen-an are: publication of "*Ch'ün-chung Pao*" ("People's Newspaper"), a vernacular translation of the "*Chieh-fang Jih-pao*" ("Emancipation Daily"); composition of work songs which are excellent vehicles of propaganda; preparation of old and new, Chinese and foreign plays for local consumption.
- WU Wen-yü—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 3rd Division, New 4th Army.
- YANG Ch'eng-wu—No information later than 1943 when he was reported as a Chinese Communist general with headquarters 50 km. NW Pao-ting, Hopeh. He had been operating as a guerrilla leader in North China at least since 1938.
- YANG Ching-yü—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was also Director of the Northwest Political Branch Bureau in 1943.

*YANG Hsiu-feng—Chairman of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government. He was formerly professor in the National Normal University at Peking and member of the National Salvationist Group organized by Mme SUN Yat-sen and other liberals. He joined the CCP in 1939.

YANG Shang-k'un—Secretary General of the 18th Group Army. In 1943 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. In January 1934 he was appointed member of the Secretarial Bureau and concurrently member of the Political Bureau of the CCP and Minister (Commissar) of Organization of the Soviet Government at Jui-chin, Kiangsi.

YAO K'ai—Chinese Communist writer. Author of "*Chung-kuo Ko-ming*" (The Chinese Revolution), Moscow, 1932.

*YAO Shu-shih—Acting Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1944.

YEH Chi-chuang—In summer 1944 he was Trade Director of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Trading Company, and member of the Chairman's Committee of the Border Region Government.

YEH Chien-ying—General Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army under CHU Te Specialist in guerrilla tactics. He had been characterized as a habitually calm, reasonable man who upon occasion is capable of bursting into violent profanity. He was Director of Studies at the Whampoa Military Academy when CHIANG Kai-shek was Principal. With CHOU En-lai and CH'IN Pang-hsien he played a large part in negotiations for CHIANG's release during the Sian Incident, December 1936. He was Chief of Staff of the 8th Route Army. When the name of the 8th Route Army was changed to the 18th Group Army YEH was appointed Chief of Staff and a member of the army's delegation to the National Government. In September 1939 he was Dean of the Chinese Army a Guerrilla Training School in south Hunan where he is reported to have failed as the Government would not grant him sufficient freedom. In 1940 he was listed as a member of the General Committee of the CCP, but remained at his station in Chungking. He returned to Yen'an in 1941 allegedly because there was "nothing for him to do" in Chungking, and resumed active duty as Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army.

YEH Hsi-i—see YEH T'ing.

YEH T'ing (YEH Hsi-i)—No information is available about him dated later than December 1943, but he apparently remains a prisoner of the National Government. He was captured and imprisoned by the Nationalist forces during the new 4th Army Incident in January 1941. YEH T'ing is an able soldier with a distinguished military career. Well-built, stocky, unpretentious, like a merchant in appearance. He was born in Kwangtung province 1898, studied at Weichow Agricultural School 1911. In 1914 he graduated from the Kwangtung Military School, and attended the Hupeh Military School 1914-16. In 1919 he graduated from the Paoting Military Academy. In 1921 he served as a Company Commander in the Kwangtung Provincial Army. In 1922 he was Commander 2nd Battalion, Guards' Regiment of the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton. Next year he became Chief of Staff, Kwangtung Gendarmerie. In 1925 he was Chief of the Staff Office, 4th Nationalist Army, and participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition as Commander of the 24th Division of the 4th Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei. In 1927 YEH and his division rebelled in Kiangsi while enroute to the rescue of T'ANG Sheng-chih. YEH joined HO Lung in the Nan-ch'ang and Swatow uprisings that same year, and was reported to have been a leading figure in the "Canton Commune" of December 1927.

There are contradictory reports about his activities between December 1927 when the Commune failed and the spring of 1938 when the New 4th Army was organized with him as Commander. One report states he visited Russia and Germany, traveled through Europe, then retired to Macao. According to another report he worked with CHU Te. Still a third report states he did not participate in Kuomintang-Communist hostilities of those years.

In the spring of 1938 the New 4th Army was organized by CHIANG Kai-shek who appointed YEH T'ing as Commander. He was also to act as the Central Government's Political Commissar. The military leadership, however, is said to have been provided mostly by HSIANG Ying, the Vice Commander. Based on the Kiangsu-Anhwei border near Nanking, the New 4th Army became famous for its guerrilla tactics against the Japanese in the


lower Yangtze valley. YEH is reported to have visited Chungking late in 1939 to negotiate for more supplies and funds.

Following the "New 4th Incident" of January 1941, YEH and some 200 officers of the New 4th Army were arrested by the Central Government. They were reported to have been held first at Shang-jao, Kiangsi, then elsewhere until early 1943 when they were transferred to a prison in Chungking. Later CH'EN Ch'eng obtained permission for YEH to reside with him in En-shih, Hupeh on the personal responsibility of CH'EN; but soon after YEH and his family arrived, CH'EN Ch'eng's new command in western Yunnan made it impossible for CH'EN himself to reside at En-shih. Thereupon CH'EN suggested to CHANG Fa-k'uei, a friend of YEH's, that the latter move with his family to Kwangsi. CHANG and LI Chi-shen are reported to have accepted joint responsibility for YEH and the latter moved to Kweilin. On 19 January 1944 YEH was reported rearrested. A request for his release was among the resolutions passed by the 2nd People's Political Council of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, December 1944.

YÜAN Kuo-p'ing—Identified in 1940 as Chief of the Political Department of the New 4th Army.

ZENG Pi-shu—see JEN Pi-shih.

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